Bertrand Russell on Critical Thinking

William Hare
Mount St. Vincent University
William.hare@msvu.ca

ABSTRACT: The ideal of critical thinking is a central one in Russell's philosophy, though
this is not yet generally recognized in the literature on critical thinking. For Russell, the
ideal is embedded in the fabric of philosophy, science, liberalism and rationality, and this
paper reconstructs Russell's account, which is scattered throughout numerous papers and
books. It appears that he has developed a rich conception, involving a complex set of skills,
dispositions and attitudes, which together delineate a virtue which has both intellectual and
moral aspects. It is a view which is rooted in Russell's epistemological conviction that
knowledge is difficult but not impossible to attain, and in his ethical conviction that freedom
and independence in inquiry are vital. Russell's account anticipates many of the insights to
be found in the recent critical thinking literature, and his views on critical thinking are of
enormous importance in understanding the nature of educational aims. Moreover, it is
argued that Russell manages to avoid many of the objections which have been raised against
recent accounts. With respect to impartiality, thinking for oneself, the importance of feelings
and relational skills, the connection with action, and the problem of generalizability, Russell
shows a deep understanding of problems and issues which have been at the forefront of
recent debate.

The ideal of critical thinking is a central one in Russell's philosophy, though this is not yet
generally recognized. Russell's name seldom appears in the immense literature on critical
thinking which has emerged in philosophy of education over the past twenty years. Few
commentators have noticed the importance of Russell's work in connection with any theory
of education which includes a critical component. Chomsky, for example, reminds us of
Russell's humanistic conception of education, which views the student as an independent
person whose development is threatened by indoctrination. Woodhouse, also appealing to
the concept of growth, points out Russell's concern to protect the child's freedom to exercise
individual judgment on intellectual and moral questions. Stander discusses Russell's claim
that schooling all too often encourages the herd mentality, with its fanaticism and bigotry,
failing to develop what Russell calls a "critical habit of mind". (1) The threat of
indoctrination, the importance of individual judgment, and the prevalence of fanatical
opinions all point up the need for what nowadays is called critical thinking; and Russell's
work is valuable to anyone who wants to understand what this kind of thinking entails and
why it matters in education.

More needs to be said, however, to establish the significance of Russell's conception of

critical thinking, which anticipates many of the insights in contemporary discussions and
avoids many of the pitfalls which recent writers identify. Some factors, perhaps, obscure a
ready appreciation of Russell's contribution. His comments on critical thinking are scattered
throughout numerous writings, never systematized into a comprehensive account; (2) nor did
Russell tend to use the now dominant terminology of "critical thinking". This phrase only
began to come into fashion in the 1940s and 1950s, and earlier philosophers spoke more
naturally of reflective thinking, straight thinking, clear thinking, or scientific thinking, often
of thinking simpliciter. There are useful distinctions to be drawn among these, but it is often
clear from the context that, despite terminological differences, the issue concerns what is
now called critical thinking. Russell uses a wide variety of terms including, occasionally,
references to a critical habit of mind, the critical attitude, critical judgment, solvent
criticism, critical scrutiny, critical examination, and critical undogmatic receptiveness. The
ideal of critical thinking is, for Russell, embedded in the fabric of philosophy, science,
rationality, liberalism and education, and his views emerge as he discusses these and other
themes. (3)
Russell's conception of critical thinking involves reference to a wide range of skills,
dispositions and attitudes which together characterize a virtue which has both intellectual
and moral aspects, and which serves to prevent the emergence of numerous vices, including
dogmatism and prejudice. Believing that one central purpose of education is to prepare
students to be able to form "a reasonable judgment on controversial questions in regard to
which they are likely to have to act", Russell maintains that in addition to having "access to
impartial supplies of knowledge," education needs to offer "training in judicial habits of
thought." (4) Beyond access to such knowledge, students need to develop certain skills if the
knowledge acquired is not to produce individuals who passively accept the teacher's wisdom
or the creed which is dominant in their own society. Sometimes, Russell simply uses the
notion of intelligence, by contrast with information alone, to indicate the whole set of
critical abilities he has in mind.
Such critical skills, grounded in knowledge, include: (i) the ability to form an opinion for
oneself, (5) which involves, for example, being able to recognize what is intended to mislead,
being capable of listening to eloquence without being carried away, and becoming adept at
asking and determining if there is any reason to think that our beliefs are true; (ii) the ability
to find an impartial solution, (6) which involves learning to recognize and control our own
biases, coming to view our own beliefs with the same detachment with which we view the
beliefs of others, judging issues on their merits, trying to ascertain the relevant facts, and the
power of weighing arguments; (iii) the ability to identify and question assumptions, (7) which
involves learning not to be credulous, applying what Russell calls constructive doubt in
order to test unexamined beliefs, and resisting the notion that some authority, a great
philosopher perhaps, has captured the whole truth. Russell reminds us that "our most
unquestioned convictions may be as mistaken as those of Galileo's opponents." (8) In short,
his account of critical skills covers a great deal of the ground set out in detailed, systematic
fashion in more recent discussions. (9)

There are numerous insights in Russell's account which should have a familiar ring to those
acquainted with the recent critical thinking literature. First, Russell's language, especially his
emphasis on judgment, suggests the point that critical skills cannot be reduced to a mere
formula to be routinely applied. Critical judgment means that one has to weigh evidence and
arguments, approximate truth must be estimated, with the result that skill demands wisdom.
Second, critical thinking requires being critical about our own attempts at criticism. Russell
observes, for example, that refutations are rarely final; they are usually a prelude to further
refinements. (10) He also notes, anticipating a recent objection that critical thinking texts
restrict criticism to "approved" topics, that punishment awaits those who wander into
unconventional fields of criticism. (11) For Russell, critical thinking must include critical
reflection on what passes for critical thinking. Third, critical thinking is not essentially a
negative enterprise, witness Russell's emphasis onconstructive doubt, and his warning
against practices which lead to children becoming destructively critical. (12) Russell
maintains that the kind of criticism aimed at is not that which seeks to reject, but that which
considers apparent knowledge on its merits, retaining whatever survives critical scrutiny.
There is a pervasive emphasis in Russell's writings, as in much recent commentary, on
the reasons and evidence which support, or undermine, a particular belief. Critical scrutiny
of these is needed to determine the degree of confidence we should place in our beliefs. He
emphasizes the need to teach the skill of marshalling evidence if a critical habit of mind is to
be fostered, and suggests that one of the most important, yet neglected, aspects of education
is learning how to reach true conclusions on insufficient data. (13)This emphasis on reasons,
however, does not lead Russell to presuppose the existence of an infallible faculty of
rationality. Complete rationality, he observes, is an unattainable ideal; rationality is a matter
of degree. (14) Far from having an uncritical belief in rationality, he was even prepared to say,
somewhat facetiously, that philosophy was an unusually ingenious attempt to think
fallaciously!
The mere possession of critical skills is insufficient to make one a critical thinker. Russell
calls attention to various dispositions which mean that the relevant skills are actually
exercised. Typically, he uses the notion of habit(sometimes the notion of practice) to
suggest the translation of skills into actual behaviour. Russell describes education as the
formation, by means of instruction, of certain mental habits [and a certain outlook on life
and the world]. (15) He mentions, in particular: (i) the habit of impartial inquiry, (16)which is
necessary if one-sided opinions are not to be taken at face value, and if people are to arrive
at conclusions which do not depend solely on the time and place of their education; (ii) the
habit of weighing evidence, (17) coupled with the practice of not giving full assent to
propositions which there is no reason to believe true; (iii) the habit of attempting to see
things truly, (18)which contrasts with the practice of merely collecting whatever reinforces
existing prejudice; and (iv) the habit of living from one's own centre, (19) which Russell
describes as a kind of self-direction, a certain independence in the will. Such habits, of
course, have to be exercised intelligently. Russell recognizes clearly, indeed it is a large part
of the problem which critical thinking must address, that one becomes a victim of habit if
the habitual beliefs of one's own age constitute a prison of prejudice. Hence the need for

a critical habit of mind.

Because they are not simply automatic responses in which one has been drilled, such
intellectual habits in effect reflect a person's willingness, what Russell typically calls
one's readiness, to act and respond in various ways. His examples include: (i) a readiness to
admit new evidence against previous beliefs, (20) which involves an open-minded acceptance
(avoiding credulity) of whatever a critical examination has revealed; (ii) a readiness to
discard hypotheses which have proved inadequate, (21) where the test is whether or not one is
prepared in fact to abandon beliefs which once seemed promising; and (iii) a readiness to
adapt oneself to the facts of the world, (22) which Russell distinguishes from merely going
along with whatever happens to be in the ascendant, which might be evil. To be ready to act,
or react, in these ways suggests both an awareness that the habits in question are appropriate
and a principled commitment to their exercise. They have in common the virtue Russell
called truthfulness, which entails the wish to find out, and trying to be right in matters of
belief. (23)
In Russell's conception, beyond the skills and dispositions outlined above, a certain set
of attitudes characterizes the outlook of a critical person. By the critical attitude, Russell
means a temper of mind central to which is a certain stance with respect to knowledge and
opinion which involves: (i) a realization of human fallibility, a sense of the uncertainty of
many things commonly regarded as indubitable, bringing with it humility; (24) (ii) an openminded outlook with respect to our beliefs, an "inward readiness" to give weight to the other
side, where every question is regarded as open and where it is recognized that what passes
for knowledge is sure to require correction; (25)(iii) a refusal to think that our own desires
and wishes provide a key to understanding the world, recognizing that what we should like
has no bearing whatever on what is; (26) (iv) being tentative, (27) without falling into a lazy
scepticism (or dogmatic doubt), but holding one's beliefs with the degree of conviction
warranted by the evidence. Russell defends an outlook midway between complete
scepticism and complete dogmatism in which one has a strong desire to know combined
with great caution in believing that one knows. Hence his notion of critical undogmatic
receptiveness which rejects certainty (the demand for which Russell calls an intellectual
vice (28) ) and ensures that open-mindedness does not become mindless.
Russell describes critical undogmatic receptiveness as the true attitude of science, and often
speaks of the scientific outlook, the scientific spirit, the scientific temper, a scientific habit
of mind and so on, but Russell does not believe that critical thinking is only, or invariably,
displayed in science. It is clear that Russell is suggesting a certain ideal to which science can
only aspire but which, in his view, science exemplifies to a greater extent than philosophy, at
least philosophy as practised in the early twentieth century. Russell uses a number of other
phrases to capture the ideal of critical thinking, including the philosophic spirit and a
philosophical habit of mind, the liberal outlook (or even the liberal creed), and the rational
temper. All of these ideas are closely intertwined. He remarks, for example, that the
scientific outlook is the intellectual counterpart of what is, in the practical sphere, the
outlook of liberalism. The critical outlook, for Russell, reflects an epistemological and
ethical perspective which emphasizes: (i) how beliefs are held i.e. not dogmatically, (ii) the

doubtfulness of all beliefs, (iii) the belief that knowledge is difficult but not impossible, (iv)
freedom of opinion, (v) truthfulness, and (vi) tolerance.
Russell's account of critical thinking is itself a critical one. It is not rendered naive by
postmodern doubts about enlightenment notions, doubts which Russell would regard as
dogmatic. With respect to both skills and dispositions, for example, Russell does stress
impartiality, but he is acutely aware of, and emphasizes, the problems which readily
frustrate the realization of this ideal. No one can view the world with complete impartiality,
Russell notes, but a continual approach is possible. He speaks of controlling our biases, but
at the same time is quick to observe that "one's bias may be too profound to be
conscious." (29) He concedes that even scientific articles (for example, about the effects of
alcohol) will generally betray the writer's bias. He notes that it is very easy to become
infected by prejudice and speaks of having to struggleagainst it. Russell admits that his
account of the critical attitude may seem nothing more than a trite truism, but keeping it in
mind, and adhering to it, especially as far as our own biases are concerned, is not at all easy.
As with his conviction about the attainability of knowledge, and unlike many contemporary
sceptics, Russell defends the ideal of impartiality and offers practical advice to anyone who
takes this elusive ideal seriously. We can try to hear all sides and discuss our views with
people who have different biases, making sure to face real opponents; we can stretch our
minds by trying to appreciate alternative pictures of the world presented in philosophy,
anthropology and history; we can learn to recognize our own biases by, for example, noting
when contrary opinions make us angry. And so on.
Russell attaches considerable importance to forming one's own opinions, and this might
seem to betray an unwarranted confidence in an individual's ability to avoid dependence on
expert knowledge, an issue which recent discussions concerning trust in knowledge have
brought to the fore. Russell's concern is that "with modern methods of education and
propaganda it has become possible to indoctrinate a whole population with a philosophy
which there is no rational ground to suppose true," (30) hence his emphasis on thinking for
oneself. He is not, however, blind to the value of expert knowledge. He maintains that
expert opinion, when unanimous, must be accepted by non-experts as more likely to be right
than the opposite opinion. One of his famous principles is that "when the experts are agreed,
the opposite opinion cannot be regarded as certain." It cannot be regarded as certain, but
it may prove to be correct since the experts, despite their agreement, may be mistaken.
Hence we need to maintain our critical guard and an open-minded outlook. Russell observes
that an economist should form an independent judgment on currency questions, but an
ordinary mortal had better follow authority. There remains some scope, however, for one's
own critical judgment even with respect to expert, or supposed expert, pronouncements.
Learning not to be taken in by eloquence is part of learning to recognize who speaks with
real authority. Russell also believes that non-specialists can learn to distinguish the genuine
expert from cocksure prophets and dishonest charlatans, and in the case of doubt a critical
person can and should suspend judgment.
It is sometimes objected against influential accounts of critical thinking that there is little or
no mention of the feelings and relational skills which go beyond opening the mind to

include opening one's heart to the world and to other people. This feminist critique does not,
I believe, apply to Russell; indeed he anticipates this very criticism of critical thinking:
"Schools . . . will turn out pupils whose minds are closed against reason and whose hearts
have been taught to be deaf to humane feeling." (31) Elsewhere, speaking of an education
designed to undermine dogmatism, Russell says plainly: "What is needed is not merely
intellectual. A widening of sympathy is at least as important." (32) Again, far from the
hostility and aggressiveness which is sometimes associated with critical thinking, and
thought to make it gender biased, Russell advises that "in studying a philosopher, the right
attitude is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of hypothetical
sympathy. . . ." (33) Russell here anticipates what is called "the believing game" (by contrast
with "the doubting game"), where one tries to discover, as Russell puts it, what it feels like
to believe in the ideas in question before one attempts to overturn them.
Furthermore, Russell is not open to the objection, also raised against recent accounts of
critical thinking, that the paradigm encourages one to lose touch with one's own personal
voice, detaching and objectifying that voice in a misguided quest for Truth and Certainty.
Russell himself disparages the tendency to use "truth" with a big T in the grand sense.
People persecute each other because they believe they know the "Truth". (34) Although
Russell thinks that there is a danger in passionate belief (in general he holds that the
passionateness of a belief is inversely proportional to the evidence in its favour!), he does
not advocate an attitude of complete detachment because he believes that detachment will
lead to inaction. (35) The kind of detachment he favours is from those emotions (hatred, envy,
anger and so on) which interfere with intellectual honesty and which prevent the emergence
of kindly feeling. (36) The person who has no feelings, he says, does nothing and achieves
nothing. Here again, Russell anticipates the recent objection that critical thinking may lead
to people becoming spectators rather than participants. The philosopher is not a merely
sceptical spectator of human activities. (37) We need, Russell says, to learn to live without
certainty, yet without being paralyzed by hesitation. He advocates living from one's own
centre, but warns against subjective certainty. Many have gone to war with the certainty that
they would survive, Russell observes, but death paid no heed to their certainty.
Finally, it is worth noting that Russell avoids the "philosopher's fallacy" of exaggerating the
role of philosophy and logic in the development of critical thinking to the neglect of subject
knowledge. Certainly Russell thinks that philosophy has much to contribute, especially to
learning the value of suspended judgment no doubt because philosophy is so full of
controversy and uncertainty. Moreover, Russell is not nearly as dismissive of informal logic
as some recent critics; clear logical thinking has a definite part to play. (38) It is useful,
Russell thinks, to study informal fallacies and to have good names for them, such as the
"pigs-might-fly" fallacy. (39) In giving an example of this fallacy from physics, Russell seems
to agree with those who hold that such principles of reasoning are subject-neutral and
generalizable. Having said this, however, it is important to recall that Russell
does not equate critical thinking with logical proficiency. Logic and mathematics are the
alphabet of the book of nature, not the book itself. Russell also makes it clear in many
places that it is one thing to know, for example, the principle that belief should be
proportioned to the evidence, and quite another to know what the actual evidence is. Russell,

as we have seen, stresses access to impartial sources of knowledge; without such access, our
critical abilities cannot function. He is not, therefore, to be convicted of a simplistic view
about the generalizability of critical thinking. (40)