RepublicofthePhilippines

SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L24732April30,1968
PIOSIANMELLIZA,petitioner,
vs.
CITYOFILOILO,UNIVERSITYOFTHEPHILIPPINESandTHECOURTAPPEALS,respondents.
CornelioP.Ravenaforpetitioner.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforrespondents.
BENGZON,J.P.,J.:
JulianaMellizaduringherlifetimeowned,amongotherproperties,threeparcelsofresidentiallandinIloilo
CityregisteredinhernameunderOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.3462.Saidparcelsoflandwereknownas
LotsNos.2,5and1214.ThetotalareaofLotNo.1214was29,073squaremeters.
OnNovember27,1931shedonatedtothethenMunicipalityofIloilo,9,000squaremetersofLot1214,to
serveassiteforthemunicipalhall.1Thedonationwashoweverrevokedbythepartiesforthereasonthat
the area donated was found inadequate to meet the requirements of the development plan of the
municipality,thesocalled"ArellanoPlan".2
Subsequently,LotNo.1214wasdividedbyCertezaSurveyingCo.,Inc.intoLots1214Aand1214B.And
stilllater,Lot1214BwasfurtherdividedintoLots1214B1,Lot1214B2andLot1214B3.Asapproved
bytheBureauofLands,Lot1214B1with4,562squaremeters,becameknownasLot1214BLot1214
B2, with 6,653 square meters, was designated as Lot 1214C and Lot 1214B13, with 4,135 square
meters,becameLot1214D.
On November 15, 1932 Juliana Melliza executed an instrument without any caption containing the
following:
Que en consideracion a la suma total de SEIS MIL CUATRO CIENTOS VEINTIDOS PESOS
(P6,422.00),monedafilipinaqueporlapresentedeclarohaberrecibidoamienterasatisfacciondel
GobiernoMunicipaldeIloilo,cedoytraspasoenventarealydifinitivaadichoGobiernoMunicipalde
Iloiloloslotesyporcionesdelosmismosqueacontinuacionseespecificanasaber:elloteNo.5en
toda su extension una porcion de 7669 metros cuadrados del lote No. 2, cuya porcion esta
designadacomosublotesNos.2By2Cdelpianodesubdivisiondedichoslotespreparadoporla
CertezaSurveyingCo.,Inc.,yunaporcionde10,788metroscuadradosdelloteNo.1214cuya
porcionestadesignadacomosublotesNos.1214B2y1214B3delmismoplanodesubdivision.
Asimismo nago constar que la cesion y traspaso que ariba se mencionan es de venta difinitiva, y
que para la mejor identificacion de los lotes y porciones de los mismos que son objeto de la
presente,hagoconstarquedichoslotesyporcionessonlosquenecesitaelGobiernoMunicipalde
Iloiloparalaconstrucciondeavenidas,parquesyCityHallsitedelMunicipalGovernmentCenterde
iloilo,segunelplanoArellano.
OnJanuary14,1938JulianaMellizasoldherremaininginterestinLot1214toRemediosSianVillanueva
who thereafter obtained her own registered title thereto, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18178.
Remedios in turn on November 4, 1946 transferred her rights to said portion of land to Pio Sian Melliza,
who obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2492 thereover in his name.Annotated at the back of Pio
SianMelliza'stitlecertificatewasthefollowing:
...(a)thataportionof10,788squaremetersofLot1214nowdesignatedasLotsNos.1214B2and
1214B3 of the subdivision plan belongs to the Municipality of Iloilo as per instrument dated

November15,1932....
OnAugust24,1949theCityofIloilo,whichsucceededtotheMunicipalityofIloilo,donatedthecityhallsite
together with the building thereon, to the University of the Philippines (Iloilo branch). The site donated
consisted of Lots Nos. 1214B, 1214C and 1214D, with a total area of 15,350 square meters, more or
less.
Sometimein1952,theUniversityofthePhilippinesenclosedthesitedonatedwithawirefence.PioSian
Mellizathereuponmaderepresentations,thruhislawyer,withthecityauthoritiesforpaymentofthevalue
of the lot (Lot 1214B). No recovery was obtained, because as alleged by plaintiff, the City did not have
funds(p.9,Appellant'sBrief.)
The University of the Philippines, meanwhile, obtainedTransfer Certificate ofTitle No. 7152 covering the
threelots,Nos.1214B,1214Cand1214D.
OnDecember10,1955PioSianMellizafiledanactionintheCourtofFirstInstanceofIloiloagainstIloilo
CityandtheUniversityofthePhilippinesforrecoveryofLot1214Borofitsvalue.
Thedefendantsanswered,contendingthatLot1214Bwasincludedinthepublicinstrumentexecutedby
Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo municipality in 1932.After stipulation of facts and trial, the Court of First
Instance rendered its decision on August 15, 1957, dismissing the complaint. Said court ruled that the
instrumentexecutedbyJulianaMellizainfavorofIloilomunicipalityincludedintheconveyanceLot1214B.
Insupportofthisconclusion,itreferredtotheportionoftheinstrumentstating:
Asimismo hago constar que la cesion y traspaso que arriba se mencionan es de venta difinitiva, y
que para la major identificacion de los lotes y porciones de los mismos que son objeto de la
presente,hagoconstarquedichoslotesyporcionessonlosquenecesitaelGobiernomunicipalde
Iloiloparalaconstrucciondeavenidas,parquesyCityHallsitedelMunicipalGovernmentCenterde
Iloilo,segunelplanoArellano.
and ruled that this meant that Juliana Melliza not only sold Lots 1214C and 1214D but alsosuch other
portionsoflotsaswerenecessaryforthemunicipalhallsite,suchasLot1214B.AndthusitheldthatIloilo
CityhadtherighttodonateLot1214BtotheU.P.
PioSianMellizaappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.InitsdecisiononMay19,1965,theCourtofAppeals
affirmedtheinterpretationoftheCourtofFirstInstance,thattheportionofLot1214soldbyJulianaMelliza
wasnotlimitedtothe10,788squaremetersspecificallymentionedbutincludedwhateverwasneededfor
theconstructionofavenues,parksandthecityhallsite.Nonetheless,itorderedtheremandofthecasefor
reception of evidence to determine the area actually taken by Iloilo City for the construction of avenues,
parksandforcityhallsite.
ThepresentappealtherefromwasthentakentoUsbyPioSianMelliza.Appellantmaintainsthatthepublic
instrumentisclearthatonlyLotsNos.1214Cand1214Dwithatotalareaof10,788squaremeterswere
theportionsofLot1214includedinthesalethatthepurposeofthesecondparagraph,relieduponfora
contrary interpretation, was only to better identify the lots sold and none other and that to follow the
interpretation accorded the deed of sale by the Court ofAppeals and the Court of First Instance would
renderthecontractinvalidbecausethelawrequiresasanessentialelementofsale,a"determinate"object
(Art.1445,now1448,CivilCode).
Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the present appeal improperly raises only questions of fact.
And,further,theyarguethatthepartiestothedocumentinquestionreallyintendedtoincludeLot1214B
therein,asshownbythesilenceofthevendorafterIloiloCityexercisedownershipthereoverthatnotto
includeitwouldhavebeenabsurd,becausesaidlotiscontiguoustotheothersadmittedlyincludedinthe
conveyance, lying directly in front of the city hall, separating that building from Lots 1214C and 1214D,
whichwereincludedtherein.And,finally,appelleesarguethatthesale'sobjectwasdeterminate,because
it could be ascertained, at the time of the execution of the contract, what lots were needed by Iloilo
municipalityforavenues,parksandcityhallsite"accordingtotheArellanoPlan",sincetheArellanoplan
wasthenalreadyinexistence.

TheappealbeforeUscallsfortheinterpretationofthepublicinstrumentdatedNovember15,1932.And
interpretation of such contract involves a question of law, since the contract is in the nature of law as
betweenthepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest.
Attheoutset,itiswelltomarkthattheissueiswhetherornottheconveyancebyJulianaMellizatoIloilo
municipalityincludedthatportionofLot1214knownasLot1214B.Ifnot,thenthesamewasincluded,in
theinstrumentsubsequentlyexecutedbyJulianaMellizaofherremaininginterestinLot1214toRemedios
Sian Villanueva, who in turn sold what she thereunder had acquired, to Pio Sian Melliza. It should be
stressed,also,thatthesaletoRemediosSianVillanuevafromwhichPioSianMellizaderivedtitledid
not specifically designate Lot 1214B, but only such portions of Lot 1214 as were not included in the
previoussaletoIloilomunicipality(StipulationofFacts,par.5,RecordonAppeal,p.23).Andthus,ifsaid
Lot1214BhadbeenincludedinthepriorconveyancetoIloilomunicipality,thenitwasexcludedfromthe
saletoRemediosSianVillanuevaand,later,toPioSianMelliza.
The point at issue here is then the true intention of the parties as to the object of the public instrument
Exhibit"D".Saidissuerevolvesontheparagraphofthepublicinstrumentaforequotedanditspurpose,i.e.,
whetheritwasintendedmerelytofurtherdescribethelotsalreadyspecificallymentioned,orwhetheritwas
intendedtocoverotherlotsnotyetspecificallymentioned.
Firstofall,thereisnoquestionthattheparamountintentionofthepartieswastoprovideIloilomunicipality
withlotssufficientoradequateinareafortheconstructionoftheIloiloCityhallsite,withitsavenuesand
parks. For this matter, a previous donation for this purpose between the same parties was revoked by
them,becauseofinadequacyoftheareaofthelotdonated.
Secondly,readingthepublicinstrumentintoto,withspecialreferencetotheparagraphsdescribingthelots
included in the sale, shows that said instrument describes four parcels of land by their lot numbers and
areaandthenitgoesontofurtherdescribe,notonlythoselotsalreadymentioned,butthelotsobjectof
thesale,bystatingthatsaidlotsaretheonesneededfortheconstructionofthecityhallsite,avenuesand
parksaccordingtotheArellanoplan.IfthepartiesintendedmerelytocoverthespecifiedlotsLots2,5,
1214Cand1214D,therewouldscarcelyhavebeenanyneedforthenextparagraph,sincetheselotsare
already plainly and very clearly described by their respective lot number and area. Said next paragraph
doesnotreallyaddtothecleardescriptionthatwasalreadygiventotheminthepreviousone.
It is therefore the more reasonable interpretation, to view it as describing those other portions of land
contiguoustothelotsaforementionedthat,byreferencetotheArellanoplan,willbefoundneededforthe
purposeathand,theconstructionofthecityhallsite.
Appellant however challenges this view on the ground that the description of said other lots in the
aforequotedsecondparagraphofthepublicinstrumentwouldtherebybelegallyinsufficient,becausethe
objectwouldallegedlynotbedeterminateasrequiredbylaw.
Suchcontentionfailsonseveralcounts.Therequirementofthelawthatasalemusthaveforitsobjecta
determinate thing, is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is
capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the
parties(Art.1273,oldCivilCodeArt.1460,NewCivilCode).Thespecificmentionofsomeofthelotsplus
the statement that the lots object of the sale are the ones needed for city hall site, avenues and
parks,accordingtotheArellanoplan, sufficiently provides a basis, as of the time of the execution of the
contract, for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a new and further agreement of the
parties.
TheArellanoplanwasinexistenceasearlyas1928.Asstated,thepreviousdonationoflandforcityhall
site on November 27, 1931 was revoked on March 6, 1932 for being inadequate in area under said
Arellanoplan.Appellantclaimsthatalthoughsaidplanexisted,itsmetesandboundswerenotfixeduntil
1935, and thus it could not be a basis for determining the lots sold on November 15, 1932. Appellant
howeverfailstoconsiderthattheareaneeded under that plan for city hall site was then already known
thatthespecificmentionofsomeofthelotscoveredbythesaleineffectfixedthecorrespondinglocation
of the city hall site under the plan that, therefore, considering the said lots specifically mentioned in the
public instrument Exhibit "D", and the projected city hall site, with its area, as then shown in theArellano

plan(Exhibit2),itcouldbedeterminedwhich,andhowmuchoftheportionsoflandcontiguoustothose
specificallynamed,wereneededfortheconstructionofthecityhallsite.
And, moreover, there is no question either that Lot 1214B is contiguous to Lots 1214C and 1214D,
admittedlycoveredbythepublicinstrument.Itisstipulatedthat,afterexecutionofthecontractExhibit"D",
theMunicipalityofIloilopossessedittogetherwiththeotherlotssold.Itsitspracticallyintheheartofthe
cityhallsite.Furthermore,PioSianMelliza,fromthestipulationoffacts,wasthenotarypublicofthepublic
instrument.As such, he was aware of its terms. Said instrument was also registered with the Register of
Deeds and such registration was annotated at the back of the corresponding title certificate of Juliana
Melliza.Fromthesestipulatedfacts,itcanbeinferredthatPioSianMellizaknewoftheaforesaidtermsof
the instrument or is chargeable with knowledge of them that knowing so, he should have examined the
ArellanoplaninrelationtothepublicinstrumentExhibit"D"that,furthermore,heshouldhavetakennotice
ofthepossessionfirstbytheMunicipalityofIloilo,thenbytheCityofIloiloandlaterbytheUniversityofthe
Philippines of Lot 1214B as part of the city hall site conveyed under that public instrument, and raised
proper objections thereto if it was his position that the same was not included in the same. The fact
remains that, instead, for twenty long years, Pio Sian Melliza and his predecessorsininterest, did not
object to said possession, nor exercise any act of possession over Lot 1214B. Applying, therefore,
principlesofcivillaw,aswellaslaches,estoppel,andequity,saidlotmustnecessarilybedeemedincluded
intheconveyanceinfavorofIloilomunicipality,nowIloiloCity.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it affirms that of the Court of First
Instance,andthecomplaintinthiscaseisdismissed.Nocosts.Soordered.
Reyes,J.B.L.,Actg.C.J.,Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Sanchez,Castro,AngelesandFernando,JJ.,concur.
Concepcion,C.J.,isonleave.
Footnotes
1SeeExhibitADonation.
2SeeExhibitBCancellation.