PHIL4110:PhilosophyofLaw

Dr.RobertLane
LectureNotes:MondayMarch6,2007

[1]
[3.5.]DworkinsConstructivism.

Wewillnowconsiderathirdposition(inadditiontolegalformalismandlegalrealism)inthedebateaboutlegal
reasoning.

[2]
ThisthirdpositionwasintroducedbyRonaldDworkin(b.1931inMassachusetts):
perhapsthemostimportantlivingphilosopheroflaw
bachelorsdegreesfromHarvardandOxfordlawdegreefromHarvard
workedasalawclerkforLearnedHand(18721961afederaljudgefor52yearsneverappointedtothe
U.S.SupremeCourt,butviewedasagreaterjuristthanmanywhowere)
succeededH.L.A.HartasprofessorofjurisprudenceatOxfordin1969
currentlyaprofessoratbothUniversityCollegeLondonandNYU(atbothNYUsphilosophydepartmentand
itslawschool)
majorworksinclude:TakingRightsSeriously(1977),AMatterofPrinciple(1985),Law'sEmpire(1986),
PhilosophicalIssuesinSenileDementia(1987),ABillofRightsforBritain(1990),Life'sDominion(1993),
andFreedom'sLaw(1996).
coauthorofAssistedSuicide:ThePhilosophersBrief(1997inyourtextbook,pp.344ff.wellbereading
thissoon)

Dworkinstheory,constructivism(alsoknownasinterpretivism),isanaccountofjudicialreasoning.Soitis
correctlyviewedasanalternativetolegalformalismandlegalrealism.

ButDworkinattimesdescribesitasaformofnaturallawtheory,indicatingthatitmayalsoaddresstheissue
oftheconnectionbetweenmoralityandlaw(aswellasthequestionoftherelationbetweenthe
formalism/realismdebateandthepositivism/naturallawdebate).

[3.5.1.]Rules,Policies,Principles.

ThefirstaspectofDworkinsthoughtwhichwewillconsiderishisdistinctionamongrules,principlesand
policies(tobedefinedmomentarily).

Inmakingthisdistinction,heseemstobeenteringintothedebateoverthenatureoflaw(whatmakesaprinciple
alaw?whatmakesasystemofprinciplesalegalsystem?).

Thisisbecause,inintroducingthedistinction,hetakeshimselftobeimprovingonHartsdefinitionoflawasa
unionofprimaryrules(rulesofobligation)andsecondaryrules(rulesofrecognition,change,and
adjudication).

Hart,alegalpositivist,providedadefinitionoflawthatincludednomoralcomponents.Inotherwords,onHarts
viewtherearenomoralstandardsthatasystemofruleshastomeetinordertobeagenuinelegalsystemitneed
onlyincludebothprimaryandsecondaryrules.

(ThisisverydifferentthanFullersaccountoflaw.Fuller,theproceduralnaturallawyer,heldthatthereareeight
moralstandardsprinciplesoflegalitythatasystemmustmeetforittobeagenuinelegalsystem.)


OnDworkinsview,Hartsaccountisincomplete.Acompleteaccountofjudicialreasoningwillinclude
somethingotherthanrules.Itwillalsoinclude(whatDworkincalls)principles:

principle(broadsense)(df.)standardsotherthanrulesusedbylawyersandjudgesindecisionmaking.

Dworkinidentifiestwosuchtypesofprinciple:policiesandprinciples(narrowsense):

policy(df.):astandardthatsetsoutagoaltobereached,generallyanimprovementinsomeeconomic,
political,orsocialfeatureofthecommunity(thoughsomegoalsarenegative,inthattheystipulatethat
somepresentfeatureistobeprotectedfromadversechange).E.g.,thestandardthatautomobile
[3]
accidentsaretobedecreased.(144,emphasisadded)

principle(narrowsense)(df.):astandardthatistobeobserved...becauseitisarequirementof
justiceorfairnessorsomeotherdimensionofmorality.E.g.,automobilemanufacturersmustbe
[4]
heldtohigherstandardsthanothermanufacturersbecauseofthenatureoftheirproduct.

Wheredoprinciples(inthebroadsense)comefrom?
Judgesdonotsimplypullthemoutofthinairinparticular,theydonotsimplyrelyonwhateverprinciples
theythemselvesmightthinkarerequiredbymorality.
Theyaregroundedin(exemplified,quotedorsomehowsupportedby)pastofficialacts(forexample,the
textofstatutes,judicialdecisions,orconstitutions)....judgesaretoldtodecidecasesbasednoton
whateverprinciples(critical)moralitymightrequire,butratherbasedonadifferentandperhapsinconsistent
setofprinciples:thosecitedin,orimplicitin,pastofficialactions.(Bix,p.2345,emphasisadded)

Toillustratethedistinctionbetweenrulesandprinciples,DworkinreferstoRiggsv.Palmer(1889),adecisionof
theNewYorkCourtofAppeals:
ElmerPalmerknewthathisgrandfatherwasleavinghimalargesumofmoneyinhiswill,buthebeganto
fearthathisgrandfatherwouldchangethewillandleavehimnothing.
Beforethatcouldhappen,Elmerkilledhisgrandfather,bypoisoninghim.
Ofcourse,therewerecriminallawsgoverningthekillingitself,buttherewerenolawspreventingElmer
fromkeepingtheinheritance.
TwoofElmersauntssuedincivilcourttopreventElmerfromgettingtheinheritance.
Themajorityopinion,writtenbyJudgeRobertEarl,heldthatElmershouldbedeniedhisinheritance.Earl
reliedontheideathatNooneshallbepermittedtoprofitbyhisownfraud,ortotakeadvantageofhis
ownwrong,ortofoundanyclaimuponhisowniniquity,ortoacquirepropertybyhisowncrime.
[5]
(139)
ThisideaisaprincipleinDworkinsnarrowsense:astandardthatajudgeobservesbecauseitisa
requirementofjustice(ratherthanofpositivelaw).

Ininsistingthatlegalsystemsincludesuch(moral)principles,Dworkinisineffectrejectinglegal
positivismandadoptingnaturallawtheory.

[3.5.2.]FewerGapsintheLaw.

AccordingtoDworkin,Hartsview(thatlawconsistsonlyofrules)impliesthatthereisnotenoughlawto
coverallcases.

IfHartisright,thentherearenumerousgapsinthelawaboutwhichjudgeshavetousetheirdiscretion.When

ajudgeencountersacasethatisnotcoveredbyanexistingrule,heorshehasdiscretionastowhatdecisionto
make,ineffectmakingnewlaw.SoHartslegalpositivismimpliesthatjudgessometimesactasdeputy
legislators,fillingingapsbyenactingthelawthattheysupposethelegislaturewouldenactifseizedofthe
[6]
problem.(146)

ButifDworkinsprinciplesaspartofthelaw,thenthereisanabundanceoflawandfarfewergaps.As
Dworkinseesit,thelawincludesprinciplesnotallofwhichhavebeenstatedexplicitlyanywhereintheblack
letter,positivelaw.Judgeshavethoseprinciplestorelyon,sotherearefarfewergapsthantherewouldbewere
Hartsaccounttrue.

[3.5.3.]CompetingPrinciples.

However,thisdoesnotmeanthatjudicialreasoningisasimplematter.Identifyingwhichprinciplesoughttobe
appliedinagivencaseisnoeasytask.

Onewayinwhichitisdifficultisthatinagivencase,oneprinciplemightfavormakingonedecision,whilea
differentprinciplemightfavormakinganother.Whathappenswhentherearecompetingprinciples,principles
thatpullindifferentdirectionsforagivencase?
E.g.theprinciplethatcarmanufacturersmustbeheldtohigherstandardsthanothermanufacturers,vs.the
principlethatcompetentindividualshaveabasicfreedomtoenterintobindingcontracts.

Tounderstandwhathappensinthecaseofcompetingprinciples,considerthefollowing:

Legalrulesareallornothing.Eitherthefactsofagivencasefallunderagivenrule(theruledefinitely
applies)ortheydonot(theruledefinitelydoesnotapply).Theyareliketherulesofbaseball:threestrikesand
youreoutallowsfornoexceptions.

Legalprinciplesarenotallornothing.Rather,theyhaveweight,andweightcomesindegrees.More
specifically,principlescomeinvaryingdegreesofimportance.Thismakesitpossibletocompareoneagainst
theotherandaskwhichisthemoreimportantwhentheycomeintoconflictandonemusttakeprecedencethe
other:

Whenprinciplesintersect(thepolicyofprotectingautomobileconsumersintersectingwithprinciplesoffreedomof
contract,forexample),onewhomustresolvetheconflicthastotakeintoaccounttherelativeweightofeach.This
cannotbe,ofcourse,anexactmeasurement,andthejudgmentthataparticularprincipleorpolicyismoreimportant
thananotherwilloftenbeacontroversialone.Nevertheless,itisanintegralpartoftheconceptofaprinciplethatit
[7]
hasthisdimension,thatitmakessensetoaskhowimportantorhowweightyitis.(145,emphasisadded)

[3.5.4.]ConstructiveInterpretation.

DworkindevelopedhisconstructivismmostfullyinhisbookLawsEmpire(1986).
[8]
Therelevantreadinginyourtextbookisfromhis1982articleNaturalLawRevisited.

ThepracticeoflawinvolveswhatDworkincallsconstructiveinterpretation.Thisresemblestheworkofa
literarycriticinterpretingaworkofliterature.

Constructiveinterpretationisbothanimpositionofformupontheobjectbeinginterpreted(inthesensethatthe
formisnotimmediatelyapparentintheobject)andaderivationofformfromit(inthesensethattheinterpreteris
constrainedbytheobjectofinterpretation,andnotfreetoimposeanyformshemightchoose).(Bixp.236,emphases
added)


Examplesofthissortofinterpretationare:lookingatstarsandseeingaconstellationintheformofamythic
figurelookingatpointsonagraphandseeingalinethatexplainsthedataintermsofacorrelationbetween
variables.

Injurisprudence,theobjecttobeconstructivelyinterpretedisthepositivelaw:
caselaw(pastjudicialdecisionsandthereasoninggiventosupportthem)
statutespassedbylegislatures
thetextsofconstitutions.
Dworkincallsthisthepreinterpretivedata.Thesearedatatobeexplained,tobeaccommodatedina
coherentpicture.

Ajudgemustsometimeschoosebetweencompetinginterpretations,eachofwhichfitsthedatatosome
degree.Inchoosing,heorshemustconsiderboth
howwelleachinterpretationfits(bothmightfit,butonemightfitbetterthantheother,i.e.,mightbemore
consistentwithallthedata)
whichonehasthegreatermoralvalue.

Insomeareasoflaw(estatelaw,propertylaw),whetheradecisionfitsbettermaybemoreimportantthan
itsmoralvalue.

Inotherareas(civilliberties),fitmaybelessimportantthanmoralvalue.

Dworkincompareslegalinterpretationtowritingachapterinachainnovel[seeSimonpp.1412].

[9]
[L]egalclaims...interpretcontemporarylegalpracticeasanunfoldingnarrative.

Inconstructingsuchaninterpretation,judgesshouldtrytomaintainwhatDworkincallsintegrity:theyshould
decidecasesinawaywhichmakesthelawmorecoherent,preferringinterpretationswhichmakethelawmore
[10]
liketheproductofasinglemoralvision.

[ThewordintegrityderivesfromtheLatinintegr,meaningentireinoneofitscontemporarysenses,it
referstothestateofbeingwholeorundivided.]

Simonemphasizesthedifferencebetweenthisviewandlegalrealism:

Realistsseejudgesasgoingoutsidethelawtotheirmoralandpoliticalvaluestomakedecisionswhenthelawdoes
notprovideaclearanswer.Dworkin,ontheotherhand,seesjudgesinthesehardcasesasdiggingdeeperintothe
lawtofindthestrongestmoralandpoliticalprinciplesthatcouldjustifyanauthoritativedecision....[Theydo]not
findtherightanswerinsometranscendentreality,butinternally,withintheintegrityoflegalpractice.(pp.13940,
emphasesadded)

Thus,Dworkinsviewisthat[a]mongthetheoriesofwhatthelawrequiresthatadequatelyfittherelevantlegal
materials,thejudgewouldthenchoosethattheorywhichwasmorallybest,whichmadethelawthebestit
couldbe.(Bixp.235,emphasisadded)

Whatsmore,Dworkinsviewimpliesthatfornearlyalllegalquestions,there[is]auniquerightanswer,a
bestinterpretation.(Bixp.235,emphasisadded)DworkinsHerculescharacterisalawyerofsuperhumanskill,
learning,patienceandacumen(147)who,innearlyallcases,beabletoidentifytheonebestdecision.Dworkin
invokessuchabeingtoillustratehisclaimthatthereissuchasinglecorrectdecisioninalmosteverycase.

[3.5.5.]DworkinasNaturalLawTheorist.

AstandardobjectiontoDworkinsconstructivismisasfollows:Judgesshouldnotlookatthelawthroughrose
coloredglasses,tryingtoseeitinthebestpossibleway,orasthebestpossiblesystem.Rather,theyshouldtry
theirbesttoseelawasitactuallyis.

Dworkinsresponseistosaysomethinglikethis:

...thereisnosimpledescriptionoflawasitisor,moreaccurately,describinglawasitisnecessarilyinvolves
aninterpretativeprocess,whichinturnrequiresdeterminingwhatisthebestinterpretationofpastofficialactions.
Lawasitis,lawasobjectiveornoncontroversial,isonlythecollectionofpastofficialdecisionsbyjudgesand
legislators(whichDworkinreferstoasthepreinterpretivedata,thatwhichissubjecttotheprocessofconstructive
interpretation).However,evencollectively,theseindividualdecisionsandactionscannotofferananswertoa
currentlegalquestionuntilsomeorderisimposeduponthem.Andtheorderinginvolvesachoice,amoral
[11]
politicalchoiceamongtenableinterpretationsofthosepastdecisionsandactions.

ThisisthewayinwhichDworkinisanaturallawtheorist:heholdsthatmoralevaluationisintegraltothe
[12]
descriptionandunderstandingoflaw,
includingtothedescriptionofjudicialdecisionmakingandtothe
wayinwhichjudgesthemselvescometounderstandthelaw.AndthatlastideaexplainshowDworkins
theoryisalsoanalternativetolegalformalismandrealism.

StoppingpointforMondayMarch5.Nonewreadingfornexttimewellhaveareviewsessionforyour
test,whichisnextMonday(noclassthisFridaysinceImoutoftownforaconference).

[1]
SomeinformationinthissectionofnotescomesfromBrianBix,NaturalLawTheory,inACompaniontothe
PhilosophyofLawandLegalTheory,ed.DennisPatterson,Blackwell,Malden,MA,1996,22340.

[2]
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/ronalddworkin

[3]
Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,p.22.SimonnotesthatDworkinchallengestheuseofpolicybyjudgestomakehard
decisions(p.138).Dworkinwrites:Ipropose...thethesisthatjudicialdecisionsincivilcases...characteristicallyareand
shouldbegeneratedbyprinciplenotpolicy.(TakingRightsSeriouslyp.84)
[4]
Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,p.26(notinSimon).
[5]
QuotedinDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,p.23.

[6]
Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,p.82.
[7]
Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,pp.2627.
[8]
UniversityofFloridaLawReview165(1982).Onlineathttp://gongfa.com/dewojinziranfa.htm.
[9]
DworkinquotedatBixp.235.
[10]
Bix,p.236,emphasisadded.
[11]
Bixp.237,emphasesadded.
[12]
Bixp.237.

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