Facts

1. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion GR 139465

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States
requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various
crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related
municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069
Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who
Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the
established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America, the department proceeded with proceeded with
the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a
technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the
presidential decree and the treaty.

Issue

Ruling

WON, under
the Doctrine of
Incorporation,
International
Law prevails
over Municipal
Law

Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law

form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action
is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
local courts are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provisions of the local states constitution/statute. First,
efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both. This is because it is presumed that municipal law
was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause. However, if the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law jurisprudence dictates that the municipal
courts should uphold municipal law. This is because such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound
by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law was
made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national/municipal law in
the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied
in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. In case of conflict, the courts should
harmonize both laws first and if there exists an unavoidable
contradiction between them, the principle of

The respondent requested for a copy of the official

extradition request as well as the documents and papers
submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it
alleges that such information is confidential in nature and
that it is premature to provide such document as the process
is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation.
Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not
yet available.

Lex posterior derogat priori - a treaty may repeal a statute and

a statute may repeal a treaty will apply. But if these laws are
found in conflict with the Constitution, these laws must be
stricken out as invalid. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, such as in ours, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution. Supreme Court has the power to invalidate a
treaty.
2. In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 984
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among
others that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City of
Filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in
Spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in Spain
under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and
the exercise of profession between the Republic of the
Philippines.

Whether treaty
can modify
regulations
governing
admission to
the phil. bar.

No. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between

the RP and Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant.
The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain. The treaty could
not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines for
the reason that the executive may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines.
The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
The Treaty on Academic Degrees and the exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State, is intended to govern the Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of
Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines.
A Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines, is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish

Facts

3. Sison vs Board of Accountancy 85 Philippines Report 276

Ferguson is a British subject admitted in the practice of
accountancy in the Philippines without examination because
there exists a reciprocity between the Philippines and the
United Kingdom regarding the practice of accountancy.
Subsequently, the Board of Accountancy, upon the
examination of the case of those British accountants without
examination, came to the conclusion that , there being no
law which regulates the practice of accountancy in England,
and that the practice of accountancy in England, and that
the practice of accountancy in said country being limited
only to the members of incorporated private accountant's
societies, the certificates issued by the Institutes of
chartered accountants and other similar societies in
England and Wales cannot be considered on a par with the
public accountant's certificates issued by the Philippine
Board of Accountancy, which is government entity. In view
thereof, the respondent Board of Accountancy "resolved to
suspend, . . . the validity of the C.P.A. certificates of the
above-mentioned candidates pending the final revocation
thereof should they fail to prove to the satisfaction of the
Board within sixty days' notice that : (a) Filipinos are
allowed to take the professional accountant examination
given by the British government, if any, and (b) Filipino
certified public accountants can, upon application, be
registered as chartered accountants or granted similar
degrees by the British Government.
Such action of the Board of Accountancy was based on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice, on October 1,
1946 (Annex A), to the Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales does not meet the requirement of section 41 of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court and that the negative
statement therein, as quoted above, does not establish the
existence of reciprocity, which induced the board to hold
that the registration, without examination, of those British
subjects as certified public accountants, is in accordance
with the provision of section 122 of Act No. 3105 as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342.
However, the Secretary of justice, answering a query from
the Secretary of Finance, in an opinion rendered on
February 10, 1947 "on the legality of the suspension or
revocation " of the certificates issued to those British
subjects as contemplated in resolution No. 5, series of 1946
of the Board of Accountancy, was of the opinion that "the
board may not suspend or revoke the certificates previously
granted to the ten British accountants herein involved,

Issue

Ruling
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

While the profession of certified public accountant is not

controlled or regulated by the Government of Great Britain, the
country of origin of respondent Robert Orr Ferguson, according
to the record, said respondent had been admitted in this
country to the practice of his profession as certified public
accountant on the strength of his membership of the Institute of
Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow (England), incorporated
by the Royal Charter of 1855. The question of his entitlement
to admission to the practice of his profession in this jurisdiction,
does not therefore, come under reciprocity, as this principle is
known in International Law, but it is included in the meaning of
comity, as expressed in the alternative condition of the proviso
of the above-quoted section 12 which says: such country or
state does not restrict the right of Filipino certified public
accountants to practice therein.
International Law is founded largely upon mutuality, reciprocity,
and the principle of comity of nations. Comity, in this
connection, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other; it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
acts of foreign governments and tribunals, having due regard
both to the international duty and convenience and the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws. The fact of reciprocity does not
necessarily influence the application of the doctrine of comity,
although it may do so and has been given consideration in
some instances.
The Philippine and the United Kingdom, are bound by a treaty
of friendship and commerce, and each nation is represented in
the other by corresponding diplomatic envoy. There is no
reason whatsoever to doubt the statement and assurance
made by the diplomatic representative of the British
Government in the Philippines, regarding the practice of the
accountancy profession in the United Kingdom and the fact
that Filipino certified public accountant will be admitted to
practice their profession in the United Kingdom should they
choose to do so.

Facts
including respondent Robert Orr Ferguson, because such
action is in contravention of section 13 of Act No. 3105 as
amended which explicitly provides that the suspension or
revocation of the certificate issued under the said Act may
be done by the board for unprofessional conduct of the
holder or other sufficient cause.

4. Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 131

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the
proceedings in a civil case which were initiated during the
Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling
law granting such authority.
During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was
effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the different
courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive
Commission, and in the laws they administered and
enforced.

Issue

Ruling

1. Whether or
not under the
rules of
international
law the judicial
acts and
proceedings of
the courts
during a de
facto
government
are good and
valid.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all

acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The
doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his
work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war,
and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do
not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such
rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by
the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of
nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or
changed by the acts of conqueror. He, nevertheless, has all
the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure
either change the existing laws or make new ones.
According to that well-known principle in international law, the
fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy
comes again into the power of its legitimate government of
sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the
effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or
another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts
done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they
take effect during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by private persons
under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and
remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued
by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which

Facts

Issue

Ruling
declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of
the governments established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for
said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab
initio.

2. Whether the
present courts
of the
Commonwealt
h, which were
the same court
existing prior
to, and
continued
during, the
Japanese
military
occupation of
the
Philippines,
may continue
those
proceedings
pending in
said courts at
the time the
Philippines
were
reoccupied
and liberated
by the United
States and
Filipino forces,
and the
Commonwealt
h of the
Philippines
were reestablished in
the Islands.

2. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and

judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader
does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of
President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that in
practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to
be adhered to on the present occasion. And Taylor in this
connection says: From a theoretical point of view it may be
said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice
such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of
nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws
and institution so far as military necessity will permit.
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the
ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become re-established and conceived of as having in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts,
without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon
them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points
out in speaking of said principles a state or other
governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. Such political resurrection is the
result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies
to regain their original shape upon removal of the external
force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.

5. Lawyers League for Better Philippines vs Pres. Corazon C. Aquino GR 73748

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Whether or not Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President the
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
Laurel were taking power.
government of only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the

Facts
On March 25, 1986, Proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."

6. Tanada vs Angara 277 SCRA 18

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the
concurrence of the respondent Senators to the WTO
agreement that opens access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on
its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits
as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Issue
Corazon
Aquino is
legitimate.

Ruling
people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government. The
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.

Whether or not
the
sovereignty
can be
subjected to
restrictions
and limitations
by a treaty?

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and

all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject
to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family
of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules
in international law is pacta sunt servanda international
agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure
the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

Whether or not
Holy See can
invoke
sovereign
immunity.

In Public International Law, when a state or international

agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a
foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it
is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement

as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First
policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives
foreign trading intervention.

7. The Holy See vs Rosario 238 SCRA 524

Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot
5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to
Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which
represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over
the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who
assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute
arose between the two parties because both were unsure
whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said
lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists
that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says
that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest
money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation.

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or

the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the
trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the
Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and
Memorandum as amicus curiae.

Facts
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment
of the sale, specific performance and damages against
Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos
moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based
on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on
ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign
immunity by entering into a business contract. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to
the Supreme Court.

Issue

Ruling
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be
allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support
of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty,
where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign
jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also
recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign
diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and
to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia,
Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and
Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican
City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and
visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable
sovereignty also in the field of international relations"
(O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of
states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in
a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states
(Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International
Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican
City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its
size and object, the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the
Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in
the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the
Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international
state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International
Law 160 [1956]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and
enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of
the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view,
it is the Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.

8. People vs Perfecto 43 Phil 887

Facts
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in
the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper
La Nacion, edited by Mr. Perfecto, published an article about
it to the effect that the author or authors of the robbery of the
records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but
followed the example of certain Senators who secured their
election through fraud and robbery.
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution
adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information
alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256
of the Penal Code.

Issue
Whether or not
article 256 of
the Spanish
Penal Code
was abrogated
with the
change from
Spanish to
American
sovereignty

Ruling
It is a general principle of the public law that the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. All
laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political
character, institutions and constitution of the new government
are at once displaced. Article 256 was enacted to protect
Spanish officials which were representatives of the King. Such
intent is contradictory to the ideology of the new government
where In the eye of our (American) Constitution and laws,
every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has
equal rights with every other man. As such, Article 256 is
deemed abrogated and the case is consequently dismissed
and judgment reversed.

Whether or not
the change of
the
sovereignty
extinguishes
the previous
liability of the
City of Manila
to its creditor?

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not

necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under
the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal
sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is
entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor
corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the
governmental functions that are not compatible with the
present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of
Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it
is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

Whether or not
a law may
invalidate or
supersede
treaties or
generally
accepted
principles.

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted

principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the
raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and,
that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The defendant was found guilty in the municipal court and

again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
9. Vilas vs City of Manila 229 Phil 345
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the
Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the
City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to
recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City
of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its
sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by
the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the
theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
extinguished.

10. Ichong vs Hernandez 101 Phil 155

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the
country to take advantage of business opportunities herein
abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954
when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to
Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the
RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection
clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese
businessman engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.

11. US vs Look Chaw 18 Phil 573

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port
of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its
cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a

treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must
be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong
can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the
Pasay city market.

Whether or not
courts of local
state can
exercise its

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter.

The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports,
does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the

Facts
defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought
these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that
as his hold had already been searched several times for
opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All
the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

Issue
jurisdiction
over foreign
vessels
stationed in its
port.

Ruling
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality. However, the
same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can of
opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime. Only the court
established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction,
in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

Whether or not
the Philippine
courts have
jurisdiction
over the crime
committed
aboard
merchant
vessels
anchored in
our
jurisdictional
waters.

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal
waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction
over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium
smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it
causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our
territory.

Whether or not
Asaalis
contention is
correct.

No. Asaalis contention is without merit. The Revised Penal

Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability
not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime
zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction against those
committing offense while on a Philippine ship. The ships
intercepted were of Philippine registry.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English

nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.
12. People vs Wong Cheng 46 Phil 729
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General,
filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer
sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented
by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was
anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the
shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant
contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the
said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

13. Asaali vs The Commissioner of Customs 26 SCRA 382

In 1950, customs officers intercepted 5 ships owned by Illuh
Asaali et al. Said ships were found to be from Borneo and
were on their way to a port in Tawi-tawi, Sulu. On board the
ships were rattan products and cigarettes. The customs
confiscated said items on the ground that Asaali et al do not
have the required import permits for the said goods.
Asaali questioned the legality of the seizure as he
contended that the customs officers did not intercept them
within Philippine waters but rather, they were intercepted in
the high seas. Hence, according to Asaali, Philippine import
laws have no application to the case at bar.

14. Baer vs Tizon 57 SCRA (1974)

Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for
injunction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against
petitioner, Donald Baer, Commander of the United States
Naval Base in Olongapo.
He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging
and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his
logging operations.
He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
petitioner from interfering with his logging operations.
A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge

Further, it has been an establish principle that a state has the

right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its
own territory but extending to the high seas. The authority of a
nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The
seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign
force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it
is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may
certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.

Whether the
contention of
the petitioner
that the
respondent
judge acquires
no jurisdiction
on the ground
that the suit
was one
against a
foreign
sovereign
without its

The judgment of the Court cannot be any clearer as to the

action against petitioner Donald Baer being against the United
States government, and therefore, covered by the principle of
state immunity from suit.
Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base
in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may
therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or
when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the
government which he represents.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What
was sought by private respondent and what was granted by
respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the

Facts
Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American
Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for
the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign
sovereign without its consent.

Issue
consent

Ruling
performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in
accordance with the powers possessed by him under the
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This point was
made clear [in the petition] in these words: 'Assuming, for
purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through
the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a
Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases
Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber
license issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by
the United States of its rights, power and authority of control
within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense
Board, an agency of both the Philippine and United States
Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener
within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be
consistent with the security and operation of the Base," is
conclusive upon the respondent Judge. ...
The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which
would result in a pecuniary charge against the, sovereign or
would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of
a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly
and immediately to the most important public function of any
government - defense of the state is - equally as untenable as
requiring it to do an affirmative act.
The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled
into court in connection with acts performed by it pursuant to
treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental
character.

15. Republic of the Philippines vs Guanzon 61 SCRA 360

The defendant obtained two (2) loans from the former Bank
of Taiwan, Ltd. Secured by a real estate mortgage on the
two parcels of land and a Chattel Mortgage on standing
crops growing on the same properties. By virtue of Vesting
Order No. P-4, and under the authority of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, as amended, the USA vested in the
Government of the United States the assets in the
Philippines of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. Pursuant to the
Philippine Property Act of 1946, these assets were
subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines
by the Attorney General of the US under Transfer
Agreements and are now administered by the Board of
Liquidators.

It thus appears obvious that counsel for appellee lacks

awareness of the controlling doctrine announced in the leading
case of Brownell, Jr. v. Sun Life Assurance Company, 9 where
Justice Labrador explicitly set forth: "This purpose of conveying
enemy properties to the Philippines after all claims against
them shall have been settled is expressly embodied in the
Philippine Property Act of 1946," A brief history of the Philippine
Property Act of 1946 is likewise found in his opinion: "On July
3, 1946, the Congress of the United States passed Public Law
485-79th Congress, known as the Philippine Property Act of
1946. Section 3 thereof provides that "The Trading with the
Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 411), as amended,
shall continue in force in the Philippines after July 4, 1946, ... ."
To implement the provisions of the act, the President of the
United States on July 3, 1946, promulgated Executive Order
No. 9747, "continuing the functions of the Alien Property
Custodian and the Department of the Treasury in the
Philippines." Prior to and preparatory to the approval of said
Philippine Property Act of 1946, and agreement was entered
into between President Manuel Roxas of the Commonwealth
and U.S. Commissioner Paul V. McNutt whereby title to enemy
agricultural lands and other properties was to be conveyed by
the United States to the Philippines in order to help the
rehabilitation of the latter, but that in order to avoid complex
legal problems in relation to said enemy properties, the Alien

Facts

Issue

Ruling
Property Custodian of the United States was to continue
operations in the Philippines even after the latter's
independence, that he may settle all claims that may exist or
arise against the above-mentioned enemy properties, in
accordance with the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United
States."
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court
grievously erred in failing to perceive that precisely the
Republic of the Philippines, contrary to its holding, possesses a
legal interest over the subject matter of this controversy.
Apparently, the lower court, perhaps taken in by the contention
of appellee, could not see its way clear to applying the
Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the United States
Congress as it was a foreign statute not susceptible to judicial
notice. Again, if it were cognizant of the leaning of the above
Brownell decision, it would have realized how erroneous such
a view is. For, as was made clear in the above decision, there
was "conformity to the enactment of the Philippine Property Act
of 1946 of the United States [as] announced by President
Manuel Roxas in a joint statement signed by him and by
Commissioner McNutt Ambassador Romulo also formally
expressed the conformity of the Philippine Government to the
approval of said act to the American Senate prior to its
approval."

16. Guerreros Transport Services vs Blaylock Transportation Services Employees Association 71 SCRA 621
In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a Whether or not YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor
public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate
the said
Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/
and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval
members of
military requirements, to provide security for employment, and,
base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, ownerthe Union
in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed
operator of Guerreros Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero),
were entitled
Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give
over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent
to be
priority consideration to affected employees for employment.
concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock reinstated by
Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblocks 395 employees
Guerrero.
A treaty has 2 aspects as an international agreement
are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).
between states, and as municipal law for the people of each
state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid
When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to
provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract
employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a
between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view
complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to
of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore,
employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US
bound to give priority to the employment of the qualified
Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC
employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously
upon Guerreros MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being
in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the
no employer-employee relationship between the parties.
aforementioned Compromise Agreement.
Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the
NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to
Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to
absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or
submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the
before the deadline set by Guerrero, except those who may
members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by
have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in
Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as
Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.
final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC,
through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the
Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision
absorption of the 175 members into Guerreros Transport
of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that
Services, subject to the following conditions:
any non-compliance was attributable to the individual
complainants who failed to submit themselves for
a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock
processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the
Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and

Facts
reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasnt appealed
so it was declared final & executory

Issue

b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the

appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise

Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of
Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall
be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final.
The agreement is deemed to have superseded the
Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the
absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2
conditions.

17. De Perio-Santos vs Macaraig GR 94070

Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for
a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which
provided that she could bring someone with her so she
brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her coworkers complained because they thought that Santos used
government fund to finance her daughters fare. It was later
found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less
than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her
expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal
to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty
of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the
President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino
issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos
guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post
and was replaced.

Ruling

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure

from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at
Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the
names of the members of the Union.
Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is
more than a mere contract and has the force and effect of any
other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and
their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the
parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is
enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.

Whether or not
Santos should
reinstated to
her office.

No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which

showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty
as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the
cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and
thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save
and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to
reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by
the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is
solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is
primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of
the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is
not actually removed from her position or office but rather her
term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign
relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC
cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of
such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from
posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her
to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the
interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.
"Considering that the conduct of foreign relations is primarily
an executive prerogative, courts may not inquire into the
wisdom or unwisdom in the exercise thereof. This is a principle
laid down by the courts from time immemorial. The power to
conduct foreign policy and its necessary element of assigning
the countrys representatives abroad is best addressed to the
wisdom of the executive branch and not to be unduly interfered
with by the judiciary
"The head of State, as the States Chief organ and
representative in the totality of its international intercourse, with
the consequence that all his legally relevant international acts
are considered acts of his state. Such acts comprises chiefly
the reception and sending of diplomatic agents and consuls,
conclusion of treaties, and recognition of states.
The conduct of the external affairs of the State is an executive
prerogative. As head of the State, the President deals with
foreign states and governments with respect to matters relating

Facts

18. Reyes vs Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553

Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the
Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta
Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less
than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then
Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that
there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the
rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued
City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies
within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing
pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to
the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to
Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
And that under our constitution we adhere to generally
accepted principles of international law.

19. Minucher vs CA GR 97765 (1992) GR 97765

Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of
Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the
American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by
Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence
community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian
products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to
Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy
regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian.
Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing
that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in
Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy
caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the
visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be

Issue

Ruling
to entering into treaties, maintaining diplomatic relations,
extending or withholding recognition. Chief Justice Marshall
described the President of the United States as the `sole organ
of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative
with foreign nations. This apt description likewise applies to the
President of the Philippines.

Whether or not
a treaty may
supersede
provisions of
the
Constitution.

The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by
the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument
of ratification was signed by the President on October 11,
1965, and was thereafter deposited with the Secretary General
of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it
was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the
Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty
to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity. " The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. ..."
To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
the generally accepted principles of international law, it should
be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there
were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its
dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit
insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover,
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from
any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its
invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in
view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be
applicable, that question the confronts this Court.

Whether or not
a complaint for
damages be
dismissed in
the sole basis
of a statement
complained in
a Diplomatic
Note.

No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by

either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In
the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in
effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by
earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and
filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said
complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that
Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and
outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC
gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frameup hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be
held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come
forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official
capacity.

Facts
entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a
buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he
had already made arrangements with his contacts
concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.

Issue

Ruling

It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a

Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were
falsely arrested and charged with violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages.
However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash
summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the
processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages
is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the
Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of
merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that
because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that
Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission
investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed
with diplomatic immunity.
20. Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American
who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a
position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education
Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for
damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint
against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian
personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director),
for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and
sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary
Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the
condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically
selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after
180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a
future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer.
During that time, Mrs. Abalateos was about to vacate her
position but her appointment was extended thus, Shauf was
never appointed to said position. She claims that Abalateos
stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment
as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi
who denies the allegation. He claims it was a joint decision
of the management & it was in accordance of with the
applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues
such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review
Board, Philippine RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Shauf
ordering defendants to pay actual damages + attorneys
fees and moral & exemplary damages.

WON private
respondents
are immune
from suit being
officers of the
US Armed
Forces

No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of

diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the acts of its agents in
the Phils. Respondents are personally liable in indemnifying
petitioner Shauf.
While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints
filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in
their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law &
injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a
manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights
of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit
will not be a suit against the state. The doctrine of immunity
from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in
his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered
for the position even if she was previously employed as a
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted
an interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for
that position and that person kept the position despite orders
from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal.
Extension of Abalateos services is another proof. She was not
appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the
position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service
Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air
Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas
respondents merely denied allegations.
The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in
employment & work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi
& Detwiler violated Shaufs constitutional right to earn a living,

Facts

Issue

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the

increase of the damages to be collected from defendants.
Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense
that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements
made by them in performance of their official governmental
functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus
case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision.
According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Ruling
an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should be
accountable.
Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the
defendants discriminatory acts. The Department of Air Force in
Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to
file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after
180 days from the dated of the initial appeal to the
Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it
has not been decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is
entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise prohibited, which
will best advance & protect her interests.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their

private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US
government which would require consent.
21. US vs Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state
from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of
the principle of independence and equality of states.
However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they
are continually and evolving and because the activities of
states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts and private,
commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state
immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental
acts.
22. US vs Guinto 182 SCRA 644
These cases have been consolidated because they all
involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, The
private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air
Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
conducted by them for contracts for barber services inthe
said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an
area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently,
to conduct a rebidding.
In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and
Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from
the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove
had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club
manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to
a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective
bargaining agreement between the center and
its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Genoves reaction was to file
his complaint against the individual petitioners.

Whether the
US naval base
in bidding for
said contracts
exercise
governmental
functions to be
able to invoke
state immunity.

The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from

being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are continually and
evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It
has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign
and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory
acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to
sovereign and governmental acts.

Whether the
defendants
were also
immune from
suit under the
RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts
done by them
in the
performance
of their official
duties.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law
that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even
without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the
generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by
the majority of the states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has
not been formally impleaded

Facts

Issue

Ruling

Whether the
Holy See is
immune from
suit insofar as
its business
relations
regarding
selling a lot to
a private entity

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each

widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts
jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987];
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194
[1984]).

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a

barracks boy in Cano O Donnell, an extension of Clark Air
Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of
the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office
of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn
statements made by them, an information for violation
of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act,
was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers
testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from
his employment. He then filed a complaint against the
individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their
acts that he was removed.
In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the
private respondents against the herein petitioners (except
the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of
the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual
allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants
beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and
caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this
and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were
bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and
resisting arrest. In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the
US and the individually named defendants argued that
the suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had
not given its consent to be sued.
23. The Holy See vs Rosario 238 SCRA 524
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over
the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent,
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land
consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality
of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot
was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of
the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold
to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the
land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties
was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the
sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance

Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the

executive or judicial determination when an act may be
considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a
commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."
Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character
of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament
enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in
Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as
any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course
of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial

Facts
and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo
A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana, petitioner and Msgr.
Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper
party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner
shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the
business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated
the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the
privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and
on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Issue

Ruling
character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the
host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has
created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions
in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in
characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a
private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the
trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings,
particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the
privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently
established by the Memorandum and Certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with
the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative
Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of
Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and
officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines
exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights,
privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy
in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the
executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is
entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political
question that is conclusive upon the courts (International
Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
[1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept
this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in
International Catholic Migration Commission and in World
Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the
redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law
and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the
acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to
espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through
the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See.
Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take
up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of
its espousal on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private
Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on
Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919
[1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse
the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

24. Syquia vs Lopez 84 Phil 312

Facts
The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all
surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three
apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as
the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and
Michel Apartments.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed
three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments,
in favor of the United States of America at a monthly rental
of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the
South Syquia Apartment, and P3,335 for the Michel
Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to
be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the United States of America.
The apartment buildings were used for billeting and
quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the
Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were
commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding
General, United States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command,
Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in
the Manila Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the
said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the
United States Government to assign officers of the U. S.
Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate
the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate
Division, Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila,
who, under the command of defendant Moore was in direct
charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said three
apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman
themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in
question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months
after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs
sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in
office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the
return of the apartment buildings to them, but were advised
that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the
premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested the
predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate
said leases, execute lease contract for a period of three
years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those
payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office
of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute
new leases but advised that it is contemplated that the
United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1
February 1947. Not being in conformity with the
continuance of the old leases because of the alleged
comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs
formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and
to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946.
Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the
alleged representation and assurance that the U.S.
Government would vacate the premises before February 1,
1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure

Issue
whether
respondents
are not
individually
responsible for
the payments
of rentals or
damages in
relation to the
occupancy of
the houses in
question;
whether this is
a suit against
the USA
without its
consent

Ruling
Yes. The real party in interest as defendant in the original case
is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three
lease agreements was the United States of America and the
lease agreement themselves were executed in her name by
her officials acting as her agents. The considerations or rentals
was always paid by the U. S. Government. The original action
in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three
lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of the Supreme
Court that any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be
paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as already
stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such
Government but also because the premises were used by
officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately
after the terminations of hostilities.
The defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman cannot be
held individually responsible for the payments of rentals or
damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses
in question. Both of these army officials had no intervention
whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the
initial occupancy of the premises both of which were effected
thru the intervention of and at the instance of their
predecessors in office. The original request made by the
petitioners for the return of the apartment buildings after the
supposed termination of the leases, was made to, and denied
not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office.
The notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact
continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and
Tillman but by predecessors in office. The refusal to
renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners was
made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according
to the very complaint filed in the municipal court. The
assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to
February 29, 1947, was also made by the predecessors in
office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was
Chief, Real State Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S.
Army, and was in direct charge and control of the leases and
occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the
command of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot
see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to
occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order
or direction from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held
personally liable for the payment of rentals or increase thereof,
or damages said to have been suffered by the plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed
his command in Manila, these lease agreements had already
been negotiated and executed and were in actual operation.
The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers
assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he must
have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to
apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to
changes in station. He found these apartment buildings
occupied by his government and devoted to the use and
occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his

Facts
possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly
rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and
Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to
cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure
to comply with the alleged representation and assurance
that the three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to
February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served
formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64
other army officers or members of the United States Armed
Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three
buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b)
increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment
effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases
for the three or any one or two of the said apartment
buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said
apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the
event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands.
The thirty-day period having expired without any of the
defendants having complied with plaintiffs demands, the
plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal
Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer
(desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons
occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose
of having them vacate the apartments, each occupants to
pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January
1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated
said apartment; to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment
buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages
sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants; that
defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages
may have been actually caused on said property; and that in
the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a
month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the
defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made
to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per
apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947,
inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said
apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman be
permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties
in the future from entering and occupying said premises.

25. Sanders vs Veridiano 162 SCRA 88

Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to permanent parttime. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to
institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent
rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the
Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of
employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer
filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a
complaint for damages against the herein petitioners
claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations
against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court,
Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.

Issue

Ruling
command, and he had reasons to believe that he could
continue holding and using the premises theretofore assigned
for that purpose and under contracts previously entered into by
his government, as long as and until orders to the contrary
were received by him. It is even to be presumed that when
demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of
increased rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings,
defendant Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier,
must have consulted and sought the advise of his legal
department, and that his action in declining to pay the
increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the three
buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and
counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position
to pay increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the
lease agreements, without the approval of his government,
unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor.
Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that
defendant Moore can be held personally liable for the payment
of back or increased rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments
involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable
for rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs.
It must be remembered that these army officers when coming
to their station in Manila were not given the choice of their
dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the
apartment buildings in question. Said assignments or billets
may well be regarded as orders, and all that those officers did
was to obey them, and, accordingly, occupied the rooms
assigned to them.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it can be
concluded that the real party defendant in interest is the
Government of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to
be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 codefendants but by the said U. S. Government. The U. S.
Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latters consent but it is of citizen filing
an action against a foreign government without said
governments consent.

Whether the
petitioners
were
performing
their official
duties when
they did the
acts for which
they have
been sued for
damages.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which
the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as
director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the
private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It
is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply
to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents.
Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was
within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin

Facts

Issue

Ruling
effect a direct attack against him-that Special Services was
practicing "an autocratic form of supervision.
There should be no question by now that such complaint
cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have
ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we
upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to
our own government but also to foreign states sought to be
subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is
that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of
foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par
in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude
would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this
precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that
the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be
sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be
sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is
clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him
to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds
refuses to record a deed of sale; or to restrain a Cabinet
member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be
unconstitutional; or to compel the national treasurer to pay
damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; or the
commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments
from a fund already available for the purpose; or, in general, to
secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by
himself without the government itself having to do a positive act
to assist him. We have also held that where the government
itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may
directly implead the government even without first filing his
claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as
the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice."
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as
Festejo v. Fernando, where the Court held that a bureau
director could be sued for damages on a personal tort
committed by him when he acted without or in excess of
authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just
compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public
irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous
consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a
party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's
unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under
any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the
United States has not given its consent to be sued for the

Facts

26. WHO vs Aquino 48 SCRA 242

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional
office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health
Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12)
crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes.
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected
that the crates contain large quantities of highly dutiable
goods beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon
application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal
effects of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised
Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from
search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host
Agreement and requested that the search warrant be
suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined
Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but
respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting
diplomatic immunity.

Issue

Whether or not
personal effect
of Verstuyft
can be
exempted from
search and
seizure under
the diplomatic
immunity.

Ruling
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment
that may be rendered against them. As it is the American
government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of
appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly
recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity,
pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as
principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly
affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and
asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his
discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering
the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of
the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

27. Minucher vs CA (2003) GR 142396

"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official
acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith
or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked
with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the
United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to

Facts

28. The Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon GR 154705

Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement
with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the
following specific equipments: air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water
motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's
work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with
the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent
terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter
claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as
a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
29. Liang vs People GR 125865
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong
City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After
fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody
of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating

Issue

Ruling
show any similar agreement between the governments of the
Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its
agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or
imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be
gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The
official exchanges of communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries, certifications from officials of
both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy, as well as the participation of
members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buybust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the
behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic
status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent,
to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of
Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected
drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to
inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to
make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to
have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

W/N the CA
erred in
sustaining the
trial court's
decision that
petitioners
have waived
their immunity
from suit by
using as its
basis the
provision in
the
Maintenance
Agreement.

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a

private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act
is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The
state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain
the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

Whether or not
the petitioners
case is
covered with
immunity from
legal process
with regard to
Section 45 of
the Agreement

NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity.

Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the
DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to
due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in official capacity. Hence, slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity

Facts
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process
under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case
to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered
by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
30. Callado vs IRRI 244 SCRA 211
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the
IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip
to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the findings,
he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under
the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to
supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a
problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges
against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination
to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity
pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor
Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute
to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent
IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving
the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and,

Issue
between the
ADB and the
Philippine
Govt.

Ruling
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

Did the (IRRI)

waive its
immunity from
suit in this
dispute which
arose from an
employeremployee
relationship?

No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by
the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law.
There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive
Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities
accorded to international organizations, which determination
has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarass a political department of
Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or
other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which
it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may
waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary
on its part.

Facts
finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.

Issue

Ruling

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the

IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the
case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of
its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
31. Lasco vs UN Revolving Fund for National Resouces Exploration 241 SCRA 681
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with
WON
Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no
private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for
specialized
recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a
agencies enjoy Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations
special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The diplomatic
states that each specialized agency shall make a provision for
UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine
immunity
appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of
Government and the United Nations for exploration work in
contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal
specialized agency is a party. Private respondent is not
dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged that
engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its
respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral
exploration in Dinagat Island
32. International Catholic Migration Commission vs Pura Calleja 190 SCRA 130
This is a case of an organization operating in the Philippines Whether or not
subjected to an attempt to organize a labor union among its
the ICMC is
employees. ICMC or the International Catholic Immigration
subject to the
Commission was one of those accredited by the Philippine
Labor Laws of
Government to operate the refugee processing center in
the Phils and
Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at
therefore, can
the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved be compelled
in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly
to recognize
registered with the United Nations Economic and Social
labor unions
Council and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II.
and proceed
with the
The Trade Union of the Philippines made initial actions, a
certification
process called certification election, for recognition of a
election.
labor union. The ICMC claims that it is an international
organization registered with the United Nations and hence
enjoys diplomatic immunity.
The Med-Arbiter in the initial proceeding dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction, however, Director Pura Calleja of the
Bureau of Labor Relations ordered the immediate conduct of
a certification election. This was the same decision rendered
by the Director after ICMC asked for a reconsideration on
the basis that it has now been granted diplomatic privileges
and immunities as evidenced by Memorandum of
Agreement between the Government and ICMC.
This case has also resolved another petition of the same
nature, the International Rice Institute. This is why in the
ruling of this case, mention of the IRRI case may be made
from time to time.

"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having

functions in particular fields. The term appears in Articles 57
and 63 of the Charter of the United Nations:
The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the
general task of promoting progress and international
cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural, educational
and related matters, contemplates that these tasks will be
mainly fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself but by
autonomous international organizations established by intergovernmental agreements outside the United Nations. There
are now many such international agencies having functions in
many different fields, e.g. in posts, telecommunications,
railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation,
meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and
culture, health and refugees. Some are virtually world-wide in
their membership some are regional or otherwise limited in
their membership. The Charter provides that those agencies
which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be
brought into relationship with the United Nations by
agreements entered into between them and the Economic and
Social Council, are then to be known as "specialized
agencies."
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI
is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of
partiality and interference by the host country in their internal
workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of
Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from

Facts

Issue

Ruling
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice
of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there
are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall
make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which the specialized agency is a party."
Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government,
whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. 1. The
Commission shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate
authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of
Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper
administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any
abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and
alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the
Commission.
2.In the event that the Government determines that there has
been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted under
this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the
Government and the Commission to determine whether any
such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall
withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the
Commission and its officials.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of
dispute with management as, in fact, there had been organized
a forum for better management-employee relationship as
evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees
and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and
employees were and still are represented for purposes of
maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI
and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and
tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620, which
grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an
international organization, deprives its employees of the right to
self-organization.
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process
except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly
waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a
certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for
the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification
election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated
process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective
bargaining process together with related incidents and/or
concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the
"legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and

Facts

Issue

33. Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center vs NLRC 206 SCRA 283
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture W/N NLRC
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a department of an
has jurisdiction
international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries
over the case?
Development Center, organized through an agreement
entered into in Bangkok, Thailand. Juvenal Lazaga was
employed as a Research Associate. Lacanilao in his
capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to private respondent informing him that due to
the financial constraints being experienced by the
department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDECAQD's failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him
to file a case with the NLRC. The LA and NLRC ruled in
favor of Lazaga. SEAFDEC-AQD claimed that the NLRC
has no jurisdiction over the case.
34. DFA vs NLRC GR 113191
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an
illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and
the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB
and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB,
as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1)
and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5
and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and
The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's
Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

1. Whether or
not ADB is
immune from
suit

Ruling
administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation
is neither remote and from which international organizations
are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of
their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to
be standard provisions in the constitutions of international
Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization
concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to
proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."

No. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international

agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including
its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB

enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well
as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The
Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all
acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter
and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities
and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must
be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a
diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence
or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member-states."

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the

impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity
from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03
November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC;
in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void
judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision
from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

2. Whether or
not by entering
into service
contracts with
different
private

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party

to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a
waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service
contracts with different private companies. There are two
conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute

Facts

Issue
companies,
ADB has
descended to
the level of an
ordinary party
to a
commercial
transaction
giving rise to a
waiver of its
immunity from
suit

Ruling
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of
a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act
can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have
not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official
acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Whether or
not the DFA
has the legal
standing to file
the present
petition

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other

mandates, the determination of persons and institutions
covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to
seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations.
The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever
necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility
of the Philippine government before the international
community. When international agreements are concluded, the
parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the
responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly
regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA
as being the highest executive department with the
competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the
international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this
Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international
agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a
foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it
is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of
'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international
organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary
of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to
submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled
to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or
the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary

Facts

Issue

Ruling
of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the
trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA
1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the
Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and
memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be
allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support
of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was
submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents
through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign
states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the
facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the
acts and transactions involved."