VALISNO vs.

ADRIANO
G.R. No. L-37409
May 23, 1988

FACTS: Valisno bought the land from the defendant-appellees sister, Honorata The land adjoins that
of the appellee Felipe on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
Honorata and Felipe, from their father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno,
the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal traversing the Felipes land.
Later on, Felipe levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the Valisno was deprived of the
irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his land.
The Valisno filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of
water rights. A decision was rendered Felipe to reconstruct the irrigation canal, Instead of restoring
the irrigation canal, the Felipe asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the same Bureau. A
reinvestigation was granted.
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for
water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.
He later filed a complaint for damages in the CFI of Nueva Ecija claiming that he suffered damages
when he failed to plant his fields that year (1960) for lack of irrigation water.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureaus decision by issuing a final
resolution dismissing Valisnos complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adrianos water rights
which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation
canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then for a period of more than five years
extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the water rightsdid not form part of his
hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Valisno, as vendee of the land
which Honorata received from her fathers estate did not acquire any water rights with the land
purchased.
In his answer to the damage suit, Felipe admitted that he levelled the irrigation canal on his land, but
he averred: that neither his late father nor his sister Honorata possessed water rights for the land
which she sold to the appellant. He set up a counterclaim for damages.
The trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass through the defendants land to draw water
from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies
between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court
within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works
Secretary collaterally.. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim.

The Valisnos MR of the decision was denied by the trial court. The plaintiff appealed to the CA which
certified the case to Us upon the legal question of whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No.
2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to this case.
ISSUE: WON Valiano has water rights over the irrigation canal
HELD: The appealed decision is SET ASIDE.
YES
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendants land for the passage of water from the Pampanga
River to Honoratas land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honoratas land to the plaintiff was
equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the
Civil Code:
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be considered,should either of them be alienated, as a title
in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, the
ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of
either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.
This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more
persons (Civil Code)
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided:
Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point
is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners, the
owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of
conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any compensation
therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance. (Art. 122, Spanish Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866.)
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements appurtenant to Honoratas property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas
Valisno all rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above- described, together
with [irrigation equipment] and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the
property subject of this sale. According to the Valisno, the water right was the primary consideration
for his purchase of Honoratas property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchasers easement of necessity in a
water ditch running across the grantors land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a
third person

As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the Felipes act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way
Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by
voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the
dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide
road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north
and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was
originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation.
Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation
assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason
developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista
acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the
other to use their half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMUs 7.5 meters of the mangyan
road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the
developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical
concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party
complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had
adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the
negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the
Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I dont think I can
find the details regarding it in the case I just saw the one regarding acknowledgement between
admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met.
And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.
In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of such

easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along
Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there
no such thing as a judicial easement)
LAUREANA A. CID vs. IRENE P. JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14116 ; June 30, 1960
FACTS : Respondents own a building with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, owned by the
petitioners. Allegedly, in 1913 or 1914, before the New Civil Code took effect, the predecessors-ininterest of the petitioner were verbally prohibited by the respondent to obstruct view and light. When
the Court of Appeals adjudicated the case, it found out that the two estates are covered by Original
Certificates of Title, both issued by the Register of Deeds. The court further observed that in both of
the title, any annotation does not appear in respect to the easement supposedly acquired by
prescription which, counting the twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by
1937, date of the decrees of registration.
ISSUE: Whether the owners of a building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent
lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal
prohibition to obstruct such view and light, to petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as owner of the
adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.
HELD: Inasmuch as the alleged prohibition having been avowedly made in1913 or 1914, before the
present Civil Code took effect, the applicable legal provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code
which provides that negative easements are acquired, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate has, by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any act
which would be lawful without the easement. The law requires not any form of prohibition, but exacts,
in a parenthetical expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a specific, particular act, but a
formal act. The phrase "formal act" would require not merely any writing, but one executed in due
form and/or with solemnity. That this is the intendment of the law although not expressed in exact
language is the reason for the clarification made in Article 621 of the new Civil Code which
specifically requires the prohibition to be in "an instrument acknowledged before a notary public.
Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of
the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title
and by prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion,
apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By the same token, negative easements cannot be
acquired by less formal means. Hence, the requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent of the act
of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an instrument acknowledged before a notary
public."Conceding arguendo that such an easement has been acquired by prescription which,
counting the twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, it had been
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System without the

easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land
Registration Act

AMOR v. FLORENTINO- Easement

FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to
Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor
then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will
shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose.
Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from
constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no
easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on
easement do not apply.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied

RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is
title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons
and the service (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor
removed, an easement is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624
is acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil
Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is
already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the law on easement was
already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.

DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.

2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply. Moreover, the Spanish Law and the Partidas provided
for only three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract 2) testament 3) prescription. There was no
provision similar to the doctrine of apparent sign.

3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal regarding the doctrine.

4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning devices, the easement of light and view
would be obsolete and deterrent to economic progress especially when in the cities, buildings are side
to side with each other.
GARGANTOS V. CA- Easement

FACTS:
Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One lot was sold to
Tengtio, whol sold to Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A
third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem arose when latter asked from the
Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. Yan Yung
opposed for it would block his window and impair his right of loght and view.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established

RULING:

Yes. Again, Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person
who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house contructed on the first estate
extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first
estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as
passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light
and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is
established as a title.
PURUGGANAN V. PAREDES, 69 SCRA 69- Easement of Drainage

In an easement of receiving rainwater, the distances prescribed in the decree of registration should
not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the house but on the distance of the rainwater
falling inside the land of the servient estate.

FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot adjacent to and bounded on the north by the lot
of Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an easement of drainage in favor of Paredes
annotated in the Decree of registration, which read in part:

XXX the applicant agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion of the lots No. 1 and 2
which is EIGHT and ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in lengthand the width is ONE (1) meter, in order
that the rainwater coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor over the ruins
of her brick wallshall fall into the land of the applicant.

Paredes constructed a new house, the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer than the length allowed in the
Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the lot of
Purugganan, which is .20 meters wider than that allowed, and the rainwater from the GI roofing falls
about 3 meters inside lots 1 and 2 of Purugganan.

Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from proceeding with the construction of the roof, which
exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in a summary proceeding decided in favor of
Purugganan. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of the roofing?

HELD: No.
Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the decree of registration to the
roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend the meaning of the phrase servidumbre de
vertiente de los tejados constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated, it means the easement of
receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed on the land of Purugganan
because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain water falling inside the property of
Purugganan. The report submitted by the court-appointed commissioner clearly shows that Paredes
exceeded the dimension allowed in the decree of registration
CARIDAD ONGSIACO, et.al., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EMILIA ONGSIACO, et.al., defendants-appellees
G.R. No. L-7510 March 30, 1957 - Reyes, J.B.L., J.
SUMMARY: Upon dissolution of their partnership, the partners divided their share in a hacienda. Each of the 3
partners then distributed their share amongst their family members. This case involved the family of one of the
partners. The share of the partner was divided among the mother and the 8 children. Later, the mother donated
her share to her children on the condition that the land will be held in usufruct for their father and that the
children will support their father with a pension. Sometime in 1937-38, two children who occupied the
catchbasin areas built dikes which prevented the natural flow of rainwater, and stopped supporting their father.
This led the mother to revoke the donation as to them without judicial declaration. In 1951, one of the children
sued the prodigal siblings, to revoke the donation and compel them to provide an easement of drainage. The
lower court dismissed the case for prescription of cause of action. The SC upheld this decision, holding inter
alia that a continuous easement, as defined, does not depend upon acts of man. Continuous easements such as
that of drainage are extinguished by non-user for 10 years. If they were really prejudiced by the dikes, the
plaintiffs should have filed their action much earlier, considering that they waited for 13 years before filing the
present action.
FACTS: The partnership Ongsiaco, Lim y Cia. owned 1/3 of the Hacienda Esperanza in Nueva Ecija. On Mar.
25, 1929, the partners agreed to dissolve the partnership and divide their share among themselves. 4/9 went to
the Ongsiacos and the Lims while 5/9 went to the Santoses. Later the Ongsiacos and Lims divided their 4/9
share among themselves. In said partition, plaintiff-appellant Caridad received Lot 7 with 565 ha. while
defendant-appellee Emilia got lots 9 and 9A with 826 ha. On Jul. 31, 1929, the mother of herein parties, Doa
Gorgonia Ongsiaco executed a deed of donation, turning over her whole 3/18 interest in the Hacienda to her
heirs, on the conditions that: it will be held in usufruct in favor of their father Don Lucio Ongsiaco; and that
each of the heirs must give their father a 1000-peso annual pension. Titles to the subdivided lots were
subsequently issued.
On July 7, 1941, Doa Gorgonia rescinded the donation as to two of her children (Ramon and Emilia) for
flooding the land of their sister Caridad by building dikes on their own lands and not contributing to the
monthly pension. In the same deed, Doa Gorgonia adjudicated the land to Caridad and the other 6 children.

According to the record, Emilia was not notified of the deed. No action for revocation of donation was filed
even after Doa Gorgonia died on Nov. 6, 1950.
On April 25, 1951, Caridad and her husband filed the present action before the Nueva Ecija CFI against Emilia
et.al., alleging the following causes of action: 1) violating the conditions of the deed of donation; 2) violating
the legal easement of drainage by building dikes which prevented water from flowing off Caridads land (which
was higher in elevation than that of Emilias); and 3) depriving Caridad of 27 ha. of land by manipulation and
fraudulent changing of boundary markers by Emilias husband. Emilia et.al. moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the causes of action had been barred by extinctive prescription. The CFI ruled in favor of Emilia
et.al., hence this appeal.
ISSUES (HELD)
1) Has the action for revocation of donation prescribed? (YES)
2) Has the cause of action for violation of the legal easement of drainage been barred by prescription? (YES)
3) Did defendants illegally and fraudulently deprive plaintiffs of land by altering boundary markers to include
public lands? (NO, but the cause of action has been barred by prescription anyway)
RATIO
1) Jurisprudence interpreting NCC 647 has held that a donor may revoke a donation unilaterally only if such
revocation is approved by court judgment or by consent of the donee; and that the action to revoke a donation
prescribes in 10 years. In this case, Emilias consent was not obtained; and no court judgment has been issued to
affirm the revocation even long after the donor died. Actions to revoke a written contract prescribe in 10 years.
The cause of action in this case accrued from the date of first violation, that is, on Sep. 30, 1930; hence the
filing of the action on Apr. 25, 1951 is long overdue. The subsequent instances of violation of the conditions did
not constitute new causes of action so as to extend the prescriptive period.
To circumvent the prescriptive period, plaintiffs assert that: a) their action is for recovery of land inherited by
Caridad through the 1941 deed, therefore the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years (of adverse possessors in
bad faith) and b) Emilia held the property in an implied trust subject to the donors rights.
a) Caridad cannot lay claim to the land through the 1941 deed, because the donation was never revoked in a
proper court action. Thus, the applicable prescriptive period is still that for revocation of donation for breach of
stipulations, which is 10 years. The claim that the applicable period is that for adverse possessors in bad faith is
incorrect, since Emilia remains the lawful owner of the property until the donation is properly revoked.
b) The implied trust contemplated in NCC 1456 refers to property acquired through mistake or fraud. Emilia
acquired the property legally; and her subsequent violation of the conditions of the donation did not taint her
previous acquisition.
2) Emilia received a larger share in the partition because the land assigned to her served as catchbasin for the
higher areas, such as that assigned to Caridad. It was found that Emilia built dikes on her land between 1937
and 1938. Such act is covered by the provision on legal easement of drainage of rural lands, OCC 552. Such
easement does not depend upon acts of man but upon the natural flow of rainwater from higher to lower areas.
It is thus a continuous easement which is extinguished by non-user for 10 years (20 years under the Old Code;
the period was reduced by Act 190). The cause for action therefore arose in 1937 or 1938 and has already
prescribed when the present suit was filed.
The dikes cannot be considered a nuisance as plaintiffs assert, first, because their complaint does not adduce
facts in support of such allegation. Second, because assuming that the dikes were a nuisance, in this case the
nuisance arises from the interference of plaintiffs right to drainage and the action for easement against such
nuisance has also prescribed by 1951 (NCC 631, which is an exception to the general rule of NCC 698 that
lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance). The Philippine law on nuisance is derived from US law, which
holds that private nuisances can prescribe.
3) This allegation is unsupported by the record. The plaintiffs have not objected to the original 1929 partition
and kept their title. Caridads husband is an attorney of note and should have known if they were being
cheated with respect to the partition. It was also proven that Caridad was able to receive government lots in

Manila through exchange of 5 of their lots, including those now claimed by them to public land. These
circumstances evince the lack of equity in appellants position. Furthermore, assuming that there was fraud, the
action has prescribed. This cause of action accrues from the date of partition in 1929. Granting that a case filed
against Emilias husband for appropriation of lands in 1937 stemmed the running of the period, the action
remains prescribed since the case was dismissed in 1939 by agreement of the parties. The plaintiffs action was
filed simply way too late.
DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the order dismissing the complaint is affirmed. Costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.

ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way

An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access to a
public road and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which requires
payment of indemnity which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the damages caused.

FACTS:
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by the
servient estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river and the
Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway.

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at no
particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a
roadpath 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant
nursery business on his land. When his business flourished, it became more difficult to transfer the
plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion bought an owner-type jeep for
transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the roadpath so he approached
Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1 meters of their property to add to the
existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a
right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the complaint for there
is another outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus the case at
bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way

RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded: (1)
when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult
or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep
to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is
impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right
of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried
river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the dominant
estate. Art. 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient
for the needs of the dominant estate To grant the additional easement of right of way of 1
meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount
of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.

FRANCISCO V. IAC- Easement of Way

An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway
and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due to his own
acts.

FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which
an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3
portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an
undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila. A
partition was then executed.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dilas lot came
to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus effectively
isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way through Franciscos land but negotiations failed. Francisco's proposal
for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was
supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dilas lot. Yet in
August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing the very right
of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage
precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not
bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.]
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along
Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him asserting his
right to a legal easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land belonging to
Francisco

HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate.
The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the
isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the
contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use
of the passageway through Lot 860-B was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary
and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that
mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar
easement in an alternative location.
CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS 291 SCRA 122
Posted on July 3, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standar
d
[G.R. No. 125339. June 22, 1998.]
FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City,
where they have been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the
other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which once included
the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2.
The said lots were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar
Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma
Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential
lots. The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as
Lot 1 and Lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor
Transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots
to his son and daughter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione
spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the property in 1987, they found out that the
lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used as a
passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about
the intrusion into their property to the barangay office. At the barangay conciliation proceeding,
petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses
rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses started
enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners protested the enclosure alleging that their property
was bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging to different owners and had no adequate
outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of the Paciones. As their protest went
unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO). The trial court issued a TRO directing the Pacione spouses to
cease and desist from fencing the disputed property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of a
right of way was not proved. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the findings of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
filed the present petition together with the issue of legality or illegality of the conversion of Road Lot 2
into two (2) residential lots by the Cesar Ledesma, Inc.
ISSUE: WON the conversion of lot 2 to a residential lot was legal.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court ruled that the first element of a compulsory
easement of right of way, i.e., that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners property
and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. Mere convenience for
the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.

The second assignment of error was likewise properly rejected by the appellate court. Primarily, the
issue of legality or illegality of the conversion of the road lot in question has long been laid to rest in
LRC Case No. Q-1614 15 which declared with finality the legality of the segregation subdivision
survey plan of the disputed road lot. Consequently, it is now too late for petitioners to question the
validity of the conversion of the road lot
Finally, questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are
properly cognizable by the National Housing Authority (NHA), now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957 16 and not by the regular courts.
The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.
SEC. 22.No owner shall charge or alter roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use
and/or other form of subdivision developments as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity
or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by the
majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is vested upon an
administrative body, no resort to the courts may be made before such administrative body
shall have acted upon the matter.

TRIAS VS. ARANETA- Easement

Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements and restrictions as conditions for contracts
of sales; the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the ground that it impacts dominical
rights.

FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of
Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition that
said lot should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael
Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that stated 5. That no factories be permitted in this
section.

Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal and existed as
mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in the
vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised
the issue to the court and received relief.

Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition resulted from a valid
sales transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no authority to
overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid.

HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art 594 which
provides that every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not
in contravention to the law, public policy and public order

The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of neighboring residents.
The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy, the
easement may not be eroded.

The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime,
allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original intent to bar
factories remains binding.