Adille vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455 , No.

L-44546, January 29, 1988

Adille vs. CA, 157 SCRA 455

which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis of evidence and law,
judgment appealed from should be maintained. 3

G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988

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RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO
ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO and SANTIAGO ASEJO, respondents.

The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, 4 and ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants,
the private respondents herein. The petitioner now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Court's
decision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having given due course to
the petition, directed the parties to file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and
the private respondents having failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for decision.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of controversy and a wellspring
of enormous conflict that has led not only to protracted legal entanglements but to even more
bitter consequences, like strained relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is a question
that likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural values and institutions,
where, as one observer notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and
where property is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his property," says this
modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody that threatens
his possessions will arouse his most passionate enmity." 1
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing
the social order is shouldered by the political leadership-and the people themselves.
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them
that relief pursuant to the decree of law.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision 2 appealed from:

The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the
property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him
upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He
relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the
vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. 5 While
the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the
expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end
the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect
reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. 6 There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:

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... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay located in Legaspi City with an
area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property;
she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an only
child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her
children were herein plaintiffs, now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de
retro to certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without
being able to redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant
repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that
he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his
mother was transferred to his name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of
compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case for
partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo
was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that,
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was
and became absolute owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and also
condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because of this that plaintiffs have come
here and contend that trial court erred in:

ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a
retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,"
the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro
to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. 7 But the provision does not give
to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his
name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said,
liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim
exclusive right to the property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of
acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private
respondents. The Civil Code states:

I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;

II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property to vacate the
land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.

We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the
property. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of
extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on
his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. The
aforequoted provision therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either
on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under
Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and
must act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The
evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of
exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot
therefore be said to have assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his coheirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court
itself affirms, the result would be the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would
remain liable to the Private respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on
property (owned in common) held by another (co-owner) following the required number of years.
In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership
is ended . 8 In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his
name, while the claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then,
set in?

Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived, 17 and here, the petitioner
never raised that defense. 18 There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has
not shown why they apply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

FACTS:

We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must

have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. 9

The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa Alzul who got married twice. Her child in
the first marriage was petitioner Rustico Adile and her children in the second marriage were
respondents Emetria Asejo et al.

The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not
convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the
private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot
therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of
the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to the present, yet,
the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover
possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the private
respondents had first sought judicial relief.

Felisa died before she could repurchase the property.

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, 10 but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. 11 It is therefore
no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming
there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal
notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974
over the estate registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, 12 reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, 13 we, as we said, are not
prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa
efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and
child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also."
14 Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they
actually discovered the petitioner's act of defraudation. 15 According to the respondent Court of
Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the litigation." 16
Hence, prescription is not a bar.

During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sodl the property in pacto de retro with a three-year repurchase
period.

During the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the property by himself alone at his own
expense, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be
the only heir and child of his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was able to secure title in his name
alone.
His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a case for partition and accounting claiming that
Rustico was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the property, and thus, he
cannot claim exclusive ownership of the entire property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common.
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor
HELD: No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share
alone. Although Rustico Adille redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses did
not make him the owner of all of it.
Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he
had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Art 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive
benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the respondents being the
beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.