COMPUSOFT, An international journal of advanced computer technology, 3 (10), October-2014 (Volume-III, Issue-X)

ISSN:2320-0790

SECURING DATA USING FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

SCHEMES OVER CLOUD COMPUTING
V. Satish Kumar1, V.Trilik Kumar2
1

Student, Computer Science & Engineering Dept., Dr. KVSR Institute of Technology, Andhra Pradesh, INDIA
Assoc. Professor, Information Technology Dept., Dr. KVSR Institute of Technology, Andhra Pradesh, INDIA

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Abstract: There is a problem for business organizations to move towards cloud computing regarding the safety and security issues
associated with cloud computing. Different technologies have been used to relate these types of issues including various control
methods and cryptographic techniques. When the data transmitted to the Cloud we use standard encryption methods to secure the
operations and the storage of the data. Fully homomorphic encryption has cloud computing is to perform computations on
encrypted data without previous decryption. The first fully homomorphic schemes have been proposed and developed to improve
the performance, reduce the complexity and the cost of the scheme. Mainly two important schemes are refreshed and discussed in
this paper. The first scheme discoursed in this paper is Encryption over Integers using fully Homomorphism. The second one is
about Encryption without Bootstrapping by using fully Homomorphism. These two are basically concentrated on the security,
performance and complexity factors of the mentioned schemes.
Key Words: Fully Homomorphic Encryption, homomorphic scheme, Security, Partial Homomorphic Encryption

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confidential platform, the side channel attacks may still
compromise the security. For example, an attacker using the
cold boot attack [3] is able to retrieve sensitive data from the
unrepressed DRAM after using a cold reboot to restart the
machine. An intruder using the Branch prediction attacks [4]
can gather information about the encryption keys by simply
monitoring the system time. These types of attacks typically
require physical access to the systems, which is not an easy
way to perform. However it is possible that your code will
be executed in a system belongs to the intruder in cloud
computing settings. In such cases, the intruder will be able
to gain active access to the system easily.

1. INTRODUCTION
The distributed systems and especially cloud
computing are developing according to the technology. The
organization has benefits through information sharing and
the greater degree of flexibility in scaling resources has
pushed the cloud into mainstream computing.
However, the cloud comes into most information
security problems from traditional computing domains. With
this, the distributed nature of the cloud alters many new
types of problems. There are several major problems that the
cloud faces:

2. BACK GROUND

The cloud may not be trusted. The cloud service

provider (CSP) is not necessarily trusted. For example, a
malicious company employee may be able to setup back
doors and circumferential all the protection over the
company cloud services. In addition, some systems in the
cloud may be mismanaged, making them tender to attacks.
Even further, some machines may belong to intruders.
Implementation of bugs can be overworked. Even if
the Cloud Service Providers are trusted and they provide
easy mechanisms such as sandboxing and virtualization.
Bugs in the machine are declared every day, may be
exploited to circumvent any protection, e.g. [1]. As an
example, in [2] the authors show that an attacker could take
control of the VMware and Xen virtualization software
when moving a virtual machine from one physical computer
to another.
Side channel attacks can bypass security. Although
the system is fully protected and the code is executing in a

2.1 Homomorphic Encryption Schemes:

The development of homomorphic encryption provides yet
another distinct approach to build SFE protocols.
Conversationally, a homomorphic encryption scheme allows
computation directly on encrypted data. It is easy to build
the SFE protocol freely by using Homomorphic Encryption.
Alice send the input x in the form of cipher texts to Bob.
Bob will calculate f(x) directly on the cipher text which the
Alice was sent and get back the encrypted result. And that
result was decrypt only by Alice. As long as the security of
the homomorphic encryption scheme holds, Bob will not be
able to learn anything about x. The Homomorphic properties
of public key encryption schemes, e.g. RSA and ElGamal
encryption, were accepted. However they were largely
viewed as a weakness rather than a plus. Applications where
data is inactive typically require uninfluenced encryption.

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However, the community of people has grown to believe the

confidentiality of these schemes and recently, the work of
Gentry and others exhibit that, when carefully employed,
such homomorphic properties can be quite useful. Indeed, a
number of recent specific applications such as data
aggregation in distributed networks, electronic voting, and
biometrics and Financial transactions.

The idea of fully homomorphic encryption was raised by

Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [7], shortly after the
invention of RSA [8]. A fully homomorphic encryption
scheme consists of following four algorithms:
KeyGen () - Generates the encryption keys. As an input,
it exacts for the security parameter and generates the
secret key sk and the public key pk.
Enc (pk, m) Encrypts the plaintext m with the public
key pk to create ciphertext c.
Dec (sk,c) Decrypts the ciphertext c using the secret key
sk to retrieve the plaintext m.
Eval (pk,C,c1,c2 ct) - Uses a Boolean circuit C to
outputs a ciphertext of f(m) such that Decrypt (sk, m) =
f(m).
Gentrys construction consists of three main elements: a
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that can
evaluate low degree polynomials, a technique to squash the
decryption circuit to get a bootstrappable scheme and
finally a method of transferring bootstrapping the scheme
into fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The significant
point in this process is to obtain a scheme that can evaluate
high degree polynomials while the decryption procedure can
still be expressed as low degree polynomial. Once the
scheme can evaluate its own decryption function plus an
additional operation then it is called bootstrappable
scheme and can be converted into a fully homomorphic
scheme.

Fig - 1 : Homomorphic encryption scheme

Restriction of Partial HE Scheme: Without any doubt,
partial HE schemes are valuable in certain applications. In
accession, for particular applications some partial HE
schemes are very adequate regarding the efficiency. E.g. the
Paillier scheme can execute ratings in milliseconds level.
Yet, the loopholes of this category of schemes are also clear.
The main problem of the partial HE schemes is the
range of the circuits that they provide. Almost partial HE
schemes only support one kind of process, e.g. additions for
Paillier and multiplications for RSA. This draws a heavy
restriction on the circuits that the HE schemes can evaluate
homomorphically. Some partial HE schemes supports more
than one process, however, limitations even survive. The
Boneh-Goh-Nissim scheme supports one level of
multiplications via bilinear maps. The characteristic of this
scheme make changes by measuring 2-DNF expressions and
which may not be measured by using single-operation
partial HE schemes. However, only one level of
multiplication operation is supported. The Boneh-GohNissim scheme cannot hold additional difficult circuits.
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme: FHE
schemes without freeing the disturbance can also be utilized
as partial HE schemes. These schemes commonly have a
large number of additions and bounded levels of
multiplications. With this property HE schemes are usually
referred as Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
(SWHE). Although this type of partial HE schemes can
support much more complicated circuits than the singleoperation ones, it is even hardly limited because the
restrictions on levels of multiplications will finally be
achieved. Only some partial HE schemes have additional
constrictions that keep them from existing applied only for
exceptional applications. For example, the Boneh-GohNissim scheme needs a small message length to reach
responsive decryption ratio, which enforces additional
restriction to the scheme.

Although Gentry scheme proved the possibility of

implementing fully homomorphic encryption, the scheme
complexity, efficiency and performance needed to be
improved. For example Gentry has estimated that building a
circuit to execute an encrypted Google search with
encrypted keywords would multiply the current computing
time by one trillion. However the scheme has cheered many
researchers to suggest many forms to Gentrys scheme to
better the performance and lighten the complexity and
ciphertext length. Two interesting approaches were
discussed in the following sections.

2.2 GENTRYS Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Schemes
Fig 2 & 3 : FHE scheme

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COMPUSOFT, An international journal of advanced computer technology, 3 (10), October-2014 (Volume-III, Issue-X)

Complexity: When compared to FHE over Integers,

Brakerskis scheme applies most difficult mathematical
algorithms and notations as a result of using Ring LWE
instead of working with integers. However the removal of
bootstrapping technique has reduced decryption function
and calculations.

3. DIFFERENTIATING
In this part we compare and analyze Dijks and
Brakerskis schemes for the security, efficiency and
complexity factors.
A. Encryption over Integers using Fully Homomorphism

4. CONCLUSION

Security: The security of this scheme is based on the

hardness of the approximate-gcd problem. With appropriate
selection of parameters the scheme has proved to resist
different types of attacks to recover the secret key including
brute-force attack with atleast 2 time. Nevertheless by
using lattice reduction algorithm, it has been examine that
the scheme can be attacked to retrieve the plaintext from
ciphertext. The parameters settings which have been used in
the attack were considered to be appropriate by the Dijks
scheme.
Performance: The noise factor grows large when addition
and multiplication operations are performed, it doubles on
addition and squares on multiplication. By multiplying
ciphertexts yields a noise factor with a size equals ~2dn
where n is the number of performances. The ciphertext
original message cannot be amended, if the noise factor gets
higher than q/2. On the other hand, in order to better the
security of the scheme the cipher text was choose to have a
prominent value n6, this value gain with multiplication
which also outcomes on degraded efficiency.
Complexity: Reducing the Gentrys scheme complexity was
the main purpose of developing this scheme. The
complexity of the somewhat scheme was reduced by using
additions and multiplications over integers instead of ideal
lattices. Although one of the meaning of this scheme is that
it examined out that different mathematical functions and
theories can be used to build a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme using Gentrys blueprint.
B. Encryption without
Homomorphism

Bootstrapping

using

Even though Dijks scheme has succeeded to reduce the

complexity of Gentrys original scheme, his scheme has
transmitted the efficiency limitations of the original scheme
in term of disturbance, size of cipher text and encryption
keys, as well the time needed for encoding, decoding and
evaluation functions. On the other hand Brakerskis scheme
introduced new novel technique for noise management
which permitted for measuring deeper circuits with the same
cost as earlier, this method is used in later schemes to
improve FHE schemes performance. Both schemes have
inspired many researchers to search for new mathematical
approaches and techniques to improve the performance and
efficiency while meeting the security requirements. At the
moment the available schemes provide a great potential for
cloud computing but they still have lots of scope for
improvement and enhancement before they can be ready for
practical use in the cloud computing.

REFERENCES
[1] M. Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Vaikuntanathan,
Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers, in
EUROCRYPT, 2010, pp. 2443.
[2] N. Howgrave-Graham, Approximate integer common
divisors, in CaLC, 2001, pp. 5166.
[3] Z. Brakerski, C. Gentry, and V. Vaikuntanathan, Fully
homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping,Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2011/277, 2011.
[4] Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, and Oded Regev,
On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings, in
EUROCRYPT, volume 6110 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 123, 2010.
[5] Oded Regev, On lattices, learning with errors, random
linear codes, and cryptography, in Harold N. Gabow and
Ronald Fagin, editors, STOC, pages 8493. ACM, 2005.
[6] Gu Chunsheng, Attack on Fully Homomorphic
Encryption over the Integers, Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2012/157, 2012.
[7] National Institute of Standards and Technology Computer Security Resource Center - www.csrc.nist.gov.
[8] R. Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. Dertouzos, On data
banks and privacy homomorphisms, in Foundations of
Secure Computation. Academic Press, 1978, pp. 169177.
[9] T. E. Gamal, A public key cryptosystem and a
signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, in CRYPTO,
1984, pp. 1018.
[10] Gu Chunsheng, Attack on Fully Homomorphic
Encryption over the Integers, Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2012/157, 2012.

Fully

Security: The security of this scheme is based on the

hardness of lattice problems with quasi-polynomial
estimation components. The attained level of security has
not improved from original FHE scheme as it remains 2
time against known lattice attacks. Because the scheme is
comparatively fresh, it is likely too early to sustain its
security strength against different types of attacks with high
assurance.
Efficiency: Brakerski has developed a novel noise
management technique that controlled the noise level so that
it increases linearly with multiplication instead of
exponential function. In a theoretical manner, this scheme
measures former bootstrapping-based FHE schemes
operation-wise. This scheme also permitted for L-level
arithmetic circuit to be measured with (.L3) per-gate
computation or rather than of (4) which is a large
polynomial in the security parameter quantity. The removal
of the bootstrapping technique has also resulted on real cost
reduction as the cost of bootstrapping in only () time was
(4). From this, it provides us for measuring deeper
circuits with a less cost. Applying batching and
bootstrapping as optimization techniques can achieve a
better per-gate computation of (2) independent of number
of levels.

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BIOGRAPHIES
V.SATISH KUMAR received his
B.Tech degree in Computer Science
& Engineering from SK University,
Anantapur, India, in 2006. Currently
pursuing M.Tech in Computer
Science
and
Engineering
at
Dr.KVSR Institute of Technology,
Kurnool, India.
V.TRILIK KUMAR received his
M.Tech in Computer Science &
Engineering from Jawaharlal Nehru
Technological
University,
Anantapur, India in 2008. He is
working as an Assoc.Professor at
DR.K.V.S.R.I.T, Kurnool, India

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