VICENTE TAN vs CITY OF DAVAO (1988)

Facts:
The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted Dominga Garcia.
Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman, Tan Seng with whom she had three children:
Vicenta, Mariano and Luis. In 1923, Dominga Garcia and her family emigrated to
China. According to the petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate and left in the
Philippines a parcel of land in Davao. Since her departure for China with her family,
neither she, nor her husband, nor any of their children has returned to the
Philippines to claim the lot.
Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro died. Her nephew, Ramon Pizarro,
occupied a part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals. Another nephew of
Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, informed the Solicitor General about the property. The
City of Davao filed a petition with the CFI, to declare Dominga Garcia's land
escheated in its favor. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children are
presumed to be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir or person by law
entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated.
Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not
authorized to declare that a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga
Garcia's being in Red China is not a sufficient ground to deprive her of her property
by escheat proceedings. Pizarro alleges that Dominga's daughter, Vicenta Tan, is
alive in China or in Hongkong. Pizarro tried to prove it through: (1) supposed
pictures of the missing heir (2) an Extrajudicial Settlement and Adjudication of
Dominga's Estate allegedly executed by Vicenta in Hongkong; and (3) a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Pizarro.
The trial court found that Pizarro's testimonies "ring with untruthfulness; they are
replete with inconsistencies" and the witnesses who corroborated him were
"unworthy of belief. Trial court rendered judgment declaring that the land
escheated and assigned to the City of Davao.
Issue:
WON the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition
Ruling:
With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Solicitor-General, may file the escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of
the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the CA correctly ruled that the case did not come
under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12,1962, when the
applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court. Rule 91 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, may commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until

January 1, 1964. Although the escheat proceedings were still pending then, the
Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition because to do so would
work injustice to the City of Davao.

The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga
Garcia and her heirs may be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are,
in effect, proceedings to settle her estate. Indeed, while a petition instituted for the
sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead
cannot be entertained if that were the only question or matter involved in the case,
the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an
incident of, or in connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the
intestate estate of such absentee.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs HI-TRI DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION (2012)
Facts:
Millan paid the spouses Bakunawa P1,019,514.29 as down payment for the
purchase of six (6) lots with the Spouses Bakunawa giving Millan the Owners Copies
of TCTs of said lots. Due to some obstacles, the sale did not push through; so
Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her down.
However, Millan refused to accept back the down payment. Consequently, the
Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, Hi-Tri took out on October 28, 1991, a
Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of P 1,019,514.29, payable to
Millans company Rosmil and used this as one of their basis for a complaint against
Millan.
The Spouses Bakunawa retained custody of RCBC Managers Check and refrained
from cancelling or negotiating it. Millan was also informed that the Managers Check
was available for her withdrawal, she being the payee. On January 31, 2003, without
the knowledge of Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the "P 1,019,514.29-credit
existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its "unclaimed
balances" as of January 31, 2003. On December 14, 2006, the Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the RTC the action for Escheat.
On April 30, 2008, Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute with Millan.
Spouses Bakunawa tried to recover the P1,019,514.29 under Managers Check but
they were informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings
before the RTC.
The trial court ordered the deposit of the escheated balances with the Treasurer and
credited in favor of the Republic. Respondents claim that they were not able to
participate in the trial, as they were not informed of the ongoing escheat
proceedings. Later motion for reconsideration was denied.
CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA pronounced that RTC Clerk of Court failed to issue
individual notices directed to all persons claiming interest in the unclaimed
balances. CA held that the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for want of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic
Ruling:
Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did
not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact,
petitioner confirms that the Managers Check was never negotiated or presented for

payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still held by the
bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of HiTri, which procured the Managers Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented
by a managers check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because
the instrument although accepted in advance remains undelivered. Hence,
respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for
more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left
unclaimed.
After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to
remand the case for hearing to determine whether the claim of respondents was
valid. There was no contention that they were the procurers of the Managers Check.
It is undisputed that there was no effective delivery of the check, rendering the
instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled that respondents
retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions that
they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated
deposit, subject of the Managers Check, should be excluded from the escheat
proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat
proceedings is state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note that there is
nothing in the records that would show that the OSG appealed the assailed CA
judgments. We take this failure to appeal as an indication of disinterest in pursuing
the escheat proceedings in favor of the Republic.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

OF PASAY CITY vs CA (2002)
Facts:
Private respondent Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the
late Elizabeth Hankins. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms.
Hankins executed in her favor 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent
alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the
escheat
of
the
estate
of
Elizabeth
Hankins
before
the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Since it was established that there were no known
heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines. The registry of deeds issued new TCTs in the name of Pasay City. In
the meantime, Solano claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation
she had been looking for for a long time. In view of this development, she filed a
petition before the CA for the annulment of the lower courts decision, which the CA
granted.
Issue:
WON the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the parcels of land escheated in
favor of the estate
Ruling:
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within
five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of
and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him
for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred
forever." In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the
lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or
less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat
judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the
escheated properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but
not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v.
Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified
by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners
of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure

him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the
lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her
right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough
justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

EMILIA DIVINO vs CEFERINO HILARIO (1936)

Facts:
Tan Chay had died intestate. The court declared that he left no legal heirs, that he
left as his only estate the sum of P5,000 deposited with the Philippine Foreign
Trading & Company, and decreed the escheat of said funds to the municipality of
Guianga, Province of Davao. Thereafter the municipal president of Guianga took
charge of the funds. On October 16, 1935, the petitioner, in the same capacity as
guardian of the minors Loo Tan, appeared in the case and through her attorneys
filed a motion to set aside the decree escheating the P5,000 to the municipality of
Guianga, to declare the minors the only heirs of Tan Chay, and, finally, to adjudicate
to them share and share alike the sum of P5,000. The motion was based on the
allegation under oath that the minors were the only legitimate nephews and niece
left by the deceased and that the latter had not been survived by another that the
decree of reversion was already irrevocable,
Issue:
WON the minors should be declared heirs of the deceased Tan Chay entitled to
inherit their share
Ruling:
Section 750 provides how the Court of First Instance may acquire jurisdiction over
the properties left by a deceased who resided in the Philippine Islands and may
decree its escheat to the municipality where he resided. n the case under
consideration, the procedure fixed by section 750 has neither been followed nor
complied with, wherefore, we hold that the respondent judge and the Court of First
Instance of Davao did not acquire jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the
escheat case or to promulgate the order of August 24, 1935, whereby the sum of
P5,000 was escheated or adjudicated the municipality of Guianga. No petition was
filed either by the required publication made which was the essential step which
should have conferred jurisdiction. If the respondent judge and the Court of First
Instance of Davao never acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the escheat
case, it is clear and logical that they neither have jurisdiction to grant the aforesaid
remedy.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (1961)

Facts:
Petitioner filed before the CFI a complaint for escheat of certain unclaimed bank
deposits balances under the provisions of Act No. 3936 against several banks,
among them the First National City Bank of New York. It is alleged that pursuant to
Section 2 of said Act defendant banks forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines a
statement under oath of their respective managing officials of all the credits and
deposits held by them in favor of persons known to be dead or who have not made
further deposits or withdrawals during the period of 10 years or more. Wherefore, it
is prayed that said credits and deposits be escheated to the Republic of the
Philippines by ordering defendant banks to deposit them to its credit with the
Treasurer of the Philippines.
After hearing the court a quo rendered judgment holding that cashier's is or
manager's checks and demand drafts as those which defendant wants excluded
from the complaint come within the purview of Act No. 3936, but not the telegraphic
transfer payment which orders are of different category. Consequently, the
complaint was dismissed with regard to the latter. But, after a motion to reconsider
was filed by defendant, the court a quochanged its view and held that even said
demand drafts do not come within the purview of said Act and so amended its
decision accordingly.
Issue:
WON demand drafts and telegraphic orders come within the meaning of the term
credits or deposits employed by the law
Ruling:
To begin with, we may say that a demand draft is a bill of exchange payable on
demand. Since it is admitted that the demand drafts herein involved have not been
presented either for acceptance or for payment, the inevitable consequence is that
the appellee bank never had any chance of accepting or rejecting them. Verily,
appellee bank never became a debtor of the payee concerned and as such the
aforesaid drafts cannot be considered as credits subject to escheat within the
meaning of the law.
But a demand draft is very different from a cashier's or manager's cheek, contrary
to appellant's pretense, for it has been held that the latter is a primary obligation of
the bank which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. A
demand draft is not therefore of the same category as a cashier's check which
should come within the purview of the law.
The case, however, is different with regard to telegraphic payment order. It is said
that as the transaction is for the establishment of a telegraphic or cable transfer the

agreement to remit creates a contractual obligation a has been termed a purchase

and sale transaction. The drawer bank was already paid the value of the telegraphic
payment orders otherwise it would not have transmitted the same to the defendant
bank. Hence, it is absurd to say that the drawer banks are still the owners of said
telegraphic payment orders. Telegraphic transfer payment orders should be
escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

REPUBLIC vs CFI OF MANILA (1988)

Facts:
Pursuant to a provision in Unclaimed Balance Law, Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded
to the Treasurer of the Phil. in Jan 1968 separate statements under oath by their
respective managing officers all deposits and credits held by them in the names of
depositors or creditors known to be dead, have not been heard from or who have
not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding 10 yrs. or more.
Two names appeared:
1. Jesus Ydirin with balance of P126.54
2. Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91
Thereafter, Rep. instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against
31 banks including Pres. Roxas Rural Bank.Pres. Roxas Rural Bank filed a Motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue. MR was granted.
Issue:
WON the purpose of Act 3936 will be defeated if escheat proceedings will be
instituted in every province or city where the bank is located
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners interpretation on Sec 3 of Act 3936 was patently misplaced. CFI
correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all
banks located in one and the same province where the Court of First Instance
concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in one action" was clearly
intended to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as
authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in the Philippines in
one single escheat proceedings. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must
be brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits,
are located.

CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG vs THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY

(2010)
Facts:
The Coronels executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating
that they received from respondent Ramona down payment for their inherited
house and lot. The Coronels sold the property to petitioners for a higher price and
rescinded their contract with Ramona. Respondents filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages which was granted by the court. Respondents moved for
execution which was granted.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of
thedeed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the
buyer of the subject property
Ruling:
It should be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge
Ramonas qualifications to acquire land. Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg.
185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings
against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state that only the
Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien
transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government,
through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the
capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This
limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not
against any individual; and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be
not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous
owner or any other individual.
Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the
subject property, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the
subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject
property will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa
Blg. 185

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA vs COLEGIO DE SAN

JOSE (1938)
Facts:
The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose,
claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed the petition upon
the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants
to the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda
under a contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in the
case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance and
intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled.
Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of
San Pedro.
Issue:
WON the petition for escheat should be dismissed
Ruling:
YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91), the
essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional
because they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are:
1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where
deceased has his last residence or in case he should have no residence in the
country, the municipality where the property is situated.

Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial,
if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal
property situated in the country and has not left any heir or other person entitled
there to, it may order, after payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat
and in such case, it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where
the deceased had his last residence and the real property to the municipality/ies
where they are situated.
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a
deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving

any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a special proceeding. The
proceeding should be commenced by a petition and not by a complaint.
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now sec 1 to 3
of Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person
alleging to have a direct right or Interest in the property sought to be escheated is
likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition
for escheat.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner
to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that
there is no ground for the court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an
interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition
which is untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is
entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally.
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as
an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively.
The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were
confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. From the moment it was confiscated,
it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is
evident that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them,
because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who
has not left any person which may legally claim it (2 nd requirement lacking).

VICENTE CAWIS vs HON. ANTONIO CERILLES (2010)

Facts:
The DENR approved the sales patent application of Andrada for a parcel of land. RA
6099 then took effect, which provided that certain parcels of land, which included
Andradas Lot No. 47 would be sold to the actual occupants of the subdivision
without the necessity of a public bidding. Claiming to be the actual occupants,
petitioners protested the sales patent awarded to Andrada. The Bureau of Lands
denied the protest.
Sometime later, Peralta purchased Lot No. 47 from Andrada. The Deputy Public Land
Inspector, in his final report of investigation, found that neither Andrada nor Peralta
had constructed a residential house on the lot, which was required in the Order of
Award and set as a condition precedent for the issuance of the sales patent.
Apparently, it was Vicente Cawis, one of the petitioners, who had built a house on
Lot No. 47.
The Director of Lands confirmed that Andrada and Peralta complied with the
construction requirements. An OCT was issued in Peraltas name. Petitioners filed a
complaint before the trial court, claiming they had interest in the lot as qualified
beneficiaries of R.A. No. 6099, cancelling Andradas sales patent and revoking it in
their favor. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that reversion of title on
the ground of fraud must be initiated by the government through the Office of the
Solicitor General.
Issue:
WON petitioners have standing to question the validity of the sales patent and OCT
Ruling:
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners complaint questioning the validity
of the sales patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47 is, in reality, a
reversion suit. The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the
cancellation of the certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered
by the title to the State. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated
as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings. Private persons may not
bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling
a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the
patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain. Only the OSG or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since the title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee. In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when

Andrada filed the sales patent application. Any subsequent action questioning the
validity of the award of sales patent on the ground of fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation should thus be initiated by the State. The State has not done so
and thus, we have to uphold the validity and regularity of the sales patent as well as
the corresponding original certificate of title issued based on the patent.

LOLITA ALAMAYRI vs ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER AND AMANDA, ALL

SURNAMED PABALE (2008)
Facts:
Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific
Performance with Damages against Nave who owns a parcel of land which the
former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave
allegedly reneged on their agreement when she refused to accept the partial
payment of Fernando. The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings.
Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of guardianship
proceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompetent.
The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that
Nave was found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court
of Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld
the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nave. Petitioner alleged that since Nave
was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that she subsequently
entered into should be declared null and void.
Issue:
WON the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata
Ruling:
No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on
the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. While both cases involve a
determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at two separate
times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in
1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. The decision on the
former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of
judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and
had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor
of the Pabale siblings.
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in
1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not
judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case
was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as
her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and
competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject
property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984.
The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to
do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C.

EDUARDO ABAD vs LEONARDO BIASON (2012)

Facts:
Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura, with
the former alleging to be the nephew of the latter. After Abad formally offered his
evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Biason filed a motion to oppose
the petition. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that
he was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the
latters guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Mauras
guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in
Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason
prayed that he be appointed as Mauras guardian since he was previously granted
by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties. Biason was
appointed guardian.
Issue:
WON it is a requirement for the guardian be a resident of the same locality as the
ward or to be living with the latter under the same roof in order to qualify for the
appointment
Ruling:
With Biasons demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving
the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of
guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or
the ward.23 The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the
propriety of Biasons appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has
already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford
Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.

HEIRS OF SY BANG vs SY et al (2009)

Facts:
Sy Bang died intestate in 1971 and in an out-of-court conference, the children of
both marriages divided upon themselves the control and management of Sy Bangs
various businesses. Rosita Ferrera-Sy also filed a motion for payment of widows
allowance. From the time of Sy Bangs death until the filing of the motion in 1996,
she claimed she was not given any widows allowance.
In the meantime, Respondents filed a joint petition for the guardianship of Rosita
Ferrer-Sy where Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named special guardian, filed before
the guardianship court a motion to order the deposit of the widows allowance. The
Court ruled in favor of the deposit of the widows allowance.
Issue:
WON the guardianship court exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the
widows allowance
Ruling:
Yes. The court had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance. The
court hearing the settlement of the estate is the court which has jurisdiction over
the properties of the estate, to the exclusion of all other courts. The Guardianship
Court may order the delivery of the property of the ward to the guardian only if the
property clearly belongs to the ward or if the title has been judicially decided.

NILO OROPESA vs CIRILO OROPESA (2012)

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for him to be appointed as guardian over the property of
his father, respondent herein. Cirilo filed his opposition. After presenting his
evidence, Nilo failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. Respondent filed his
Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his
Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not
formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record;
and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
The trial court granted the motion and subsequently, the Demurrer to Evidence
submitted by Cirilo.
Issue:
WON respondent is considered an incompetent person
Ruling:
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence. Respondent denied the
allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material evidence to
support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant
documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his
assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating
medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical
document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of
his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his
sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and
their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their
direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony,
were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and
instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal
offer of evidence, his documentary proof do not in any way relate to his fathers
alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. There was no error on the part of
the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring
respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a
demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to
preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the
law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

NELSON CABALES AND RITO CABALES vs COURT OF APPEALS (2007)

Facts:
A property was the subject of co-ownership. Some of the co-owners sold the whole
property without the consent of the two others, Nelson, a minor and his mother.
Issue:
WON the sale is enforceable
Ruling:
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable. Rule 93, Section 7 of
the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically designates
the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in
case the latters property does not exceed two thousand pesos. Saturnina was
clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of court appointment
considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property
was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos.
However, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the
minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the
latters pro-indivisoshare in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do
so.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was
void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other coowners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber
his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by
the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did
not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its
entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their proindiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his
mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over
their undivided share of subject property.
The sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon
his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject
property. However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of
petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of

their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses.

BONIFACIA VANCIL vs HELEN BELMES (2001)

Facts:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her
deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children,
instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil,
asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA
reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time
the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who between the mother
and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
Issue:
WON Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent
Ruling:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his
guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only
in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still
alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to
prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent,
still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that
an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As
the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult
to protect the wards.

JOSEFA VILLANUEVA-MIJARES vs COURT OF APPEALS (2000)

Facts:
Upon Felipes death, ownership of the land was passed on to his children. Leon, one
of the children, held the property in trust for his co-heirs. After his death, private
respondents discovered that the shares of four of the heirs, was purchased by Leon,
who then executed the sale and partition of the property in favor of his children,
herein petitioners. Private respondents contended that the sale in favor of Leon was
fraudulently obtained through machinations and false pretenses. Thus, the
subsequent sale of the lot by Leon to his children was null and void despite the OCT
in his favor.
The CA ruled that Maria Baltazar (spouse of Benito, one of the heirs) had no
authority to sell the portion of her late husbands share inherited by her then minor
children since she had not been appointed their guardian. Respondent court likewise
declared that as far as private respondents Procerfina, Prosperidad, Ramon and
Rosa, were concerned, the Deed of Sale was unenforceable.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in declaring the Deed of Sale unenforceable against private
respondents for being an unauthorized contract
Ruling:
Under the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of Benitos death, the rule was that
while parents may be the guardians of their minor children, such guardianship did
not extend to the property of their minor children. Parents then had no power to
dispose of the property of their minor children without court authorization. Without
authority from a court, no person could make a valid contract for or on behalf of a
minor or convey any interest of a minor in land. Admittedly, Maria Baltazar showed
no authorization from a court when she signed the Deed of Sale of August 26, 1948,
allegedly conveying her childrens realty to Leon.
While it is true that the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale, it
nevertheless correctly ruled that the sale by Maria Baltazar of her childrens share
was invalid. Article 1529 of the old Civil Code, which was the prevailing law in 1948
and thus governed the questioned Deed of Sale, clearly provided that a contract is
unenforceable when there is an absence of authority on the part of one of the
contracting parties.

ERIC JONATHAN YU vs CAROLINE YU (2006)

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA alleging that his
estranged wife, respondent herein unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their
minor child Bianca. The petition, which included a prayer for the award to him of the
sole custody of Bianca, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68460. Subsequently,
respondent filed a petition against petitioner before the RTC for declaration of nullity
of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition
included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the
fixing of schedule of petitioners visiting rights subject only to the final and
executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460.
The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition for having
become moot and academic, the restraint on the liberty of the person alleged to be
in restraint [having been] lifted. In the meantime, respondent filed before the Pasay
RTC a petition for habeas corpus praying for the award of the sole custody to her of
Bianca. Acting on respondents petition, the RTC issued the writ of habeas corpus
drawing petitioner to file a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, forum shopping and litis pendentia, he
citing the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which he filed before
the Pasig RTC.
Issue:
WON the question of custody should be litigated before the Pasay RTC or the Pasig
RTC
Ruling:
Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before
the Pasig RTC,
regardless
of
which
party
would
prevail,
would
constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the
former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Since the ground
invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is
respondents alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital
obligations as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to support this
cause of action necessarily involves evidence of respondents fitness to take
custody of Bianca.

JOCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO vs CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO (2005)

Facts:
Crisanto had filed for divorce and custody of their child - Rafaello. Joycelyn failed to
appear at the court proceedings and the judge awarded custody to Cristiano after
having considered evidence that Jocelyn was having extramarital lesbian relations
and that she did not care for and was witnessed slapping her child. It was further
held that her parental authority was subordinated to that of Crisanto under Article
211 of the Family Code. Jocelyn challenged this decision, which was reversed and
she was granted custody on the basis that, according to Article 213 of the Family
Code, a minor child shall not be separated from his mother unless a court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. At the next instance, the Court of Appeal
annulled the second court order on procedural grounds and returned custody to
Crisanto until Jocelyns motion was decided on again.
Issue:
WON the remedies of habeas corpus, because the whereabouts, physical and
mental condition of the illegally detained Minor Rafaello is now unknown to
petitioner, and preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for immediate
issuance of preliminary [injunction], petitioner having a clear and settled right to
custody of Minor Rafaello which has been violated and still is being continuously
violated by petitioner, be granted by the Court
Ruling:
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in her custody,
the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by
Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, a
situation that does not apply here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot
be granted, because Crisantos right to custody has not been proven to be clear and
unmistakable. Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the
performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond the maintenance of the
status quo. Besides, such an injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case
has been decided on its merits.

ISABELITA LAHOM vs JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (2003)

Facts:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that,
despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use
their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.
Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of
care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to
rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A.
8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it
was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
Issue:
WON the subject adoption can still be revoked or rescinded by the adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters
action prescribed
Ruling:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom
after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period.

ANA JOYCE REYES vs HON. CESAR SOTERO (2006)

Facts:
espondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and
settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and
heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal
properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a
grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition be
dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving
any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the
certification of her adoption from the local civil registrars office that the adoption
decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification
issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
badges of fraud. The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was
indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities
permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
Issue:
WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities
Ruling:
No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those
which she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public
records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such,
the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding
details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their

official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These
certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos
spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of
irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the
certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is
offered.
ANGELA REYES vs LIBRADA MAURICIO and LEONIDA MAURICIO (2010)
Facts:
Eugenio is the registered owner of a 4,500 square meter parcel of land acquired
thru extrajudicial settlement with his co-heirs. The controversy stemmed from a
complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F.
Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio
(Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated asKasunduanand between Librada
and Eugenio as parties.
As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by
Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death
of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a
mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
Issue:
WON the status of Leonida can be assailed in the petition
Ruling:
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot
collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition. It is settled law that
filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. In Braza v. City Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents
estate. Furthermore, inAustria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida
from the case for annulment of the Kasunduan that supposedly favors petitioners
cause.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs ROSANNA AGUAS (2006)

Facts:
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. Pablos surviving spouse,
Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on indicating in her
claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly
pension was settled.
SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting
Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family
abode approximately more than 6 years before, and lived with another man on
whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no
legal children with Rosanna. Their neighbors testified that Janet and Jeylnn were the
children of Pablo and Rosanna but that Janet was not their real child. She was just
taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have children;
however, there were no legal papers on Janets adoption. Later on, Rosanna got
pregnant with Jeylnn.
Issue:
WON Rosanna, Jeylnn or Janet is entitled to the benefits
Ruling:
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has
sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnns claim is justified by
the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been
complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time
of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna
to prove that she and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until his death were
the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made such
declaration.
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the
SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she
is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely
"adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she
cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate
wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed
to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent
on him for support even if they were already living separately.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

(2005)
Facts:
The petitioner's application to adopt his illegitimate child was granted by the trial
court who also ordered that the child's name be changed to reflect the petitioner's
surname. Before the adoption, the child had been using her natural mother's middle
name and surname. The petitioner wanted to change the child's name such that the
child would keep her natural mother's surname as her middle name and the
petitioner's surname as her surname. The trial court denied the petitioner's request
as there was no law that allowed an adopted child to use the surname of the child's
biological mother as the child's middle name.
The petitioner appealed and argued that the trial court had erred in its decision.
While there is no law providing that an adopted child can use the natural mother's
surname as a middle name, there is no law prohibiting it either. It is also customary
for every Filipino to have the surname of the mother as a middle name and the use
in this instance is customary, not opposed by any interested party or prohibited by
any laws.
Issue:
WON an illegitimate child, may, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name
Ruling:
The Court held that there is no law expressly prohibiting the child to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name and what is not prohibited by
law, is allowed. It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. While not set out in law this custom has been
recognied during the lawmaking process. In fact, the Family Law Committees had
agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to preserve and maintain the childs
relationship with her natural mother because under the law, she remains an
intestate heir of the mother. The underlying intent of adoption law is in favour of the
child and the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and purposes under the law. Being a legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption by the petitioner, it follows that the child is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Adoption law should be interpreted and construed liberally to carry out the
beneficial purposes of adoption with the interests and welfare of the adopted child
being the primary and paramount consideration.

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (2006)

Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and
Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, remarried there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer
communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the
paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness
and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assent to the adoption.
Issue:
WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptees biological mother
Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological
parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of
the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child
in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated
and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the

requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the

time of adoption.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM (2009)

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months
old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to
the adoption executed in an affidavit.
Issue:
WON petitioner can singly adopt
Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not
present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly
exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of
consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their
moral mental and physical character and well-being.