People vs.

Pomar
G.R. No. L-22008; November 3, 1924
Police power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate
the Constitution.
Facts:
On the October 26, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila presented a complaint in
the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a violation of Section 13 in connection
with Section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint alleged that the
defendant being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela failed and refused to
pay Macaria Fajardo, employed as a cigar maker, the sum of P80 to which she was entitled as her
regular wages on time of delivery and confinement by reason of pregnancy despite and over the
demands to do so. The defendant demurred in said complaint, alleging that the facts contained
did not constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered
and admitted at the trial all of the allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the
provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based were illegal,
unconstitutional and void. Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and
admitted by the defendant, the court found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described
in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 15 of said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of Sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful
exercise of the police power of the state.
Held:
The provisions of Section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional
land void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of Section
3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. Said Section 13 was enacted by

the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the
praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or
place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support
for one month before and one month after their delivery. It has been said that the particular
statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose end freedom of contract
may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The right to liberty includes the right to enter into
contracts and to terminate contracts. One citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to
another citizen, nor can anyone be compelled to be employed against his will. The Act of 1893,
now under consideration, deprives the employer of the right to terminate his contract with his
employee. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or
managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine Islands, of his
right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree
upon. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the
Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to
contract. Every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public
peace, health, and morals, must come within this category. But the state, when providing by
legislation for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is
subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will
not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the
execution of the powers and rights guaranteed to the people under their law the constitution.
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. But that power cannot grow
faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the
people's law the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and
applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon

G.R. No. 81958; June 30, 1988
Police power is the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare.
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in
the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARYSUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," and specifically assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills;" and that it is in violation of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid
exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. On May
25, 1988, the Solicitor General; on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration; filed a Comment in forming the Court that on March 8,
1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar,
Canada, Hong Kong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of
the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether or not the challenged Department Order is a valid regulation in the nature of a police power
measure under the Constitution.
Held:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. It finds
no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along

with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inherent in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It
is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
governance. The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self- protection. It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner
has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution
does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. "Protection to labor" does not
signify the promotion of employment alone. What is given more import in the Constitution is that such an
employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. Under these circumstances, the Government is dutybound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence; evidence the petitioner cannot seriously
dispute. As part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. This Court
understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern
of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary
sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State
is to provide a decent living to its citizens.

Cerezo vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company

G.R. No. L-10107; February 4, 1916
in those cases either within or without the words of the Act in which the law, as it stood prior
to the passage of the Act, gives an employee a remedy, he still has a right to sue under the same
conditions and to recover damages to the same extent as if the Act had not been passed.
Facts:
The deceased, plaintiff Clara Cerezos son Jorge Ocumen was an employee of the defendant
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company as a day laborer on the 8th of July, 1913, assisting in laying
gas pipes on Calle Herran in the city of Manila. The digging of the trench was completed both
ways from the cross-trench in Calle Paz, and the pipes were laid therein up to that point. The
men of the deceased's gang were filling the west end, and there was no work in the progress at
the east end of the trench. Shortly after the deceased entered the trench at the east end to answer
a call of nature, the bank caved in, burying him to his neck in dirt, where he died before he could
be released. It has not been shown that the deceased had received orders from the defendant to
enter the trench at this point; nor that the trench had been prepared by the defendant as a place to
be used as a water-closet; nor that did the defendant acquiesce in the using of this place for these
purposes. The trench at the place where the accident occurred was between 3 and 4 feet deep.
Nothing remained to be done there except to refill the trench as soon as the pipes were
connected. The refilling was delayed at that place until the completion of the connection. At the
time of the accident the place where the deceased's duty of refilling the trench required him to be
was at the west end. There is no contention that there was any danger whatever in the refilling of
the trench.
The plaintiff insists that the defendant was negligent in failing to shore or brace the trench at the
place where the accident occurred. While, on the other hand, the defendant urges (1 ) that it was
under no obligation, in so far as the deceased was concerned, to brace the trench, in the absence
of a showing that the soil was of a loose character or the place itself was dangerous, and (2) that
although the relation of master and servant may not have ceased, for the time being, to exist, the
defendant was under no duty to the deceased except to do him no intentional injury, and to
furnish him with a reasonably safe place to work.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to recover based on the Employers' Liability Act or the
Civil Code.
Held:
Act No. 1874 is essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act, it having been
originally enacted in that jurisdiction in 1887. The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim,
with some variations of detail, from the English statute. We agree with the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts that the Act should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main
purpose of the Act was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in damages
for certain classes of personal injuries for which it was thought they were liable under the law
prior to the passage of the Act. We do not doubt that it was, prior to the passage of Act No. 1874
and still is, the duty of the employer in this jurisdiction to perform those duties, in reference to
providing reasonably safe places, and safe and suitable ways, works, and machinery, etc., So, to
this extent, the first subsection of section 1 of the Act is simply declaratory of the law as it stood
previous to the enactment. Standing in this form, it is quite clear that it was not intended that all
rights to compensation and of action against employers by injured employees or their
representatives must be brought under be governed by the Act. Assuming that the excavation for
the gas pipe is within the category of "ways, works, or machinery connected with the used in the
business of the defendant, " we are of the opinion that recovery cannot be had under the Act for
the reason that, as we have indicated, the deceased was at a place where he had no right to be at
the time he met his death. His work did not call him there, nor is it shown that he was permitted
there tacitly or otherwise. Under the Anglo-American law the applicable to such a set of facts is
that the master is not responsible, under the Employers' Liability Act, for accidents to his
employees when they are outside the scope of their employment for purpose of their own. The
case under consideration does not fall within the exceptions of Art 1105 of the Civil Code. After
providing a reasonably safe place in and about which the deceased was required to work, the
defendant's liability was then limited to those events which could have been foreseen. Article
1902 provides that a person who, by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. Article 1903 after providing for
the liability of principals for the acts of their employees, agents, or these for whom they are

otherwise responsible, provides that such liability shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of family to avoid the damage.
We have then, on the one hand, no liability of an employer for events which could not be
foreseen (Article 1105), and where he has exercised the care of good father of a family (Article
1903), and, on the other hand, his liability where fault or negligence may be attributed to him
(Article 1902).The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of the earth which fell upon him,
but was due to suffocation. The accident was of a most unusual character. Experience and
common sense demonstrate that ordinarily no danger to employees is to be anticipated from such
a trench as that in question. The fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week,
without indication of their giving way, strongly indicates that the necessity for bracing or shoring
the trench was remote. To require the company to guard against such an accident as the one in
question would virtually compel it to shore up every foot of the miles of trenches dug by it in the
city of Manila for the gas mains. Upon a full consideration of the evidence, we are clearly of the
opinion that ordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place where the
deceased met his death. The event properly comes within the class of those which could not be
foreseen; and, therefore, the defendant is not liable under the Civil Code. The act was not
intended to curtail the any of the rights which an employee had under the pre-existing law. Under
the act, the defense of contributory negligence would defeat an action for damages.