Property: ImImmovable and Movable Case Doctrines

I. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

REAL PROPERTY UNDER PAR NO. 1; LANDS, BUILDINGS, ROADS

AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF ALL KINDS ADHERING TO THE SOIL

A BUILDING IS ALWAYS IMMOVABLE

Lopez v. Orosa
Building is separate and distinct from land
While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the
building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing that
a building is by itself an immovable property (cf. Leung Yee v. Strong
Machinery). In the absence of any specific provision of law to the
contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether
or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to
the same owner.

Prudential Bank v. Panis

Building
separate
and
distinct
from
the
land
In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, it is obvious that the inclusion of 'building' separate and
distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a
building is by itself an immovable property.

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery

Building separate from land does not affect character as real property;
Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the building
and
the
machineries
installed
therein
The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for
mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the
chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel
mortgages," mortgages of personal property executed in the manner
and form prescribed in the statute. The building of strong materials in
which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact
that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the
land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real
property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage
of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation
in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect
whatever so far as the building was concerned.

BUILDING IS IMMOVABLE BY INCORPORATION

Bicerra v. Teneza

House is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a

different
owner;
Exception,
when
demolished
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence
to the soil on which it is built (Article 415, paragraph 1, Civil Code).
This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may
be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house
is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its
character as an immovable likewise ceases.

BUILDING ON RENTED LAND IS STILL IMMOVABLE

Evangelista v. Alto Surety

House
is
not
personal,
but
immovable
property
The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other
personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable
property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a

true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or

real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a
usufructuary or lessee. This is the doctrine in Leung Yee vs. Strong
Machinery Company, 37 Phil., 644. The opinion that the house of
Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of
said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by
taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that
"Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house
from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time
he sold it at a public auction is untenable.

House may be considered personal property in a deed of chattel

mortgage,
but
view
is
limited
to
parties
Parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house
as personal property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs.
Encarnacion, 48 OOG 2664; Standard Oil Co. of New York vs.
Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil.,
464). However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties
are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel.
Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said
contract.

INSTANCES WHERE BUILDING IS TREATED AS PERSONAL BY

THE PARTIES
GENERAL TEST, OF MOVABLE CHARACTER

Stadard Oil v. Jamarillo

Jaramillo, register of deeds, does not have judicial or quasi-judicial

power to determine nature of document registered as chattel mortgage
Section 198 of the Administrative Code, originally of Section 15 of the
Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496), does not
confer upon the register of deeds any authority whatever in respect to
the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of chattel
mortgages. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial
only. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in
the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the
contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the
instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds
nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects
nobody's rights except as a species of notice. Thus, it is duty for the
register of deed to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on
record, as his duties in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages
are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be
cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to
determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought
as a chattel mortgage.
It may be noted that in an administrative ruling by James Ostrand,
Judge of the fourth branch of CFI Manila (9th Judicial District) and later
Supreme Court Justice, provided the same position that the Register of
Deeds has no authority to pass upon the capacity of the parties to a
chattel mortgage which is presented to him for record. The issue where

the chattel mortgage is held ineffective against third parties as the

mortgaged property is real instead of personal is a question determine
by the courts of justice and mot by the register of deeds.

Issue whether interest is in nature of real property not relevant to the

issue of placing the document on record in Chattel Mortgage
In Leung Yee vs. Frank L. Strong Machinery, the Supreme Court held
that where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the
placing of the document on record in the chattel mortgage register is a
futile act. That decision is not decisive of the question before the
Supreme Court, which has reference to the function of the register of
deeds in placing the document on record.

CONSTRUCTION OF ALL KINDS ADHERED TO THE SOIL

Board of Assessment Appeals v. City Treasurer

Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5

The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned
in paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or
constructions adhered to the soil. They are not constructions
analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description,
given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a

square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could

easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without
breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which
they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of
steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can
be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by
screwing the same.
These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for
they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or implements,
and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on
the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land
in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

REAL PROPERTY UNDER NO. 2: TREES, PLANTS AND GROWING

FRUITS.
TREES AND PLANTS
Sibal v. Valdez
Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the Tribunal
Supremo de Espana as that growing crops may be considered as
personal property
Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as
"ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code,

which enumerates as real property as "Trees, plants, and ungathered

products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of
any immovable property." That article, however, has received in recent
years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, which
holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered
as personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil
Jurisprudence of Spain.) Thus, under Spanish authorities, pending
fruits and ungathered products may be sold and transferred as
personal property. Also, the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of
ejectment of a lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee was
entitled to gather the Products corresponding to the agricultural year
because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to
the lessee. And further, under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as
amended, the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits
and products existing thereon, unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise.

REAL PROPERTY UNDER NO. 3: EVERYTHING ATTACHED TO AN

IMMOVABLE IN A FIXED MANNER
ATTACHMENT MUST BE IN A FIXED MANNER
Board of Assessment Appeals v. City Treasurer
Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5
They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without
breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which

they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of

steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can
be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by
screwing the same.

building or real estate on which the same was constructed, converting

the said machineries and equipments into real estate within the
meaning of Article 415(5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Davao Sawmill v. Castillo

REAL PROPERTY UNDER NO. 5: MACHINERIES, RECEPTACLES,
INSTRUMENTS OR IMPLEMENTS
THEY MUST BE DESTINED FOR USE IN THE INDUSTRY OR WORK

Movables must be placed by the owner

MOVABLES MUST BE PLACED BY THE OWNER

Standard Oil ruling key to issue on the character of the property

It must be pointed out that Davao Sawmill should have registered its
protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further
be pointed out that while not conclusive, the characterization of the
property as chattels by Davao Sawmill is indicative of intention and
impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties.
In this connection the decision of the court in the case of Standard Oil
vs. Jaramillo, whether obiter dicta or not, furnishes the key to such a
situation.

Ago v. CA
Sawmill machineries and equipment are real properties in accordance
with Art. 415 (5)
By reason of installment in a building, the said sawmill machineries
and equipments became real estate properties in accordance with the
provision of Art. 415(5) of the Civil Code. It is interpreted similarly to
the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e Hijos, where the Court held
that the installation of the machinery and equipment in the central of
the Mabalacat Sugar Company for use in connection with the industry
carried by that company, converted the said machinery and equipment
into real estate by reason of their purpose. In the present case, the
installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the Golden
Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said
building, the same became a necessary and permanent part of the

Immobilization of machinery; when placed in plant by owner

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized
when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not
when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only
a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
The distinction rests upon the fact that one only having a temporary
right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by
the law to have applied movable property belonging to him so as to

deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become

the property of another.

fact found therein. Thus, said machines are proper subjects of the Writ
of Seizure

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL

Third parties acting in good faith not affected by stipulation to consider

real
property
as
personal
The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property
pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound
by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by
its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In the
present case, however, there is no showing that any specific third party
would be adversely affected.

Sergs Products v. PCI Leasing

Machinery
immovable
properties
by
incorporation
The machinery were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become
"immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal
elements in the industry." The machines are thus, real, not personal,
property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.

REAL PROPERTY UNDER NO. 10

Hongkong & Shanghai Banking v. Aldecoa & Co.

Parties estopped when parties stipulated properties as personal;
property
thus
subject
to
writ
of
seizure
Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth of any material

Court has jurisdiction as bank does not seek to exercise mortgage right
on
real
properties
in
the
provinces
The bank is not seeking to exercise its mortgage rights upon the
mortgages which the defendant firm holds upon certain real properties
in the Provinces of Albay and Ambos Camarines and to sell these
properties at public auction in these proceedings; nor does the
judgment of the trial court directs that this be done. Before that

property can be sold the original mortgagors will have to be made

parties. The bank is not trying to foreclose any mortgages on real
property executed by Aldecoa & Co.

Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to

maintain the flow of oil, it is in a sense machinery within the meaning of
the Real Property Tax Code.

CONCEPT OF REAL PROPERTY IN REAL PROPERTY TAXES

II. MOVABLE PROPERTY

Meralco vs CBAA

PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER NO. ART. 416 (1): "NOT INCLUDED

IN ART. 415."

Pipeline means a line of pipe connected to pumps, valves and control

devices for conveying liquids, gases or finely divided solids. It is a line
of pipe running upon or in the earth, carrying with it the right to the use
of the soil in which it is placed.
Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist
of constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object.
The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction adhering
to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were
welded to form the pipeline.

Involuntary insolvency of Paul Strochecker v. Ramirez

Interest
in
business
may
be
subject
of
mortgage
With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half
interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in
articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All
personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)

PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER ART. 416 (2): "BY SPECIAL

PROVISION OF LAW."

Sibal v. Valdez

Chattel Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal property

Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing
crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All
personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the
provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof
shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides that "If
growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement
stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for
and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508
were enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal
property.

PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER ART. 416 (3): "FORCES OF

NATURE."

US v. Carlos

While electrivity is not fluid, still its manifestations and effects like those
of gas may be felt and seen. The true test of what may be stolen is not
whether it is corporeal ro incorporeal, but whether, being poessed of
value, a person other than the owner, may appropirate the same.
Electrcity like gas, is a valuable merchandise, and may thus be stolen.

PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER ART. 416

TRANSPORTED FROM PLACE TO PLACE."

(4):

"CAN

BE

Philippine Refining v. Jarque

Vessels are personal property under civil and common law

Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of
Commerce, article 585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are
personal property. Under the common law, vessels are personal
property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of
personal property.

PERSONAL PROPERTY UNDER ART. 417 (2): "SHARES OF

STOCKS."

Chua Guan v. Samahang Magsasaka

A share of stock in a gold mining corporation is personal property; bu

the gold mine itself, as well as any land of the corporation, is regarded
as real

property by the law. The certificate itself evidencing the ownership of

the share, as well as the share itself, is regarded as personal property.
Being personal it can be subject of chattel mortgage.

III. PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT

BELONGS (ARTS. 419-426)

property belonging to public dominion. Article 502 adds "rivers and

their natural beds; continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves; waters
rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion; and
lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds; to
the enumeration.

Extent of a lake bed

PUBLIC DOMINION AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

Republic v. CA

Classification of property as either of public dominion or of private

ownership;
Public
lands
/
public
dominion
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or those
of public dominion, have been described as those which, under
existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are
reserved for public purposes. The New Civil Code enumerates
properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article
420 includes those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and those which
belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth" as

The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of the Law of Waters of

1866, as the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth."
Highest Ordinary Depth in a lake; Determinant is rainfall and not
gravitational pull (tides)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted in the case
of Government. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the
"regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time
during the year; or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna
de Bay from different sources." While the waters of a lake are also
subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of
tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily
occurrence in the case of lakes. The alternation of high tides and low
tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise
in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a year
during the rainy season; rather, it is the rains which bring about the
inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the

water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a
shorter period than the level of the water at which the land is
completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary
depth" of Laguna de Bay. The land sought to be registered, therefore,
is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.

Foreshore land defined; Definition does not apply to land adjacent to

lake
Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; or the strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In the present case, since
the inundation of a portion of the land near the lake is not due to flux
and reflux of tides, it thus cannot be considered a foreshore land
within the meaning cited by the Director of Lands.

Purpose
of
land
registration
under
Torrens
System
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
already possesses over the land. Registration under the Torrens Law
was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in
this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register
and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor of
his father from whom he
inherited said land.

Tax declaration strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription;

also Open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse
possession
of
the
land
Applicant presents tax declarations covering the land since 1918 and
also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become
strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Further,
applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in
open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession
of the disputed land for more than 30 years, counted from 19 April
1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase.
Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of
owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for
ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in.
Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement.

Judicial
confirmation
of
imperfect
title
Even if the land sought to be registered is public land, applicant would
be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has
also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as
amended by RA 1942). Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among
the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, such as
those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious

possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,

under bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title."

CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION.

Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo

Reclamation requires proper permission; reclaimed land does not
automatically
belong
to
party
reclaiming
the
same
Private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies
belonging to the public domain without proper permission from
government authorities. And even if such reclamation had been
authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the
party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of
the authority earlier granted. In the present case, private oppositorspetitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation,
therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.

Property of public domain applies to municipal property for public use;

both
not
within
the
commerce
of
man
The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is
applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said
municipal property is similar in character. The principle is that the
property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man
and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the
commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and,
consequently, said property is also inalienable.

Tolerance
of
possession
cannot
ripen
into
ownership
As the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the
land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio;
the fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent.
Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were
merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the
character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into
ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can
serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.

CONVERSION OF PROPERTY
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY.

OF

PUBLIC

DOMINION

TO

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene v. Bercilles

Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property;
Subsequent sale valid
When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the

object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of

the Civil Code, "property of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu,
in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that "property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be

lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of the property in

question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is
valid.