Crimpro - Yu Vs Samson-Tatad

JUDITH YU vs. HON.
ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,

Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 170979
February 9, 2011
Facts: In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner of estafa. On November 16, 2005, the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. CA, she had a
fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial,
or up to November 18, 2005, within which to fi le a notice of appeal. On December 8, 2005, the
prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable
to appeals in criminal cases. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner fi led the present petition for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal
and for the
execution of the decision
Issue: W h e t h e r t h e f r e s h p e r i o d r u l e e n u n c i a t e d i n Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.
Held: YES. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of afresh
period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section39 of BP 129
categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from fi nal orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
Second , the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though diff erently worded, mean exactly the same. There
is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals
(CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari t o t h i s
C o u r t , b o t h o f w h i c h a l s o a p p l y t o a p p e a l s i n c r i m i n a l cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner
seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
People vs. Lacson,

G.R. 149453, October 7, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying
penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied prospectively and retroactively without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the
retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal
law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application
thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the
criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law.
ISSUE:
What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused , can the time-bar rule be applied retroactively?
HELD:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of
the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court
emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with
a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of
the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and
the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The
Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases
with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the
State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
Ombudsman; Supreme Courts review of Ombudsmans grant of immunity. An immunity statute does not, and
cannot, rule out a review by the Supreme Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion. Like all other
officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must adhere to the Constitution. The
parameters of the Supreme Court, however, are narrow. In the first place, what the Supreme Court reviews are
executive acts of a constitutionally independent Ombudsman. Also, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Since the determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly factual in
nature, the Court must thus generally defer to the judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than
the Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently in
his possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case. It should
not be forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the
criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant. This point is
no less important as the grant directly affects the individual and enforces his right against self-incrimination.
These dynamics should be a constant reminder to the Supreme Court to tread softly, but not any less critically,
in its review of the Ombudsmans grant of immunity. The Supreme Courts room for intervention only occurs
when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown. Erdito Quarto v. The Hon. Ombudsman
Simeon Marcelo, et al

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JUDITH YU vs. HON.

ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,

People vs. Lacson,

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