EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and
LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heirappellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP; U.S.
CITIZENSHIP NOT LOST BY STAY IN PHILIPPINES BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. The
citizenship that the deceased acquired in California when he resided there from
1904 to 1913 was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States until 1946, and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his
will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
2.
ID.; VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS; MEANING OF "NATIONAL
LAW" IN ARTICLE 16, CIVIL CODE; CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IN CALIFORNIA TO BE
APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to any general American law, because there is no such
law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the union having its own private law applicable to its citizen only and in
force only within the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the private law of
the state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of
California, prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for its citizens
domiciled in other jurisdiction. Hence, reason demands that the California conict of
law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
3.
ID.; ID.; DOMICILE; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING ALIEN'S
DOMICILE IN THE PHILIPPINES. An American citizen who was born in New York,
migrated to California, resided there for nine years, came to the Philippine in 1913,
and very rarely returned to California and only for short visits, and who appears to
have never owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, shall be
considered to have his domicile in the Philippines.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF RESORTING TO THE LAW OF THE DOMICILE IN
DETERMINING MATTERS WITH FOREIGN ELEMENT INVOLVED. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with

foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF DOMICILE BOUND TO APPLY ITS OWN LAW AS
DIRECTED IN THE CONFLICT OF LAW RULE OF DECEDENT'S STATE; APPLICATION
OF THE RENVOI DOCTRINE. The conict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not
and should refer the case back to California, as such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth
between the two states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine court must
apply its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in
the conict of law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially
because the internal law of California provides no legitime for natural children,
while the Philippine law (Articles 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines)
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE LAW TO BE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR.
As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledge natural child of
the latter's legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, not by the law of California.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J :
p

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among other things the nal accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of
P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to
Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
and contains the following provisions:
"3.
I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named Maria Lucy
Christensen (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
"4.

I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no

descendents except my above named daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen

Daney.
xxx xxx xxx
"7.
I give, devise and bequeath unto Maria Helen Christensen, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
"12.
I hereby give devise and bequeath unto my well-beloved daughter,
the said Maris Lucy Christensen Daney (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing
as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property
and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character,
and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and
which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime: . . ."

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his nal
account and project partition ratied the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was led by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and
(b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplication of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile
of the decedent apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent,
she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United

States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record
on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, led various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
(1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

"In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record
show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875, in New York City, N. Y., U.S.A.; his rst arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport 'Sheridan' with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco,
in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
"In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and
stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he
resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
"Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States
and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in
1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
"Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April
1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees' Collective Exhibits '6', CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622.
as Exhibits 'AA', 'BB' and 'CC-Daney'; Exhs. 'MM', 'MM-1', 'MM-2-Daney', and p.
473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.
"In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California
shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question
herein) which he executed at his lawyers' oces in Manila on March 5, 1951.
He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953." (Pp.
2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties
in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
"Sec. 16.
Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from
mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence." (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, we nd that the citizenship that he acquired in

California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in

accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conict of

Laws.
"The terms 'residence' and 'domicile' might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where
he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.
The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said
to have sucient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear,
however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the
particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be
a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.'
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe
to insist that any one use is the only proper one." (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is dened in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
"ART. 16.
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law " as used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to
its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the case at bar, the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions

of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
the law of his domicile."

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not

denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee,
on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testied to by a
witness. (Only the case Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's
behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the above-cited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The theory or doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
"The problem has been stated in this way: 'When the Conict of Laws rule of
the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
to the corresponding rule of the Conict of Law of that foreign law, or is the
reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
totality of the foreign law, minus its Conflict of Laws rules?
"On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined that
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan Conict of Laws. This
would have resulted in the 'endless chain of references' which has so often
been criticized by legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have
looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be to the internal law rather than to the Conict of
Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting o at the second reference and at that point applying
internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent
for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
"Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi
plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective
views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states
whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the
renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the

result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect
to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

"The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title
to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases, the Conict of Laws rule of the situs of the land,
or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but
any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere."
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
"X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
"Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the
rule of the conict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis
X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court
to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts state of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to
apply the French laws as to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into
a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the socalled renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own
law.
"This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conict-oflaws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conict-of-laws rule of
which, in turn refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
"After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to
as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules
as to the conict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted
to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in
but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively

designated by them as the 'Renvoyer' to send back, or the

Ruchversweisung', or the 'Weiterverweisung', since an armative answer to
the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law
in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
decided according to the law of the forum . . . (15 C.J.S. 872.)
"Another theory, known as the 'doctrine of renvoi', has been advanced. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of
the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conict of laws, and then apply
the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities." (2 Am. Jur. 296.)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been dened and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 509-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
"The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conict of
laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal
law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conict of laws as
well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its
law.
xxx xxx xxx
"Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
"(1)
Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
"(2)
Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court
shall respect:
"(a)
The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by law of the domicile, or even by the
law of the place where the act in question occurred.
"(b)
The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be
certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
"If, for example, the English Law directs its judge to distribute the personal
estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
with the law of his domicile, he must rst inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of

domicile, and if he nds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law, he must
accept this reference back to his own law."

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code as its conict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conict of law rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each
in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its
citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
"When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more estates, and
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of
the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of the
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that,
since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case
of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary disposition of the property. Here, also, it is not that
the domiciliary has eect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The
rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conict of Laws
rules at the situs of the property, and the reason for the recognition as in
the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point; 'The general principle that a
disposition of personal property valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
everywhere, is one of universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and in this
age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of
the rule is more apparent than ever.'" (Goodrich, Conict of Laws, Sec. 164,
pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conict of law rules law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If
we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to do, as so
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California
in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply
the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict of laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in

the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conict of law rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894,
Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced
heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil., 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock,
52 Phil., 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil., 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the
United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or
identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore nd that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law
on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.