Arroyo vs. DOJ
Arroyo vs. DOJ
Arroyo vs. DOJ
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 199082
Before the Court are three (3) consolidated petitions and supplemental petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo) in G.R.
No. 199082, Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) in G.R. No. 199085 and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) in G.R. No. 199118 assailing the following: (1) Commission on Elections (Comelec)
Resolution No. 9266 "In the Matter of the Commission on Elections and Department of Justice Joint
Investigation on the Alleged Election Offenses Committed during the 2004 and 2007 Elections
Pursuant to Law"1 dated August 2, 2011; (2) Joint Order No. 001-2011 (Joint Order) "Creating and
Constituting a Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee [Joint Committee] and FactFinding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and
Manipulation Cases"2 dated August 15, 2011; (3) Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections (Joint
Committee Rules of Procedure)3 dated August 23, 2011; and (4) Initial Report of the Fact-Finding
Team dated October 20, 2011.4 The consolidated petitions and supplemental petitions likewise assail
the validity of the proceedings undertaken pursuant to the aforesaid issuances.
The Antecedents
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating the
occurrence of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007
National Elections, on August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the
creation of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.5
On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 640 6 naming three (3) of
its prosecutors to the Joint Committee.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are
composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of the Joint Order lays down the
mandate of the Joint Committee, to wit:
Section 2. Mandate. The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the
basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team created
and referred to in Section 4 hereof. Resolutions finding probable cause for election offenses, defined
and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws shall be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. For other offenses, or those not
covered by the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the corresponding criminal
information may be filed directly with the appropriate courts.7
The Fact-Finding Team,8 on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real,
documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be
conducted by the Joint Committee. Its specific duties and functions as enumerated in Section 4 of
the Joint Order are as follows:
a) Gather and document reports, intelligence information, and investigative leads from official
as well as unofficial sources and informants;
b) Conduct interviews, record testimonies, take affidavits of witnesses, and collate material
and relevant documentary evidence, such as, but not limited to, election documents used in
the 2004 and 2007 national elections. For security reasons, or to protect the identities of
informants, the Fact-Finding Team may conduct interviews or document testimonies
discreetly;
c) Assess and evaluate affidavits already executed and other documentary evidence
submitted or may be submitted to the Fact-Finding Team and/or Committee;
d) Identify the offenders, their offenses and the manner of their commission, individually or in
conspiracy, and the provisions of election and general criminal laws violated, establish
evidence for individual criminal and administrative liability and prosecution, and prepare the
necessary documentation, such as complaints and charge sheets for the initiation of
preliminary investigation proceedings against said individuals to be conducted by the
Committee;
e) Regularly submit to the Committee, the Secretary of Justice and the Chairman of the
Comelec periodic reports and recommendations, supported by real, testimonial and
documentary evidence, which may then serve as the Committees basis for immediately
commencing appropriate preliminary investigation proceedings, as provided under Section 6
of this Joint Order; and
f) Upon the termination of its investigation, make a full and final report to the Committee, the
Secretary of Justice, and the Chairman of the Comelec. 9
Pursuant to Section 710 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its
Rules of Procedure.
The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that the subject of the Initial Report
would be the electoral fraud and manipulation of election results allegedly committed during the May
14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its Initial Report11 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces
of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. 12 The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that petitioner Abalos and ten (10) others13 be subjected to preliminary investigation
for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato.
Twenty-six (26)14 persons, including petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for manipulating the election results in
Maguindanao.15 Several persons were also recommended to be charged administratively, while
others,16 including petitioner Mike Arroyo, were recommended to be subjected to further
investigation.17 The case resulting from the investigation of the Fact-Finding Team was docketed as
DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) filed a ComplaintAffidavit18 for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others 19 and several John Does and
Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJComelec Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011.20 On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel,
appeared before the Joint Committee.21On that preliminary hearing, the Joint Committee
consolidated the two DOJ-Comelec cases. Respondents therein were likewise ordered to submit
their Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.22
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. 23 The petitions were eventually consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings 24 before the Joint
Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, petitioner
GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam 25 to require Senator
Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of
election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA contended that for the crime
of electoral sabotage to be established, there is a need to present election documents allegedly
tampered which resulted in the increase or decrease in the number of votes of local and national
candidates.26 GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from
receipt of the requested documents.27 Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),28 in view of the pendency of his petition brought before
the Court.
In an Order29 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of
petitioners. GMA subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. 30
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later
indorsed to the Comelec.31 On November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the Comelec
en banc issued a Resolution32approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee in DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 001-2011 and DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 0022011, upon the recommendation of the COMELECs own representatives in the Committee, is
hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. That information/s for the crime of ELECTORAL SABOTAGE under Section 42 (b) of R.A.
9369, amending Section 27 (b) of R.A. 6646, be filed against GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., LINTANG H. BEDOL, DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN, SR.
and PETER REYES;
2. That the charges against MICHAEL C. ABAS, NICODEMO FERRER, REUBEN BASIAO,
JAIME PAZ and NORIE K. UNAS be subjected to further investigation;
3. That the charges against JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, BONG SERRANO, ALBERTO
AGRA, ANDREI BON TAGUM, GABBY CLAUDIO, ROMY DAYDAY, JEREMY JAVIER,
JOHN DOE a.k.a BUTCH, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
cause;
4. That the recommendation that ESTELITA B. ORBASE, ELIZA A. GASMIN, ELSA Z.
ATINEN, SALIAO S. AMBA, MAGSAYSAY B. MOHAMAD, SALONGA K. EDZELA, RAGAH
D. AYUNAN, SUSAN U. CANANBAN, RUSSAM H. MABANG, ASUNCION CORAZON P.
RENIEDO, NENA A. ALID, MA. SUSAN L. ALBANO, ROHAIDA T. KHALID, ARAW M. CAO,
JEEHAN S. NUR, ALICE A. LIM, NORIJEAN P. HANGKAL, CHRISTINA ROAN M. DALOPE,
and MACEDA L. ABO be administratively charged be subjected to further review by this
Commission to determine the appropriate charge/s that may be filed against them;
5. That the findings of lack of probable cause against LILIAN S. SUAN-RADAM and YOGIE
G. MARTIRIZAR be REJECTED by reason of the pendency of their respective cases before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay (Branch 114) and this Commission for the same offense
under consideration.
In the higher interest of justice and by reason of manifest attempts to frustrate the governments right
to prosecute and to obtain speedy disposition of the present case pending before the Commission,
the Law Department and/or any COMELEC legal officers as may be authorized by this Commission
is hereby ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY PREPARE and FILE the necessary Information/s before the
appropriate court/s
SO ORDERED.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law Department filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal
Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42 (b)(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9369, amending Section 27 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432CR.34 The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which
was served on GMA on the same day.35
On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam36 with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by
GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a Hold Departure Order, and to proceed to judicial
determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad
Cautelam37 praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC nonetheless
issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which
was granted.
Issues
In G.R. No. 199082, petitioner Arroyo relies on the following grounds:
A. THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE VIA THE JOINT ORDER IS AT WAR WITH
THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION,
HAVING BEEN CREATED WITH THE SOLE END IN VIEW OF INVESTIGATING AND
PROSECUTING CERTAIN PERSONS AND INCIDENTS ONLY, SPECIFICALLY THOSE
INVOLVING THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTIONS TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS, IN
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN BIRAOGO V. TRUTH COMMISSION AND
COMPANION CASE.
B. NO LAW OR RULE AUTHORIZES THE JOINT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
C. THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, WHICH FUSES THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS - A CONSTITUTIONALLY INDEPENDENT BODY - WITH THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE A POLITICAL AGENT OF THE EXECUTIVE DEMOLISHES THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE
IX(A), SECTIONS 1 AND 2 AND IX(C) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
D. IN VIEW OF THE NUMEROUS AND PERSISTENT PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF
THE PRESIDENT, HIS SPOKESPERSONS, THE HEADS OF THE DOJ AND THE
COMELEC, AND MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE THAT CASES SHOULD BE
FILED AGAINST PETITIONER AND HIS FAMILY AND ALLEGED ASSOCIATES BY THE
investigation.47 Respondents also claim that the issues relating to the constitutionality and validity of
the conduct of the preliminary investigation of GMA are best left to the trial court, considering that it
involves questions of fact.48 Respondents add that considering that the RTC has concurrent
jurisdiction to determine a constitutional issue, it will be practical for the Court to allow the RTC to
determine the constitutional issues in this case.49
We do not agree.
Mootness
It cannot be gainsaid that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual
case or controversy, that is, one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.50 The case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 51
A case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. 52 However, a case should not be
dismissed simply because one of the issues raised therein had become moot and academic by the
onset of a supervening event, whether intended or incidental, if there are other causes which need to
be resolved after trial.53
Here, the consolidated cases are not rendered moot and academic by the promulgation of the Joint
Resolution by the Joint Committee and the approval thereof by the Comelec. It must be recalled that
the main issues in the three petitions before us are the constitutionality and legality of the creation of
the Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team as well as the proceedings undertaken pursuant
thereto. The assailed Joint Order specifically provides that the Joint Committee was created for
purposes of investigating the alleged massive electoral fraud during the 2004 and 2007 national
elections. However, in the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report, the team specifically agreed that the
report would focus on the irregularities during the 2007 elections. Also, in its November 18, 2011
Resolution, the Comelec, while directing the filing of information against petitioners Abalos and
GMA, ordered that further investigations be conducted against the other respondents therein.
Apparently, the Fact-Finding Teams and Joint
Committees respective mandates have not been fulfilled and they are, therefore, bound to continue
discharging their duties set forth in the assailed Joint Order. Moreover, petitioners question the
validity of the proceedings undertaken by the Fact-Finding Team and the Joint Committee leading to
the filing of information, on constitutional grounds. We are not, therefore, barred from deciding on the
petitions simply by the occurrence of the supervening events of filing an information and dismissal of
the charges.
Jurisdiction over the validity of the
conduct of the preliminary investigation
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation and at the same time with the propriety of the conduct of preliminary
investigation. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 54 the
Court resolved two issues, namely: (1) whether or not the PCGG has the power to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against
Eduardo Conjuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds; and
(2) on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to conduct such a preliminary investigation, whether or
not its conduct constitutes a violation of petitioners right to due process and equal protection of the
law.55 The Court decided these issues notwithstanding the fact that Informations had already been
filed with the trial court.
In Allado v. Diokno,56 in a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the Court could not ignore the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate
interest of the government in filing the same. Thus, this Court took time to determine whether or not
there was, indeed, probable cause to warrant the filing of information. This, notwithstanding the fact
that information had been filed and a warrant of arrest had been issued. Petitioners therein came
directly to this Court and sought relief to rectify the injustice that they suffered.
Hierarchy of courts
Neither can the petitions be dismissed solely because of violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts. This principle requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.57 The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this
jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals and the RTC, a direct invocation of this Courts
jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially
set out in the petition, as in the present case.58 In the consolidated petitions, petitioners invoke
exemption from the observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts in keeping with the Courts duty to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 59
It is noteworthy that the consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of issuances and
resolutions of the DOJ and the Comelec. The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation.
However, such rule is subject to exception, that is, in circumstances where the Court believes that
resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. 60
This case falls within the exception. An expeditious resolution of the issues raised in the petitions is
necessary. Besides, the Court has entertained a direct resort to the Court without the requisite
motion for reconsideration filed below or without exhaustion of administrative remedies where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the government or of the petitioners and when there is an alleged violation of due
process, as in the present case.61 We apply the same relaxation of the Rules in the present case
and, thus, entertain direct resort to this Court.
Substantive Issues
Bases for the Creation of the
Fact-Finding Team and Joint Committee
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the
Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof vests in the Comelec the power to:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This was an important innovation introduced by the 1987 Constitution, because the above-quoted
provision was not in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.62
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct
to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The failure of the
Comelec to exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. 63
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on
any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the
office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the Ministry Department of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the
authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. 64 Thus, under
Section 2,65 Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same. The
complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its duly
authorized representatives.66
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec. The reason for
this delegation of authority has been explained in Commission on Elections v. Espaol: 67
The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need for prompt
investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of the task of securing fine,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its
workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such
investigation and to prosecute such cases.68
Moreover, as we acknowledged in People v. Basilla,69 the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would
simply not be possible without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals prosecutors and their
assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the DOJ. 70
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was amended by Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369, 71 which
reads:
Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. 72
As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the Comelec and the DOJ to perform any act
necessary to ensure the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses. Pursuant
to the above constitutional and statutory provisions, and as will be explained further below, we find
no impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team
for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the
manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the
presidential and senatorial elections.73
Constitutionality of Joint-Order No. 001-2011
A. Equal Protection Clause
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and
prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They argue that there is no substantial distinction
between the allegations of massive electoral fraud in 2004 and 2007, on the one hand, and previous
and subsequent national elections, on the other hand; and no substantial distinction between
petitioners and the other persons or public officials who might have been involved in previous
election offenses. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo
Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration. To bolster their claim,
petitioners explain that Joint Order No. 001-2011 is similar to Executive Order No. 1 (creating the
Philippine Truth Commission) which this Court had already nullified for being
violative of the equal protection clause.
Respondents, however, refute the above contentions and argue that the wide array of the possible
election offenses and broad spectrum of individuals who may have committed them, if any,
immediately negate the assertion that the assailed orders are aimed only at the officials of the Arroyo
Administration.
We agree with the respondents.
The equal protection clause is enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 74
The concept of equal protection has been laid down in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010:75
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly-situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 76
Unlike the matter addressed by the Courts ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials of the
Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection clause. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of investigating alleged graft and
corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive Order No. 1 77 specifically referred to the
"previous administration"; while the Joint Committee was created for the purpose of conducting
preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and
Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein
were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their
acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.78
We once held that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by
the Constitution and by law and thus may, for every particular investigation, whether commenced by
complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue each investigation. Since the Office of
the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations
cannot by itself be considered a violation of any of the parties rights to the equal protection of the
laws.79 This same doctrine should likewise apply in the present case.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing and administering all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall,80 and tasked to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, 81 the Comelec
has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this
authority, the Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or national elections setting
forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the elections. This shows that every election is
distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
existing circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for violations of election laws may be filed
either with the Comelec or with the DOJ. The Comelec may even initiate, motu proprio, complaints
for election offenses.82
Pursuant to law and the Comelecs own Rules, investigations may be conducted either by the
Comelec itself through its law department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying
procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that respondents are not treated alike. Thus,
petitioners insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to equal protection of the law is
misplaced.
B. Due Process
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel does not possess the required cold neutrality of an impartial
judge because it is all at once the evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge. They explain that since
the Fact-Finding Team has found probable cause to subject them to preliminary investigation, it is
impossible for the Joint Committee to arrive at an opposite conclusion. Petitioners likewise express
doubts of any possibility that the Joint Committee will be fair and impartial to them as Secretary De
Lima and Chairman Brillantes had repeatedly expressed prejudgment against petitioners through
their statements captured by the media.
For their part, respondents contend that petitioners failed to present proof that the President of the
Philippines, Secretary of Justice, and Chairman of the Comelec actually made the statements
allegedly prejudging their case and in the context in which they interpreted them. They likewise
contend that assuming that said statements were made, there was no showing that Secretary De
Lima had tried to intervene in the investigation to influence its outcome nor was it proven that the
Joint Committee itself had prejudged the case. Lastly, they point out that Joint Order No. 001-2011
created two bodies, the Fact-Finding Team and the Joint Committee, with their respective mandates.
Hence, they cannot be considered as one.
We find for respondents.
It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court proceedings, subject to the
requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. 83 Preliminary investigation is
considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of
his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer.84 The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer
duly empowered to preside over or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a
municipal judge or even an RTC Judge.85 Thus, as emphasized by the Court in Ladlad v. Velasco: 86
x x x We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving
the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political
ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the
interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or
poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure
may public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. 87
In this case, as correctly pointed out by respondents, there was no showing that the statements
claimed to have prejudged the case against petitioners were made by Secretary De Lima and
Chairman Brillantes or were in the prejudicial context in which petitioners claimed the statements
were made. A reading of the statements allegedly made by them reveals that they were just
responding to hypothetical questions in the event that probable cause would eventually be found by
the Joint Committee.
More importantly, there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself, tasked to
conduct the requisite preliminary investigation against petitioners, made biased statements that
would convey to the public that the members were favoring a particular party. Neither did the
petitioners show that the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice or the Chairman of the
Comelec intervened in the conduct of the preliminary investigation or exerted undue pressure on
their subordinates to tailor their decision with their public declarations and adhere to a predetermined result.88 Moreover, insofar as the Comelec is concerned, it must be emphasized that the
constitutional body is collegial. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that
of the entire body itself.89 In equating the alleged bias of the above-named officials with that of the
Joint Committee, there would be no arm of the government credible enough to conduct a preliminary
investigation.90
It must also be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies, namely: (1) the FactFinding Team tasked to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in
the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee; and (2) the Joint Committee
mandated to conduct preliminary investigation. It is, therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only
one body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge.
C. Separation of powers
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel is a new public office as shown by its composition, the creation
of its own Rules of Procedure, and the source of funding for its operation. It is their position that the
power of the DOJ to investigate the commission of crimes and the Comelecs constitutional mandate
to investigate and prosecute violations of election laws do not include the power to create a new
public office in the guise of a joint committee. Thus, in creating the Joint Panel, the DOJ and the
Comelec encroached upon the power of the Legislature to create public office.
Respondents dispute this and contend that the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team are not new
public offices, but merely collaborations between two existing government agencies sharing
concurrent jurisdiction. This is shown by the fact that the members of the Joint Panel are existing
officers of the DOJ and the Comelec who exercise duties and functions that are already vested in
them.
Again, we agree with respondents.
As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where appropriate,
prosecute cases of election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is mandated to administer the criminal justice
system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system. 91 It is specifically
empowered to "investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system."92 Also, the provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants, as
well as the national and regional state prosecutors, are specifically named as the officers authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation.93 Recently, the Comelec, through its duly authorized legal
offices, is given the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government such as
the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.94
Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the assailed Joint Order
which give the DOJ and the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary investigation. No new power
is given to them by virtue of the assailed order. As to the members of the Joint Committee and FactFinding Team, they perform such functions that they already perform by virtue of their current
positions as prosecutors of the DOJ and legal officers of the Comelec. Thus, in no way can we
consider the Joint Committee as a new public office.
D. Independence of the Comelec
Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has effectively abdicated its
constitutional mandate to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation of
election laws including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices in
favor of the Executive Department acting through the DOJ Secretary. Under the set- up, the
Comelec personnel is placed under the supervision and control of the DOJ. The chairperson is a
DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly surrendered its independence to the DOJ and has
acceded to share its exercise of judgment and discretion with the Executive Branch.
We do not agree.
Section 1,95 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. 96 The
Constitution envisions a truly independent Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as the guardian of the peoples sacred right of suffrage
the citizenrys vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and
promoting political stability.97
Prior to the amendment of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Comelec had the
exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses. In the discharge of this exclusive
power, the Comelec was given the right to avail and, in fact, availed of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government such as the prosecutors of the DOJ. By virtue of this continuing
authority, the state prosecutors and the provincial or city prosecutors were authorized to receive the
complaint for election offense and delegate the conduct of investigation to any of their assistants.
The investigating prosecutor, in turn, would make a recommendation either to dismiss the complaint
or to file the information. This recommendation is subject to the approval of the state, provincial or
city prosecutor, who himself may file the information with the proper court if he finds sufficient cause
to do so, subject, however, to the accuseds right to appeal to the Comelec. 98
Moreover, during the past national and local elections, the Comelec issued Resolutions 99 requesting
the Secretary of Justice to assign prosecutors as members of Special Task Forces to assist the
Comelec in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. These Special Task Forces were
created because of the need for additional lawyers to handle the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses.
Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the prosecutors the power to conduct
preliminary investigation. Otherwise, the prompt resolution of alleged election offenses will not be
attained. This delegation of power, otherwise known as deputation, has long been recognized and, in
fact, been utilized as an effective means of disposing of various election offense cases. Apparently,
as mere deputies, the prosecutors played a vital role in the conduct of preliminary investigation, in
the resolution of complaints filed before them, and in the filing of the informations with the proper
court.
As pointed out by the Court in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections,100 the grant of exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases of election offenses to the Comelec was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the
Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ
now conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no
longer as mere deputies. If the prosecutors had been allowed to conduct preliminary investigation
and file the necessary information by virtue only of a delegated authority, they now have better
grounds to perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of authority. If deputation was
justified because of lack of funds and legal officers to ensure prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses, the same justification should be cited to justify the grant to the other
prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the creation of a Joint Committee.
While the composition of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is dominated by DOJ officials,
it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is inferior. Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the
Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec
in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts
jointly with the DOJ, remains in control of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec
has thereby abdicated its independence to the executive department.
The text and intent of the constitutional provision granting the Comelec the authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is to give the Comelec all the necessary and incidental powers for it
to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 101 The
Comelec should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created.102We may not agree fully with its
choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
Court should not interfere.103 Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional
bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
Although it belongs to the executive department, as the agency tasked to investigate crimes,
prosecute offenders, and administer the correctional system, the DOJ is likewise not barred from
acting jointly with the Comelec. It must be emphasized that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses. The doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.104 Contrary to
the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between
two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office
over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. 105 As
cogently held by the Court in Department of Justice v. Hon. Liwag:106
To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who
would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would lead hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their
cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies
exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt
of the respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the
use of valuable and limited resources of Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started
with the Ombudsman.107
None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ
themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the
preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the
Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel both complaints were filed with the Joint
Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was
conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given
the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation
also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the
prompt disposition of the cases.
Citing the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, petitioners insist that the investigation conducted by the
Comelec involving Radam and Martirizar bars the creation of the Joint Committee for purposes of
conducting another preliminary investigation. In short, they claim that the exercise by the Comelec of
its jurisdiction to investigate excludes other bodies such as the DOJ and the Joint Committee from
taking cognizance of the case. Petitioners add that the investigation should have been conducted
also by the Comelec as the 2007 cases of Radam and Martirizar include several John Does and
Jane Does.
We do not agree.
While the Comelec conducted the preliminary investigation against Radam, Martirizar and other
unidentified persons, it only pertains to election offenses allegedly committed in North and South
Cotabato. On the other hand, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee
(involving GMA) pertains to election offenses supposedly committed in Maguindanao. More
importantly, considering the broad power of the Comelec to choose the means of fulfilling its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as discussed earlier, there is
nothing wrong if the Comelec chooses to work jointly with the DOJ in the conduct of said
investigation. To reiterate, in no way can we consider this as an act abdicating the independence of
the Comelec.
Publication Requirement
In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the DOJ is governed by the Rules of Court, while the
Comelec is governed by the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure. There is, therefore, no need to
promulgate new Rules as may be complementary to the DOJ and Comelec Rules.
As earlier discussed, considering that Joint Order No. 001-2011 only enables the Comelec and the
DOJ to exercise powers which are already vested in them by the Constitution and other existing
laws, it need not be published for it to be valid and effective. A close examination of the Joint
Committees Rules of Procedure, however, would show that its provisions affect the public.
Specifically, the following provisions of the Rules either restrict the rights of or provide remedies to
the affected parties, to wit: (1) Section 1 provides that "the Joint Committee will no longer entertain
complaints from the public as soon as the Fact-Finding Team submits its final report, except for such
complaints involving offenses mentioned in the Fact-Finding Teams Final Report"; (2) Section 2
states that "the Joint Committee shall not entertain a Motion to Dismiss"; and (3) Section 5 provides
that a Motion for Reconsideration may be availed of by the aggrieved parties against the Joint
Committees Resolution. Consequently, publication of the Rules is necessary.
The publication requirement covers not only statutes but administrative regulations and issuances,
as clearly outlined in Taada v. Tuvera:108 effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.109
As opposed to Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice,110 where the Court held that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is only an internal
arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman outlining the authority and
responsibilities among prosecutors of both offices in the conduct of preliminary investigation, the
assailed Joint Committees Rules of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors of the DOJ and the
Comelec but also the conduct and rights of persons, or the public in general. The publication
requirement should, therefore, not be ignored.
Publication is a necessary component of procedural due process to give as wide publicity as
possible so that all persons having an interest in the proceedings may be notified thereof. 111 The
requirement of publication is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. It is
imperative for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgressions of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever.112
Nevertheless, even if the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure is ineffective for lack of publication,
the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee are not rendered null and void for that reason,
because the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Joint Committee pursuant to the
procedures laid down in Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec Rules
of Procedure.
Validity of the Conduct of
Preliminary Investigation
In her Supplemental Petition,113 GMA outlines the incidents that took place after the filing of the
instant petition, specifically the issuance by the Joint Committee of the Joint Resolution, the approval
with modification of such resolution by the Comelec and the filing of information and the issuance of
a warrant of arrest by the RTC. With these supervening events, GMA further assails the validity of
the proceedings that took place based on the following additional grounds: (1) the undue and
unbelievable haste attending the Joint Committees conduct of the preliminary investigation, its
resolution of the case, and its referral to and approval by the Comelec, taken in conjunction with the
statements from the Office of the President, demonstrate a deliberate and reprehensible pattern of
abuse of inalienable rights and a blatant disregard of the envisioned integrity and independence of
the Comelec; (2) as it stands, the creation of the Joint Committee was for the singular purpose of
railroading the proceedings in the prosecution of the petitioner and in flagrant violation of her right to
due process and equal protection of the laws; (3) the proceedings of the Joint Committee cannot be
considered impartial and fair, considering that respondents have acted as law enforcers, who
conducted the criminal investigation, gathered evidence and thereafter ordered the filing of
complaints, and at the same time authorized preliminary investigation based on the complaints they
caused to be filed; (4) the Comelec became an instrument of oppression when it hastily approved
the resolution of the Joint Committee even if two of its members were in no position to cast their
votes as they admitted to not having yet read the voluminous records of the cases; and (5) flagrant
and repeated violations of her right to due process at every stage of the proceedings demonstrate a
deliberate attempt to single out petitioner through the creation of the Joint Committee. 114
In their Supplement to the Consolidated Comment,115 respondents accuse petitioners of violating the
rule against forum shopping. They contend that in filing the Supplemental Petition before the Court,
the Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with the RTC, and the Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam with
the Comelec, GMA raises the common issue of whether or not the proceedings before the Joint
Committee and the Comelec are null and void for violating the Constitution. Respondents likewise
claim that the issues raised in the supplemental petition are factual which is beyond the power of this
Court to decide.
We cannot dismiss the cases before us on the ground of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari.116There can also be forum shopping when a party institutes two or
more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule
on the same and related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a partys
chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.117
Indeed, petitioner GMA filed a Supplemental Petition before the Court, an Urgent Omnibus Motion
Ad Cautelam before the RTC, and a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam before the Comelec,
emphasizing the unbelievable haste committed by the Joint Committee and the Comelec in
disposing of the cases before them. However, a plain reading of the allegations in GMAs motion
before the RTC would show that GMA raised the issue of undue haste in issuing the Joint Resolution
only in support of her prayer for the trial court to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, considering that her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to be furnished
copies of documents was not yet acted upon by the Joint Committee. If at all the constitutional issue
of violation of due process was raised, it was merely incidental. More importantly, GMA raised in her
motion with the RTC the finding of probable cause as she sought the judicial determination of
probable cause which is not an issue in the petitions before us. GMAs ultimate prayer is actually for
the court to defer the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Clearly, the reliefs sought in the RTC are
different from the reliefs sought in this case. Thus, there is no forum shopping.
With respect to the Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam filed with the Comelec, while the issues raised
therein are substantially similar to the issues in the supplemental petition which, therefore, strictly
speaking, warrants outright dismissal on the ground of forum shopping, we cannot do so in this case
in light of the due process issues raised by GMA.118 It is worthy to note that the main issues in the
present petitions are the constitutionality of the creation of the Joint Panel and the validity of the
proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto for alleged violation of the constitutional right to due
process. In questioning the propriety of the conduct of the preliminary investigation in her
Supplemental Petition, GMA only raises her continuing objection to the exercise of jurisdiction of the
Joint Committee and the Comelec. There is, therefore, no impediment for the Court to rule on the
validity of the conduct of preliminary investigation.
In Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman,119 the Court explained the nature of preliminary investigation, to
wit:
A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory
rather than constitutional, it is a component of due process in administering criminal justice. The right
to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and before being exposed
to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.120
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an
individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the
one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to
a preliminary investigation as not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part
of due process in criminal justice.121
In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the petitioners basic due process rights
such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits, and other supporting documents in her
defense.122 Admittedly, GMA received the notice requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit. Yet, she
did not comply, allegedly because she could not prepare her counter-affidavit. She claimed that she
was not furnished by Senator Pimentel pertinent documents that she needed to adequately prepare
her counter-affidavit.
In her Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam123 to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents
referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for production of election documents as basis for the charge
of electoral sabotage, GMA prayed that the Joint Committee issue an Order directing the FactFinding Team and Senator Pimentel to furnish her with copies of the following documents:
a. Complaint-affidavit and other relevant documents of Senator Aquilino Pimentel III filed
before the Commission on Elections against Attys. Lilia Suan-Radam and Yogie Martirizar, as
well as the Informations filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 in
Criminal Case Nos. R-PSU-11-03190-CR to R-PSU-11-03200-CR.
b. Records in the petitions filed by complainant Pimentel before the National Board of
Canvassers, specifically in NBC Case Nos. 07-162, 07-168, 07-157, 07-159, 07-161 and 07163.
c. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Maguindanao."
d. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Norte."
e. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan."
f. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur."
g. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Sulu."
h. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Basilan."
i. Documents which served as basis in the allegations of "Significant findings specific to the
protested municipalities in the Province of Sultan Kudarat." 124
GMA likewise requested the production of election documents used in the Provinces of South and
North Cotabato and Maguindanao.125
The Joint Committee, however, denied GMAs motion which carried with it the denial to extend the
filing of her counter-affidavit. Consequently, the cases were submitted for resolution sans GMAs and
the other petitioners counter-affidavits. This, according to GMA, violates her right to due process of
law.
We do not agree.
GMAs insistence of her right to be furnished the above-enumerated documents is based on Section
3 (b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
(b) x x x
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent,
and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense,
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.126
Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure also grants the respondent such right of
examination, to wit:
Sec. 6. Conduct of preliminary investigation. (a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he
shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Sec. 8
(c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of
the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from
receipt within which to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent
shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. 127
Clearly from the above-quoted provisions, the subpoena issued against respondent therein should
be accompanied by a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents. GMA also
has the right to examine documents but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or
evidence submitted by the complainants (Senator Pimentel and the Fact-Finding Team) which she
may not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases
in the allegations of significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were
no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. 128 As stated in the Joint Committees Order dated
November 15, 2011 denying GMAs Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to
furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence129 However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he
was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report. 130 Therefore, when
GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the
right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If
there are other documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint but were not
submitted to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point
(without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may later be presented during the trial) 131 as
the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against
her.132 Anyway, the failure of the complainant to submit documents supporting his allegations in the
complaint may only weaken his claims and eventually works for the benefit of the respondent as
these merely are allegations unsupported by independent evidence.
We must, however, emphasize at this point that during the preliminary investigation, the
complainants are not obliged to prove their cause beyond reasonable doubt. It would be unfair to
expect them to present the entire evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused prior to
the filing of information.133 A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties respective evidence but the presentation only of such evidence as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.134 Precisely there is a trial to allow the reception of
evidence for the prosecution in support of the charge. 135
With the denial of GMAs motion to be furnished with and examine the documents referred to in
Senator Pimentels complaint, GMAs motion to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence was consequently denied. Indeed, considering the nature of the crime for
which GMA was subjected to preliminary investigation and the documents attached to the complaint,
it is incumbent upon the Joint Committee to afford her ample time to examine the documents
submitted to the Joint Committee in order that she would be able to prepare her counter-affidavit.
She cannot, however, insist to examine documents not in the possession and custody of the Joint
Committee nor submitted by the complainants. Otherwise, it might cause undue and unnecessary
delay in the disposition of the cases. This undue delay might result in the violation of the right to a
speedy disposition of cases as enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the Constitution which states
that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies." The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil
and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. 136 Any
party to a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to
expedite its disposition.137 Society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the
societys representatives are the ones who should protect that interest. 138
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the denial of GMAs motion to be furnished with and
examine the documents referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint carried with it the denial to
extend the filing of her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence rendering the preliminary
investigation irregular, such irregularity would not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over the case and
would not nullify the warrant of arrest issued in connection therewith, considering that Informations
had already been filed against petitioners, except Mike Arroyo. This would only compel us to
suspend the proceedings in the RTC and remand the case to the Joint Committee so that GMA
could submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence if she still opts to. However, to
do so would hold back the progress of the case which is anathema to the accuseds right to speedy
disposition of cases.
It is well settled that the absence or irregularity of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts
jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information or render it
defective. Dismissal is not the remedy.139 Neither is it a ground to quash the information or nullify the
order of arrest issued against the accused or justify the release of the accused from detention. 140 The
proper course of action that should be taken is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such
information and to remand the case for the conduct of preliminary investigation. 141
In the landmark cases of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG)142 and Allado v. Diokno,143 we dismissed the criminal cases and set aside the informations
and warrants of arrest. In Cojuangco, we dismissed the criminal case because the information was
filed by the PCGG which we declared to be unauthorized to conduct the preliminary investigation
and, consequently, file the information as it did not possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
In Allado, we set aside the warrant of arrest issued against petitioners therein and enjoined the trial
court from proceeding further for lack of probable cause. For one, there was serious doubt on the
reported death of the victim in that case since the corpus delicti had not been established nor had
his remains been recovered;and based on the evidence submitted, there was nothing to incriminate
petitioners therein. In this case, we cannot reach the same conclusion because the Information filed
before the RTC of Pasay City was filed by the Comelec en banc which had the authority to file the
information for electoral sabotage and because the presence or absence of probable cause is not an
issue herein. As can be gleaned from their assignment of errors/issues, petitioners did not question
the finding of probable cause in any of their supplemental petitions. It was only in GMAs
memorandum where she belatedly included a discussion on the "insufficiency" of the evidence
supporting the finding of probable cause for the filing of the Information for electoral sabotage
against her.144 A closer look at her arguments, however, would show that they were included only to
highlight the necessity of examining the election documents GMA requested to see before she could
file her counter-affidavit. At any rate, since GMA failed to submit her counter-affidavit and other
countervailing evidence within the period required by the Joint Committee, we cannot excuse her
from non-compliance.
There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the
investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the
information in court. However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial
officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. 145 The orderly
administration of justice remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar
circumstances of each case.146 To be sure, petitioners were given the opportunity to present
countervailing evidence. Instead of complying with the Joint Committees directive, several motions
were filed but were denied by the Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners right to submit
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases and following the procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion
and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn, performed its task and filed the information
in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They even actively participated
in the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the
constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided.
Finally, we take judicial notice that on February 23, 2012, GMA was already arraigned and entered a
plea of "not guilty" to the charge against her and thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which has been
granted. Considering that the constitutionality of the creation of the Joint Panel is sustained, the
actions of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team are valid and effective. As the information was
filed by the Commission authorized to do so, its validity is sustained. Thus, we consider said entry of
plea and the Petition for Bail waiver on the part of GMA of her right to submit counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence before the Joint Committee, and recognition of the validity of the information
against her. Her act indicates that she opts to avail of judicial remedies instead of the executive
remedy of going back to the Joint Committee for the submission of the counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence. Besides, as discussed earlier, the absence or irregularity of preliminary
investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case nor does it impair the validity of the
criminal information or render it defective.
It must be stressed, however, that this supervening event does not render the cases before the
Court moot and academic as the main issues raised by petitioners are the constitutionality of the
creation of the Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team and the validity of the proceedings
undertaken pursuant to their respective mandates.
The Court notes that the Joint Committee and the Comelec have not disposed of the cases of the
other respondents subjects of the preliminary investigation as some of them were subjected to
further investigation. In order to remove the cloud of doubt that pervades that petitioners are being
singled out, it is to the best interest of all the parties concerned that the Joint Committee and the
Comelec terminate the proceedings as to the other respondents therein and not make a piecemeal
disposition of the cases.
A peripheral issue which nonetheless deserves our attention is the question about the credibility of
the Comelec brought about by the alleged professional relationship between Comelec Chairman
Brillantes on one hand and the complainant Senator Pimentel and Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), GMAs
rival in the 2004 elections, on the other hand; and by the other Commissioners 147 reasons for their
partial inhibition. To be sure, Chairman Brillantes relationship with FPJ and Senator Pimentel is not
one of the grounds for the mandatory disqualification of a Commissioner. At its most expansive, it
may be considered a ground for voluntary inhibition which is indeed discretionary as the same was
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the Commissioner judge based
on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case. 148 Bare allegations of bias and prejudice
are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a
judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or
favor.149 It being discretionary and since Commissioner Brillantes was in the best position to
determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit from the case, his decision to participate in the
proceedings, in view of higher interest of justice, equity and public interest, should be respected.
While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge (or prosecutor or
Commissioner) who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in
handling the case, this right must be weighed with his duty to decide cases without fear of
repression.150
Indeed, in Javier v. Comelec,151 the Court set aside the Comelecs decision against Javier when it
was disclosed that one of the Commissioners who had decided the case was a law partner of
Javiers opponent and who had refused to excuse himself from hearing the case. Javier, however, is
not applicable in this case. First, the cited case involves the Comelecs exercise of its adjudicatory
function as it was called upon to resolve the propriety of the proclamation of the winner in the May
1984 elections for Batasang Pambansa of Antique. Clearly, the grounds for inhibition/disqualification
were applicable. Second, the case arose at the time where the purity of suffrage has been defiled
and the popular will scorned through the confabulation of those in authority.152 In other words, the
controversy arose at the time when the public confidence in the Comelec was practically nil because
of its transparent bias in favor of the administration.153Lastly, in determining the propriety of the
decision rendered by the Comelec, the Court took into consideration not only the relationship (being
former partners in the law firm) between private respondents therein, Arturo F. Pacificador, and then
Comelec Commissioner Jaime Opinion (Commissioner Opinion) but also the general attitude of the
Comelec toward the party in power at that time. Moreover, the questioned Comelec decision was
rendered only by a division of the Comelec. The Court thus concluded in Javier that Commissioner
Opinions refusal to inhibit himself divested the Comelecs Second Division of the necessary vote for
the questioned decision and rendered the proceedings null and void. 154
On the contrary, the present case involves only the conduct of preliminary investigation and the
questioned resolution is an act of the Comelec En Banc where all the Commissioners participated
and more than a majority (even if Chairman Brillantes is excluded) voted in favor of the assailed
Comelec resolution. Unlike in 1986, public confidence in the Comelec remains. The Commissioners
have already taken their positions in light of the claim of "bias and partiality" and the causes of their
partial inhibition. Their positions should be respected confident that in doing so, they had the end in
view of ensuring that the credibility of the Commission is not seriously affected.
To recapitulate, we find and so hold that petitioners failed to establish any constitutional or legal
impediment to the creation of the Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee and FactFinding Team.
First, while GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA; thus, Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Second, the due process clause is likewise not infringed upon by the alleged prejudgment of the
case as petitioners failed to prove that the Joint Panel itself showed such bias and partiality against
them. Neither was it shown that the Justice Secretary herself actually intervened in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation. More importantly, considering that the Comelec is a collegial body, the
perceived prejudgment of Chairman Brillantes as head of the Comelec cannot be considered an act
of the body itself.
Third, the assailed Joint Order did not create new offices because the Joint Committee and FactFinding Team perform functions that they already perform by virtue of the Constitution, the statutes,
and the Rules of Court.
1wphi1
Fourth, in acting jointly with the DOJ, the Comelec cannot be considered to have abdicated its
independence in favor of the executive branch of government. Resolution No. 9266 was validly
issued by the Comelec as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. The role of the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation of
election offenses has long been recognized by the Comelec because of its lack of funds and legal
officers to conduct investigations and to prosecute such cases on its own. This is especially true
after R.A. No. 9369 vested in the Comelec and the DOJ the concurrent jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses. While we uphold the validity of Comelec Resolution
No. 9266 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, we declare the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure infirm
for failure to comply with the publication requirement. Consequently, Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure govern.
Fifth, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They were furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents submitted to the Joint Committee and they
were required to submit their counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. As to petitioners Mike
Arroyo and Abalos, the pendency of the cases before the Court does not automatically suspend the
proceedings before the Joint Committee nor excuse them from their failure to file the required
counter-affidavits. With the foregoing disquisitions, we find no reason to nullify the proceedings
undertaken by the Joint Committee and the Comelec in the electoral sabotage cases against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED.
Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15,
2011, and the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election
Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in
accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases
for electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice