Doctrine of Non Interference of Judicial Stability
Doctrine of Non Interference of Judicial Stability
Doctrine of Non Interference of Judicial Stability
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)
Present:
- versus -
JUDGE RASAD G.
BALINDONG, Acting Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City,
Respondent.
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,* and
REYES,** JJ.
Promulgated:
September 6, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the administrative complaint against respondent Acting Presiding
Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8,
for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or
Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service.[1]
belatedly,
in
behalf
of
City
RTC denied
the
opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the denial by
filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition
and mandamus with an
of a
temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and
Sheriff Gaje.[7] The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City,
Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a
TRO on April 8, 2009.[8] After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO
restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City
Branch account.[9]
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required
MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.[10] On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. [11] The respondent Judge thereafter granted the
motion and dismissed the case.[12]
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion,
and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for
interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by
issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBPMarawi City Branch account.[13]
The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of
the Iligan City RTC.[14] He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to
be heard and eventually dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. [15]
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the
elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of co-equal
jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting that this is the
respondent Judges second offense.[17]
The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative
matter and to require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records on file. [18]
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010,
[19]
stating that he learned from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is basically
good
Judge,
and
an
admonition
will
in
probably
the
future.
freeze the enforcement of the writ of execution, thus frustrating the lawful
order of the HLURB, a co-equal body.[31]
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera, [32] the Court penalized two judges for
issuing a TRO against the execution of a demolition order issued by another co-equal
court. The Court stressed that when the respondents-judges acted on the application
for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on matters
pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, which was
already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T.
Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere with the order of a coequal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of
the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law. [33]
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may
violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should
be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another
co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing
court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,[34] speaks of and which this Court has operationalized
through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[35]
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of
judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain [36] Sheriff Gaje from enforcing
the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and
from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account
with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was
acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal
and coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009
Order.[37]
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition
because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on
the enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations, finds no application to this
case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the
judgment obligor or his agent;[38] a third-party claimant of a property under
execution may file a claim with another court [39] which, in the exercise of its own
jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for
injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the
judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his
authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a
motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the
decision, not from any other court,[40] or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition
for certiorari.[41] In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the
issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another coequal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution
is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the
enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The
duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary. [42] As already
mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ
before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek
redress through a higher judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its opposition before
the issuing court Iligan City RTC which denied this opposition.
That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually
dismissing the petition before him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the
respondent Judge can use.[43] His lack of familiarity with the rules in interfering with
the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary through his
demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan public that
the kind of interference he exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily, i.e., that
an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted by going to the Marawi City RTC
although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong
Cabili, subsequently reversed course and manifested that the respondent Judge is
basically a good Judge,[44] and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the
respondent Judges liability. This liability and the commensurate penalty do not
depend on the complainants personal opinion but on the facts he alleged and proved,
and on the applicable law and jurisprudence.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to
simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [45]
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re:
Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge,
punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering the
attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after prolonged deliberations holds
that a fine ofP30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This imposition is an act of
leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for
suspension since this is the respondent Judges second offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of P30,000.00, with
a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
(On Leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p
In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for recovery of
ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala
of the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor. While the civil case was pending there,
respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993
for qualified theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also
assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-398, the criminal cases were temporarily
archived.
After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in favor of Naval who was
declared the lawful owner and possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was ordered to
vacate the land.
Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived
criminal cases. Having declared Naval the lawful owner and possessor of the
contested land in Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal cases
against her and her co-accused.
Judge Villamor likewise granted execution pending appeal of his decision in Civil Case
No. B-398. This order was challenged by Carlos in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court, both without success.
Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-105, against Judge
Villamor, charging him with having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in Civil
Case No. B-398. On November 21, 1988, this Court, in anEn Banc resolution,
summarily dismissed the administrative case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a
civil action for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-6478) against Judge Villamor for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five (5) criminal
cases against Naval, et al.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon Judge Villamor on
December 10, 1987. The next day (December 11, 1987), instead of answering the
complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order of
direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Guerrero, "for
degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and
contemptous language before the court," and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.
Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Judge (G.R. Nos. 82238-42).
We promptly restrained Judge Villamor from enforcing his Order of Contempt against
Carlos and Attorney Guerrero. On November 13, 1989, we annulled the contempt
order. (See pp. 26-34, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041.)
Back to Civil Case No. CEB-6478; Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion. The order of
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 20657, June 26,
1990). Carlos appealed to this Court which also denied the petition. (p. 125, Rollo of
G.R. No. 101296.)
Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed
separate complaints for damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an
unjust order of contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-8802) was raffled to
Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G. Aleonar.
Carlos' complaint for damages was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8823 and raffled
to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by Judge Bernardo LL.
Salas.
On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8802
but it was denied by Judge Aleonar (p. 33, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order docketed as
G.R. No. 101296.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against
Judge Aleonar to stop him from proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8802 (pp. 4546, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor praying Judge Salas to
dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8823 but the motion was denied by respondent Judge on
July 2, 1991 (pp. 13-16, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
Hence, this second petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order (G.R.
No. 101041).
On August 21, 1991, a Resolution was issued by this Court: 1) temporarily restraining
Judge Salas from further proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8823; and 2) granting the
petitioner's prayer that this case be consolidated with G.R. No. 101296 (pp. 3739, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
The sole issue here is: whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance
of the actions for damages against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an
unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which this Court
subsequently annulled.
The answer is no.
As very aptly held by this Court in a Resolution it issued in connection with a previous
case filed by respondent Carlos against Judge Villamor, over a similar action for
"Damages and Attorney's Fees Arising From Rendering an Unjust Judgment," in
dismissing the five (5) criminal cases for qualified theft which he (respondent Carlos)
had filed against Gloria P. Naval and others
Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much
less declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and
sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul
with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to
review and correct errors of the trial courts. (George D. Carlos vs. CA,
G.R. No. 95560, November 5, 1990; p. 125, Rollo of G.R No. 101296.)
To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions
for damages against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in
effect permit a court to review and interfere with the judgment of a co-equal court
over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of
a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not
interfere with each other's cases, judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals,
111 SCRA 262).
This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final judgment,
has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may
a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against the latter
(Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs.
Riodique, 64 SCRA 494).
Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt
(G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the
erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to
commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge
Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by this Court (Jaynes C.
Abarrientos, et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an
error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable
to the respondents.
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful
conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for certiorari are GRANTED, Civil Cases Nos.
CEB-8802 and CEB-8823, respectively, pending in the salas of respondents Judge
Peary G. Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL. Salas, are hereby dismissed. The temporary
restraining orders issued by this Court in these cases are hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ., Cruz, Feliciano and Medialdea, JJ., concur.