Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)

Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio

Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote
concurringand dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President
allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of
the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations
and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision
provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their
deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states
that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated
unless otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated
on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally
allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government
for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both
constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular
instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and
void.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision
under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose. 11

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee onJustice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred tothe
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and threeweeks since the filing of the
first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The
second
impeachment
complaint
was
accompanied
by
a"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power"
to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and
"to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As
indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of
the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with thecorollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures
that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The
separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within
its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. TheConstitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks

and balances to secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the

government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference
between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court isthat while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower
courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring
distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied inSection
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The
people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which
this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists
no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of thecalibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned
to it by the Constitution.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the
constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
evermindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
thelegislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for

absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned
to it by thesovereign people.At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances
which has been carefullycalibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches mustbe given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
There exists no constitutionalbasis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedingswould upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned
to it by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of theHouse shall be necessary to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the
House does not initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does.Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsementof the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at leastone-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against thesame official within a one year period.The Court in the present petitions subjected
to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits onlythe main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed oneyear time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
LAMBINO, ET AL. VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 174153, 25 OCTOBER 2006) DIGEST
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino Group)
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On
25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)
and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed
changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme Courts
ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.
1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
direct proposal by the people

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a peoples
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to
adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third
mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as
shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change
the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions
to the Constitution.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before not after signing.
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect
of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of
text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a
question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the
full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless,
and unelected individuals.
2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There
is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is
an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also
affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the
three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A
change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or
theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure
of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checksand-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed

and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments

and not revisions.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines
only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government
and the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group initiative is a revision
and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group proposed changes overhaul
two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of
105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,
the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances
within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and
revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that
when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time
on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are
called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not
make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however,
ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution
contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of
the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical
intent and language.
3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary
The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There

is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of
the present petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if
the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be
complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following
provisions of RA 6735:
a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million
signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only
Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition.
b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
Occena vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments goes further than merely
assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions
is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The three Resolutions
were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet,
and the National Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections. The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981 which the date of
plebiscite has been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a fundamental law. (2) Whether or not the Interim
Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments. (3) Whether or not the threefourth votes is necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission. (4) Whether or not the three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments are valid.
Held:
Yes, the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power and privilege to propose amendments. On
January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that
what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor
for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973

Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this power is indubitable as the
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. The Interim Batasang
Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as
the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as
a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments.
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was
approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. The three resolutions were approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus
making them valid.
Imbong v Comelec

September 11, 1970

RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates
from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of
320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the
population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.

Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing
a delegate to the convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of
running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA
6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the
parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent
Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as
constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call
for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis
employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable
for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In
this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent
political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the
Constituional Convention.

RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.

- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates
equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the
support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any
particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

Sec 2: apportionment of delegates

FACTS:

Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or
from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a

Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples
Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications

of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers
of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions
of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the
time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a
valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an
enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
void.

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

ISSUE:

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier
issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign
for constitutional amendments.

HELD:

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the
ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of
such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.

NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No.
6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that
the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting
en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such
petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records
and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;
and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300,
for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it
orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view
that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition
with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and
MENDOZA concur)

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly
and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735
is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and
MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds
that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
initiatory Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through
initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate,
or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required
number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from
the majoritys two other rulings.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term
limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec.
2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power
todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set
the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as
intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground
that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as
the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2)
The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples
initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2)
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementinglegislation
the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the
people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat
has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest).
Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate
rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of
the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot
be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a
maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at
least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to
be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;"
and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended
so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective
seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913
and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto
officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments
to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.