Common Misunderstandings of Van Til's Apologetics: by Dr. Richard L. Pratt, Jr. Part 2 of 2
Common Misunderstandings of Van Til's Apologetics: by Dr. Richard L. Pratt, Jr. Part 2 of 2
Common Misunderstandings of Van Til's Apologetics: by Dr. Richard L. Pratt, Jr. Part 2 of 2
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contradictions within itself, nor does it contradict the facts of general revelation. But because
our use of logic is finite and corrupted by sin, the teachings of Scripture often challenge our
rational capacities. It is not rational to believe such things, unbelievers contend. As
Christians, we have to admit both the appearance of logical difficulties and our inability to
solve all of these problems. Yet, we affirm in no uncertain terms, that the problem is in the
sinful use of human reason, not in Scripture.
For this reason, we must give practical priority to the Bible over our rational abilities,
including our best attempts to follow the law of non-contradiction. It is dangerous to tell
people that they should be rational without also warning them to be humble before the pure
and infinite rationality of God revealed in Scripture. We must not place a corrupted finite
standard above or on par with the absolute standard of Gods Word. When our thoughts
conflict with the Bible, we should bow in humility before God, believing him despite the
appearance of logical difficulties.
Support from Van Tils writings:
The gift of logical reason was given by God to man in order that he might
order the revelation of God for himself (IST 256).
Christian theism should employ the law of contradiction, whether
positively or negatively, as a means by which to systematize the facts of
revelation. Whether these facts are found in the universe at large or in the
Scripture. The law of contradiction cannot be thought of as operating
anywhere except against the background of the nature of God (IST 11).
It appears that there must seem to be contradiction in human knowledge.
To this we must now add that the contradiction that seems to be there can in
the nature of the case be no more than a seeming contradiction. If we said
that there is real contradiction in our knowledge we would once more be
denying the basic concept of Christian-theism, i.e., the concept of the selfcomplete universal in God. We should then not merely be saying that there
is no complete coherence in our thinking but we should also be saying that
there is no complete coherence in Gods thinking. And this would be the
same as saying that there is no coherence or truth in our thinking at all. If
we say that the idea of paradox or antinomy is that of real contradiction, we
have destroyed all human and all divine knowledge; if we say that the idea
of paradox or antinomy is that of seeming contradiction we have saved
Gods knowledge and therewith also our own (DOF 62).
As Christians we say that this is a mystery that is beyond our
comprehension. It surely is. God himself, in the totality of his existence, is
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while the non-Christian holds that there is either no mystery for God or
man, or there is mystery for both God and man (DOF 29-30).
The finite mind cannot thus, if we are to reason theistically, be made the
standard of what is possible and what is impossible. It is the divine mind
that is determinative of the possible. We conclude then that Gods
knowledge of the universe is also analytical. Gods knowledge of the
universe depends upon Gods knowledge of himself. God has made the
universe in accordance with his eternal plan for that universe. Thus the very
existence of the universe depends upon Gods knowledge of or plan for the
universe. God does, to be sure, behold the universe and the children of men
as being outside himself. He beholds them now as actually existing
beings engaged in actual work of their own, because he has from all eternity
beheld them as going to exist. His knowledge of that which now takes place
in the universe is logically dependent upon what he has from all eternity
decided with respect to the universe (DOF 56).
We have repeatedly asserted that the facts of the universe are what they
are because they express together the system of truth revealed in the Bible.
What is meant by the idea of truth as found in Scripture does not, as noted,
mean a logically penetrable system. God alone knows himself and all the
things of the created universe exhaustively. He has revealed himself to man.
But he did not reveal himself exhaustively to man. Neither the created
universe nor the Bible exhaustively reveals God to man. Nor has man the
capacity to receive such an exhaustive revelation. God reveals himself to
man according to mans ability to receive his revelation. All revelation is
anthropomorphic. Moreover, when we say that man understands the
revelation of God what is meant is not that he sees through this revelation
exhaustively. Neither by logical reasoning nor by intuition can man do
more than take to himself the revelation of God on the authority of God.
(CTK 37)
A word must here be said about the question of antinomies. It will readily
be inferred what as Christians we mean by antinomies. They are involved in
the fact that human knowledge can never be completely comprehensive
knowledge. Every knowledge transaction has in its [sic] somewhere a
reference point to God. Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us
we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our
knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical.
We say that if there is to be any true knowledge at all there must be in God
an absolute system of knowledge. We therefore insist that everything must
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Misconception #6: Van Til denied the importance of logic by suggesting that it is
acceptable to commit the fallacy of begging the question (arguing in a circle).
Van Til never suggested that anyone should commit the logical fallacy of begging the
question (e.g. A is true because A is true.). That would be strange indeed. In reality, he
frequently called attention to the failure of such arguments. It is true that Van Til spoke
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positively of circular reasoning, but he had something other than begging the question in
mind. He was not talking so much about argumentation, setting down a convincing case that
leads to a conclusion. In argumentation, reasoning should be linear. Instead, Van Til spoke of
circularity in terms of the inescapable process by which finite minds attain knowledge to be
used in arguments.
Van Til urged that all human reasoning is involved in a finite process of circular, or
better spiral, learning. We grasp a measure of truth, reason from that to other truths, and these
new truths in turn enhance our understanding of that first truth. There is no logical fallacy in
this. It is the reality of human apprehension and reflection. This is the basic process of
scientific induction. As we move from one fact to another, the latter illumines the former. It is
similar to the procedure that we use in Biblical interpretation. The second and third verses we
read help us understand the first verse we read. We do not begin with an idea and never return
to it. Logical inferences constantly inform our understanding of the notions that started us
thinking in a particular direction.
This kind of reciprocity in reasoning is ultimately unavoidable. For example, suppose
you want to defend the idea that the senses are basically reliable. It would be fallacious to
argue, I believe in the reliability of the senses because I believe in the reliability of the
senses. That is begging the question. Nevertheless, we should all realize that it is absolutely
impossible to argue for the basic reliability of sense perception without relying at least
implicitly on sense perception. How do we argue for the reliability of our senses? We
accumulate examples of times when our senses gave us true knowledge of the world. This is a
perfectly sound induction. But how did we know that our examples even took place? How did
we know our senses gave us true knowledge at these times? The answer is obvious: through
sense perception. In what other way could one possibly demonstrate the reliability of the
senses, except by relying on the senses? This is the kind of circularity or spiraling that Van Til
pointed out in all human reasoning. It has nothing to do with begging the question.
Consider the law of non-contradiction. How can it be logically justified? Of course, no
one should say, The law of non-contradiction is true because the law of non-contradiction is
true. That is begging the question. We may say that the law is self-evident, but that is an
assertion, not an argument. Every linear argument we muster in support of the law of noncontradiction at least implicitly relies on the law. Sometimes, we argue for the law of noncontradiction by saying that its denial leads to absurdity. But to recognize absurdity we have
implicitly to use the law of non-contradiction. At other times, we argue for the law by
pointing out that every attempt to deny it requires the implicit use of the law. Once again, we
rely implicitly on the principle to support the principle. Because the law of non-contradiction
holds as a universal principle for all human reasoning, we can never reason properly without
it, even as we defend its necessity. If it is indeed necessary for human thought, we then use it
all the time, even when discussing the law itself. To acknowledge this is not to beg the
question, it is merely to acknowledge the reality of how we come to know things.
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Now consider the whole system of beliefs that we hold as Christians. The teaching of
Scripture is vast, entailing not only ideas about God, but a host of teachings about the world
(an orderly universe, etc.) and humanity (sinful, rational, etc.) as well. Suppose we want to
argue for this world and life view by focusing on one claim of the Bible say, the existence
of God. We would not want to beg the question by arguing, I believe God exists because
God exists. Instead, we would demonstrate this belief by any number of linear arguments:
the principle of cause and effect, the design of the world, the testimony of human conscience,
etc. But once we touch on these ideas (or for that matter, any other true concept), we have
argued with ideas derived from the Christian world and life view, an outlook that is based on
the fact that God exists.
The situation in apologetics is similar to that which we face with sense perception and
the law of non-contradiction. If the Christian belief system is an exhaustive world and life
view, covering all matters, we can never argue for it or any part of it without using arguments
that are implicitly dependent on it. We cannot support the truth of Christianity without
implicitly relying on truths that Christianity teaches. In this sense, we should not attempt to
use ideas outside of the Christian world and life view to argue for Christianity, unless we
want to argue from lies to the truth.
Happily, people are Gods images and have the inescapable witness of general
revelation. They often accept (at least superficially) truths that we use in argumentation. For
this reason, we do not always have to tell unbelievers that our arguments are distinctively
Christian ideas. But remember, even the truths of general revelation that many unbelievers
acknowledge (order of nature, existence of God, reliability of the senses, etc.) are part of our
Christian world and life view. To argue for Christian theism without at the same time
implicitly depending on Christian theism is like trying to get out of your skin to reach out and
touch yourself. Impossible.
This is what Van Til taught when he described all reasoning as circular. He did not
for a moment suggest that Christians should beg the question. Argumentation is to be linear.
He merely insisted that there is no way for finite creatures to escape the implicit spiral of the
learning and reasoning processes.
Support from Van Tils writings:
We hold it to be true that circular reasoning is the only reasoning that is
possible to finite man. The method of implication as outlined above is
circular reasoning. Or we may call it spiral reasoning. We must go round
and round a thing to see more of its dimensions and to know more about it,
in general, unless we are larger than that which we are investigating. Unless
we are larger than God we cannot reason about Him by any other way, than
by a transcendental or circular argument. The refusal to admit the necessity
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Misconception #7: Van Til rejected the use of rational arguments and empirical
evidences to support the claims of Christ. He simply told unbelievers that they must
believe.
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On the contrary, Van Til affirmed that apologists should use every available rational
argument and empirical evidence to present a convincing case for Christian theism.
Traditional theistic proofs, archaeological evidences, and the like are part of the arsenal for
believers engaged with the world of unbelief. They are tools that the Spirit uses to bring men
and women to saving faith.
Van Til did not, however, emphasize the use of particular rational and empirical
resources. He was more concerned with alerting his readers to the basic outlooks people use
to evaluate such evidences. Van Til believed that every fact of the universe confirms the truth
of Scripture. How could it be otherwise? Nonetheless, appealing to particular facts or
arguments to defend the faith often proves vain because unbelievers have alternative
explanations that rise out of their basic world views.
For instance, the empty tomb does not prove that Jesus is the Son of God, unless we
adopt a fuller Christian outlook on the world. Perhaps his body was stolen; maybe Jesus was a
freak accident in a chance universe, the only mere man to come back to life. Likewise, the
principle of cause and effect does not prove the existence of God, unless we operate with a
host of other Christian ideas. Many leading physicists today simply respond that the universe
is infinite and eternal; perhaps there is an infinite series of physical causes, or a multiplicity of
gods and demons that formed the universe as we know it.
Van Til affirmed that in reality most traditional arguments used in support of Christian
theism are absolutely conclusive; they objectively demonstrate the truth of Christianity. But
unless the Spirit is at work, unbelievers will dispute their decisiveness because they operate
out of a false world and life view that keeps them from drawing the proper conclusions. When
this occurs, Christian apologists must be ready to address the deeper issues that mislead
unbelievers, especially their commitment to human autonomy. Van Til believed that these
more basic commitments were neglected in other apologetic methods. So he stressed dealing
with presuppositions over particular arguments and evidences.
In a word, Van Til never disputed the value of rational arguments and empirical
evidences. He simply called attention to how we should use them. On a practical level, Van
Til followed the counsel of Proverbs 26:4,5:
Do not answer a fool according to his folly,
or you will be like him yourself.
Answer a fool according to his folly,
or he will be wise in his own eyes.
He proposed a two-step approach. First, believers should invite unbelievers to consider
the evidence for Christian theism on its own terms, making certain that we do not follow the
principles of unbelievers (Prov. 26:4). Does it cohere? Does it make sense of the world? If
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Christianity is true, does it not explain reality? Here apologists use every argument, great and
small, to demonstrate the credibility of the claims of Christ. On the deepest (transcendental)
level, we urge that the only sufficient basis (or presupposition) for human knowledge is
Christian theism.
Second, believers should help unbelievers examine their own outlooks on life, so that
they will not be so wise in their own eyes (Prov. 26:5). Do they cohere? Do they make sense
of the world? If their world view is true, then why doesnt it explain reality? Here evidences
and arguments are used to demonstrate the futility of trying to understand anything on the
basis of human autonomy. With the false self-confidence of unbelievers shaken, the truth of
the gospel stands out clearly. If the Spirit is at work, it will become plain that Christ alone is
the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6).
Support from Van Tils writings:
I would therefore engage in historical apologetics. (I do not personally do
a great deal of this because my colleagues in the other departments of the
Seminary in which I teach are doing it better than I could do it.) Every bit
of historical investigation, whether it be in the directly Biblical field,
archaeology, or in general history, is bound to confirm the truth of the
claims of the Christian position. But I would not talk endlessly about facts
and more facts without ever challenging the non-believers philosophy of
fact. A really fruitful historical apologetic argues that ever fact is and must
be such as proves the truth of the Christian theistic position (DOF 258).
The method of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be indirect
rather than direct. The issue between believers and non-believers in
Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to facts or laws
whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both parties to the
debate. The question is rather as to what is the final reference-point
required to make the facts and laws intelligible. The question is as to
what the facts and laws really are. Are they what the non-Christian
methodology assumes that they are? (DOF 117).
The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his
opponent, assuming the correctness of his method merely for arguments
sake, in order to show him that on such a position the facts are not facts
and the laws are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place
himself upon the Christian position for arguments sake in order that he
may be shown that only upon such a basis do facts and laws appear
intelligible (DOF 117-118).
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fact could be distinguished from any other fact. No law could be said to be
law with respect to facts. The whole manipulation of factual experience
would be like the idling of a motor that is not in gear. Thus every fact--not
some facts--every fact clearly and not probably proves the truth of Christian
theism. If Christian theism is not true then nothing is true (DOF 266-267).
It is not as though the Reformed apologist should not interest himself in
the nature of the non-Christians method. On the contrary he should make a
critical analysis of it. He should, as it were, join his friend in the use of it.
But he should do so self-consciously with the purpose of showing that its
most consistent application not merely leads away from Christian theism
but in leading away from Christian theism leads to destruction of reason
and science as well (DOF 119).
Intellectually sinners can readily follow the presentation of the evidence
that is placed before them. If the difference between the Christian and the
non-Christian position is only made plain to them, as alone it can be on a
Reformed basis, the natural man can, for arguments sake, place himself
upon the position of the Christian. But though in this sense he then knows
God more clearly than otherwise, though he already knew him by virtue of
his sense of deity, yet it is only when by the grace of God the Holy Spirit
removes the scales from mens eyes that they know the truth existentially.
Then they know him, whom to know is life eternal (DOF 397).
This is, in the last analysis, the question as to what are ones ultimate
presuppositions. When man became a sinner he made of himself instead of
God the ultimate or final reference point. And it is precisely this
presupposition, as it controls without exception all forms of non-Christian
philosophy, that must be brought into question. If this presupposition is left
unquestioned in any field all the facts and arguments presented to the
unbeliever will be made over by him according to his pattern. The sinner
has cemented colored glasses to his eyes which he cannot remove (DOF
94).
Our argument as over against this would be that the existence of the God
of Christian theism and the conception of his counsel as controlling all
things in the universe is the only presupposition which can account for the
uniformity of nature which the scientist needs. But the best and only
possible proof for the existence of such a God is that his existence is
required for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence of all things in
the world. We cannot prove the existence of beams underneath a floor if by
proof we mean that they must be ascertainable in the way that we can see
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the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as the support
of tables and chairs requires the idea of beams that are underneath. But
there would be no floor if no beams were underneath. Thus there is
absolutely certain proof for the existence of God and the truth of Christian
theism. Even non-Christians presuppose its truth while they verbally reject
it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account
for their own accomplishments (DOF 120).
Christian theism must be presented as that light in terms of which any
proposition about any fact receives meaning. Without the presupposition of
the truth of Christian theism no fact can be distinguished from any other
fact (A 73).
The proofs may be formulated either on a Christian or on a non-Christian
basis. They are formulated on a Christian basis if, with Calvin, they rest
clearly upon the ideas of creation and providence. They then appeal to what
the natural man, because he is a creature of God, actually does know to be
true. They are bound to find immediate response of inward assent in the
natural man. He cannot help but own to himself that God does exist.
When the proofs are thus formulated they have absolute probative force.
They are not demonstrable in the sense that this word is often taken. As
often taken, the idea of demonstration is that of exhaustive penetration by
the mind of man; pure deduction of one conclusion after another from an
original premise that is obvious. Such a notion of demonstration does not
comport with the Christian system. That system is analogical. Man cannot
penetrate through the relations of the Creator to the creature. But this does
not in the least reduce the probative force of the proofs. Man is internally
certain of Gods existence only because his sense of deity is correlative to
the revelation of God about him. And all the revelation of God is clear
(DOF 196).
The argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity is
objectively valid. We should not tone down the validity of this argument to
the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be
adequately stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound.
Christianity is the only reasonable position to hold. It is not merely as
reasonable as other positions, or a bit more reasonable than other positions;
it alone is the natural and reasonable position for man to take. By stating the
argument as clearly as we can, we may be the agents of the Holy Spirit in
pressing the claims of God upon men. If we drop to the level of the merely
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