SCIENTIFIC

AMERICAN

APRIL 1950

VOL.

182, NO. 4

On the Generalized
Theory of Gravitation
An account of the newly published extension
of the general theory of relativity against
its historical and philosophical background
by Albert Einstein
HE editors of SCI
ENTIFIC AMERI
CAN have asked
me to write about
my recent work
which has just
been published. It
is a mathematical
investigation con
cerning the foundations of field physics.
Some readers may be puzzled: Didn't
we learn all about the foundations of
physics when we were still at school?
The answer is "yes" or "no," depending
on the interpretation. We have become
acquainted with concepts and general
relations that enable us to comprehend
an immense range of experiences and
make them accessible to mathematical
treatment. In a certain sense these con
cepts and relations are probably even
final. This is true, for example, of the
laws of light refraction, of the relations
of classical thermodynamics as far as
it is based on the concepts of pressure,
volume, temperature, heat and work,
and of the hypothesiS of the non-exist
ence of a perpetual motion machine.
What, then, impels us to devise theory
after theory? Why do we devise theories
at all? The answer to the latter question
is simply: Because we enjoy "compre
hending, " i.e., reducing phenomena by
the process of logic to something ah'eady
known or (apparently) evident. New
theories are first of all necessary when
we encounter new facts which cannot be
"explained" by existing theories. But this
motivation for setting up new theories is,
so to speak, trivial, imposed from with
out. There is another, more subtle mo-

tive of no less importance. This is the

striving toward unification and simpli
fication of the premises of the theory as
a whole (i.e., Mach's principle of econo
my, interpreted as a logical principle).
There exists a passion for comprehen
sion, just as there exists a passion for
music. That passion is rather common in
children, but gets lost in most people
later on. Without this passion, there
would be neither mathematics nor natu
ral science. Time and again the passion
for understanding has led to the illusion
that man is able to comprehend the ob
jective world rationally, by pure thought,
without any empirical founc4ttions-in
short, by metaphysics. I believe that
every true theorist is a kind of tamed
metaphysicist, no matter how pure a
"positivist" he may fancy himself. The
metaphysicist believes that the logically
simple is also the real. The tamed meta
physicist believes that not all that is logi
cally simple is embodied in experienced
reality, but that the totality of all sensory
experience can be "comprehended" on
the basis of a conceptual system built on
premises of great simplicity. The skeptic
will say that this is a "miracle creed."
Admittedly so, but it is a miracle creed
which has been borne out to an amazing
extent by the development of science.
The rise of atomism is a good example.
How may Leucippus have conceived
this bold idea? When water freezes and
becomes ice-apparently something en
tirely different from water-why is it that
the thawing of the ice forms something
which seems indistinguishable from the
original water? Leucippus is puzzled and
looks for an "explanation." He is driven

to the conclusion that in these transi

tions the "essence" of the thing has not
changed at all. Maybe the thing consists
of immutable particles and the change
is only a change in their spatial arrange
ment. Could it not be that the same is
true of all material objects which emerge
again and again with nearly identical
qualities?
This idea is not entirely lost during the
long hibernation of occidental thought.
Two thousand years after Leucippus,
Bernoulli wonders why gas exerts pres
sure on the walls of a container. Should
this be "explained" by mutual repulsion
of the parts of the gas, in the sense of
Newtonian mechanics? This hypothesis
appears absurd, for the gas pressure de
pends on the temperature, all other
things being equal. To assume that the
Newtonian forces ofi nteraction depend
on temperature is contrary to the spirit
of Newtonian mechanics. Since Bernoul
li is aware of the concept of atomism, he
is bound to conclude that the atoms (or
molecules) collide with the walls of the
container and in doing so exert pressure.
After all, one has to assume that atoms
are in motion; how else can one account
for the varying temperature of gases?
A simple mechanical consideration
shows that this pressure depends only on
the kinetic energy of the particles and
on their density in space. This should
have led the physicists of that age to the
conclusion that heat consists in random
motion of the atoms. Had they taken this
consideration as seriously as it deserved
to be taken, the development of the theo
ry of heat-in particular the discovery of
the equivalence of heat and mechanical

13

1950 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC

energy-would have been considerably

Facilitated.
This example is meant to illustrate two
things. The theoretical idea (atomism in
this case) does not arise apart from and
independent of experience; nor can it be
derived from experience by a purely
logical procedure. It is produced by a
creative act. Once a theoretical idea has
been acquired, one does well to ,hold
fast to it until it leads to an untenable
conclusion.
S FOR my latest
theoretical work,
I do not feel justi
fied in giving a
detailed account
of it before a wide
group of readers
interested in sci
ence. That should
be done only with theories which have
been adequately confirmed by experi
ence. So far it is primarily the sim
plicity of its premises and its intimate
connection with what is already known
(viz., the laws of the pure gravitational
field) that speak in favor of the theory
to be discussed here. It may, however,
be of interest to a wide group of readers
to become acquainted with the train of
thought which can lead to endeavors of
such an extremely, speculative nature.
Moreover, it will be shown what kinds
of difficulties are encountered and in
what sense they have been overcome.
In Newtonian physics the elementary
theoreticaJ concept on which the theoret
ical description of material bodies is
based is the material point, or particle.
Thus matter is considered a priori to be
discontinuous. This makes it necessary
to consider the action of material points
on one another as "action at a distance."
Since the latter concept seems quite con
trary to everyday experience, it is only
natural that the contemporaries of New
ton-and indeed Newton himself-found
it difficult to accept. Owing to the almost
miraculous success of the Newtonian
system, however, the succeeding genera
tions of physicists became used to the
idea of action at a distance. Any doubt
was buried for a long time to come.
But when, in the second half of the
19th century, the laws of electrodynam
ics became known, it turned out that
these laws could not be satisfactorily in
corporated into the Newtonian system.
It is fascinating to muse: Would Fara
day have discovered the law of electro
magnetic induction if he had received a
regular college education? Unencum
hered by the traditional way of thinking,
he felt that the introduction of the "field"
as an independent element of reality
helped him to coordinate the experi
mental facts. It was Maxwell who fully
comprehended the significance of the
field concept; he made the fundamental
discovery that the laws of electrody
namics found their natural expression in
the differential equations for the electric

and ma.gnetic fields. These equations im

plied the existence' of waves, whose
properties corresponded to those of light
as far as they were known at that time.
This incorporation of optics into the
theory of electromagnetism represents
one of the greatest triumphs in the striv
ing toward unification of the founda
tions of physics; Maxwell achieved this
unification by purely theoretical argu
ments, long before it was corroborated
by Hertz' experimental work. The new
insight made it possible to dispense with
the hypothesis of action at a distance, at
least in the realm of electromagnetic
phenomena; the intermediary field now
appeared as the only carrier of electro
magnetic interaction between bodies,
and the field's behavior was completely
determined by contiguous processes, ex
pressed by differential equations.
Now a question arose: Since the field
exists even in a vacuum, should one con
ceive of the field as a state of a "carrier,"
or should it rather be endowed with an
independent existence not reducible to
anything else? In other words, is there an
"ether" which carries the field; the ether
being considered in the undulatory state,
for example, when it carries light waves?
The question has a natural answer:
Because one cannot dispense with the
field concept, it is preferable not to in
troduce in addition a carrier with hypo
thetical properties. However, the path
finders who first recognized the indis
pensability of the field concept were still
too strongly imbued with the mechanis
tic tradition of thought to accept unhesi
tatingly this simple point of view. But in
the course of the following decades this
view imperceptibly took hold.
The introduction of the field as an
elementary concept gave rise to an in
consistency of the theory as a whole.
Maxwell's theory, although adequately
describing the behavior of electrically
charged particles in their interaction
with one.another, does not explain the
behavior of electrical densities, i.e., it
does not provide a theory of the parti
cles themselves. They must therefore be
treated as mass points on the basis of
the old theory. The combination of the
idea of a continuous field with that of
material points discontinuous in space
appears inconsistent. A consistent field
theory requires continuity of all elements
of the theory, not only in time but also in
space, and in all points of space. Hence
the material particle has no place a" a
fundamental concept in a field theory.
Thus even apart from the fact that gravi
tation is not included, Maxwell's electro
dynamics cannot be considered a com
plete theory.
Maxwell's equations for empty space
remain unchanged if the spatial cOOldi
nates and the time are subjected to a par
ticular kind of linear transformations
the Lorentz transformations ("covari
ance" with respect to Lorentz transfor
mations). Covariance also holds, of
course, for a transformation which is

14

1950 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC

composed of two or more such transfor

mations; this is called the "group" prop
erty of Lorentz transformations.
Maxwell's equations imply the "Lo
rentz group," but the Lorentz group does
not imply Maxwell's equations. The Lo
rentz group may indeed be defined in
dependently of Maxwell's equations as
a group of linear transformations which
leave a particular value of the velocity
the velocity of light-invariant. These
transformations hold for the transition
from one "inertial system" to another
which is in uniform motion relative to
the first. The most conspicuous novel
property of this transformation group is
that it does away with the absolute char
acter of the concept of simultaneity of
events distant from each other in space.
On this account it is to be expected that
all equations of physics are covariant
with respect to Lorentz transformations
(special theory of relativity). Thus it
came about that Maxwell's equations led
to a heuristic principle valid far beyond
the range of the applicability or even
validity of the equations themselves.
Special relativity has this in common
with Newtonian mechanics: The laws of
both theories are supposed to hold only
with respect to certain coordinate sys
tems: those known as "inertial systems. "
An inertial system is a system in a state
of motion such that "force-free" material
points within it are not accelerated with
respect to the coordinate system. How
ever, this definition is empty if there is
no independent means for recognizing
. the absence of forces. But such a means
of recognition does not exist if gravita
tion is considered as a "field."
Let A be a system uniformly accele
rated with respect to an "inertial system"
1. Material points, not accelerated with
respect to I, are accelerated with respect
to A, the acceleration of all the points
being equal in magnitude and direction.
They behave as if a gravitational field
exists with respect to A, for it is a charac
teristic property of the gravitational field
that the acceleration is independent of
the particular nature of the body. There
is no reason to exclude the possibility of
interpreting this behavior as the effect
of a "true" gravitational field (princi
ple of equivalence). This interpretation
implies that A is an "inertial system,"
even though it is accelerated with re
spect to another inertial system. (It is
essential for this argument that the intro
duction of independent gravitational
fields is considered justified even though
no masses generating the field are de
fined. Therefore, to Newton such an
argument would not have appeared con
vincing.) Thus the concepts of inertial
system, the law of inertia and the law of
motion are deprived of their concrete
meaning-not only in classical mechanics
but also in special relativity. Moreover,
following up this train of thought, it
turns out that with respect to A time can
not be measured by identical clocks; in
deed, even the immediate physical signi-

ficance of coordinate differences is gen

erally lost In view of all these difficulties,
should one not try, after all, to hold on to
the concept of the inertial system, relin
quishing the attempt to explain the fun
damental character of the gravitational
phenomena which manjofest themselves
in the Newtonian system as the equiva
lence of inert and gravitational mass?
Those who trust in the comprehensibili
ty of nature must answer: No.
HIS is the gist f
the principle of
equivalence:
In
order to account
for the equality of
inert and gravita
tional mass within
the theory it is
necessary to ad
mit non-linear transformations of the
four coordinates. That is, the group of
Lorentz transformations and hence the
set of the "permissible" coordinate sys
tems has to be extended.
What group of coordinate transfor
mations can then be substituted for
the group of Lorentz transformations?
Mathematics suggests an answer which is
based on the fundamental investigations
of Gauss and Riemann: namely, that the
appropriate substitute is the group of all
continuous (analytical) transformations
of the coordinates. Under these transfor
mations the only thing that remains in
variant is the fact that neighboring
points have nearly the same coordinates;
the coordinate system expresses only the
topological order of the pOints in space
(including its four-dimensional charac
ter). The equations expressing the laws
of nature must be covariant with respect
to all continuous transformations of the
coordinates. This is the principle of gen
eral relativity.
The procedure just described over
comes a deficiency in the foundations of
mechanics which had already been no
ticed by Newton and was criticized by
Leibnitz and, two centuries later, by
Mach: Inertia resists acceleration, but
acceleration relative to what? Within the
frame of classical mechanics the only
answer is: Inertia resists acceleration
relative to space. This is a physical prop
erty of space-space acts on objects, but
objects do not act on space. Such is prob
ably the deeper meaning of Newton's
assertion spatium est absolutum (space
is absolute). But the idea disturbed
some, in particular Leibnitz, who did not
ascribe an independent existence to
space but considered it merely a proper
ty of "things" (contiguity of phYSical
objects). Had his justified doubts won
out at that time, it hardly would have
been a boon to physics, for the em
pirical and theoretical foundations nec
essary to follow up his idea were not
available in the 17th century.
According to general relativity, the
concept of space detached from any
physical content does not exist. The phys-

ical reality of space is represented by a

field whose components are continuous
functions of four independent variables
-the coordinates of space and time. It is
just this particular kind of dependence
that expresses the spatial character of
physical reality
Since the theory of general relativity
implies the representation of physical
reality by a continuous field, the concept
of particles or material points cannot
play a fundamental part, nor can the
concept of motion. The particle can only
appear as a limited region in space in
which the field strength or the energy
density are particularly high.
A relativistic theory has to answer two
questions: 1) What is the mathematical
character of the field? 2) What equa
tions hold for this field?
Concerning the first question: From
the mathematical pOint of view the field
is essentially characterized by the way
its components transform if a coordinate
transformation is applied. Concerning
the second question: The equations must
determine the field to a suffiCient extent
while satisfying the postulates of gen
eral relativity. Whether or not this re
quirement can be satisfied depends on
the choice of the field-type.
The attemt to comprehend the cor
relations among the empirical data on
the basis of such a highly abstract pro
gram may at first appear almost hope
less. The procedure amounts, in fact, to
putting the question: What most simple
property can be required from what
most simple object (field) while pre
serving the principle of general relativi
ty? Viewed from the standpoint of form
al logic, the dual character of the qus
tion appears calamitous, quite apart from
the vagueness of the concept "simple."
Moreover, from the standpOint of physics
there is nothing to warrant the assump
tion that a theory which is "logically
simple" should also be "true."
Yet every theory is speculative. When
the basic concepts of a theory are com
paratively "close to experience" (e.g.,
the concepts of force, pressure, mass), its
speculative character is not so easily
discernible. If, however, a theory is
such as to require the application of
complicated logical processes in order to
reach conclusions from the premises that
can be confronted with observation,
everybody becomes conscious of the
speculative nature of the theory. In such
a case an almost irresistible feeling of
aversion arises in people who are inex
perienced in epistemological analysis
and who are unaware of the precarious
nature of theoretical thinking in those
fields with which they are familiar.
On the other hand, it must be con
ceded that a theory has an important
advantage if its basic concepts and fun
damental hypotheses are "close to expe
rience," and greater confidence in such
a theory is certainly justified. There is
less danger of going completely astray,
particularly since it takes so much less

time and effort to disprove such theories

by experience. Yet more and more, as the
depth of our knowledge increases, we
must give up this advantage in our quest
for logical simplicity and uniformity in
the foundations of physical theory. It has
to be admitted that general relativity has
gone further than previous physical
theories in relinquishing "closeness to ex
perience" of fundamental concepts in
order to attain logical simplicity. This
holds already for the theory of gravita
tion, and it is even more true of the new
generalization, which is an attempt to
comprise the properties of the total field.
In the generalized theory the procedure
of deriving from the premises of the
theory conclusions that can be confront
ed with empirical data is so difficult that
so far no such result has been obtained.
In favor of this theory are, at this pOint,
its logical simplicity and its "rigidity."
Rigidity means here that the theory is
either true or false, but not modifiable.
HE greatest inner
difficulty imped
ing the develop
ment of the theo
ry of relativity is
the dual nature of
the problem, indi
cated by the two
questions we have
asked. This duality is the reason why the
development of the theory has taken
place in two steps so widely separated
in time. The first of these steps, the
theory of gravitation, is based on the
principle of equivalence discussed above
and rests on the following consideration:
According to the theory of special rela
tivity, light has a constant velocity of
propagation. If a light ray in a vacuum
starts from a pOint, designated by the co
ordinates Xl> X2 and Xa in a three dimen
sional coordinate system, at the time X4,
it spreads as a spherical wave and
reaches a neighboring point (Xl+dXl,
x2+dx2, xa+dxa) at the time x4+dx4'
Introducing the velocity of light, c, we
write the expression:
vdxl +dx22 + dX3:!= cdx4
This can also be written in the form:

This expression represents an objec

tive relation between neighboring space
time points in four dimensions, and it
holds for all inertial systems, provided
the coordinate transformations are re
stricted to those of special relativity. T4e
relation loses this form, however, if ar
bitrary continuous transformations of the
coordinates are admitted in accordance
with the principle of general relativity.
The relation then assumes the more gen
eral form:

:t gik dXj 'dxk

Ik

The gil, are certain functions of the coor-

15

1950 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC

dinates which transform in a definite

way if a continuous coordinate transfor
mation is applied. According to the prin
ciple of equivalence, these gik functions
describe a particular kind of gravita
tional field: a field which can be ob
tained by transformation of "field-free"
space. The gik satisfy a particular law of
transformation. Mathematically speak
ing, they are the components of a
"tensor" with a property of symmetry
which is preserved in all transforma
tions; the symmetrical property is ex
pressed as follows:
gik= gki

The idea suggests itself: May we not

ascribe objective meaning to such a sym
metrical tensor, even though the field
cannot be obtained from the empty
space of special relativity by a mere
coordinate transformation? Although we
cannot expect that such a symmetrical
tensor will describe the most general
field, it may well describe the particular
case of the "pure gravitational field."
Thus it is . evident what kind of field, at
least for a special case, general relativity
has to postulate: a symmetrical tensor
field.
Hence only the second question is
left: What kind of general covariant
field law can be postulated for a sym
metrical tensor field?
This question has not been difficult to
answer in our time, since the necessary
mathematical conceptions were already
at hand in the form of the metric theory
of surfaces, created a century ago by
Gauss and extended by Riemann to
manifolds of an arbitrary number of di
mensions. The result of this purely for
mal investigation has been amazing in
many respects. The differential equa
tions which can be postulated as field
law for gik cannot be of lower than sec
ond order, i.e., they must at least contain
the second derivatives of the gik with
respect to the coordinates. Assuming that
no higher than second derivatives appear
in the field law, it is mathematically de
termined by the principle of general
relativity. The system of equations can
be written in the form:
Rik=O
The Rik transform in the same manner
as the gik> i.e., they too form a symmetri
cal tensor.
These differential equations com
pletely replace the Newtonian theory of
the motion of celestial bodies provided
the masses are represented as singulari
ties of the field. In other words, they
contain the law of force as well as the
law of motion while eliminating "inertial
systems."
The fact that the masses appear as
singularities indicates that these masses
themselves cannot be explained by sym
metrical gik fields, or "gravitational
fields." Not even the fact that only posi
tive gravitating masses exist can be de
duced from this theory. Evidently a com
plete relativistic field theory must be
based on a field of more complex nature,

that is, a generalization of the symmetri

cal tensor field.
EFORE consider
ing such a gener
alization, two re
marks pertaining
to gravitational
theory are essen
tial for the expla
nation to follow.
The first obser
vation is that the principle of general
relativity imposes exceedingly strong re
strictions on the theoretical possibilities.
Without this restrictive principle it
would be practically impossible for any
body to hit on the gravitational equa
tions, not even by using the principle of
special relativity, even though one
knows that the field has to be described
by a symmetrical tensor. No amount of
collection of facts could lead to these
equations unless the principle of general
relativity were used. This is the reason
why all attempts to obtain a deeper
knowledge of the foundations of physics
seem doomed to me unless the basic con
cepts are in accordance with general
relativity from the beginning. This situa
tion makes it difficult to use our empiri
cal knowledge, however comprehensive,
in looking for the fundamental concepts
and relations of physics, and it forces us
to apply free speculation to a much
greater extent than is presently assumed
by most physicists. I do not see any rea
son to assume that the heuristic signifi
cance of the principle of general relativ
ity is restricted to gravitation and that
the rest of physics can be dealt with
separately on the basis of special rela
tivity, with the hope that later on the
whole may be fitted consistently into a
generai relativistic scheme. I do not
think that such an attitude, although his
torically understandable, can be objec
tively justified. The comparative small
ness of what we know today as gravita
tional effects is not a conclusive reason
for ignoring the principle of general rela
tivity in theoretical investigations of a
fundamental character. In other words,
I do not believe that it is justifiable to
ask: What would physics look like with
out gravitation?
The second pOint we must note is that
the equations of gravitation are 10 differ
ential equations for the 10 components
of the symmetrical tensor gik. In the case
of a non-general relativistic theory, a
system is ordinarily not overdetermined
if the number of equations is equal to
the number of unknown functions. The
manifold of solutions is such that within
the general solution a certain number of
functions of three variables can be
chosen arbitrarily. For a general rela
tivistic theory this cannot be expected
as a matter of course. Free choice with
respect to the coordinate system implies
that out of the 10 functions of a solu
tion, or components of the field, four
can be made to assume prescribed values

by a suitable choice of the coordinate

system. In other words, the prinCiple
of general relativity implies that the
number of functions to be determined
by differential equations is not 10 but
10-4=6. For these six functions only
six independent differential equations
may be postulated. Only six out of the 10
differential equations of the gravitation
al field ought to be independent of each
other, while the remaining four must
be connected to those six by means of
four relations (identities). And indeed
there exist among the left-hand sides,
Rik, of the 10 gravitational equations four
identities- "Bianchi's identities"-which
assure their "compatibility. "
In a case like this-when the number
of field variables is equi\l to the number
of differential equations-compatibility
is always assured if the equations can be
obtained from a variational principle.
This is indeed the case for the gravita
tional equations.
However, the 10 differential equa
tions cannot be entirely replaced by six.
The system of equations is indeed "over
determined," but due to the existence of
the identities it is overdetermined in
such a way that its compatibility is not
lost, i.e., the manifold of solutions is not
critically restricted. The fact that the
equations of gravitation imply the law
of motion for the masses is intimately
connected with this (permissible) over
determination.
After this preparation it is now easy to
understand the nature of the present in
vestigation without entering into the de
tails of its mathematics. The problem is
to set up a relativistic theory for the
total field. The most important clue to
its solution is that there exists already
the solution for the special case of the
pure gravitational field. The theory we
are looking for must therefore be a
generalization of the theory of the gravi
tational field. The first question is: What
is the natural generalization of the sym
metrical tensor field?
This question cannot be answered by
itself, but only in connection with the
other question: What generalization of
the field is going to provide the most
natural theoretical system? The answer
on which the theory under discussion is
based is that the symmehical tensor field
must be replaced by a non-symmetrical
one. This means that the condition
gik= gki for the field components must
be dropped. In that case the field has 16
instead of 10 independent components.
There remains the task of setting up
the relativistic differential equations for
a non-symmetrical tensor field. In the
attempt to solve this problem one meets
with a difficulty which does not arise in
the case of the symmetrical field. The
principle of general relativity does not
suffice to determine completely the field
equations, mainly because the transfor
mation law of the symmetrical part of
the field alone does not involve the com
ponents of the antisymmetrical part or

16

1950 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC

vice versa. Probably this is the reason

why this kind of generalization of the
field has hardly ever been tried before.
The combination of the two parts of the
field can only be shown to be a natural
procedure if in the formalism of the
theory only the total field plays a role,
and not the symmetrical and antisym
meh'ical parts separately.
It turned out that this requirement
can indeed be satisfied in a natural way.
But even this requirement, together with
the principle of general relativity, is still
not sufficient to determine uniquely the
field equations. Let us remember that
the system of equations must satisfy a
further condition: the equations must
be cmpatible. It has been mentioned
above that this condition is satisfied if
the equations can be derived from a vari
ational principle.
This has indeed been achieved, al
though not in so natural a way as in the
case of the symmetrical field. It has been
disturbing to find that it can be achieved
in two different ways. These variational
principles furnished two systems of
equations-let us denote them by El
and E2-which were different from each
other (although only slightly so), each
of them exhibiting specific imperfec
tions. Consequently even the condition
of compatibility was insufficient to de
termine the system of equations unique
ly.
It was, in fact, the formal defects of
the systems El and E2 that indicated a
possible way out. There exists a third
system of equations, Eg, which is free
of the formal defects of the systems E]
and E2 and represents a combination of
them in the sense that every solution of
Eg is a solution of El as well as of Eo.
This suggests that Ea may be the syste]
we have been looking for. Why not pos
tulate Eg, then, as the system of equa
tions? Such a procedure is not justified
without further analysis, since the com
patibility of El and that of E2 do not
imply compatibility of the stronger sys
tem E3, where the number of equations
exceeds the number of field components
by four.
An independent consideration shows
that irrespective of the questioJ.l of com
patibility the stronger system, Eg, is the
only really natural generali-zation of the
equations of gravitation.
But Eg is not a compatible system in
the same sense as are the systems El and
E2, whosj'l compatibility is assured by a.
sufficient number of identities, which
means that every field that satisfies the
equations for a definite value of the time
has a continuous extension representing
a solution in four-dimensional space. The
system Eg, however, is not extensible in
the same way. Using the language of
classical mechanics we might say: In the
case of the system Eg the "initial condi
tion" cannot be freely chosen. What real
ly matters is the answer to the question:
Is the manifold of solutions for the sys
tem Eg as extensive as must be required

for a physical theory? This purely mathe

matical problem is as yet unsolved.
The skeptic will say: "It may well be
h'ue that this system of equations is rea
,sonable from a logical standpoint. But
this does not prove that it corresponds
to nature." You are right, dear skeptic.
Experience alone can decide on truth.
Yet we have achieved something if we

have succeeded in formulating a mean

ingful and precise question. Affirmation
or refutation will not be easy, in spite
of an abundance of known empirical
facts. The derivation, from the equa
tions, of conclusions which can be con
fronted with experience will require
painstaking efforts ancl probably new
mathematical methods.

17

1950 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC