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JominiandClausewitzTheirInteraction

JOMINIANDCLAUSEWITZ:
THEIRINTERACTION

by
ChristopherBassford
Aneditedversionofapaper
presentedtothe23rdMeetingofthe
ConsortiumonRevolutionaryEurope
atGeorgiaStateUniversity
26February1993.Copyright
ChristopherBassford.

PartofTheClausewitzHomepage
Introduction
Clausewitz
Jomini
FundamentalDifferencesBetweentheTwoTheorists
TheirInteraction
Conclusions:TheReturnofJomini
Notes
Bibliography

AtleastthreeimportantmilitarytheoristsemergedfromtheexperienceofthewarsoftheFrench
RevolutionandNapoleon:TheAustrianArchdukeCharlestheSwisswriterAntoineHenriJominiand
thePrussianCarlvonClausewitz.ThearchdukehashadverylittleinfluenceintheUnitedStatesorGreat
Britain,sincehisworkwasnevertranslatedintoEnglish.*1Themilitarytheoreticaltraditionsfoundedby
JominiandClausewitz,however,haveverydefinitelyhadanimpactonourmilitarythinking.
Mostfrequently,JominiistreatedasbeingsomehowtheoppositeofClausewitz:militaryeducatorsoften
hurltheepithets"Jominian"and"Clausewitzian"atoneanotherasifthosesinglewordssomehow
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summeduptheiropponents'fallaciousworldviewsanddefectsofpersonalcharacter.Ontheotherhand,
anumberofthoughtfulobservershaveconsideredthedifferencesbetweemJominiandClausewitztobe
ratherinconsequential.AlfredThayerMahanisacaseinpoint.Mahan'sfather,militaryeducatorDennis
HartMahan,isgenerallyconsideredtohavebeenadevoutJominian,andsoishisson(thoughinfact
bothwerecreativethinkersintheirownright,andcallingthem"Jominians"isanunfaircharacterization).
TheyoungerMahaneventuallybecamefamiliarwithClausewitz,*2callinghim"oneofthefirstof
authorities."However,hefoundClausewitztobeinessentialagreementwithJominiinallsignificant
respects,*3sohecontinuedtoputforthhisargumentsinlargelyJominianterminology.*4Thegreat
BritishClausewitzianSpenserWilkinsonthoughtthatMahanandClausewitzwereingeneralaccord.*5
InGermany,AlbrechtvonBoguslawskialsoarguedthatJominiandClausewitzweresayingthesame
thing.Morerecently,USNavalWarCollegeProfessorMichaelHandelhassoughttoreconcilethetwo
theorists.*6
ThusJominiandClausewitzoftenappeareitherasoppositesorastwins.Asusualwhenwearegivena
choicebetweentwosuchclearalternatives,neitherreallyprovestobeveryusefulandthetruthlies
somewhereelse.Inreality,JominiandClausewitzsawmuchthesamethingsinwar,butsawthem
throughverydifferenteyes.Thesimilaritiesintheirmilitaryideas,whichareindeedverygreat,stem
fromthreesources:
1.AcommonhistoricalinterestinthecampaignsofFredericktheGreat
2.LongpersonalexperiencesintheNapoleonicWars,albeitusuallyondifferentsides
3.Theyreadeachother'sbooks.
Despitehavingthesethingsincommon,theirapproachestomilitarytheorywerefundamentallydifferent,
andthesourceofthesedifferencescanbefoundintheirverydifferentpersonalities.
Thisisnottheplacetodelveterriblydeeplyintothearcanetheoreticaldetailsofthesetwomen'swork.
Instead,Iwanttofocusonthesourcesofourmoderndayconfusion:WhyisitthatJominiand
Clausewitzlooksoradicallydifferenttosomeobservers,yetsoverysimilartoothers?Iwillattributethis
confusiontoourfrequentlackofsensitivitytothedifferencesinthetwomen'sexperiencesand
personalities,andtothewayinwhichtheyinteractedovertime.
CLAUSEWITZ
CarlvonClausewitz(17801831)wasaprofessionalsoldierfromtheageof12tohisdeathfromCholera
adiseaseheincurredonactivedutyattheageof51.Hefirstsawcombatin1794whenhewas13.He
experiencedfirsthandPrussia'sdisastrousmilitaryhumiliationbyNapoleonin1806,wascaptured,and
returnedtoPrussiaapassionatemilitaryreformer.Asajuniorstaffofficer,heworkedcloselywiththe
greatPrussianmilitaryreformersGerhardvonScharnhorst(whowashismentor)andAugustvon
Gneisenau(whobecamehisfriendandprotector).In1810,hewasappointedmilitarytutortothecrown
prince,forwhomhewrote(in1812)amilitarytreatisewecallThePrinciplesofWar.*7Thesameyear,
onamatterofhighprinciple,hegaveuphiscommissionandjoinedtheRussianarmytofightNapoleon.
HefoughtthroughouttheRussiancampaignandonthroughtheWarsofLiberationof1813and1814.He
wasPrussianIIICorpschiefofstaffduringthecampaignof1815.ItwasClausewitz'scorpswhich
outnumberedtwotooneheldGrouchy'sforcesatWavre,contributingdecisivelytoNapoleon'sdefeatat
Waterloo.
ClausewitzhadareputationinthePrussianarmyasbothanidealistandasuperbstaffofficer,buthewas
consideredtemperamentallyunsuitableforcommand.NohintofpersonalscandalattachestoClausewitz,
andhisintellectualintegritywasthedrivingforcebehindtheruthlessexaminationofmilitarytheoretical
ideasthatwefindinhisgreatestbook,OnWar.However,whileheroseveryhighintheKing'sservice,
hewaswidelyconsideredtooopentoliberalideastobealtogetherpoliticallyreliable.Hisideasonwar
areheavilyinfluencedbythemasspopularwarfareoftheFrenchRevolutionaryperiod,andthoseideas
wereuncomfortabletoconservativearistocrats.
Clausewitz'srelationshiptoNapoleonisoftenmisunderstood.Althoughheisoftencalledthe"highpriest
ofNapoleon"(LiddellHart'sandJ.F.C.Fuller'stermforhim),itisimportanttonotethat,infact,
ClausewitzrepresentsnottheideasofNapoleonbutratherthoseofhismostcapableopponent,the
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PrussianmilitaryreformerGerhardvonScharnhorst.
JOMINI
ThemanwhodidclaimtointerpretNapoleontothemilitaryworldwasAntoineHenriJomini,later
BarondeJomini,aFrenchspeakingSwiss(17791869).*8Originallyheadedforacareerinbanking,
youngJominigotcarriedawaybytheexcitementoftheFrenchRevolutionandjoinedtheFrencharmyin
1798.HereturnedtobusinessinSwitzerlandafterthePeaceofAmiens(1802),wherehebeganwriting
onmilitarysubjects.HisTraitdegrandetactiquewasfirstpublishedin1803.Hecontinuallyrevised,
enlarged,andreissueditintothe1850s.
Rejoiningthearmyin1804,JominiwasacceptedasavolunteerstaffmemberbyMarshalNey(whohad
loanedhimthemoneytopublishhisTraitdegrandetactique).*9HeservedintheAusterlitzand
Prussiancampaigns,theninSpain.HefinallyreceivedanactualstaffcommissionintheFrencharmyat
thebehestofNapoleonawhileafterAusterlitz.Heservedforawhileaschiefofstafftohislongtime
mentor,MarshalNey.Jomini'sarrogance,irascibility,andnakedambitionoftenledtofrictionwithhis
fellowsandeventuallytoafallingoutwithNey.Eventually,however,Jominiwaspromotedtobrigadier
generalandgivenasuccessionoffairlyresponsiblestaffpositions,mostlyawayfromactualtroops.
FollowinghisrecoveryfromtherigorsoftheRussiancampaign,hewasreassignedtoNeyin1813.
However,hewasshortlythereafterarrestedforsloppystaffwork.Hisambitionsthwartedbyrealor
imaginedplotsagainsthimself,JominijoinedtheRussianarmyinlate1813.Hespentmuchofthe
remainderofhislongcareerintheRussianservice.
Duringhisactualmilitarycareer,"Jomini...[hadbeen]averyminorfigure,seldommentionedinorders
ordispatches,practicallyignoredinthememoirsoftheofficerswhohadservedwithhim."*10
Nonetheless,hebecamebyfarthebestknownmilitarycommentatorofhisday,andmaintainedthat
positionthroughzealousselfpromotion.Hismostfamouswork,SummaryoftheArtofWar,waswritten,
likeClausewitz'sPrinciplesofWar,foraroyalprincetowhomhewasmilitarytutor.Althoughlongsince
retired,headvisedCzarNicholasduringtheCrimeanWarandNapoleonIIIduringhisItaliancampaigns.
EvenduringJomini'slifetime,however,thereweremanyprominentmilitarymenwhoviewedJomini
withgreatskepticism.TheDukeofWellingtonconsideredhimapompouscharlatan.*11
Inhismaturity,Jominigrewwaryoftherevolutionarypassionsthathadoriginallyinspiredhimtotakeup
theswordhimself.Perhapshisdependenceontheczar,oneofthemostconservativerulersinEurope,had
someinfluenceonhisattitude.ItisoneoftheironiesofhistorythatClausewitz,anofficerofthe
conservativekingofPrussia,shouldbetheonetobasehistheoriesonthemostradicallegacyofthe
revolutionaryperiod,whileNapoleon'sownstaffofficerandinterpreter,Jomini,shouldaimhistheories
attheprofessionalofficercorpsofessentiallyeighteenthcentury
stylearmies.
Jomini'smilitarywritingsareeasytounfairlycaricature:theywerecharacterizedbyahighlydidacticand
prescriptiveapproach,conveyedinanextensivegeometricvocabularyofstrategiclines,bases,andkey
points.*12Hisfundamentalprescriptionwassimple:placesuperiorpoweratthedecisivepoint.Inthe
theoreticalworkforwhichhegainedearlyfame,chapterXXXVoftheTraitdegrandetactique,he
constantlystressedtheadvantagesofinteriorlines.
Jominiwasnofool,however.Hisintelligence,facilepen,andactualexperienceofwarmadehiswritings
agreatdealmorecredibleandusefulthansobriefadescriptioncanimply.OnceheleftNapoleon's
service,hemaintainedhimselfandhisreputationprimarilythroughprose.Hiswritingstyleunlike
Clausewitz'sreflectedhisconstantsearchforanaudience.Hedealtatlengthwithanumberofpractical
subjects(logistics,seapower)thatClausewitzhadlargelyignored.Elementsofhisdiscussion(his
remarksonGreatBritainandseapower,forinstance,andhissycophantictreatmentofAustria'sArchduke
Charles)areclearlyaimedatprotectinghispoliticalpositionorexpandinghisreadership.And,onemight
add,atminimizingClausewitz's,forheclearlyperceivedthePrussianwriterashischiefcompetitor.For
Jomini,Clausewitz'sdeaththirtyeightyearspriortohisowncameasapieceofraregoodfortune.
FUNDAMENTALDIFFERENCESBETWEENTHETWOTHEORISTS
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AsidefromtheirdifferingrelationshipstoNapoleon,thefundamentaldifferencesbetweenClausewitz
andJominiarerootedintheirdifferingconceptsofthehistoricalprocessandofthenatureandroleof
militarytheory.
Clausewitzsawhistoryinrelativeterms,rejectingabsolutecategories,standards,andvalues.Thepast
hadtobeacceptedonitsownterms.Thehistorianmustattempttoenterintothemindsetsandattitudesof
anygivenperiod,the"spiritoftheage."Historywasadynamicprocessofchange,drivenbyforces
beyondthecontrolandoftenbeyondthecomprehensionofanyindividualorgroup.Thishistoricismis
particularlyobviousintwokeythemesofOnWarthataremissinginthe1812PrinciplesofWar.These
arethefamousnotionthat"Warisacontinuationofpoliticswithanadmixtureofothermeans"(i.e.,
organizedviolence)andtherecognitionthatwarcanvaryinitsformsdependingonthechangingnature
ofpolicyandofthesocietywithinwhichitiswaged.
Incontrast,Jomini'sviewofhistoryandofwarwasstaticandsimplistic.Hesawwarasa"greatdrama,"
astageforheroesandmilitarygeniuseswhosetalentswerebeyondthecomprehensionofmeremortals.
Hesawtherevolutionarywarfareinwhichhehimselfhadparticipatedasmerelythetechnicalnear
perfectionofafundamentallyunchangingphenomenon,tobemodifiedonlybysuperficialmatterslike
thelistofdramatispersonae,technology,andtransientpoliticalmotivations.Hedrewhistheoreticaland
practicalprescriptionsfromhisexperiencesintheNapoleonicwars.Thepurposeofhistheorywasto
teachpracticallessonsto"officersofasuperiorgrade."
Accordingly,Jomini'saimwasutilitarianandhistonedidactic.Hiswritingthusappealedmorereadilyto
militaryeducators.Hislaterwork,SummaryoftheArtofWar(Precisdel'ArtdelaGuerre,1838),
became,invarioustranslations,popularizations,andcommentaries,thepremiermilitaryeducationaltext
ofthemidnineteenthcentury.*13
MuchofthecontrastbetweenJominiandClausewitz*14canbetracedtosuchphilosophicalfactorsand
tothefrequentabridgementofOnWar,whichmakesitappearmuchmoreabstractthanJomini'swork
wheninfacttheyoftendiscussedthesamepracticalsubjectmatter.Despitehisinsistencethattheory
mustbedescriptiveratherthanprescriptiveinnature,Clausewitzfrequentlyprovidesinstructive
discussionsofcommonmilitaryproblemslikecontestedrivercrossings,thedefenseofmountainous
areas,etc.
THEIRINTERACTION
Asthediscussionsofarhasindicated,thereweremanyparallelsandmanypointsofdivergenceinthe
personalities,militaryexperiences,andunderlyingphilosophiesofthesetwomen.Therewerealso,
however,someratherinterestingpointsofintersection.JominiandClausewitzmayhavecaughta
glimpseofoneanotherfromoppositesidesduringthetragiccrossingoftheBeresinariverduringthe
FrenchretreatfromMoscow,butthereisnoevidencethattheyevermet.Nonetheless,theyinteracted
intellectually,influencingoneanother'sthinkingoveralongperiodoftime.
WhentheyoungClausewitzwrotehisPrinciplesofWar(1812)forhisstudentthePrussiancrownprince,
heseemstohavebeenrathertakenwithJominiandhisargumentaboutinteriorlines.
"Instrategy,...thesidethatissurroundedbytheenemyisbetteroffthanthesidewhichsurroundsits
opponent,especiallywithequalorevenweakerforces....ColonelJominiwasrightinthis....*15

HealsousedagreatdealofJomini'sgeometricvocabularyofbases,lines,andpoints,andwas,like
Jomini,positiveabouttheusefulnessofmountainsasdefensivelines.Later,inOnWar,hewouldbe
quiteskepticalonallthesematters.TheyoungClausewitzalsoacceptedJomini'sfundamentalstrategic
theme:"Thetheoryofwarfaretriestodiscoverhowwemaygainapreponderanceofphysicalforcesand
materialadvantagesatthedecisivepoint."Eventhisearlyinhisevolution,hethenwentontostress
somethingwethinkofasmoretypicallyClausewitzian:"Asthisisnotalwayspossible,theoryalso
teachesustocalculatemoralfactors:thelikelymistakesoftheenemy,theimpressioncreatedbyadaring
action,...yes,evenourowndesperation."*16
Giventwentyyearstothinkaboutsuchmatters,however,Clausewitzbecameextremelyskepticalof
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Jomini.InOnWar,Clausewitz'ssweepingcritiqueofthestateofmilitarytheoryappearstohavebeen
aimedinlargepartattheSwiss:
Itisonlyanalyticallythattheseattemptsattheorycanbecalledadvancesintherealmoftruth
synthetically,intherulesandregulationstheyoffer,theyareabsolutelyuseless.
Theyaimatfixedvaluesbutinwareverythingisuncertain,andcalculationshavetobemadewith
variablequantities.
Theydirecttheinquiryexclusivelytowardphysicalquantities,whereasallmilitaryactionisintertwined
withpsychologicalforcesandeffects.
Theyconsideronlyunilateralaction,whereaswarconsistsofacontinuousinteractionofopposites....
Anythingthatcouldnotbereachedbythemeagerwisdomofsuchonesidedpointsofviewwasheldtobe
beyondscientificcontrol:itlayintherealmofgenius,whichrisesaboveallrules.
Pitythesoldierwhoissupposedtocrawlamongthesescrapsofrules,notgoodenoughforgenius,which
geniuscanignore,orlaughat.Nowhatgeniusdoesisthebestrule,andtheorycandonobetterthanshow
howandwhythisshouldbethecase.*17

ThesepassagesimmediatelyfollowClausewitz'ssneersatthe"lopsidedcharacter"ofthetheoryof
interiorlines,commentsunquestionablydirectedatJomini.Asaresultofthesecomments,somewriters
haveclaimedthatClausewitzwasanadvocateofconcentricattacks,incontrasttoJomini'sadvocacyof
"interiorlines."Infact,Clausewitzspentmoretimediscussingconcentricoperationsinpartsimply
becausehefeltthatJominihadalreadydonesogoodajobexplainingtheoppositeapproach.Thechoice
ofeitherwoulddepend,asalwaysinClausewitz'sreasoning,onthespecificsituation.*18
ThesecriticalcommentsbyClausewitzareasourceofmuchconfusion.AnyonewhoreadsJomini'smost
famousworkandifyouthinkfewpeopleactuallyreadOnWar,thereareevenfewerwhoreadthe
SummarywillnoticequitereadilythatClausewitz'sremarksseemundulyharshandmisleading.Jomini's
prefatorycommentsseemquitereasonableandentirelycompatiblewithaClausewitzianunderstandingof
war,despiteJomini'spersonalbarbsatClausewitz.Thefrequentlyforgottenreasonforthisconfusionis
thatClausewitz'scommentsareaimedatJomini'sTraitdegrandetactiqueandotherearlyworks.The
SummarywaswrittenafterJominihadreadOnWarandafterClausewitzwassafelydead.Clausewitz's
commentsthereforedonotreflectJomini'smodificationstohisearlierarguments,fortheSummary
containsmanyadjustmentsclearlyattributabletoOnWar'sarguments.TheseincludeJomini'scomments
ontheimportanceofmoraletheimpossibilityoffixedrules(saveperhapsintactics)theneedtoassign
limitstotheroleoftheoryskepticismofmathematicalcalculations(andadenialthatJomini'sownwork
despiteallthegeometricalterminologyanddiagramswasbasedonmath)thedisclaimerofanybelief
thatwaris"apositivescience"andthecleardifferentiationbetweenmeremilitaryknowledgeandactual
battlefieldskill.*19
JominiacknowledgedthetruthofClausewitz'sstrongconnectionbetweenpoliticsandwar.TheSummary
isfullofreferencesto"politique"thesametermasClausewitz'sPolitik.However,thissimilarityis
hiddenbythestandardEnglishtranslation,whichsubstitutestheterm"diplomacy"i.e.,onlythepolitics
thatoccursbetweenstates,notthatwithinthemaswell.OneexampleofadirectborrowingfromOnWar:
"[T]hefirstcareofacommandershouldbetoagreewiththeheadofthestateuponthecharacterofthe
war."ComparethiswithClausewitz:"Thefirst,thesupreme,themostfarreachingactofjudgmentthat
thestatesmanandcommanderhavetomakeistoestablish...thekindofwaronwhichtheyare
embarkingneithermistakingitfor,nortryingtoturnitinto,somethingthatisalientoitsnature."*20
ThesedirectbutunacknowledgedborrowingsfromOnWarconvincemanyreadersthatthetwotheorists
werethinkingonparalleltracks.Simultaneously,thetwowriters'overtmutualinsultstendtomakeother
readersthosewhoarenotfamiliarwithbothworksassumeabasiccontradictionintheirviews.
However,Jomini'srecognitionofthevalidityofmanyofClausewitz'spointsdidnotleadhimto
genuinelyadoptClausewitz'sphilosophy,foratleastthreereasons.First,hecorrectlydistinguishedhis
ownworkfromClausewitz'sbypointingtoitsexplicitlyinstructional(i.e.,doctrinal)purposes.Despite
hisagreementthatwarwasessentiallyapoliticalact,hepointedtothepracticalimplicationsofthis
differentfocus:"Historyatoncepoliticalandmilitaryoffersmoreattractions,butisalsomuchmore
difficulttotreatanddoesnotaccordeasilywiththedidacticspecies...."
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Second,andincommonwithanumberofClausewitz'slaterdetractors,hefoundthePrussian'sapproach
intellectuallyarrogant,overlymetaphysical,andsimplytoodamneddifficulttodigest.Joministressed
simplicityandclarityovera"pretentious"searchfordeepertruths.Further,heobjectedtowhathesawas
Clausewitz'sextremeskepticism("incrdulit")ofallmilitarytheorysavethatinOnWar.For
ClausewitztorejectJomini'sapproachtotheorywhiledefendinghisownseemedsomehowhypocritical.
Third,therewasastrongpersonalelementinJomini'scritiqueofClausewitz.Clearly,hedidonsome
levelgreatlyadmireClausewitz'swork.HeregrettedthatthePrussianhadnotbeenabletoreadhisown
Summary,"persuadedthathewouldhaverenderedtoitsomejustice."Hewasthusdeeplywoundedby
thecriticismsinOnWar.Heexpressedhisbitternessinanumberofsneers(e.g.,"Theworksof
Clausewitzhavebeenincontestablyuseful,althoughitisoftenlessbytheideasoftheauthorthanbythe
contraryideastowhichhegivesbirth")andinaccusationsofplagiarism("Thereisnotoneofmy
reflections[onthecampaignof1799]whichhehasnotrepeated").Theseinsults,becausetheyrefertothe
Prussianbyname,havemoremeaningtoreadersunfamiliarwithOnWarthandotheSummary's
concessionsontheoreticalissues.
CONCLUSIONS:THERETURNOFJOMINI
Thesignificanceofallthis,asidefromwhateverantiquarianinterestitmayarouse,liesincertainrecent
attemptstoreviveJomini.Theseattemptsarepartofareactionagainstthepredominanceof
ClausewitziantheoryinthiscountrysincetheVietnamwar.OvertheyearsClausewitzhasperiodically
beendeclaredobsolete,onlytoreemergemoreinfluentialthanever.Suchargumentsoftenfocusonthe
problemofnuclearwar,butitseemsincreasinglylikelythatitisthenucleartheorists,notClausewitz,
whohavebeenrenderedobsolescent.*21Therehavealsobeencomplaintsbymilitarytraditionalists
abouttheexcessiveinfluenceof"Clausewitznuts"andbytheoreticalpuristsofthe"theprostitutionof
Clausewitzsince1981,particularlyin[theU.S.Army's]FM100
5anditsvariousdegenerate
offspring."*22Bothcomplaintshavesomejustification.TheeclecticismofAngloSaxonmilitarythought
isrootedinthesamespiritastheLatinwarning,"Caveabhomineuniuslibri"("Bewarethemanofone
book"):anarrowrelianceonClausewitzisinconsistentwiththephilosopher'sownteaching.Ontheother
hand,usingOnWarasamerestockpileofjuicyquotesinsupportofthisdoctrinalpositionorthatisalso
anabuse.
Inlargepart,however,criticismofthenewClausewitzianismissimplyreaction.Wouldbecompetitors
havelittlechoicebuttoseektodislodgethePrussianphilosopherfromhispostVietnamprimacy.And,
ofcourse,somepeoplearesimplytiredofhearingaboutthislongdeadgenius.AsDavidChandlerhas
putit,"Clausewitz'sairyKantiangeneralizationshaveheldswaylongenough."*23Itisalsopossiblethat
inaworldseeminglyfreedoffundamentalideological(thoughobviouslynotnationalist)conflict,ina
periodinwhichsomewouldseriouslysupposean"endtoHistory,"Clausewitz'sstrifedrivenworldview
mightcometoseemlessrelevant.*24Chandler'ssuggestionthat"BaronAntoineJomini'srival(andmore
prosaic)approach...isunderseriousreconsideration"maybeasymptomofsuchatrendthoughone
maywellask,"bywhom?"Suchatrendmaybefurtherencouragedbywhatseemstosomeinforgetful
retrospecttohavebeentheunClausewitzian"simplicity"ofthePersianGulfWar.Perhapsthevery
Clausewitziancomplexityofthatwar'saftermathwillsquelchtheefforttorenewJomini'sclaimtoGuru
status.
MyownargumentisthatmostofwhatJominihadtocontributethatwasofrealvaluewhichwasagreat
dealhaslongsincebeenabsorbedintothewaywewritepracticaldoctrine.Clausewitz'scontributions,
ontheotherhand,havenot.*25Indeed,giventhebrillianceandsubtletyofmanyofClausewitz's
concepts,itishardtoseehowtheycouldeverbecomethe"conventionalwisdom."Jominiisimportantin
apurelyhistoricalsense.Incultivatingourownunderstandingofwar,past,present,andfuture,wemust
turntoClausewitz.
SeealsoChristophM.V.Abegglen,"TheInfluenceofClausewitzonJomini'sPrcisdel'Artdela
Guerre,"DissertationforanMAinWarStudiesKing'sCollegeLondon,2003.[Superviser:Dr.Jan
WillemHonig]
NOTES
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1.Lincoln'schiefofstaffGeneralHenryW.HalleckisgenerallyconsideredaJominian.Hewasalsodefinitelyawareof
Clausewitzandpresumablyhadsomenotionastohisideas.Hisgreatestsourceofinspirationmay,however,havebeen
neitherJomininorClausewitz,buttheArchdukeCharles.SeeThomasL.ConnellyandArcherJones,ThePoliticsof
Command:FactionsandIdeasinConfederateStrategy(BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1973,27
2 8,30,104,
176.RussellF.WeigleyadoptsthisviewoftheArchdukeCharles'sinfluenceonHalleckinhisarticle"AmericanStrategy
fromItsBeginningsthroughtheFirstWorldWar,"inPeterParet,ed.,MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellitothe
NuclearAge(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986),416
1 7itdidnotappearinhisearlierchapteronHalleckin
TowardsanAmericanArmy:MilitaryThoughtfromWashingtontoMarshall(NewYork:1962),inwhichhesawHalleckasa
moreoriginalthinker,albeitheavilyinfluencedbyJomini.
2.MahanhadbecomefamiliarwithatleastthebroadoutlinesofClausewitz'sthoughtbythe1890s.Thisistheviewoftwo
navalhistorians,Captain(USN)WilliamDillworthPuleston,Mahan:TheLifeandWorkofCaptainAlfredThayerMahan,
U.S.N.(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1939),295,andSpector,ProfessorsofWar,121.TheeditorofMahan'spapers,
however,isnotsurethatMahaneverreadClausewitz,andifhedid,placesitaround1910.SeeRobertSeager,AlfredThayer
Mahan:TheManandhisLetters(Annapolis:USNavalInstitutePress,1978),552,683,n.11.Iaminclinedtoagreewiththis
assessment,althoughthisdoesnoteliminatethepossibilitythatMahanknewthebroadoutlinesofOnWaratanearlierdate.
Mahan'sinterestisfurtherevidencedbyhismarginalnotesinacopyofMajorStewartMurray's1909condensationofOn
War,TheRealityofWar(London:HughRees,1909).Mahan'sowncopyhasbeenlost,buthismarginalnoteswere
transcribedintoacopydonatedtotheNavalWarCollegebyPuleston,Mahan'sbiographer.
3.AlfredThayerMahan,NavalStrategyComparedandContrastedwiththePrinciplesandPracticeofMilitaryOperations
onLand:LecturesDeliveredattheNavalWarCollege,Newport,R.I.,betweentheYears1887and1911(Boston:Little,
Brown,andCompany,1911reprintedWestport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1975),containstwoexplicitreferencesto
Clausewitz.Oneisafootnotereference(120)toClausewitz'ssarcasticdiscussionof"keys,"(BookVI,Chapter23ofOnWar).
Theother(inwhichMahanreferstoClausewitzas"oneofthefirstofauthorities")isareferencetoCorbettcitingOnWaron
therelativestrengthsofdefenseandoffense(279).Thisispartofanextendeddiscussionofsomeimportance,inthatMahanis
comparingthenavalandlandaspectsofstrategy,andheisclearlydiscussingtheClausewitzianinterpretationwithout
identifyingitassuch.[HeusedvirtuallythesamephrasinginhisdiscussionofsomenavalwargamesinalettertoRaymond
P.Rogers,4March1911,inAlfredThayerMahan,eds.RobertSeegerIIandDorisD.Maguire,LettersandPapersofAlfred
ThayerMahan(Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,1975.)]Mahanalsodiscusses"endsandmeans"atsomelength(esp.p5),ina
mannerstronglyreminiscentofClausewitz.
4.SeePuleston,295Spector,121.
5.WhilehethoughtthattheequallygreatBritishClausewitzianJulianCorbettwaswildlywronginhisinterpretations.
6.MichaelI.Handel,MastersofWar:SunTzu,ClausewitzandJomini(London:FrankCass,1992).
7.CarlvonClausewitz,trans.HansW.Gatzke,PrinciplesofWar(Harrisburg,PA:TheMilitaryServicePublishingCompany,
1942)reprintedinStackpoleBooks,RootsofStrategy:Book2,3MilitaryClassics.Harrisburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,1987.
[Originally"DiewichtigstenGrundsatzedesKriegfuhrenszurErganzungmeinesUnterrichtsbeiSr.KoniglichenHoheitdem
Kronprinzen"(writtenin1812trans.fromthe1936Germanedition).]AnothertranslationappearsasanappendixtoJ.J.
Graham's1873translationofOnWar.
8.OnJomini,seeCraneBrinton,GordonA.Craig,andFelixGilbert,"Jomini,"inEdwardMeadEarle,ed.,MakersofModern
Strategy:MilitaryThoughtfromMachiavellitoHitler(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1944)MichaelHoward,
"JominiandtheClassicalTradition,"inMichaelHoward,ed.,TheTheoryandPracticeofWar(NewYork:Praeger,1966)
JohnShy,"Jomini,"inPeterParet,ed.,MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge(Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress,1986).
9.ThebestEnglishlanguagediscussionofJomini'smilitarycareercanbefoundinJohnR.Elting,"Jomini:Discipleof
Napoleon?"MilitaryAffairs,Spring1964,1726.UnlikemostbiographicaldiscussionsoftheSwiss,whicharebasedonhis
ownhighlycoloredreminiscencestopeoplehewishedtoimpress,Elting'sstudyisbasedonXavierdeCourville,Jomini,ou
deleDevindeNapoleon(Paris,1935)."WrittenbyJomini'sdescendants,fromhispersonalpapers,itisthemostimpartialof
hisbiographies."
10.Elting,"Jomini:DiscipleofNapoleon?"
11.[FrancisEgerton,LordEllesmere],"Marmont,Siborne,andAlison,"QuarterlyReview,v.LXXVI(JuneandSeptember
1845),204
2 47,ajointventureofJohnGurwood,Egerton,andWellingtonhimself.SeeArchivesoftheJohnMurray
Company,manuscriptindextov.LXXVI,QuarterlyReviewJ.H.Stocqueler(pseud.),TheLifeofFieldMarshaltheDukeof
Wellington(London:Ingram,Cooke,andCompany,1853),v.II,330.
12.See,forexample,ArticlesXVIIIXXIIoftheSummary.
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13..ForJomini'stheoreticalwritingsinEnglishtranslation,seeAntoine
HenriJomini,trans.Col.S.B.Holabird,U.S.A.,
TreatiseonGrandMilitaryOperations:orACriticalandMilitaryHistoryoftheWarsofFredericktheGreatasContrasted
withtheModernSystem,2vols.(NewYork:D.vanNostrand,1865)BarondeJomini,trans.MajorO.F.WinshipandLieut.
E.E.McLean,TheArtofWar(NewYork:G.P.Putnam,1854).ImportantderivativeworksincludeDennisHartMahan's
instructionalworksforWestPointHenryWagerHalleck,ElementsofMilitaryArtandScience(NewYork:D.Appletonand
Company,1846)EdwardBruceHamley(1824
9 3),TheOperationsofWarExplainedandIllustrated(London:William
BlackwoodandSons,1866).
14..MostdiscussionsofJominicomparehimtoClausewitz.Forexpliciteffortstodoso,seeDepartmentofMilitaryArtand
Engineering,USMA,Clausewitz,Jomini,Schlieffen(WestPoint,1951[rewritten,inpart,byColonel[USA]JohnR.Elting,
1964])J.E.Edmonds,"JominiandClausewitz"[atreatmentextremelyhostiletotheGerman],CanadianArmyJournal,v.V,
no.2(May1951),64
6 9JosephL.Harsh,"BattleswordandRapier:Clausewitz,Jomini,andtheAmericanCivilWar,"Military
Affairs,December1974,133
1 38Major[USAF]FrancisS.Jones,"AnalysisandComparisonoftheIdeasandLaterInfluences
ofHenriJominiandCarlvonClausewitz,"Paper,MaxwellAirForceBase,AL:AirCommandandStaffCollege,April1985
Colonel[USA]RichardM.Swain,"`TheHedgehogandtheFox':Jomini,Clausewitz,andHistory,"NavalWarCollege
Review,Autumn1990,98109.
15.Gatzke,PrinciplesofWar,49(p39inCochenhausen,Grundsatze).
16.Clausewitz,Gatzkeed.,PrinciplesofWar,12Cochenhausen,Grundsatze,9.Seealsopp22/17).
17..OnWar,BookTwo,Chapter2.
18.InlaterversionsoftheTreatise,Jominidroppedhisinsistenceoninteriorlines,acknowledginglaClausewitzthatthe
valueofinteriororconcentriclinesdependedonthesituation.(Holabird,450451).
19..ThesepointsaremosteasilyfoundinthebibliographicalessaywhichopenedtheoriginalFrencheditionoftheSummary,
"Notice:surlathorieactuelledelaguerreetsursonutilit"("OnthePresentTheoryofWarandofItsUtility").Thisessayis
missingfrom(orseverelyeditedin)mostEnglishlanguageeditions,althoughitispresentinthe1854Americantranslation.
20.Jomini,trans.MendellandCraighill,Summary,66Clausewitz,OnWar,8889.
21.JohnE.Shephard,Jr.,makesarecentcaseforClausewitz'spartialobsolescencein"OnWar:IsClausewitzStillRelevant?"
SeealsoBruceR.Nardulli,"ClausewitzandtheReorientationofNuclearStrategy,"JournalofStrategicStudies,December
1982,494510.
22.Achenbach,"WarandtheCultofClausewitz,"quotingColonel(USA,retired)ArthurLykke,aseniorprofessorofstrategy
attheArmyWarCollegeColonel[USA,ret.]LloydMatthews,editorofParameters,letter17July1989.
23.DavidG.Chandler,inanenthusiasticreviewofWeigley'sAgeofBattles,JournalofMilitaryHistory,April1992,294
295.
24.MartinvanCreveldattemptedinTheTransformationofWar(NewYork:FreePress,1991)"toconstructadifferent,non
Clausewitzianandnonstrategic,frameworkforthinkingaboutwar."Hearguesthatwarinthepost
ColdWareraisdrivenby
forcesoutsidethenationstatesystemandbeyondtherationalboundariesallegedlyemphasizedinOnWar.Thepatternof
conflictinthepost
1 945worldnolongeryieldstothe"Clausewitzianassumptionthatwarisrational."Inthisview,the
"Clausewitzianuniverse"isobsoletebecauseitiscenteredonwarmakingbythe"state"Clausewitz'sallegedtrinityof
government,army,andpeopleisthereforenotapplicabletoEuropebeforetheTreatyofWestphalianortotheworldemerging
fromtheColdWarera.
25.BernardBrodieoftenmadepuzzledreferences,e.g.,"TheContinuingRelevanceofOnWar,"50,tothefailureofmodern
militarythoughttoincorporateandsupersedeClausewitz,inthemannerinwhich,say,AdamSmith'scontributionto
economicshasbeen.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brinton,Crane,GordonA.Craig,andFelixGilbert."Jomini."EdwardMeadEarle,ed.MakersofModernStrategy:Military
ThoughtfromMachiavellitoHitler.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1944.
Clausewitz,Carlvon,trans.ColonelJ.J.[JamesJohn]Graham.OnWar.London:N.Trhbner,1873.
Clausewitz,Carlvon,trans.HansW.Gatzke.PrinciplesofWar.Harrisburg,PA:TheMilitaryServicePublishingCompany,
1942reprintedinStackpoleBooks,RootsofStrategy:Book2,3MilitaryClassics.Harrisburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,1987.
[Originallywritten1812:CarlvonClausewitz,GeneralFriedrichvonCochenhausen,ed."DiewichtigstenGrundsatzedes
KriegfuhrenszurErganzungmeinesUnterrichtsbeiSr.K`niglichenHoheitdemKronprinzen.Berlin:JhnkerundDhnnhaupt
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Verlag,1936.]AnothertranslationappearsasanappendixtoJ.J.Graham'stranslationofOnWar.
Clausewitz,Carlvon,eds./trans.MichaelHowardandPeterParet.OnWar.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976.
Courville,Xavierde.Jomini,oudeleDevindeNapoleon.Paris,1935.
DepartmentofMilitaryArtandEngineering,USMA.Clausewitz,Jomini,Schlieffen.WestPoint,1951.[Rewritten,inpartby
Colonel[USA]JohnR.Elting,1964.]
Elting,JohnR."Jomini:DiscipleofNapoleon?"MilitaryAffairs,Spring1964,1726.
Edmonds,BrigadierGeneralSirJ.E."JominiandClausewitz."CanadianArmyJournal,v.V,no.2(May1951),64
6 9.
Harsh,JosephL."BattleswordandRapier:Clausewitz,Jomini,andtheAmericanCivilWar."MilitaryAffairs,December1974,
133
1 38.
Hattaway,Herman,andArcherJones.HowtheNorthWon:AMilitaryHistoryoftheCivilWar.Urbana:UniversityofIllinois
Press,1983.
Hattendorf,JohnB."SirJulianCorbettontheSignificanceofNavalHistory."TheAmericanNeptune,v.XXXI,no.4,1971.
Hittle,BrigadierGeneral[USMC]J.D.,ed.JominiandhisSummaryoftheArtofWar:ACondensedVersion.Harrisburg,PA:
1947reprintedinStackpoleBooks,RootsofStrategy:Book2,3MilitaryClassics.Harrisburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,1987.
Howard,Michael."JominiandtheClassicalTradition."MichaelHoward,ed.TheTheoryandPracticeofWar.NewYork:
Praeger,1966.
Jomini,Henri.Traitdegrandetactique,ou,Relationdelaguerredeseptans,extraitedeTempelhof,commenteat
compareauxprincipalesoprationsdeladernireguerreavecunrecueildesmaximeslesplusimportantdel'artmilitaire,
justifiesparcesdiffrentsvenments.Paris:GiguetetMichaud,1805.
Jomini,LeBaronde.Prcisdel'ArtdelaGuerre:DesPrincipalesCombinaisonsdelaStratgie,delaGrandeTactiqueetde
laPolitiqueMilitaire.Brussels:Meline,CansetCopagnie,1838.
Jomini,Baronde,trans.MajorO.F.WinshipandLieut.E.E.McLean[USA].TheArtofWar.NewYork:G.P.Putnam,1854.
Jomini,Baronde,trans.Capt.G.H.MendellandLieut.W.P.Craighill[USA].TheArtofWar.Philadelphia:J.B.Lippincott,
1862reprinted,Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1971reprinted,withanewintroductionbyCharlesMessenger,London:
GreenhillBooks,1992.
Jomini,Antoine
Henri,trans.Col.S.B.Holabird,U.S.A.TreatiseonGrandMilitaryOperations:orACriticalandMilitary
HistoryoftheWarsofFredericktheGreatasContrastedwiththeModernSystem,2vols.NewYork:D.vanNostrand,1865.
Jones,Archer."JominiandtheStrategyoftheAmericanCivilWar:AReinterpretation."MilitaryAffairs,XXXIV,December
1970,127
1 31.
Jones,Major[USAF]FrancisS."AnalysisandComparisonoftheIdeasandLaterInfluencesofHenriJominiandCarlvon
Clausewitz."Paper,MaxwellAirForceBase,AL:AirCommandandStaffCollege,April1985.
McGinnis,Major[USA]ThomasM."JominiandtheArdennes:AnAnalysisofLinesofOperationandDecisivePoints."Fort
Leavenworth,KS:SchoolofAdvancedMilitaryStudies,May1988.
Shy,John."Jomini."PeterParet,ed.MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge.Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,1986.
Swain,Colonel[USA]RichardM."`TheHedgehogandtheFox':Jomini,Clausewitz,andHistory."NavalWarCollege
Review,Autumn1990,98109.
Williams,T.Harry."TheReturnofJomini:SomeThoughtsonRecentCivilWarWriting."MilitaryAffairs,December1975,
204
2 06.

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