Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs.

Kitamura
G.R. No. 149177 | November 23, 2007
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (a
Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of
foreign governments), entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura
(Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines).
2. Agreement provides that respondent was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year
3. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog Access road (STAR) Project
in the Philippines, following the contract with the Philippine
government.
4. When the STAR Project was near completion, the DPWH
engaged consultancy services of Nippon, for the detailed
engineering and construction supervision of Bongabon-Baler
Road Improvement (BBRI) Project (Respondent named as the
project manager)
5. Petitioner Hasegawa (Nippons general manager for
International Division), informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing
his ICA (only up to the substantial completion of STAR)
6. Respondent requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI Project.
7. Nippon refused to negotiate for the renewal of ICA because
the respondents contract was for a fixed term that had
already expired
8. Respondent initiated a civil case for specific performance
and damages with RTC Lipa City
9. Petitioners:
- ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and
between Japanese nationals thus complaint must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
- The claim for improper pre-termination of respondents
ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper
courts of Japan ff the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus
10. In the meantime, DPWH approved Nippons request for the
replacement of Kitamura by a certain Kotake (as project
manager of BBRI Project)
11. RTC: denied motion to dismiss invoking that matters
connected with the performance of contracts are regulated
by law prevailing at the place of performance

12. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with CA

13. CA dismissed petition
14. Petitioners filed a 2nd petition for certiorari
15. CA affirmed RTCs decision, that RTC was correct in applying
instead the principle of lex loci solutionis
16. Petitioners MR denied
17. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine
courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages
involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
national may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most
significant rule, or forum non conveniens
HELD: NO; RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain
and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds
raised by petitioners to assail the jurisdiction are
inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly
denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
RATIO:
In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive
phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the
following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated?;
(2) Which law will the court apply?; and (3) Where can the resulting
judgment be enforced?
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of
the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction
does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law
In this case, only the first phase is at issue jurisdiction. Jurisdiction,
however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its
power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over
the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent,
over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of
the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not

claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case
No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the
RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question
subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most
significant relationship rule.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the
ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The
doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of
the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It
controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or
the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the
state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what
state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which
state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and
the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider
where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several
contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to
the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second
phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be
applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also
not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is
exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law
should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the
law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for
the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded
and proved.

When a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought

before a court or administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the
case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and
apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over
the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State
or States
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,[76] be
used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not
a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. [77] Second,
whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular
case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [78]In
this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more
properly considered a matter of defense

De Joya vs. Corona

G.R. No. 162416 | January 31, 2006
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the
court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent judge against petitioner in criminal case for
violation of Art. 315, par. 2(a) of RPC in relation to PD 1689
2. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the
existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused
- Hao induced Dy to invest more than a 100M in State
Resources Development Management Corporation, but
when the latters investments fell due, the checks issued
by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments
were dishonoured for being drawn against insufficient
funds or that the account was closed
3. Documents presented to support the motion of the
prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
- Report of NBI to Chief State Prosecutor as regards their
investigation on the complaint filed by complainant Dy
against Hao for syndicated estafa
- Affidavit-complaint of Dy
- Copies of checks issued by complainant in favor of State
Resources
- Copies of checks issued to complainant representing the
supposed return of his investments in State Resources
- Demand letter sent by complainant Hao
- Counter-affidavits
- Resolution issued by State Prosecutor Nicdao finding
probable cause to indict petitioner and his other coaccused for syndicated estafa
- Copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources
Development Management Corp naming petitioner as
incorporator and director of corp
ISSUE: Whether or not
HELD:
RATIO:
The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by
respondent judge tend to show that therein private complainant
was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources
Development Management Corporation; that he issued several

checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation;

that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private
complainant, purportedly representing the return of his
investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient
funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being
incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its
activities and transactions. These are all that need to be shown to
establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of
the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should
be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They
just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence. In the present case, it is notable that the resolution
issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the
bases for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the
accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689
The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual
findings of the trial court, which include the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in
exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the
prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause,
that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong
arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of
justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the
application of the exception.
It may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek
relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner
to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its
jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the
courts jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the
action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest
is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for
trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent
to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It

should be remembered that he who invokes the courts jurisdiction

must first submit to its jurisdiction.

Perkins vs. Roxas

G.R. No. 47517 | June 27, 1941
FACTS:
1. Respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI
Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
for the recovery of the sum of P71, 379.90, consisting of
dividends which have been declared and made payable on
shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which
was being withheld by the company, and for the recognition
of his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the
exclusion of all others.
2. Company filed its answer:
- Withholding of plaintiffs right to the disposal and control
of the shares was due to certain demands made with
respect to said shares by the petitioner and by one
George Engelhard
3. RTC ordered the respondent Perkins to include in his
complaint as parties defendants petitioner and Engelhard.
- Summons
were
served
upon
the
non-resident
defendants Perkins and Engelhard
4. Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint
5. Petitioners objection to the courts jurisdiction over her
person having been overruled by the trial court and by this
court, petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in
which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her
against respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, from the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, wherein it is
declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the
possession and control of the shares of stock in question
together with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and prays for
various affirmative reliefs against the respondent
6. Perkins filed a demurrer on the ground that the court has
no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the
alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York is res judicata
7. Petitioners demurrer having been overruled, she now filed
in this court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus
- "the respondent judge is about to and will render
judgment in the above-mentioned case disregarding the
constitutional rights of this petitioner; contrary to and
annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered
and entered in this petitioner's favor by the courts of the
State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all

the questions constituting the subject matter of civil

case No. 53317, of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and
which New York judgment the Court of First Instance of
Manila is without jurisdiction to annul, amend, reverse,
or modify in any respect whatsoever"; and
praying that the order of the respondent judge
overruling the demurrer be annulled, and that he and his
successors be permanently prohibited from taking any
action on the case, except to dismiss the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not in view of the alleged judgment

entered in favor of the petitioner by the Supreme Court of
New York, and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on
all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene Arthur
Perkins, in civil case No. 53317 of the CFI Manila, the local
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Idonah Slade Perkins in her cross-complaint brought suit against
Eugene Arthur Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment
enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon.
This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which
falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may
render judgment "annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment
rendered and entered in this petitioner's favor by the courts of the
State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all the
questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317,"
and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the
respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity
and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in
her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the
controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each
other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of

jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon

the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or
wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on
appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner
here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court
and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.

Reyes vs. Diaz

G.R. No. L-48754 | November 26, 1941
FACTS:
1. this case is certified to this Court by the CA upon the ground
that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue
2. Questions of jurisdiction:
(a) Whether or not there is sufficient to show that the
protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy
(b) Whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass
upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the
protestant which have not been challenged by the
protestee in his counter-protest
HELD: Case remanded to the CA for further proceedings
RATIO:
Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the
Supreme Court jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction
of any trial court is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3
and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior
court is in issue." It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as
used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as
to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of
its employment in a broader sense."
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court and defines its powers. The question, therefore,
of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for
interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which
distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the
Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching
consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of
our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power
and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land.

In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as

above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the
protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no
jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no
question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial
court is according to law in either case. The real question between
them is one of fact whether or not the protestant's certificate of
candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can
the question of jurisdiction be determined.
Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview
of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or
are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a
question of relevancy of evidence
Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of
the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be
tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the
parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is involved. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a
specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an
examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such
importance as call for the intervention of this Court.
Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is wellsettled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private,
interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the ballot
boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which
are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question
as to their illegality.

Pantaleon vs. Asuncion

G.R. No. L-13141 | May 22, 1959
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Vicenta Pantaleon instituted this action in the CFI
Nueve Ecija, to recover from Asuncion the sum of P2k
2. Summons originally issued was returned by the sheriff
unserved
3. An alias summons was issued however unserved because
Asuncion had left the tala estate
4. On plaintiffs motion, the court ordered that defendant be
summoned by publication; summons was published in the
Examiner
5. Having failed to appear or answer within the period stated in
the summons, defendant was declared in default
6. Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
said defendant
7. Defendant filed a petition for relief from said order, and from
said judgment, and upon the ground of mistake and
excusable negligence
8. Affidavit of Asuncion:
- On September 26, 1955, at 34 Pitimine Street, San
Francisco del Monte Quezon City, which is his residence,
he received notice of a registered letter at the Post
Office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence;
- that he proceeded immediately to the latter municipality
to claim said letter, which he received on September 28,
1955;
- that the letter contained copy of said order of July 12,
1955, and of the judgment of September 8, 1955, much
to his surprise, for he had not been summoned or
notified of the hearing of this case;
- that had copy of the summons and of the order for its
publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule
7, section 21, of the Rules of Court said summons and
order would have reached him, "as the judgment herein
had"; and that his failure to appear before the court is
excusable it being due to the mistake of the authorities
concerned in not complying with the provisions of said
section.
9. Upon denial of said petition for relief, defendant perfected
his present appeal, which is predicated upon the theory that
the aforementioned summons by publication had not been
made in conformity with the Rules of Court.
- copy of the summons and of the order for the publication
thereof were not deposited "in the post office, postage

prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to

his last known address", in violation of Rule 7, section
21, of the Rules of Court
10. Plaintiff alleged:
- provision applicable to the case is not this Section 21,
but Section 16, of Rule 7, ROC
- the requirement, Section 21, of an affidavit showing that
copy of the summons and of the order for its publication
had been sent by mail to defendants last known
address, refers to extraterritorial service of summons in
Section 17 Rule 7
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIO:
Said section 21, however, is unqualified. It prescribes the "proof of
service by publication", regardless of whether the defendant is a
resident of the Philippines or not. Section 16 must be read in
relation to section 21, which complements it. Then, too, we
conceive of no reason, and plaintiff has suggested none, why copy
of the summons and of the order for its publication should be
mailed to non-resident defendants, but not to resident defendants.
We cannot even say that defendant herein, who, according to the
return of the Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, was reportedly residing in Rizal
where he, in fact (San Francisco del Monte and Quezon City used
to be part of Rizal), was residing could reasonably be expected to
read the summons published in a newspaper said to be a general
circulation in Nueva Ecija.
Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is
necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by publication, the
onclusion is inescapable that the lower court had no authority
whatsoever to issue the order declaring the defendant in default
and to render the decision of Sept 8, 1955, and that both are null
and void ab initio
Apart from the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle of
Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the
one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority
of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot

consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights

confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.
The specification of the dates of payment, of the amounts paid
each time, of the manner in which each payment was made, and of
the number of the money orders in which eighteen (18) payments
had been effected, constitutes a strong indication of the probable
veracity of said allegation, fully justifying the grant of an
opportunity to prove the same.

Gemperle vs. Schenker

G.R. No. L-18164 | January 23, 1967
FACTS:
1. Sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker (acting through his wife
and attorney-in-fact) filed with the CFI Rizal a complaint
against plaintiff Gemperle, for the enforcement of
Schenkers allegedly initial subscription to the shares of
stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the
exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then
unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the
increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages
2. Gemperle commenced the present action against Schenkers
for the recovery of P300k as damages, attys fees and costs,
and praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker to
retract in writing the said defamatory expressions
- Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some
allegations thereof and other matters, which were
impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case No.
Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the
reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the
only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and
reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred,
discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a
businessman"
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court had acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker
HELD: YES
RATIO:
Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has
not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although
the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served
personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through
voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a special
appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an

answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants,
by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint, respectfully aver",
which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission
to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by
a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but
this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including
her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative
defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of
Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense.
Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction
over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to
him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is
the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband
aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed
at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity.
In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had
actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also,
empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly
in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the
action brought by her on his behalf.
Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs.
Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the
conclusion drawn therefore from is, likewise, untenable.

Sequito vs. Letrondo

G.R. No. L-11588 | July 20, 1959
FACTS:
1. The complaint in this case was filed in court
2. The summons was served by police sergeant Borja upon
defendants daughter (12 y/o)
3. Defendant failed to file an answer and so, upon plaintiffs
motion, he was declared in default.
4. Plaintiffs presented their evidence ex parte; same consists
of plaintiff Sequitos testimony only
5. Court rendered judgment appealed from
6. Defendant moved for new trial: he did not receive of the
summons and that he came to know about the case only
when he received a copy of the decision; attached to his
motion affidavits of merit and a copy of a deed of sale of the
land
7. Motion denied
8. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying
defendants motion for new trial (depends on whether or
not there had been a valid substituted service of summons)
HELD: YES
RATIO:
The record shows that the service of the summons was irregular. It
was served by one police sergeant, Pacifico Borja, who was not a
sheriff or a court officer, and who was not authorized by the court
to deliver the summons. This violates the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 7, Rules of Court. The proof of service is also not under oath as
required by Section 20 of said rule.
Moreover, even if the summons was really served upon defendant's
daughter, still there was no valid substituted service because she,
being only 12 years of age and a grade four pupil, could not have
appreciated the importance of the paper delivered to her. We
cannot say with certainty that the daughter was at the time of a

suitable age and discretion to be entrusted with so important a

document as a court summons (Section 8, Rule 7, Rules of Court).
As there is no evidence to show that defendant ever came to know
about the case before he received the decision, the irregularity in
the service was not cured. Defendant's failure to file his answer is,
therefore, justified.

Jaranilla vs. Gonzales

G.R. No. L-5629 | October 11, 1954
FACTS:
1. Puzons were the plaintiffs; Lourdes Vda. De Sison was the
original defendant
2. Defendant stated that it would necessary to include all the
children of the deceased Sison (husband of defendant) in
substitution of deceased
3. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint by naming therein
as co-defendants the children of deceased and requested
that their mother be appointed as their guardian ad litem,
but Antonio Jaranilla, was not included as one of the party
defendants
4. No objection thus was ordered to issue the summons
against new defendants
5. Summons was served on Lourdes Sison and on Lili Sison but
none were personally served to each of the minors
6. The property object of the litigation was originally the
conjugal property of the spouses Sison, which the plaintiffs
Puzon claimed to have acquired from Josefa de Sison
7. Upon motion of the defendants therein, the CFI rendered an
order dismissing the complaint after plaintiffs had
introduced all their evidence and after the defendant had
presented 5 witnesses, one of them being Lourdes Ichon
who was still testifying but before the defense had
completed their evidence
8. Plaintiffs brought up the case on appeal to CA
9. CA reversed order of dismissal and rendered decision in
favor of plaintiffs
10. Copy of the motion for the execution of the judgment and
copy of writ issued were served upon the attorney of record
of defendants, but were not served personally again upon
plaintiffs
11. In acc with the writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan placed defendants in possession of the land
involved
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance of the attorneys in
behalf of the minors in the action is equivalent to service

HELD: YES
RATIO:
There is no doubt that plaintiff Lili Sison Jaranilla is bound by the
judgment rendered in civil case No. 8967 of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan and reversed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR No. 2903-R, because her husband was not a
necessary party, the controversy therein involved being her share
in the parcels of land which she had inherited from her deceased
father.
As to the second point raised and decided in favor of the rest of the
plaintiffs by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, it appears
that the plaintiffs who were minors except Lili Sison Jaranilla were
not summoned in the action (civil case No. 8967), as provided for in
section 10, Rule 7; that Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison, the defendant
therein, represented to the Court that as her children were
necessary parties they should be joined as defendants; that on 25
June 1946, as prayed for by the defendant therein, the plaintiffs
therein amended their complaint impleading said children who, as
the agreed statement of facts stipulates with the exception of Lili
Sison who was of age, were minors over 15 years of age and Rufo,
12 years old; that on 1 July 1946 the Court admitted the amended
complaint and ordered the new defendants to be summoned; that
the summons issued on that date by the clerk of court was served
on the 9th of that month upon Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison and on
the 15th of that month upon Lili Sison Jaranilla; that on 17 July 1946
attorneys Perez, Gayagoy, Abenojar and Ignacio D. Castillo filed an
answer to the amended complaint in behalf of the impleaded
defendants Lili Sison Jaranilla, Lita Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio
Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison; that on 12 September 1946, as prayed for
by the attorney appearing for the defendants therein, Lourdes
Ichon Vda. de Sison was appointed guardian ad litem to represent
her minor children and qualified as such by taking her oath before
deputy clerk of court Genaro Ferrer; and that in the Court of First
Instance, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, attorneys Perez,
Gayagoy, Santos & Abenojar, Ignacio D. Castillo, Aquino & Allas and
Porfirio V. Sison represented in all their pleadings that they were
appearing for all the defendants therein.
Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, we are
of the opinion that the appearance of the attorneys in behalf of the

minors in the action is equivalent to service. The denial by the

minors of having authorized said attorneys to represent them may
be conceded but such denial does not destroy the presumption that
the services of the attorneys had been engaged by the guardian ad
litem not only to represent her but also the minors. If the duly
appointed guardian ad litem, who is the mother of the minors, did
not consider the summons served on her alone as a summons also
on her minor children, or if she did not authorize her attorneys to
represent her minor children, she should have raised the question
in the case before or during the trial or thereafter but before
judgment was rendered. The failure of the guardian ad litem and of
her attorneys to raise the point of lack of summons service upon
the minors personally is a waiver on the part of said minors
represented by their mother, their guardian ad litem, to question
the lack of such service upon them personally. As already stated,
the voluntary appearance of the attorneys not only for Lourdes
Ichon Vda. de Sison but also for the minors is equivalent to service.

Philsec Investment vs. CA

G.R. No. 103493 | June 19, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners
Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment
Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent
1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed
Ducats obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc.
executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas,
U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as
initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid
by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of
1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from
1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in
their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire
amount covered by the note became due and demandable.

Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners

PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of
the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud
allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under
the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners
filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the RTC
Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in
their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United
States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents
committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent
more than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the
grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S.,
(2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC
and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary
requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before
the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in
private international law of forum non conveniens, even as it
noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in
applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488,
Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment
of the U.S. court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
RATIO: NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the

judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on

grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction,
with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions
in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence
of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for
declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private
respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary.
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished

copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence

presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the
issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues
raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the
case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1,
which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance