Miroslav Deronjic Trial Judgement (Plea Agreement) (Srebrenica and Bratunac)

Case No.
: IT-02-61-S 30 March 2004

UNITED
NATIONS
International Tribunal for the Case No. IT-02-61-S

Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Date: 30 March 2004
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Original: English
IN TRIAL CHAMBER II
Before: Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, Presiding

Judge Carmel A. Agius
Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba
Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis
Judgement of: 30 March 2004
PROSECUTOR
v.
MIROSLAV DERONJI]
SENTENCING JUDGEMENT
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Mark B. Harmon
Counsel for the Accused:
Mr. Slobodan Cvijeti}

Mr. Slobodan Ze~evi}
Case No.: IT-02-61-S 30 March 2004

CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1
II. THE ACCUSED .................................................................................................................................. 2
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................................. 4

A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS ....................................................................................................... 4
B. PLEA AGREEMENT .............................................................................................................................. 6
C. TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED ............................................................................................................. 7
D. SENTENCING HEARING ....................................................................................................................... 7
E. CONTINUED SENTENCING HEARING .................................................................................................... 9
IV. GUILTY PLEA AND PLEA AGREEMENT ............................................................................... 11
V. THE FACTS ...................................................................................................................................... 13

A. THE POLITICAL CAREER OF THE ACCUSED ....................................................................................... 14
B. POLITICAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................. 14
C. PREPARATIONS FOR PERSECUTIONS IN GLOGOVA ............................................................................. 18
D. ACTS OF PERSECUTIONS ................................................................................................................... 26
1. Attack on the Village of Glogova ................................................................................................ 26
2. Killing of Bosnian Muslim Civilians in Glogova ........................................................................ 27
(a) Killing of Medo Deli}, [e}o Ibi{evi}, Zlatija Ibi{evi} and Adem Junuzovi} ........................ 27
(b) First Mass Killing................................................................................................................... 27
(c) Second Mass Killing .............................................................................................................. 27
(d) Third Mass Killing ................................................................................................................. 27
3. Forcible Displacement of Civilians from Glogova...................................................................... 28
4. Destruction of an Institution Dedicated to Religion (the Mosque) and Other Muslim Property. 29
E. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON GLOGOVA .............................................................................. 30
F. MEETING IN PALE ............................................................................................................................. 32
VI. THE LAW ........................................................................................................................................ 33
A. LEGAL BASIS .................................................................................................................................... 33
B. TRIAL CHAMBER’S FINDINGS............................................................................................................ 33
VII. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED.................................... 36
VIII. SENTENCING LAW ................................................................................................................... 38

A. THE INDIVIDUAL GUILT OF AN ACCUSED AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY ....................... 39
B. PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES ............................................................................................................... 39
1. Submissions of the Parties ........................................................................................................... 39
2. Discussion.................................................................................................................................... 40
(a) Deterrence .............................................................................................................................. 40
(b) Retribution ............................................................................................................................. 42
C. ARTICLE 24 OF THE STATUTE AND RULE 101 OF THE RULES ............................................................ 42
D. GRAVITY OF THE CRIME, AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS .............................................. 43
E. SENTENCING RANGES ....................................................................................................................... 44
1. Former Yugoslavia ...................................................................................................................... 44
2. The Applicability of the Principle of lex mitior........................................................................... 46
3. Other Countries............................................................................................................................ 47
IX. FACTS RELATED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED....................... 50
A. GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.................................................... 50
1. Submissions of the Parties ........................................................................................................... 50
2. Discussion.................................................................................................................................... 51
(a) Large Number of Victims ...................................................................................................... 51
i
(b) Deronji}’s Superior Position as a Political Leader in the Municipality of Bratunac ............. 51
(c) Miroslav Deronji}’s Role in the Disarmament of the Citizens of Glogova ........................... 54
(d) Deronji}’s Role in Ordering the Attack on Glogova ............................................................. 54
(e) Deronji}’s Role during the Attack on Glogova...................................................................... 55
(f) Vulnerability and Helplessness of the Victims of the 9 May 1992 Attack on Glogova......... 56
(g) Long-term Effects of the 9 May 1992 Attack on Glogova on the Victims............................ 57
3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 59
B. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES .......................................................................................................... 59
1. Guilty Plea ................................................................................................................................... 60
(a) Submissions of the Parties...................................................................................................... 60
(b) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 60
(i) Analysis of the country reports submitted by the Max Planck Institute ............................. 60
(ii) Jurisprudence of the International Tribunals ..................................................................... 62
(c) Conclusion.............................................................................................................................. 63
2. Substantial Co-operation by the Accused .................................................................................... 65
(b) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 65
(i) Provision of unique and corroborative information to the Prosecution.............................. 66
(ii) Testimony of Miroslav Deronji} in other proceedings before the Tribunal ...................... 66
(iii) Provision of original documentation to the Prosecution................................................... 68
(iv) Identification of new crimes and perpetrators unknown to the Prosecution..................... 68
3. Contribution to Prevention of Revisionism of Crimes Committed in Srebrenica ....................... 68
(b) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 69
4. Remorse ....................................................................................................................................... 70
(b) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 71
5. No Opportunity for Voluntary Surrender .................................................................................... 71
(b) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 72
6. The Accused’s Character, Behaviour and Possibility for Rehabilitation..................................... 72
(b) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 73
7. General Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 74
X. DETERMINATION OF SENTENCE............................................................................................. 75
A. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES .......................................................................................................... 75
B. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 76
C. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED SINCE ARREST ........................................................................................ 76
XI. DISPOSITION ................................................................................................................................. 77
XII. LIST OF KNOWN MURDERED PERSONS ............................................................................. 79
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHOMBURG...................................................................... 83

A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 83
B. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................................... 83
1. The Duty of the Prosecutor.......................................................................................................... 83
2. The Appropriate Sentence for the Crimes to which the Accused has Pleaded Guilty................. 86
(a) Guilty Plea.............................................................................................................................. 87
(b) Co-operation with the Tribunal.............................................................................................. 87
(c) Remorse.................................................................................................................................. 88
C. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 89
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MUMBA.................................................................................... 92
ii
ANNEXES............................................................................................................................................... 93
A. LIST OF CITED COURT DECISIONS..................................................................................................... 93
1. ICTY ............................................................................................................................................ 93
2. ICTR ............................................................................................................................................ 95
3. Other Decisions............................................................................................................................ 96
B. LIST OF OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ 96
C. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................... 96
iii
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991
(hereinafter “Tribunal”) was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993)
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 39 of Chapter VII reads as follows:
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security”. 1
2. Miroslav Deronji} (hereinafter “Accused”) was indicted by the Tribunal on 3 July 2002. The
Trial Chamber wishes to emphasize that it is seized only with Miroslav Deronji}’s individual
criminal responsibility for Persecutions committed on 9 May 1992 and only in the village of
Glogova in the Municipality of Bratunac in Eastern Bosnia, based on the Second Amended
Indictment of 30 September 2003.
3. In confessing his individual guilt and admitting all factual details contained in the Second
Amended Indictment and in an additional Factual Basis in open court on 30 September 2003,
Miroslav Deronji} has guided the international community closer to the truth on crimes committed
in the area of Glogova, truth being one prerequisite for peace. He has helped, to a certain extent, to
protect against any kind of revisionism.
4. It is now for this Trial Chamber to balance the extreme gravity of the crimes, for which the
Accused accepted full responsibility, against this contribution to peace and security. In doing so, it
is for this Trial Chamber to come as close as possible to justice for both victims and their relatives
and the Accused, justice being of paramount importance for the restoration and maintenance of
peace.
1
Emphasis added. Chapter VII is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts
of Aggression”.
1
II. THE ACCUSED
5. The Accused, Miroslav Deronjić, was born on 6 June 1954 in Magašići in the Municipality
of Bratunac, the youngest child of Milovan and Jelika Deronjić. He has three older sisters.2
6. The Accused attended elementary school in Glogova and Bratunac.3 After completing
secondary school in Srebrenica, he enrolled for History of Yugoslav Literature and Serbo-Croatian
or Croato-Serbian Language4 at the faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, from where he graduated in
19775. He was an eager and successful student.6 After his graduation, he worked for a few months
as a sub-editor for the newspaper Oslobodjenje and also as a journalist for Radio Sarajevo. Later, he
worked as a teacher in a secondary school in Sarajevo.7
7. The Accused served in the military from 1979 to 1980 at the aviation monitoring command
in Novi Sad. After his return to Bratunac, he was gainfully employed in the secondary school in
Srebrenica.8
8. After the death of his mother in 1983, he went to France to work as a teacher for guest
worker families for two years.9 He lived together with Ranka Stevanovi}, whom he married in
1984. Their first son, Neven, was born in the same year.10 In 1985, the Accused returned with his
family to Bratunac, where his second son, Stefan, was born.11 He started working as a language
teacher at the secondary school in Srebrenica and stayed in employment there until 1990.12
9. In 1990, the Accused decided to actively participate in political life. He joined the Serbian
Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter “SDS”),13 feeling a strong desire to
participate in political discourse and to take a public position on communism.14 The professional
activity of the Accused, particularly his political career between 1990 and 1997, will be discussed in
the section outlining the facts of the present case.15
2
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Psychological Report on Miroslav Deronjić, son of Milovan,
born 6 June 1954, 16 December 2003 (hereinafter “Najman Report”) , Exh. JS-16a, p. 4.
3
Ibid., p. 5.
4
Defence Closing Statement, T. 216.
5
Najman Report, pp. 5-6.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., p. 6.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Najman Report, p. 7; Birth Certificate No. 01 for 1985, Exh. DS-13/5.
11
Ibid.; Birth Certificate No. 307 for 1986, Exh. DS-13/6.
12
Najman Report, p. 7.
13
14
15
See infra subsection V.A., para. 48.
2
10. After 1997, the Accused was not gainfully employed. Attempts to start a private business
failed. His last investment, in a joint venture with a man from Bratunac in 2001, also proved to be
unsuccessful.16
11. The Accused was arrested on 6 July 2002. On 8 July 2002 he was transferred to the United
Nations’ Detention Unit (hereinafter “UNDU”), where he remains until today.17
12. The Accused enjoys the support of his family.18 After the death of his first wife, Ranka, in
1992, he married his present wife, Dana Stevi}, in 1996.19 He had two more children: a son, Vuk,
born in 199620 and a daughter, Lola, born in 200121.22
13. The Accused has no criminal record.23
16
17
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 87.
18
19
Marriage Certificate No. 86 for 1996, Exh. DS-13/7
20
Birth Certificate No. 1164 for 1996, Exh. DS-13/8
21
Birth Certificate No. 572 for 2001, Exh. DS-13/9
22
23
3
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Overview of the Proceedings
14. A first indictment against Miroslav Deronjić was issued on 3 July 200224 and confirmed on
4 July 2002;25 it initially contained six counts.26 It has been amended twice.27 The latest version,
filed on 30 September 2003,28 forms the basis of these proceedings.29
15. On 6 July 2002, Miroslav Deronjić was arrested in Bratunac, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
was transferred to the UNDU on 8 July 2002. At his initial appearance on 10 July 2002, Miroslav
Deronjić pleaded not guilty to all the counts of the initial indictment.30
16. On 2 August 2002, the Accused filed a motion requesting that the indictment be formulated
more precisely.31
17. On 25 October 2002, the Trial Chamber granted the motion in part.32 Accordingly, on 29
November 2002, changes specifically concerning the Accused’s individual criminal responsibility
pursuant to Articles 7 (1) and 7 (3) of the Statute, as well as his overall role in the criminal offences,
were submitted by the Prosecution.33 Especially, the distinction between the acts of the
subordinates, for which the Accused was allegedly responsible as a superior, were clarified.
Moreover, the Prosecution sought to amend the indictment with the identity of the murder victims
in each incident for which the Accused was individually charged.
18. On 29 September 2003, the Parties agreed on the proposed Second Amended Indictment
(hereinafter “Indictment”), which was reduced to only one charge, that of Persecutions pursuant to
Article 5 (h), incorporating the attack on the village of Glogova, killings, destruction of property in
Glogova and forcible displacement, and the Accused’s individual criminal responsibility pursuant
24
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Indictment, 3 July 2002.
25
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Warrant of Arrest Order for Surrender, 4 July 2002.
26
Including Crimes against Humanity, punishable under Articles 5 (a), 5 (h), 7 (1) and 7 (3) of the Statute as well as
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, punishable under Articles 3, 7 (1) and 7 (3) of the Statute.
27
See infra paras 16-18.
28
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, 30 September
2003.
29
See infra para. 18; Sentencing Hearing, T. 135.
30
Initial Hearing, T. 17-18.
31
Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case No.IT-02-61, Defence Preliminary
Motion, 2 August 2002.
32
Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case No. IT-02-61, Decision on Form of the Indictment, 25 October 2002, resulting in the
Prosecution’s Amended Indictment Submission, 29 November 2002.
33
Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case No. IT-02-61, Prosecution’s Amended Indictment Submission, 29 November 2002;
Prosecution’s General Reorganisation Table Submission for the Amended Indictment, 29 November 2002.
4
to Article 7 (1) of the Statute. The Indictment was accepted by the Trial Chamber at the Status
Conference held on 30 September 2003 (hereinafter “Plea Hearing”).34
19. At the Plea Hearing, the Accused pleaded guilty to the Indictment forming part of a plea
agreement (hereinafter “Plea Agreement”) which was submitted jointly by the Parties and is based
on the Indictment and a separate factual basis (hereinafter “Factual Basis”).35
20. The Trial Chamber requested the Registrar to appoint an expert in psychology to submit a
report on the Accused’s socialisation, which should provide, inter alia, details on the Accused’s
childhood, conditions under which he grew up, his school and work career, as well as relations with
friends and family (until today). The Registrar appointed Mrs. Ana Najman (Belgrade) as
consultant, from 18 November 2003 to 18 December 2003, and the report that she prepared and
submitted (hereinafter “Najman Report”), based on the consent of the Parties, was admitted into
evidence without summoning her.36
21. On 5 December 2003, the Trial Chamber issued an order for the Prosecution to produce
additional evidence in the form of a detailed description and assessment of the Accused’s co-
operation. Moreover, the Trial Chamber asked for all transcripts of the Accused’s testimonies given
in other cases before the Tribunal (hereinafter “Deronjić Testimonies”) until that point.37
22. On 17 December 2003, the Trial Chamber invited the Parties to indicate whether they
accepted the expert report prepared by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber, Director of Max Planck Institute for
foreign and international criminal law in Freiburg/Germany, in the Dragan Nikolić case38
(hereinafter “Sentencing Report”), which focused on sentencing practice and ranges relating to
crimes that included those to which the Accused pleaded guilty.39 Because the Parties accepted the
Sentencing Report and the testimony of Prof. Sieber in the Dragan Nikoli} case40 (hereinafter
34
Plea Hearing, T. 47.
35
Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case No. IT-02-61, Plea Agreement, 29 September 2003.
36
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Scheduling Order for Sentencing Hearing, 16 January 2004. The
Psychological Report was admitted into evidence as Exh. JS-16 in B/C/S and JS-16a in English. The Supplement to the
Physiological Report on Miroslav Deronji} submitted by Ana Najman on 19 January 2004 was admitted into evidence
as Exh. JS-16/1 in B/C/S and JS-16/1a in English.
37
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Order on Production of Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 98, 5
December 2003; Exhs.: DS-9, DS-10, DS-11, PS-12.
38
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Scheduling Order, 25 September 2003; Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber,
The Punishment of Serious Crimes – A comparative analysis of sentencing law and practice -, Final Version filed on 12
November 2003.
39
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Order on Admission into Evidence of Testimony of Expert Witness Prof.
Dr. Ulrich Sieber, 17 December 2003.
40
Transcript of Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber’s testimony on the Sentencing Report during the sentencing hearing in the
Dragan Nikolić case on 5 November 2003.
5
“Sieber Testimony”) in its entirety, the Sentencing Report and the Sieber Testimony were admitted
into evidence41 without summoning Prof. Sieber.
23. The Parties submitted their Sentencing Briefs on 18 December 2003.42 The Defence
informed the Trial Chamber that it would not object to the admission into evidence of the
Prosecution witnesses’ statements43 nor did it intend to cross-examine any of these witnesses.44
24. Following the Trial Chamber’s order of 5 December 2003,45 the Prosecution produced three
Annexes46 of all Deronjić Testimonies in other proceedings before this Tribunal until that date.47
B. Plea Agreement
25. The documents filed by the Prosecution in preparation for the Plea Hearing pursuant to Rule
62 ter consisted of the Plea Agreement, the Indictment and the Factual Basis.
26. The terms of the Plea Agreement are as follows:
[…] Miroslav Deronjić agrees to plead guilty to persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds, a Crime against Humanity₣...ğ, punishable under Articles 5 (h) and 7(1) of the Statute of
the Tribunal ₣...ğ, as alleged in the Second Amended Indictment.48
[…] A written factual basis supporting the crime of Persecutions, punishable under Article 5 (h) of
the Statute and Miroslav Deronjić’s participation in it has been prepared and filed with the Trial
Chamber (hereinafter “Factual Basis”). Miroslav Deronjić has reviewed with his attorneys the
Factual Basis. Miroslav Deronjić adopts the Factual Basis and agrees that he is pleading guilty to
the charge of Persecutions contained in the Second Amended Indictment because he is in fact
guilty and acknowledges full responsibility for his actions that are described therein.49
27. The Factual Basis and the entire Indictment50 were read out to the Accused paragraph by
paragraph at the Plea Hearing. The Accused pleaded guilty to the single charge of Persecutions in
the Indictment, admitting at the same time that the entire Factual Basis reflects correctly the events
described therein.51
41
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Scheduling Order for Sentencing Hearing, 16 January 2004; Exhs. JS-17
(Sentencing Report), JS-17A (Sieber Testimony).
42
Including Prosecution’s confidential Annex I and Defence’s confidential Appendixes A to D.
43
See Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Prosecution Witnesses’ Statements, filed on 18 December 2003 and
the “Annex to Prosecution’s Sentencing Brief Statements relating to Impact on Victims”.
44
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Defence’s Submission Regarding Prosecutor’s Sentencing Witnesses, 22
December 2003.
45
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Order on Production of Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 98.
46
Annexes to the “Prosecution’s Filing Pursuant to Order on Production of Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 98”,
filed confidentially on 5 January 2004; and the “Prosecution’s Submission of Further Parts of Testimony of Miroslav
Deronjić”, filed confidentially on 7 January 2004.
47
See supra para. 21.
48
Plea Agreement, para 3.
49
Ibid., para 4.
50
The “General Allegations” paras 13-16, 2-12 and 17- end.
51
Plea Hearing, T. 48-83.
6
28. However, the Trial Chamber drew to the Parties’ attention several times that in attempts to
merge the Indictment with the Factual Basis, several discrepancies could be identified.52 Therefore,
during the Plea Hearing the Trial Chamber could solely ascertain that the Accused entered the Plea
Agreement voluntarily, that the Plea Agreement was read to him in a language he understood and
that he also understood, the terms of the Plea Agreement.53 Moreover, it was explained to the
Accused one more time that under Rule 62 ter (B) of the Rules, the Trial Chamber is not bound by
any agreement; and that the maximum sentence that could be imposed is a term of imprisonment up
to and including the remainder of his life as stated in Rule 101 (A) of the Rules.54
C. Testimony of the Accused
29. In order to reconcile the aforementioned discrepancies, the Parties were invited to provide
further clarifications. This was primarily done during the Accused’s witness testimony on 27
January 2004 (hereinafter “Deronjić Testimony”). The Trial Chamber held that now there is a
sufficient Factual Basis to establish the crime and the Accused's participation in it.55 Therefore, the
Trial Chamber entered a finding of guilt in relation to the charge of Persecutions as described in the
Indictment.56
D. Sentencing Hearing
30. On 16 January 2004, Deronji} Testimonies,57 the Prosecution Witnesses’ Statements58 and
the Defence Witnesses’ Statements59 were admitted into evidence, and the transcripts of any further
testimony by the Accused were ordered to be produced by the Prosecution.60 The Sentencing
Hearing, designed to provide the Trial Chamber with “any relevant information that may assist in
determining an appropriate sentence” pursuant to Rule 100 (A) of the Rules, commenced on 27
January 2004 and concluded on 28 January 2004.
52
Sentencing Hearing, T. 177.
53
54
Ibid., T. 44.
55
56
Ibid., T. 177-78.
57
The transcripts of the Accused’s testimony given in Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No.: IT-02-60/1-S on 28
October 2003, Exh. DS-9; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.: IT-98-33-A, on 21 November 2003, Exh. DS-10; Prosecutor
v. Milosević, Case No.: IT-02-54-T, on 26 and 27 November 2003, Exh. DS-11.
58
Annex to the Prosecution Sentencing Brief admitted into evidence as Exhs.: PS-19/1 to PS-19/7.
59
Annex I: Witness List to the Defence Sentencing Brief admitted into evidence as Exhs.: DS-18/1 to DS-18/8 in B/C/S
and DS-18/1a to DS-18/8a in English respectively; upon agreement of the Parties, the confidentiality of Exhs. DS-18/2,
DS-18/4, DS-18/5, DS-18/7, DS-18/8 were lifted, Sentencing Hearing, T. 242.
60
Pursuant to the Scheduling Order from 16 January 2004 (Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Scheduling
Order for Sentencing Hearing, 16 January 2004), the Prosecution in its “Submission of Further Testimony of Miroslav
Deronji}” produced on 23 January 2004 the transcripts of the Accused’s testimony under seal given in Prosecutor v.
Blagojević et al., Case No.: IT-02-60-T, on 19-22 January, which were admitted into evidence as Exh. PS-12.
7
31. Already in the beginning of the Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Chamber emphasized that it
was only seized of the events in Glogova on 9 May 1992. Especially in relation to Paragraph 11 (d)
of the Plea Agreement, it was stressed that the application of the principle of ne bis in idem in this
concrete case is limited only to crimes committed during the attack in Glogova. Therefore the Trial
Chamber reminded the Parties that the Accused can still be indicted for all other possible crimes in
which he might have been involved, including e.g. Srebrenica, before this Tribunal or in other
countries which have jurisdiction as well. As it was pointed out by the Trial Chamber, contrary to
some other legal systems, all matters concerning prosecution and investigation before this Tribunal
remain in the sole responsibility of the Prosecutors policy.61
32. In relation to Paragraph 11 (f) of the Plea Agreement and Rule 62 ter (C) of the Rules, the
Trial Chamber also inquired whether the Plea Agreement submitted by the Parties was the full plea
agreement, or whether specifically a document titled the “Understanding of the Parties”62, having
never been mentioned before, also formed part of the Plea Agreement.63 The Prosecution submitted
that the “Understanding of the Parties” stems from a time when the Accused was generally reluctant
to provide a full statement to the Prosecution, unless he was provided by the Prosecution, in writing,
with certain understandings concerning his statements.64 It was argued that the Accused would have
been reluctant to assist and provide the Prosecution with important information without this promise
at a time when the Accused was under no legal obligation to talk to representatives of the
Prosecution.65 However, the Prosecution and the Defence stated that the “Understanding of the
Parties” did not form part of the Plea Agreement.66
33. Additionally, a number of exhibits were admitted into evidence.67 Furthermore, the Parties
agreed to delete from the Indictment the charge that he had ordered the events.68 It was emphasized
61
62
Dated 18 June 2003 and admitted into evidence as Exh. JS-15 (formerly Exh. D-96/1 in the case of Prosecutor v.
Blagojević et al., dated 18 June 2003).
63
Sentencing Hearing, T. 99 and T. 102.
64
Ibid., T. 103.
65
Ibid., T. 103-105.
66
Ibid., T. 103.
67
Six interviews of the Accused with the Prosecution between 16 December 1997 and 9 April 2002 (confidential
Appendix A to the Defence Sentencing Brief, admitted into evidence as Exhs. DS-1, DS-2, DS-3, DS-4, DS-5 and DS-
6); eleven interviews of the Accused with the Prosecution during June and July 2003 (confidential Appendix B to the
Defence Sentencing Brief, admitted into evidence as Exhs. DS-7/1 to DS-7/11); witness statement of the Accused 25
November 2003 (Exh. DS-8. After Deronji}’s Testimony in the Sentencing Hearing, the Prosecution tendered an
English version of this statement, which was not signed by the Accused; it was admitted into evidence as Exh. DS-8a,
T. 180-82); eleven documents supporting the personal and family circumstances of the Accused (Appendix D to the
Defence Sentencing Brief, admitted into evidence as Exhs. DS-13/1 to DS-13/11, English version of the Exhs. DS-13/1
to DS-13/9 were admitted into evidence as Exhs. DS-13/1a to DS-13/9a accordingly); a number of documents on the
question of the substantial co-operation by the Accused and its impact on the fulfilment of the mandate of this Tribunal
(Exhs. PS-23, PS-24 (B/C/S) and PS-24a (English), PS-25 (B/C/S) and PS-25a (English), PS-25/1 (B/C/S) and PS-
25/1a (English), PS-25/2 (B/C/S) and PS-25/2a (English), PS-25/3 (B/C/S) and PS-25/3a (English).); see supra paras
23-24.
68
i.e. para. 40.
8
that this deletion concerns the use of the word “order” only in its strict legal sense, hence not in the
descriptive part of the Indictment and the Factual Basis.69
34. The Accused was given the final word.70 He used this to express remorse and he accepted
without any reservation full responsibility for the crimes contained in the Indictment.71
E. Continued Sentencing Hearing
35. Immediately after the Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Chamber revisited Miroslav Deronji}’s
Testimony and compared it with the Indictment and the Factual Basis. As a result of this
comparison, the Trial Chamber identified discrepancies that prompted the Trial Chamber to again
examine all previous statements of the Accused. After reviewing in greater detail the Indictment,
the Factual Basis, the Deronji} Testimony, all of his prior testimonies and statements, and in
particular his witness statement of 25 November 2003, the Trial Chamber came to the conclusion
that on a prima facie basis there were substantial material discrepancies.
36. These discrepancies made it incumbent on the Trial Chamber to verify that the guilty plea of
the Accused could still fulfil the prerequisites of Rule 62 bis of the Rules. Therefore the Trial
Chamber ordered a continuation of the sentencing hearing to be held on 5 March 2004 (hereinafter
“Continued Sentencing Hearing”).72 At the same time the Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to
produce the transcripts of the Accused’s testimony given from 12 to 19 February 2004, i.e. after the
Sentencing Hearing, in Prosecutor v. Kraji{nik. Finally, the Trial Chamber requested the
Prosecution to produce a number of exhibits tendered in Prosecutor v. Kraji{nik and in Prosecutor
v. Milo{evi} in as far as these could be relevant to the present case.73
37. The Continued Sentencing Hearing took place on 5 March 2004. The Trial Chamber sought
in particular clarification on the following two issues:
- the mens rea of the Accused in relation to killings and the destruction of the mosque as
acts of Persecutions;
69
70
Compare, inter alia, Krnojelac Appeal proceedings, T. 327, line: “The Chamber, according to the principles and
standards of international law […] must listen to what Mr. Milorad Krnojelac would like to say to us […]”; Kunarac
Appeal proceedings, T. 343-44; Krstić Appeal proceedings, T. 447; Vasiljević Appeal proceedings, T. 164-65; Simić et
al., Trial proceedings, T. 20721; Stakić Trial proceedings, T. 15331-32; Mrđa Sentencing Proceedings, T. 194.
71
Sentencing Hearing, specifically T. 246-47.
72
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Scheduling Order, 19 February 2004.
73
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Urgent Order on the Production of Evidence, 25 February 2004.
9
- the role of the Accused, Mr. Relji}, and Mr. Zeki}, and their interrelationship during the
events the Indictment is based on, in order to determine precisely the individual criminal
responsibility of the Accused.74
38. The Trial Chamber noted that the underlying facts not only have to be discussed in the light
of the prerequisites of Rule 62 bis of the Rules, but they might also be relevant as factors for
determining an appropriate sentence.75
39. The Parties were given an opportunity to resolve the material discrepancies identified by the
Trial Chamber. In relation to the first issue concerning the mens rea of the Accused, the Parties
once again stressed that the Accused would stand by his guilty plea and that for both Parties there is
nothing equivocal in the Accused’s statements.76 Additionally, the Parties resolved all the existing
material discrepancies, thus eliminating any possibility for the guilty plea by the Accused to be
considered as not fulfilling the prerequisites of Rule 62 bis of the Rules. The Trial Chamber
admitted into evidence most of the exhibits produced by the Prosecution pursuant to the orders of
19 and 25 February 2004.77
74
Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 268; see also Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61, Letter to the Parties, 27
February 2004.
75
Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 250.
76
Ibid., T. 316.
77
Exhs. JS-26 through JS-39 and PS-40 were admitted into evidence.
10
IV. GUILTY PLEA AND PLEA AGREEMENT
40. The Statute does not directly address the issue of a guilty plea. Article 20 (3) of the Statute
simply provides:
The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are
respected, confirm that the accused understands the indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a
plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for a trial.
Additionally, Rules 62 (VI) and 62 bis of the Rules, which govern the taking of a guilty plea, set out
the criteria to be applied78 in such a case. The Rules provide as follows:
Rule 62 bis
Guilty Pleas
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or her plea to
guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that:
(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;
(ii) the guilty plea is informed;
(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and
(iv) there is sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused’s participation in it, either on
the basis of independent indicia or on lack of any material disagreement between the parties about
the facts of the case,
the Trial Chamber may enter a finding of guilt and instruct the Registrar to set a date for the
sentencing hearing.
41. After having accepted a guilty plea on the basis of a plea agreement, a tribunal in party-
driven systems, such as the ICTY and the ICTR, is limited to any legal and/or factual assessment
contained in, or annexed to the plea agreement.79 However, the Trial Chamber is not bound by a
sentence recommendation contained in a plea agreement.
78
These criteria were first established by the Appeals Chamber in Erdemović case; See Erdemović Appeal Judgement.
79
Dragan Nikoli} Sentencing Judgement, para. 48.
11
42. The Rule providing for the procedure for plea agreements between the Prosecution and the
Defence states as follows:
Rule 62 ter
Plea Agreement Procedure
(A) The Prosecutor and the defence may agree that, upon the accused entering a plea of guilty
to the indictment or to one or more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall do one or more
of the following before the Trial Chamber:
(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly;
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate;
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing range.
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph (A).
(C) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial Chamber shall require the
disclosure of the agreement in open session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, at
the time the accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or her
plea to guilty.
43. Having satisfied itself as to the matters set out in Rule 62 bis of the Rules, the Trial
Chamber entered a finding of guilt against the Accused on a single count of Persecutions as a crime
against humanity punishable under Article 5 (h) of the Statute.80
80
Sentencing Hearing, T. 177-78.
12
V. THE FACTS
44. On 30 September 2003, Miroslav Deronji} pleaded guilty to the crime of Persecutions of
non-Serb civilians in the village of Glogova81, committed through the following underlying acts:
ordering to attack the village of Glogova on 9 May 1992, burning it down in part, and forcibly
displacing of Bosnian Muslim residents from the village.82 As a result, 64 Muslim civilians from the
village were killed, Bosnian Muslim homes, private property, and the mosque were destroyed, and a
substantial part of Glogova was razed to the ground.83
45. The Prosecution submitted a Factual Basis supporting the factual allegations contained in
the Indictment, to which the Accused agreed before this Trial Chamber.84 The Trial Chamber will
review below the facts as agreed by the Parties and list also any additional facts and further
clarifications that resulted from the Sentencing Hearing and the Continued Sentencing Hearing.
46. However, since the Trial Chamber was solely seized of the events in Glogova on 9 May
1992, the Trial Chamber considers it necessary to stress once more that the Accused’s criminal
responsibility and the respective sentence in the present Judgement is solely based on the Accused’s
criminal conduct in relation to 9 May 1992. Accordingly, any references stated below, dealing with
the Accused’s conduct prior to the preparatory meeting in Sarajevo on 19 December 1991 as well
as after the events in Glogova on 9 May 1992, are to be considered only as additional background
information.
47. Moreover, as it was clarified during the Sentencing Hearing, wherever there are any
discrepancies between the Indictment and the Factual Basis, it shall be the Indictment itself that is
controlling, and forms the fundament in the present case. Accordingly, the Factual Basis is to be
regarded as a mere support to the guilty plea.85 The Trial Chamber would also like to stress that the
apparent discrepancies, relevant to the events in Glogova, between the Indictment, the Factual
Basis, the Deronji} Testimony and all of his prior statements to the Prosecution as well as his
testimonies in other proceedings before this Tribunal were resolved by the Parties during the
Continued Sentencing Hearing primarily on the basis of agreed facts.86
81
See supra para. 27.
82
Indictment, para. 25.
83
Indictment, para 26; Plea Agreement, paras 3-4.
84
85
86
See supra para. 39.
13
A. The Political Career of the Accused
48. From September 1990 to the end of April 1992, Miroslav Deronji} was President of the
Bratunac Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina.87 He was
appointed a member of the SDS party Commission on Personnel and Organisation by the Executive
Board on 6 September 1991.88 Miroslav Deronji} was President of three crisis staffs which existed
in the Municipality of Bratunac in the period from the end of October 1991 till June 1992. The first
was the Crisis Staff of the Serbian People, which was set up after the meeting of 18 October 1991
and existed at least until 19 December 1991;89 the second was the SDS Crisis Staff, which was set
up after the meeting of 19 December 1991, and was in force until the end of April 1992, when the
Municipality of Bratunac Crisis Staff was formed.90 The third crisis staff, the Bratunac Crisis Staff,
came into existence towards the end of April 1992 when it assumed authority from the Executive
Committee of the Municipality and the organs of the Municipal Assembly, and existed until the
time of its transformation to a War Commission, established by the Presidency of the Serb Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 1992.91 Miroslav Deronji} was appointed a member of the War
Commission of the Municipality of Bratunac,92 and in the summer of 1993 he became a member of
the Main Board of the SDS.93 On 11 July 1995, Miroslav Deronji} was appointed a Civilian
Commissioner for Srebrenica municipality.94 In 1996, he became vice-president of the SDS under
President Karadži} until Miroslav Deronji}’s resignation in 1997.95
B. Political Background
49. Prior to 9 May 1992, Glogova96 was a village located in the Municipality of Bratunac, in the
eastern part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a few kilometres away from the city of
Bratunac and Konjevi} Polje.97 The Municipality of Bratunac was of major strategic significance to
87
Indictment, para. 1; Factual Basis, para. 2.
88
Ibid.; Ibid., para. 3. See also Exh. JS-28.
89
This fact was clarified during the Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 275-76. See also Exh. JS-31/a – Minutes from
the second meeting of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board held on 25 October 1991, where “[a]ppointment of the Crisis
Staff in the Bratunac Municipality with the purpose of implementing protective measures for the Serbian people”
consisting of 11 members was decided and the Accused signed this document as President. See infra para. 56.
90
This fact was clarified during the Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 276-77. See also Exh. JS-32/a – Minutes from
the meeting of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board held on 23 December 1991, where “[a] decision was reached to form
the Crisis Staff that should commence with work immediately” and the Accused signed this document as President of
the Board. See infra paras 60 and 62.
91
Indictment, para. 1; Factual Basis, para. 4. This fact was accepted as an agreed fact during the Continued Sentencing
Hearing, T. 278-89. See also infra para. 70.
92
Hearing, T. 330.
93
Hearing, T. 282-85.
94
Blagojevi} Trial, Exh. PS-12, T. 6136-37.
95
Defence Closing Statement, T. 217; Exh. DS-8a, para. 233.
96
The term “Glogova” refers to the Bosnian Muslim part of the village of Glogova. Indictment, para. 21.
97
Indictment, paras 17, 21; Factual Basis, para. 17.
14
the Bosnian Serbs as it formed part of the land linking the Serbian population of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to a contiguous Serbian state.98
50. The majority of the population in the Municipality of Bratunac, including the village of
Glogova, was Bosnian Muslims. According to the 1991 census, the Municipality of Bratunac
consisted of 33,619 inhabitants, of which 21,535 were Bosnian Muslims, 11,475 were Bosnian
Serbs, 223 identified themselves as Yugoslavs, 40 were Bosnian Croats, and 346 of other ethnic
groups.99
51. According to the same census, the population of Glogova in 1991 consisted of 1,913
residents, of whom 1,901 were Bosnian Muslims, 6 were Bosnian Serbs, 4 identified themselves as
Yugoslavs, 1 as Bosnian Croat, and 1 as belonging to another unspecified ethnic group.100
52. In 1991, an atmosphere of increasing inter-ethnic tension existed in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. In April 1991 a plenary meeting was held in Sarajevo by the Main Board comprising
also all the presidents of the SDS municipal boards and the Serb deputies in the assembly, the joint
assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the top leadership of the SDS, including President
Karadì}101. The topic of the meeting referred to the political security situation in the context of the
events and general political circumstances in Croatia102 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina103 at that
time.104 In the course of that meeting, it was stated by Radovan Karadžić that if there was no longer
a Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter “SFRY”), Serbs would only have one
option left, and that is “Greater Serbia”.105 After that official meeting, a more informal meeting in a
smaller circle106 took place in the National Restaurant in Sarajevo, where it was stated by Radovan
Karadžić that it was agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be divided up.107
53. Later on in April 1991, the Accused and Goran Zeki}, a member of the Bosnian Serb
Republic Assembly from the adjacent Municipality of Srebrenica and a member of the SDS Main
Board,108 met with Rajko Djukić, who was connected to the leadership of the SDS and also believed
98
99
Ibid.
100
Indictment, para. 21; Factual Basis, para. 17.
101
Who at that time was the President of the SDS.
102
That is, the decision of the government of the previously formed Serbian Autonomous region of the Krajina on
joining the Krajina to the Republic of Serbia. This was the declaratory act of secession of the Serbian people in Croatia
and their annexation to the Republic of Serbia; Deronji} Testimony, T. 112.
103
That is, the SDA submitting in the Joint Assembly, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a declaration on the
independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its secession from Yugoslavia, which was regarded as being an
unconstitutional attempt for the breakaway of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Deronji} Testimony, T. 113-14.
104
Deronji} Testimony, T. 111-12.
105
Ibid., T. 113.
106
Comprising, inter alia, Mr. Zeki}, Mrs. Slobodanka Hrva~anin, Mr. Velibor Ostoji} and Miroslav Deronji}, T. 114.
107
Deronji} Testimony, T. 115.
108
Factual Basis, para. 12.
15
to be one of the founders and the first financiers of the SDS, in Mili}i.109 At this meeting, Rajko
Djukić said that the SDS political leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina decided that Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina should arm themselves. He conveyed further that Radovan Karadžić
personally convinced Slobodan Milo{evi}, the President of SFRY at the time, to arm the Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.110 Djuki} told Deronji} and Zeki} that they would be tasked with the area
of Srebrenica and Bratunac.111
54. In early May 1991, Miroslav Deronji} and Goran Zeki} met Mihalj Kertes in Belgrade
where the first arms delivery to Bratunac was agreed upon. Miroslav Deronji} participated
personally in this arms delivery. At that meeting Kertes said that the decision of the political and
state leadership of SFRY was that an area of 50 kilometres from the Drina would be Serb and Zeki}
and Miroslav Deronji} accepted this.112 In autumn or at the end of the summer of 1991 a centre to
carry out a further distribution of weapons was formed in Mili}i. This fact confirmed the existence
and implementation of a strategy.113
55. On 14-15 October 1991, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the participation
of SDS Deputies, passed a Memorandum supporting the creation of a sovereign Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs were committed to the goal that all Serbs in the former Yugoslavia
would live in a common state.114
56. Following the decision of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to support sovereignty,
the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, and
Nikola Koljević undertook steps to establish Serbian ethnic territories in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.115 On 18 October 1991 the presidents of the municipal boards in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including Miroslav Deronji}, attended a plenary meeting of the Main Board held in
Sarajevo. They were given a set of documents dealing with the principles of organisation of the
Serbian People in the newly-arisen political circumstances that were to be implemented on the
ground in the local areas.116 The aforementioned instructions comprised, inter alia, the preparation
for a plebiscite of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1991, asking
whether or not the Serbs were in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia.117 Moreover, the presidents of
the municipal boards were given the political instruction to form crisis staffs in the municipalities.
109
110
Ibid., T. 119.
111
Ibid., T. 124.
112
Ibid., T. 120-21.
113
Ibid., T. 123.
114
115
Ibid.
116
117
Ibid., T. 125.
16
Another obligation given was to organise public fora in the respective local communities to inform
the population of key political events, especially those of 15 October 1991118, and to explain this to
the people.119 Moreover, the presidents of the municipal boards were given precise instructions as to
what they were supposed to explain, i.e. that the decision was unconstitutional, that they were
deeply opposed to it and that they were now self-organising. Miroslav Deronji} implemented these
instructions in Bratunac.120 Apart from preparing the required public forum, the Accused
established the first crisis staff, called the Crisis Staff of the Serbian People, in Bratunac and
became its president.121
57. The Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana
Plavšić, and Nikola Koljević, understood and intended that the creation of Serbian ethnic territories
included the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the separation and the permanent removal of
ethnic populations from municipalities designated as Serbian, either by agreement or by force. The
Bosnian Serb leadership knew that any forcible removal of non-Serbs from Serbian-claimed
territories would involve a discriminatory campaign of persecution.122
58. In order to ensure the creation of Serbian ethnic territories, the Bosnian Serb leadership, in
collaboration with members of the government of the SFRY, including Mihalj Kertes, and with
units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (hereinafter “JNA”) and units of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of SFRY, armed large segments of the Bosnian Serb population. The Bosnian Serb
leadership co-ordinated with Serbian military, police and paramilitary units within and outside
Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve their objectives of establishing Serbian ethnic territories in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.123
59. At a meeting convened in Sarajevo on or about 19 December 1991, presided over by

Radovan Karadžić and attended by, among others, deputies of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and by
presidents of the municipal boards124, including Miroslav Deronjić, “strictly confidential” written
instructions were disseminated to the attendees relating to the establishment of Bosnian Serb
municipal governmental bodies in diverse municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
instructions, entitled “Instructions for the organization and activities of the organs of the Serb
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a state of emergency” and dated 19 December 1991, were
118
See supra para.55.
119
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid., T. 127.
122
123
Ibid., para. 9.
124
Such as Mr. Goran Zekić, the President of the Municipal Board in Srebrenica, Mr. Milenko Stanić, the President of
the Vlasenica Municipal Board, Mr. Rajko Djukić, Mr. Brano Grujić, the President of the Zvornik Municipality, Mr.
17
directed to municipalities where Bosnian Serbs constituted either a majority of the population
(Variant A) or a minority of the population (Variant B). The contents of these instructions were
explained to the participants of the meeting by Radovan Karadžić. Additionally, Karadžić warned
the participants that the instructions should be taken very seriously and be absolutely implemented
on the ground, “explaining that the political crisis had reached a high point, that armed conflict
could break out”.125 Moreover, it was explained that a state would be formed, a Serb Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.126
60. The instructions identified precise steps to be taken within the respective municipalities in
order to establish Bosnian Serb control. The instructions described two distinct phases of action:127
the first stage, which was introduced immediately, and the second stage, which would be introduced
later on depending on the circumstances.128 In the first stage of organisation in the field, certain
measures were to be taken, the first of which was to establish SDS crisis staffs. According to an
automatic procedure provided for in these documents, minority municipalities in which Serbs held
less than 50 per cent of the power in the local government bodies, the president of the municipal
board was to be the president of the crisis staff. In majority municipalities, this was to be the
president of the municipality.
C. Preparations for Persecutions in Glogova
61. The Municipality of Bratunac was a Variant B municipality. The steps described in the
instructions for Variant B municipalities included in total 10 objectives for the first and 7 objectives
for the second stage.129 They comprised, inter alia, the formation of crisis staffs of the Serbian
people in the municipality, the formation of Serb Assemblies, the mobilisation of all Serbian police
forces, as well as of JNA reserve forces and Territorial Defence (hereinafter “TO”) units. Moreover,
secret patrols and information systems were envisaged in order to focus on all possible dangers for
the Serbian population. Hereby, the crisis staff was responsible for the defence organisation on the
territory of the municipalities where Serbs were not the majority population. The Crisis Staff was
also obliged to monitor the situation within the municipality, as well as the broader political,
military and security developments.130
Vlasić, the President of the Sekovici Municipal Board, as well as several deputies like Dr. Novakovi} from Bijeljina;
125
126
Ibid., T. 132.
127
128
129
Exh. PS-22, PS-22a, pp. 6-8.
130
Ibid.
18
62. Upon receiving the aforementioned confidential written instructions in December 1991,
Miroslav Deronjić returned to the Municipality of Bratunac where, under his leadership and
direction, the Municipal Board immediately adopted and implemented the instructions. An SDS
Crisis Staff was formed and Miroslav Deronjić was elected president. A Serb Assembly was
established and Ljubisav Simić was elected president of that organ.131 Due to the fact that in
Bratunac they were understaffed, the same crisis staff that they had earlier established as the Crisis
Staff of the Serbian People was transformed into the SDS Crisis Staff.132 According to the
instructions, the Accused became the president of the SDS Crisis Staff.133
63. On an unspecified day in late February 1992, Goran Zeki} conveyed the order to implement
the second phase of these instructions in the Municipality of Bratunac and Miroslav Deronji} took
positive and concrete actions to do so, including affirmative actions in the Bratunac Municipal
Assembly.134 These affirmative actions included measures of separation and institutional division of
all organs of authority in the municipalities. This was particularly problematic in communities
where the Serbs were a minority, as there was no way to resolve this in an institutional way. But
there were suggestions made that this should be done unilaterally and that parallel Serb organs of
authority should be formed in minority municipalities.135 Miroslav Deronji} implemented these
measures, in particular the division of the police in Bratunac, in the local joint assembly together
with the representatives of the SDA.136 Those measures were a continuity of the SDS’ policy from
the spring of 1991, aimed at creating Serb ethnic territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina.137
64. In a conversation with Mr. Zekić on 5 May 1992,138 the Accused found out that for the
common purpose, even the use of force had been planned and had already been implemented in
neighbouring municipalities. Moreover, some violent methods were already used in Bratunac and
Srebrenica. The Accused was aware that those methods were a component part of the plans for
creating the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.139 The Accused unequivocally knew that the
131
132
This was the second crisis staff – SDS Crisis Staff. Deronji} Testimony, T. 127.
133
134
135
136
Ibid., T. 136. See also Exh. JS-33/a – Minutes from the meeting of the Municipal Board held on 24 February 1992,
where it was decided to implement the second level of the instructions – State of emergency and the Accused stated that
“the contact with the army was established”. The document is signed by the Accused as President of the Board.
137
138
As the Prosecution clarified during the Continued Sentencing Hearing, at that time Zeki} was a member of the
Bosnian-Serb Assembly and a member of the SDS Main Board. “He was the link to Mr. Deronji}, who was a leader in
the Municipality of Bratunac. That is the relationship between the two.” T. 319.
139
19
use of force was also one of the methods in order to implement these objectives and he acted
accordingly in Glogova.140
65. Hereby, the term “use of force” included violent transfer of the population from those
territories as well as the conduct of the “volunteer” units which had already arrived in the area, the
conduct of the JNA in those events, and the conduct of the crisis staffs and individuals on the Serb
side during that period. Moreover, the term “use of force” also included the use of arms and the use
of tanks, and finally even the killing of Bosnian Muslims.141
66. Miroslav Deronji} subscribed unequivocally to the policy of creating Serb ethnic territories
within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later to the use of force to remove non-Serbs from Serb
designated territories. In his leadership capacity in the Municipality of Bratunac, Miroslav Deronjić
actively participated in efforts to transform the Municipality of Bratunac into Serb ethnic territory
and achieve the objective set forth by the Bosnian Serb leadership.142
67. In spring of 1992, an armed conflict between Serbs and non-Serbs broke out in the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Municipality of Bratunac.143 As part of the conflict,
Bosnian Serb, JNA, and paramilitary forces carried out widespread and systematic attacks on the
civilian population of this region.144 The Municipality of Bratunac was taken over by Bosnian Serb
forces on 17 April 1992 and a systematic effort was launched to disarm the Bosnian Muslim
population of the municipality, which was completed by the end of April 1992.145
68. The Accused drew certain conclusions about the use of force in Bijeljina and Zvornik,146
and in some other municipalities. His main conclusion was that those paramilitary units were units
known as Arkan's Guard, White Eagles, or other “volunteers” from Serbia.147 These units were sent
to these regions from Serbia and they used force against the Muslim population in that area. The
final or ultimate objective of such conduct was to expel the non-Serb population from those
municipalities. Due to the fact that the Accused had the opportunity to monitor these events in
Eastern Bosnia and Podrinje, which were municipalities close to and with a similar population
140
Ibid., T. 136.
141
Ibid., T. 137.
142
143
144
Ibid.. 19.
145
Ibid.. 20.
146
See map on the inner cover page at the beginning of this document.
147
The Accused held that Mr. Jovi} was the organiser of the units known as the White Eagles, a small “opposition”
party in Serbia; Deronji} Testimony, T. 139.
20
make-up as Bratunac, he was able to conclude that the operative part – that is the actual
implementation of the use of force - was directed from Belgrade.148
69. As part of the process of ensuring that the Municipality of Bratunac would become ethnic
Serb territory, “volunteers” from the SFRY, with the co-operation of the SFRY authorities, crossed
the Drina River on 14 or 15 April 1992 and entered the village of Skelani in Srebrenica
Municipality. Their purpose for entering Bosnia and Herzegovina was to assist the Bosnian Serbs in
taking over power and forcibly removing Muslims from the area.149
70. On 17 April 1992, “volunteers” from the SFRY, who were brought to Bratunac by Mr.
Zekić150, entered Bratunac and at the Hotel Fontana their commander met with and issued an
ultimatum to the leaders of the Srebrenica and Bratunac Muslim communities to surrender weapons
and legal authority to Bosnian Serbs. Otherwise they were to suffer from destruction at the hands of
thousands of Serb soldiers who were amassed across the Drina River in Serbia.151 Following the
acquiescence to the ultimatum by the representatives of the Muslim community, the Crisis Staff
assumed political power in the Municipality of Bratunac, presided over by Miroslav Deronji}.152
71. Thereafter, efforts to expel the Bosnian Muslim population from the Municipality of
Bratunac were undertaken. This ethnic cleansing included the intimidation and random killings of
Bosnian Muslims by “volunteers” and others, and the looting of Muslim homes and businesses.
This activity resulted in an unknown number of Bosnian Muslims fleeing from the Municipality of
Bratunac.153 The Accused had accepted the arrival of the “volunteers” as well as their involvement
in the use of force.154
72. Between 21 and 23 April 1992, a small JNA formation consisting of approximately 20-30
men, arrived in the Municipality of Bratunac. It was under the command of a JNA Captain Relji}.
The unit was part of an armoured mechanised brigade that was located in [ekovici.155 Relji}
introduced a military government in Bratunac and he informed the population about it by putting up
posters announcing that he was the commander of Bratunac and he was taking responsibility for
events in Bratunac.156
148
149
150
151
152
Ibid. This was the third crisis staff – Bratunac Crisis Staff as clarified during the Continued Sentencing Hearing, T.
278-79.
153
154
155
156
21
73. Between the end of April and early May 1992, Miroslav Deronji}, exercising de facto and
de jure control as President of the Bratunac Crisis Staff over the TO and de facto control over the
Bratunac police forces authorised the TO and the Bratunac police forces to disarm the Bosnian
Muslim population in the village of Glogova.157 On at least three occasions during that period,
Bratunac police forces and the TO, working in concert with members of the JNA, went through
Glogova and secured weapons from the Bosnian Muslim population.158
74. On or about 25 April 1992, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), military trucks and police
cars arrived in Glogova. Soldiers who were part of that convoy declared themselves to be members
of the Novi Sad Corps from Serbia, who had arrived in order to gather weapons. Najdan
Mladenovi} of the TO was present with the group, as well as the following Bratunac policemen:
Milutin Milo{evi}, Chief of the Bratunac police forces (also known as the Secretariat of Internal
Affairs, hereinafter “SUP”), Miladin Joki}, Vidoje Radovi}, Dragan Ili}, Dragan Vasiljevi}, Sredoje
Stevi}, Vukovi}, and Te{i}. This group looked for weapons in Glogova and issued an ultimatum to
the villagers that the weapons were to be handed in two days later.159
75. On an unknown date near the end of April 1992, the Bosnian Muslim population of Glogova
was directed to appear at a meeting at the community building in Glogova where they were told to
turn in their weapons.160
76. On or about 27 April 1992, the aforementioned group returned to Glogova in order to collect
weapons. Milutin Milo{evi}, Chief of the Serb SUP, told the villagers that Glogova would not be
attacked because they had turned over their weapons.161 The fact that Milutin Milo{evi} added that
he was speaking on behalf of Miroslav Deronji}162 is not disputed by the Accused. Moreover, the
Accused accepted and agreed to all of those aforementioned actions.163 From then on, Glogova was
to be regarded as a disarmed and undefended village.164
77. Captain Relji} planned and assisted in the disarming of Muslim villages in the Municipality
of Bratunac. Captain Relji}’s JNA unit, the TO, and the police would jointly participate in the
disarming of the Muslim villages. Following the disarming of a Muslim village, the JNA and the
police announced that the army would guarantee the safety of the residents.165
157
The notion of “authorizing” will be discussed below in context. See infra para. 78.
158
Indictment, paras 8 (a), 22; Factual Basis, para. 18.
159
Indictment, paras 8 (c), 23.
160
Indictment, paras 8 (b), 22; Factual Basis, para. 19.
161
Indictment, paras 8 (d), 24; Factual Basis, para. 19.
162
Indictment, paras 8 (d), 24.
163
164
Ibid., T. 143.
165
22
78. As President of the Bratunac Crisis Staff, Miroslav Deronji} was aware of and agreed to the
plan to disarm the population of Glogova.166 As it was clarified during the Sentencing Hearing, the
Accused did not order the disarmament of Glogova by the end of April/beginning of May 1992.167
The decision on the disarming of the Muslims in the villages of the Municipality of Bratunac as
such was taken by Reljić after the JNA had arrived in Bratunac.168 During this period, Relji}
brought this decision to the Crisis Staff at one of its meetings and asked its members to confirm his
action.169 Miroslav Deronji}, as the President of the Crisis Staff, and the Crisis Staff accepted it and
gave their confirmation.170 However, the decision by the Crisis Staff to approve this operation was
only reached later when the disarming of the Glogova village was completed.171 In that sense he
“authorised” the disarmament.172 The Accused joined this mission to disarm the population of
Glogova by not only accepting it, but also by participating in it.173
79. The disarming of the Bosnian Muslims in Glogova and in other Muslim villages was an
important element in ensuring and facilitating the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims from
Glogova, the town of Bratunac, Suha and Voljavica and achieving the objectives set forth by the
Bosnian Serb leadership.174 The disarming of the Muslim villages continued until 6 May 1992.175
80. A second group of “volunteers” from Serbia also arrived in Bratunac. The commander of
this group of “volunteers” was a man nicknamed “Peki”. As soon as they entered Bratunac, they
committed several murders of Muslims, including the owners of a restaurant in Bratunac and
several Muslims from the suburban neighbourhood called Žljevice. They also engaged in
widespread looting of Muslim property. The activities of the “volunteers” were known to the
Bosnian Serb leadership in Bratunac, including the authorities of the Crisis Staff, the Bratunac
police, and the TO. These activities created panic amongst the local population and resulted in an
unknown number of Muslim residents fleeing from the Municipality of Bratunac.176
81. The arrival of the JNA unit under the command of Captain Relji} and the arrival of the
“volunteers” from Serbia was agreed upon by the top leadership of the Republika Srpska and the
SFRY.177
166
Indictment, paras 8 (b), 22.
167
168
Ibid., T. 142-43.
169
Ibid., T. 143, 158.
170
Ibid., T. 144, 158.
171
Ibid., T. 144.
172
Ibid., T.159.
173
Ibid., T. 143, 158.
174
175
Ibid., para. 22.
176
Ibid., para. 23.
177
Ibid., para. 24.
23
82. On 6 or 7 May 1992, and in furtherance of a plan to attack the village of Glogova, Miroslav
Deronji} and Captain Relji} travelled to the village of Maga{i}i from which point they were able to
view the entire village of Glogova. The purpose of this visit was to reconnoitre Glogova in
preparation of the attack on the village.178
83. On 7 May 1992, the preparations for the attack on Glogova began and it was agreed between
the Accused and Captain Relji} that the attack would commence within 48 to 72 hours.179
84. In the afternoon of 8 May 1992, Goran Zeki}, a Serbian well-known and popular political
figure in Bratunac was killed near Srebrenica and his body was brought to the town of Bratunac.180
85. Later the same day, at 2200 hours, the Bratunac Crisis Staff met principally about the events
surrounding the death of Goran Zeki} and the operation to attack Glogova. Miroslav Deronji}
presided over this meeting. The portion of the meeting dealing with the attack on Glogova was
attended only by members of the Crisis Staff, Captain Relji}, Ra{a Milo{evi}, Commander of the
Kravica Detachment of the TO, and another person who was a member of the State Security of
Serbia.181 None of the “volunteers” attended the Crisis Staff meeting.182
86. At this session of the Crisis Staff, Miroslav Deronji} made introductory remarks that
included an announcement that the operation against Glogova would be carried out the following
day. He explained the strategic significance of taking Glogova and said that the plan to create
Serbian ethnic territory could not be implemented in the Municipality of Bratunac without taking
Glogova first and transferring the entire Bosnian Muslim population from Glogova to non-Serb
territory within Central Bosnia. He said that if there was no resistance from the Muslim residents of
Glogova, they should all be brought to the centre of the village and transported by bus and truck to
Kladanj, outside the Municipality of Bratunac. Miroslav Deronji} also stated that if everything went
well with the Glogova operation, the operation to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims would
continue in the following days in the town of Bratunac and the communities of Voljavica and Suha.
Following the introductory remarks by Miroslav Deronji}, and a discussion about the Glogova plan,
the Bratunac Crisis Staff adopted the plan.183
87. On the evening of 8 May 1992 at the session of the Crisis Staff, Miroslav Deronji}, in his
capacity as President of the Crisis Staff of Bratunac, gave the order to the Bratunac TO, including
178
Ibid., para. 25.
179
Ibid., para. 26; Deronji} Testimony, T. 146.
180
181
Ibid., para. 28.
182
Deronji} Testimony, T. 145. This fact was again confirmed during the Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 318.
183
24
the police forces in Bratunac,184 to attack the village of Glogova, burn part of it down, and forcibly
displace its Bosnian Muslim residents. Miroslav Deronji} was aware on 8 May 1992 that he was
ordering the attack on an undefended and disarmed village.185 However, since the Accused was
unable to command the JNA units, he only asked them whether they would participate in this.186 He
asked Relji} to take an active role rather than simply observing the attack.187 Captain Relji}
informed the Crisis Staff that the JNA unit would also participate in the operation.188 Additionally,
one of the deputies who was present there said: “Yes, the army will participate, Mr. Deronji}”.189
88. Furthermore, the Bratunac Crisis Staff debated the issue of burning Glogova. Miroslav
Deronji} said that while it was impossible to forecast the events in Glogova, some houses should be
set on fire as a warning to the Muslims in order to spread panic and fear among them and part of the
houses should be preserved for refugees. Miroslav Deronji} also said that if fighting erupted, he did
not care what happened to the houses.190
89. As stated in the Factual Basis, which the Accused accepted in writing and orally, Miroslav
Deronji} urged Captain Relji} to fire a tank shell into a house at the initial stage of the attack in
order to sow panic amongst the Muslim residents of Glogova.191 However, during the Sentencing
Hearing this was modified by the Accused that he in fact did not issue an “order”, but rather made a
recommendation to fire a shell. The Accused claimed to having been of the opinion that the JNA
officer also had to take care about the manner in which that shell would be used in order not to
jeopardise human lives. The firing could have been directed against e.g. a stable or barn or some
other kind of auxiliary building and not necessarily a house. However, following the Accused’s
testimony, in the end the officer did not accept the Accused’s proposal and the grenade shell was
eventually not fired.192 The Trial Chamber did not deem it necessary to go into details of these
discrepancies between testimony and prior confession because it will have no impact on the final
assessment of this case.
184
185
Indictment, paras 29.
186
187
Ibid., T. 146, 148.
188
Factual Basis, para. 35; Deronji} Testimony, T. 144.
189
190
191
Ibid., para. 35 (emphasis added).
192
Deronji} Testimony, T. 147 (emphasis added).
25
D. Acts of Persecutions
1. Attack on the Village of Glogova
90. The attack on Glogova was a joint operation. The attacking forces were comprised of
members of the JNA (Relji}’s unit), the Bratunac TO, the Bratunac police, and paramilitary
“volunteers” from Serbia (hereinafter “attacking forces”). Miroslav Deronji} confessed that he co-
ordinated and monitored the attack on Glogova.193 However, during the Sentencing Hearing, he
claimed that he did not know that the “volunteers” would participate in this action in Glogova.194
91. Miroslav Deronji} participated in the military operation against Glogova as a member of the
TO unit.195 On the evening of 8 May 1992, Miroslav Deronji} and other Bosnian Serbs took
positions on an elevated ridge above Glogova196 and remained there until the operation against
Glogova commenced at 0600 hours on the morning of 9 May 1992. The role of Miroslav Deronji}
and members of his TO unit was to hinder Bosnian Muslims fleeing from Glogova in the direction
of Srebrenica, and to prevent Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica from coming to assist the residents
of Glogova.197 They were located at a safe distance from the village but it was possible to have a
good view of the whole of Glogova from that elevation.198 Miroslav Deronji} and the others
remained at their positions until about 1000 hours on 9 May 1992.199
92. In the early morning hours of 9 May 1992, in particular members of the Bratunac TO, the
Bratunac police, the JNA and paramilitaries, working in concert together, surrounded the village of
Glogova. Thereafter, in accordance with what was agreed with the Accused, the attacking forces
entered the village on foot and took control of it.200 The Bosnian Muslim villagers, who previously
had been disarmed, offered no resistance.201 Miroslav Deronji} was present during the attack on
Glogova and entered the village after the assault.202
193
Factual Basis, para. 36; Deronji} Testimony, T. 159-60.
194
195
Factual Basis, para. 37; Deronji} Testimony, T. 150.
196
As was submitted by the Defence, and accepted as an agreed fact, the distance between the elevated spot where the
Accused was positioned is only one kilometre away from Glogova, if one counts the distance as the crow flies,
Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 321-22. However, the Trial Chamber notes that the Accused himself stated in
Blagojevi} et al. trial that “[he] was several kilometres away from Glogova fulfilling a specific task”, Exh. PS-12, T.
6366.
197
198
199
200
Indictment, paras 9, 30; Deronji} Testimony, T. 151.
201
202
Indictment, paras 9, 30.
26
2. Killing of Bosnian Muslim Civilians in Glogova
(a) Killing of Medo Deli}, [e}o Ibi{evi}, Zlatija Ibi{evi} and Adem Junuzovi}
93. During the gathering of the Bosnian Muslim villagers of Glogova from their homes,
members of the attacking forces shot and killed the Bosnian Muslim villagers Medo Deli}, [e}o
Ibi{evi}, his wife Zlatija, and Adem Junuzovi} outside their homes.203
(b) First Mass Killing
94. During the course of the attack, members of the attacking forces executed a group of
approximately nineteen (19) Bosnian Muslim men on the main road near the centre of the village
where the Glogova villagers were gathered. This first group of executed men included \afo (or
Dàfo) Deli}, Hamed Deli}, [aban Gerovi}, [erif Goli}, Avdo Goli}, Rifat Goli}, Ismail Ibi{evi},
Salih Junuzovi}, Alija Mila~evi}, Hajro (or Hajrudin) Memi{evi}, Samir Omerovi}, Fejzo
Omerovi}, Nezir Omerovi}, Nevzet Omerovi}, ]amil Rizanovi}, Jasmin Rizanovi}, Mensur
Rizanovi}, Nurija Rizanovi} and Uzeir Talovi}.204
(c) Second Mass Killing
95. After the execution of the group of Bosnian Muslims referred to in paragraph 94, members
of the attacking forces ordered other Muslim villagers to carry these and other bodies to the river.
After all of the bodies were dumped into the river, those Bosnian Muslim villagers who had been
ordered to carry the bodies were lined up by the river and executed. This group included Ramiz
]osi}, Selmo (or Selman) Omerovi}, and Mehmed Ibi{evi}.205
(d) Third Mass Killing
96. Later during the attack on Glogova, members of the attacking forces gathered a group of
approximately twenty (20) Bosnian Muslim men by the market in Glogova. These Bosnian Muslim
men were ordered to walk to the river where they were executed by members of the attacking forces
on the order of Najdan Mla|enovi}, a member of the Bratunac TO. This group included [e}o Deli},
Re|o (or Redò) Deli}, Meho Deli}, Gusi{ (first name unknown), Hasibovi} (first name unknown),
Dèvad (or \evad) Ibi{evi}, Ilijaz Ibi{evi}, Kemal Ibi{evi}, Muharem Ibi{evi}, Mujo Ibi{evi},
203
Ibid., para. 31.
204
Ibid., para. 32.
205
Ibid., para. 33.
27
Mustafa Ibi{evi}, Ramo Ibi{evi}, Sabrija Ibi{evi}, Abid Junuzovi}, Huso Junuzovi}, Mirzet
Omerovi}, Selmo Omerovi} and Mensur Omerovi}.206
97. A total of 64 unarmed Bosnian Muslim residents from Glogova were executed by members
of the attacking forces during the 9 May 1992 attack.207 The murdered individuals are those listed in
Section XII of this Judgement.208
98. Miroslav Deronji} did not physically commit any of the murders of the 64 civilians
identified in Section XII. However, at the time he ordered the attack, given the purpose and
objective of the attack, the existing political climate, his previous experiences in other
municipalities, and the units that were to participate in it, these murders were foreseeable to him, he
took them into account, he was prepared to take the risk and he accepted that unarmed innocent
Muslim residents of the undefended village of Glogova would be murdered.209
3. Forcible Displacement of Civilians from Glogova
99. On 8 and 9 May 1992, Miroslav Deronji} ordered and committed the forcible removal and
displacement of the Bosnian Muslims of Glogova from the Municipality of Bratunac.210
100. On 9 May 1992, during and immediately after the attack on Glogova, and in fulfilment of
the operational objective of the plan to permanently displace Bosnian Muslims from the
Municipality of Bratunac, members of the attacking forces forced the Bosnian Muslim civilians
from their homes and forcibly displaced them from the village of Glogova to other parts of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specifically, the women and children who survived the attack
were placed on buses and forcibly displaced to Muslim held territory outside the Municipality of
Bratunac.211 Neither the Indictment nor the Factual Basis specify what happened to the villagers on
and after their transport. This question remains especially important because several names of
villagers originating from Glogova can be found on the list of survivors that were taken from the
hangar in Bratunac to Pale.212 The Trial Chamber also does not know what the fate of these persons
was.
206
Ibid., para. 34.
207
Indictment, para. 35; Factual Basis, paras 41, 44. During the Continued Sentencing Hearing it was accepted by the
Parties as an agreed fact, that para. 4 of the Indictment should also contain a reference to para. 35 of the Indictment. T.
252.
208
See Indictment, Schedule A.
209
Factual Basis, para. 42; Deronji} Testimony, T. 156-57.
210
211
Indictment, paras 26, 39; Factual Basis, para. 43 (emphasis added).
212
See Exh. JS-39, JS-39a.
28
101. As it was stated by the Accused during the Sentencing Hearing, he passed through the
village of Glogova and noticed a large number of people gathered in the centre of Glogova. He also
observed the buses, the presence of the army and the Bratunac police. However, according to his
testimony, he did not notice anything that would indicate that things were happening beyond what
they had agreed beforehand at the Crisis Staff meeting, i.e. that all residents of Glogova without
exception should be collected together and taken off in the direction of Kladanj.213
4. Destruction of an Institution Dedicated to Religion (the Mosque) and Other Muslim Property
102. The Accused pleaded guilty to the fact that during the 9 May 1992 attack on Glogova, the
attacking forces systematically set fire to the mosque, Bosnian Muslim houses, buildings, fields and
haystacks, causing the wanton and extensive destruction of Bosnian Muslim dwellings, businesses
and personal property in the village of Glogova. The Accused pleaded guilty to the fact that he was
present during the attack on Glogova while members of the attacking forces wantonly destroyed
Bosnian Muslim homes, businesses, and personal property.214 He stood at an elevated post
observing the development of the attack and preventing Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica to come
to the assistance of the residents of Glogova.215 He could hear shooting because he was only one
kilometre away from the village.216 He was informed, via a hand-held radio, that there was no
combat or resistance and that everything was going according to plan.
103. However, during the Sentencing Hearing, the Accused again slightly varied his version of
the events underlying the prior guilty plea by testifying that the destruction of the mosque was
neither planned nor discussed beforehand. He now claims that when he passed through the village
the mosque was allegedly not yet destroyed. According to his “opinion”, the mosque was blown up
with dynamite by the “volunteers” in the evening of 9 May 1992. However, the Accused admitted
that in the context of the developments starting in the beginning of April, this event was foreseeable
for him.217
104. At approximately 1000 hours on 9 May 1992, Miroslav Deronji} and other members of the
military unit left their positions and descended in the direction of Glogova.218 The order for the
Accused and his TO unit was to take the old macadam road leading from Bratunac to Kravica via
Glogova. When they reached the area of Avdagina Njiva, on the outskirts of Glogova, they
213
214
Indictment, paras 9, 26, 36, 37; Factual Basis, para. 44.
215
216
217
Ibid., T. 156.
218
29
encountered another unit from Kravica, including the commander of the unit Raso Milo{evi}, and
Jovan Nikoli} who was a member of the municipal board of the SDS.219
105. When Miroslav Deronji} and the others arrived at the edge of Glogova, they came upon five
to ten Muslim houses. After having checked the houses to determine if any Muslims remained in
them, and having found none, Miroslav Deronji} “approved” and “agreed”220 that soldiers burn the
houses and they were burned.221 Thereafter, Miroslav Deronji} and his companions saw another
five to six other Muslim houses from which the occupants had fled. At that location were members
of the Kravica Detachment, including a person called Ne|o, nicknamed “De|ura”. Miroslav
Deronji} encouraged him and his companions to set fire to these Bosnian Muslim houses.222 He in
fact ordered Ne|o to torch several houses in that area.223
106. At the end of the attack ordered by Miroslav Deronji}, a substantial part of Glogova was
razed to the ground and no Muslims were left in the village.224
E. Events Following the Attack on Glogova
107. On 10 May 1992 the operation, further implementing the plan of 8 May 1992,225 continued
by ordering the Muslim population, which remained in Bratunac at the time, to come to designated
places. At one point the Accused was informed that at the stadium in Bratunac, which was one of
the locations where the people were ordered to come, there were separations of men and women
taking place in the group of Muslims who had come to the stadium. Together with the president of
the executive board, Rodoljub Djukanovi}, the Accused went to the stadium to check the situation.
According to Deronji} Testimony, this was for him the first indication of such acts. He saw a group
of Muslims who were separated, and men were standing along the wall of the stadium.226 The
Accused testified that he was told that this was done pursuant to an order of the army and that these
people would be exchanged for some Serbs.227
108. The Accused was aware that these acts were a continuation of the forcible displacement of
people from Bratunac and the surrounding suburbs. Moreover, he was aware that those people were
separated at the stadium during the night, and then taken to a hangar close to the Vuk Karadì}
219
220
Ibid., T. 154.
221
222
Ibid., para. 40.
223
224
225
Factual Basis, para. 29; see also supra para. 86.
226
227
Ibid., T. 162.
30
school.228 Later that day the Accused found out that about 500 people had been placed in the
hangar.229
109. The day after a meeting in Pale,230 the Accused was informed that these people who were
separated at the hangar were abused by the “volunteers” and some local citizens.231 Moreover, he
was told that people were taken out of the hangar, in an unknown direction, and never came back.232
110. According to the Deronji} Testimony, the next day, 12 May 1992, the Accused received
information that somebody saw some killed people who had been thrown into the Drina River. He
saw several corpses in the river. When he returned to the Crisis Staff, they continued to discuss
what they should do. In the evening of 12 May 1992, between the 12th and the 13th, they held a
meeting of the Crisis Staff, where they agreed on some measures, i.e. they decided to release all the
people who had remained alive from the hangar and to transport them to Pale where the Serbian
leadership was at the time. After midnight, with the help of the local police, the released people
were boarded on trucks, transported and transferred to Pale. They made a list of all the survivors
from that hangar,233 some of whom were inhabitants of Glogova and surrounding villages.234 The
fate of these people remains unclear to the Trial Chamber.
111. On 13 May 1992, the Crisis Staff adopted a second decision related to the “volunteers” who
were blamed for the majority of the killings at the hangar. It was decided to expel all the
“volunteers” from Bratunac, as well as to expel Relji}235, who was blamed for the separation of
people, placing them in the hangar, which thus made it possible for all of the killings to take
place.236
112. In total, between 8 May 1992 and 12 May 1992, according to the Accused, at least over a
hundred people were killed in the Municipality of Bratunac. The Accused "clarified" that the
number of 200 killed people given by him in one of his previous interviews was not correct as he
stated it without verifying this information.237
228
Ibid.
229
Ibid., T. 163.
230
See infra subsection V.F. The Accused allegedly went to Pale on 10 May 1992, meaning that he found out about the
people being abused in the hangar the next day, i.e. 11 May 1992. Deronji} Testimony, T. 163.
231
The Accused mentioned, inter alia, Drago Zeki}, a father of the deceased Goran Zeki}. Deronji} Testimony, T. 163.
232
233
Ibid., T. 164.
234
See Exh. JS-39, JS-39a.
235
As was stated by the Defence it was not possible to implement the second decision, to expel Relji}, because he
escaped. Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 330. The Trial Chamber recalls that in the Accused’s interview to the
Prosecution the Accused stated that Relji} escaped from Bratunac. Interview of 24 June 2003, Exh. DS-7/5, p. 19.
236
237
Ibid., T. 166.
31
113. The Trial Chamber stresses that all facts described in the above paragraphs 107 through 112
can and will not be considered as constituting new crimes not included in the Indictment.
F. Meeting in Pale
114. On 10 or 11 May 1992238, Miroslav Deronji} was invited to Pale to report about the events
in Glogova and/or in the Municipality of Bratunac.239 Present at the meeting in Pale, held
supposedly in the Panorama Hotel,240 were Radovan Karadì}, Velibor Ostoji}, and Ratko Mladi},
as well as some 50 other participants, including the presidents of the crisis staffs from different
municipalities. When the Accused went in to the conference room, he concluded that the aim of the
meeting was for the presidents of the crisis staffs from various municipalities to report about the
security and military situation on the ground.241 On the wall behind them were maps that identified
the ethnic composition of portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in various colours. Serb areas were
designated in blue.242 Miroslav Deronji} showed his Municipality on the map. He reported that they
had attacked the village of Glogova pursuant to his order, that Glogova had been partly destroyed
and torched to a large extent and that the Bosnian Muslim population had been forcibly removed.
After having given his report, those assembled in the conference room applauded him and Velibor
Ostoji} commented “now we can colour Bratunac [sic!] blue”. This meant that they had taken
control of Bratunac and that the Serbs were the force controlling Bratunac. Miroslav Deronji}
assumed that this also meant that Bratunac had, in fact, acquired the possibility of forming part of
the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.243
238
At least after the events in Glogova and Bratunac; Deronji} Testimony, T. 168. However, in his witness statement of
25 November 2003, the Accused stated that “[…] during the meeting held on 12 May in Pale, when I explained the
events in Glogova.” Exh. DS-8a, para. 67. This fact was additionally discussed during the Continued Sentencing
Hearing where the exact date could not be determined, but it was stated by the Parties that this point is not of dispute
between them, T. 328-29.
239
Factual Basis, para. 45; Deronji} Testimony, T. 168-69. It remains unclear whether the report was on Glogova alone
or on the entire Municipality of Bratunac.
240
241
Ibid., T. 169.
242
243
Ibid., para. 47; Deronji} Testimony, T. 169-70.
32
VI. THE LAW
A. Legal Basis
115. In the terms of the Plea Agreement filed by the Prosecution in preparation of the Status
Conference on 30 September 2003, by pleading guilty the Accused acknowledged that the
Prosecutor would have had the onus to prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt.244
116. Concerning the nature of the offence to which the Accused pleaded guilty, the elements
required for the crime of Persecutions are set out in paragraph 5 of the Plea Agreement. Herein it is
stated that:
5. Miroslav Deronji} understands that the Prosecution would have had to prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt for him to be found guilty of Persecutions:
(a) the existence of an armed conflict;
(b) the existence of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian
population;
(c) the accused’s conduct was related to the widespread and systematic attack directed
against a civilian population;245
(d) the accused had knowledge of the wider context in which his conduct occurred;
(e) the accused committed acts or omissions against a victim or victim population violating
a basic or fundamental human right;
(f) the accused intended to commit the violation;
(g) the accused’s conduct was committed on political, racial or religious grounds; and
(h) the accused’s conduct was committed with a conscious intent to discriminate.
B. Trial Chamber’s Findings
117. The Accused pleaded guilty to having committed Persecutions through the following acts:
ordering the attack on the village of Glogova, the killing of Bosnian Muslim civilians in Glogova,
the forcible displacement of Bosnian Muslim civilians of Glogova from the Municipality of
Bratunac, the destruction of the mosque in Glogova, and the destruction of Bosnian Muslim civilian
244
Plea Agreement, para. 5
245
The original text of the paragraph 5 (b) and (c) of the Plea Agreement makes reference to the existence of a
widespread or systematic attack, however due to the fact that the paragraph 14 of the Indictment contains reference to
the existence of a widespread and systematic attack, the Parties agreed that the paragraph 14 of the Indictment
supersedes paragraph 5 (b) and (c) of the Plea Agreement. Sentencing Hearing, T. 172.
33
property in Glogova.246 The Trial Chamber has to decide whether all these underlying acts
constitute acts of Persecutions.
118. As it was held in the Vasiljevi} Trial Judgement247 and in the Staki} Trial Judgement248, due
to the fact that there is no comprehensive list of acts that may amount to Persecutions, acts that are
not explicitly mentioned in the Statute can also constitute persecutory acts. However, the common
denominator of all persecutory acts must be that the acts are committed on the basis of one of the
listed discriminatory grounds and must be of an equal gravity as other acts enumerated under
Article 5 of the Statute.
119. Although the term “killing” as such is not mentioned in the list of crimes punishable under
Article 5 of the Statute, it is used interchangeably with the term “murder”,249 which is a crime
punishable pursuant to Article 5 (a) of the Statute.
120. The term “forcible displacement” is not enumerated in the list of crimes in Article 5 of the
Statute; however, as was held by the Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac, forcible displacement, if
committed with the requisite discriminatory intent, constitutes the crime of Persecutions.250
121. An attack on a village is not listed under Article 5 of the Statute. The Trial Chamber in
Kordi} and êrkez, when assessing the level of gravity of this crime, held that the unlawful attack
on cities, towns and villages, “is akin to an 'attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings', a violation of the laws or customs of war
enumerated under Article 3 (c) of the Statute” and therefore when committed on discriminatory
grounds constitutes the act of Persecutions.251
122. The destruction of an institution dedicated to religion is not listed under Article 5 of the
Statute, but it was held in Staki} that “the seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments
and works of art and science”, a crime punishable under Article 3 (d) of the Statute, when
perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent, amounts to Persecutions.252
123. Although the wanton destruction of property is not a crime listed under Article 5 of the
Statute, it was held in Staki} that “[w]hen the cumulative effect of such property destruction is
246
Indictment, paras 29-35, 37, 39, 40.
247
Vasiljevi} Trial Judgement, paras 246-247.
248
Staki} Trial Judgement, paras 735-736.
249
Ibid., paras 585-586.
250
Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, paras 221-222; Cf. Judge Schomburg Dissenting Opinion, paras 4, 12, 17.
251
Kordi} and êrkez Trial Judgement, para. 203.
252
Staki} Trial Judgement, paras 765-768.
34
removal of civilians from their homes on discriminatory grounds, the 'wanton and extensive
destruction […] of Bosnian Muslim civilian dwellings, buildings, business, and civilian personal
property and livestock' may constitute the crime of persecution.”253
124. The Trial Chamber finds, for the reasons outlined above, that the aforementioned acts fulfil
the legal requirements of Article 5 (h) of the Statute, i.e. are of an equal gravity as the other crimes
listed under Article 5 of the Statute.
253
Staki} Trial Judgement, para. 763.
35
VII. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED
125. Miroslav Deronji} is individually criminally responsible pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the
Statute for the crime of Persecutions punishable under Article 5 (h) of the Statute as alleged in the
Indictment to which he pleaded guilty. Using the word “committed” does not mean that the
Accused physically committed any of the crimes charged personally. It refers to a substantial
participation in a joint criminal enterprise, well organised for months.254
126. The objective of the joint criminal enterprise was the permanent removal, by force or other
means, of Bosnian Muslim inhabitants from the village of Glogova in the Municipality of Bratunac
through commission of crime of Persecutions which is punishable under Article 5 (h) of the Statute.
Miroslav Deronji} participated as a co-perpetrator.255
127. On the level of the Municipality of Bratunac, Miroslav Deronji} worked in concert with
others, including members of the TO of the Municipality of Bratunac, inter alia, Momir Nikoli},
Najdan Mla|enovi}, Nenad Deronji}, Dragutin Taka}, Du{an @ivanovi}, Gojko (or @ivojin) Radi},
Zoran Mla|enovi}, Milo a.k.a. “Riba” and Milan Zari}, members of elements of the JNA, i.e.
members of the Novi Sad Corps from Serbia, who were under the command of Captain Relji},
members of the Bratunac police forces, inter alia, Milutin Milo{evi}, Chief of the Serbian SUP,
Miladin Joki}, Vidoje Radovi}, Dragan Ili}, Dragan Vasiljevi}, Sredoje Stevi}, Vuksi} and Te{i},
and members of paramilitary forces, whose identity is unknown.256
128. From the end of April to 9 May 1992, Miroslav Deronji}, individually as President of the
Crisis Staff of the Municipality of Bratunac and in concert with other members of the joint criminal
enterprise, committed Persecutions of Bosnian Muslims on political, racial or religious grounds, in
the village of Glogova in the Municipality of Bratunac.257 These Persecutions resulted in the
killings of 64 Bosnian Muslims, the forcible displacement of the Bosnian Muslim population from
Glogova and the destruction of the village of Glogova.258
129. Miroslav Deronji} committed the aforementioned acts with the specific intent to
discriminate against the Bosnian Muslim residents of Glogova and the Municipality of Bratunac on
political and religious grounds.259
254
255
Ibid., para. 3; see also Ojdani} Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 20.
256
Indictment, paras 6-7.
257
Ibid., para. 27.
258
Ibid., para. 40.
259
36
130. Miroslav Deronji} knew that the attack on Glogova and the forcible displacement of the
Bosnian Muslim population formed part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the
Bosnian Muslim civilian population within parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina designated as the
Republika Srpska.260
131. The attack on Glogova occurred within the context of an armed conflict between Serb and
Muslim forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina.261
132. The decision to attack Glogova and to displace permanently its Muslim residents was taken
in order to further the plan to create Serb ethnic territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina.262
260
Ibid., para. 31.
261
Ibid., para. 32.
262
Ibid., para. 33.
37
VIII. SENTENCING LAW
133. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, this Tribunal263 is not only
mandated to search for and record, as far as possible, the truth of what happened in the former
Yugoslavia, but also to bring justice to both victims and their relatives and to perpetrators. Truth
and justice should also foster a sense of reconciliation between different ethnic groups within the
countries and between the new States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
134. A guilty plea indicates that an accused is admitting the veracity of the charges contained in
an indictment. This also means that the accused acknowledges responsibility for his actions.
Undoubtedly this tends to further a process of reconciliation. A guilty plea protects victims from
having to relive their experiences and re-open old wounds. As a side-effect, albeit not really a
significant mitigating factor, it also saves the Tribunal’s resources.
135. As opposed to a pure guilty plea (Rule 62 bis of the Rules), a plea agreement (Rule 62 ter of
the Rules), while having its own merits as an incentive to plead guilty, has two negative side
effects. First, the admitted facts are limited to those in the agreement, which might not always
reflect the entire available factual and legal basis. Second, it may be thought that an accused is
confessing only because of the principle “do ut des” (give and take). Therefore, the reason why an
accused entered a plea of guilty needs to be analysed: were charges withdrawn, or was a sentence
recommendation given? In any event, a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 62 ter and 62 bis of the
Rules does not allow the Trial Chamber to depart from the mandate of this Tribunal, which is to
bring the truth to light and justice to the people of the former Yugoslavia. Neither the public, nor
the judges themselves come closer to know the truth beyond what is accepted in the plea
agreement.264 This might create an unfortunate gap in the public and historical record of the
concrete case, although, when coupled with an accused’s substantial co-operation with the
prosecution, an agreement grants more insights into previously undiscovered areas. However, while
treating plea agreements with appropriate caution,265 it should be recalled that this Tribunal is not
the final arbiter of historical facts. That is for historians. For the judiciary focusing on core issues of
a criminal case before this International Tribunal, it is important that justice be done and be seen to
be done, within the ambit of the Indictment presented by the Prosecutor.
263
See supra Introduction.
264
In the present case, the Parties merely agreed on the factual basis of the Indictment as the agreed facts in the Plea
Agreement.
265
For a detailed discussion on the appropriateness of plea agreements in cases involving serious violations of
international humanitarian law, see Momir Nikolić Sentencing Judgement, paras 57–73.
38
A. The Individual Guilt of an Accused and the Principle of Proportionality
136. The individual guilt of an accused limits the range of the sentence. Other goals and
functions of a sentence can only influence the range within the limits defined by individual guilt.266
137. In Staki}, this Trial Chamber recalled that:
[T]he International Tribunal was set up to counteract impunity and to ensure a fair trial for the
alleged perpetrators of crimes falling within its jurisdiction. […] The Tribunal is mandated to
determine the appropriate penalty, often in respect of persons who would never have expected to
stand trial. While one goal of sentencing is the implementation of the principle of equality before
the law, another is to prevent persons who find themselves in similar situations in the future from
committing crimes.267
138. The Statute explicitly vests the judges with discretion to determine the appropriate
punishment for each accused and each act charged.268 Thus, when the Trial Chamber evaluates the
different sentencing factors, it does so in the interest of the nature and gravity of the crimes
committed, the circumstances surrounding the acts themselves, the degree of responsibility of an
accused for the act, and the personality of the accused.
139. Finally, the fundamental principle of proportionality269 has to be taken into account.
B. Principles and Purposes
1. Submissions of the Parties
140. The Prosecution submits that the primary principles for the Trial Chamber to consider are
retribution and deterrence.270 It submits that “[a]lthough the principle of retribution stems from the
266
267
Ibid., para. 901.
268
R. v. Bloomfield [1999] NTCCA 137, para. 17: “Individualised justice is the touchstone of judicial sentencing,
tailoring the sentence in each case to the circumstances of the offence and of the offender.”
269
In the Canadian Supreme Court decision of R. v. Martineau, the Court stated:
[The] punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender, or as
Professor Hart puts it in Punishment and Responsibility (1968), at p. 162, the fundamental
principle of a morally based system of law [is] that those causing harm intentionally be punished
more severely than those causing harm unintentionally. (R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633,
p. 645).
This position was applied and further expanded in the subsequent decision of R. v. Arkell in which the Court declared:
[W]here a murder is committed by someone already abusing his power by illegally dominating
another, the murder should be treated as an exceptionally serious crime. [… The] decision to treat
more seriously murders that have been committed while the offender is exploiting a position of
power through illegal domination of the victim accords with the principle that there must be a
proportionality between a sentence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender and other
considerations such as deterrence and societal condemnation of the acts of the offender. (R. v.
Arkell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695, p. 704).
270
Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 7.
39
ancient theory of revenge, its modern usage refers to a requirement that the punishment be
proportionate to the crime.”271 Furthermore, the Prosecution argues that while “retribution focuses
on the circumstances of the case itself, deterrence looks outside the case to potential offenders.”272
The Prosecution submits that the penalty should have “sufficient deterrent value to ensure that those
who would consider committing similar crimes will be dissuaded from doing so”.273 The
Prosecution notes the “general importance of deterrence as a consideration in sentencing for
international crimes” endorsed by the Appeals Chamber.274
141. The Defence submits that “[r]etribution – interpreted as punishment of an offender for his
specific criminal conduct – and general deterrence form the backdrop against which sentence
should be determined.”275 However, as Defence further submits, the Trial Chamber has to “ensure
that the deterrence principle is not accorded undue prominence”.276
2. Discussion
142. Fundamental principles taken into consideration when imposing a sentence are deterrence
and retribution. The Appeals Chamber in “Čelebići” held, inter alia, that:
[T]he Appeals Chamber (and Trial Chambers of both the Tribunal and the ICTR) have
consistently pointed out that two of the main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are
deterrence and retribution.277
143. Regarding rehabilitation, the Appeals Chamber in “Čelebići” held that:
[A]lthough rehabilitation (in accordance with international human rights standards) should be
considered as a relevant factor, it is not one which should be given undue weight.278
Retribution is not revenge “[…]but to express the outrage of the international community at heinous
crimes […].”279
(a) Deterrence
144. Individual and general deterrence has an important function in principle and serves as an
important goal of sentencing.280
271
Ibid.
272
Ibid., para. 8.
273
Todorovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 30 as quoted in Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 8.
274
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 185 as quoted in Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 8.
275
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 23 (footnotes omitted).
276
Banovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 34 as quoted in Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 24.
277
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 806 (footnotes omitted).
278
Ibid.
279
280
Ibid.
40
145. Individual deterrence refers to the specific effect of the sentence upon the accused which
should be adequate to discourage him from re-offending once the sentence has been served and he
has been released. The Trial Chamber finds, however, that this factor should not attract more than
average importance.
146. The sentence imposed must also be sufficient in order to dissuade others from committing
the same crime; in other words, it must have a general deterrent effect. The Trial Chamber in the
Todorovi} sentencing judgement stated:
The Appeals Chamber has held that deterrence “is a consideration that may legitimately be
considered in sentencing” and has further recognised the “general importance of deterrence as a
consideration in sentencing for international crimes”. The Chamber understands this to mean that
deterrence is one of the principles underlying the determination of sentences, in that the penalties
imposed by the International Tribunal must, in general, have sufficient deterrent value to ensure
that those who would consider committing similar crimes will be dissuaded from doing so.281
147. In Staki}, the Trial Chamber stated that:
[i]n the context of combating international crimes, deterrence refers to the attempt to integrate or
to reintegrate those persons who believe themselves to be beyond the reach of international
criminal law. Such persons must be warned that they have to respect the fundamental global norms
of substantive criminal law or face not only prosecution but also sanctions imposed by
international tribunals. In modern criminal law this approach to general deterrence is more
accurately described as deterrence aiming at reintegrating potential perpetrators into the global
society.282
148. It is important to note that courts in various national jurisdictions recognise the principle of
deterrence. An example can be found in the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory of Australia
decision R. v. Bloomfield, which ruled that:
[t]he greater the harm, the greater its weight in the balance of conflicting interests against the
offender by way of punishment as a general deterrent. It must be made clear, both to the offender
and others with similar impulses, that if they yield to them they will meet with severe punishment:
“in all civilized countries, in all ages, that has been the main purpose of punishment and continues
to be so”283
149. One of the main purposes of a sentence imposed by an international tribunal is to influence
the legal awareness of the accused, the surviving victims, their relatives, the witnesses and the
general public in order to reassure them that the legal system is implemented and enforced.
Additionally, the process of sentencing is intended to convey the message that globally accepted
laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody. “All persons shall be equal before the courts and
281
Todorovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 30 (footnotes omitted).
282
Staki} Trial Judgement, para. 902; see Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 185; êlebi}i Appeal Judgement, para.
806; for Integrationsprävention see German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 90, 145 (173); BVerfGE 45, 187 (255f).
See also Radke in Münchener Kommentar, Strafgesetzbuch, Vol. 1, §§1-51 (München, 2003).
283
R. v. Bloomfield [1999] NTCCA 137 para. 19 (footnotes omitted).
41
tribunals.”284 This fundamental rule fosters the internalisation of these laws and rules in the minds
of legislators and the general public.
(b) Retribution
150. “An equally important factor is retribution. This is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire
for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at these crimes.”285
The principle or theory of retribution has long been confused with the notion of vengeance as
submitted by both the Prosecution and Defence. By contrast, this Trial Chamber agrees that
retribution should solely be seen as:
an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly

reflects the […] culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the
offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the
offenders conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint;
retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.286
C. Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 101 of the Rules
151. Neither the Statute nor the Rules specify a concrete range of penalties for offences under the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Determination of the appropriate sentence is left to the discretion of each
Trial Chamber,287 although guidance as to which factors should be taken into account is provided
by both the Statute and the Rules.
152. Article 24 of the Statute provides a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be taken into
account by the Trial Chamber in determining the sentence and reads in its relevant parts:
1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In

determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into account such factors as the
gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. […]
153. Rule 101 of the Rules further states in its relevant parts:
(A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the
remainder of the convicted person’s life.
(B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account the factors
mentioned in Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Statute, as well as such factors as:
(i) any aggravating circumstances;
284
Article 14 paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the ICCPR.
285
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 185.
286
R. v. M.(C.A.) [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, para. 80 (emphasis in original).
287
See supra para. 4.
42
(ii) any mitigating circumstances including the substantial co-operation with the
Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction;
(iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia; […]
(C) Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period, if any, during which the
convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending
trial or appeal.
D. Gravity of the Crime, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
154. The gravity of the offence is a factor of primary importance, and “may be regarded as the
litmus test” in the imposition of an appropriate sentence.288 It is necessary to consider the nature of
the crime and “the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of the
participation of the accused in the crime” in order to determine the gravity of the crime.289 “A
sentence must reflect the predominant standard of proportionality between the gravity of the offence
and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”290
155. In determining sentence, the Trial Chamber is obliged to take into account any aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, but the weight to be given to the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber.291 The aggravating circumstances
should be proven beyond reasonable doubt,292 while “the standard to be met for mitigating factors is
the balance of probabilities”293 and “mitigating circumstances may also include those not directly
related to the offence”.294
156. The Rules specify only “substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor” as a mitigating factor,
other factors often taken into account by this Tribunal in mitigating a sentence are, inter alia, a plea
of guilty,295 acceptance of a certain degree of guilt,296 expression of genuine remorse,297 compassion
288
êlebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 1225 endorsed in Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 182, Čelebići Appeal
Judgement, para. 731 and Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 101. See also Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 249.
289
Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 852 endorsed in Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 182, Čelebići Appeal
Judgement, para. 731 and Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 101. In Staki} this Trial Chamber stated that “The sentence
must reflect the gravity of the criminal conduct of the accused. This requires consideration of the underlying crimes as
well as the form and degree of the participation of the individual accused” and “The Trial Chamber recalls that if a
particular circumstance is included as an element of the offence under consideration, it cannot be regarded also as an
aggravating factor since each circumstance may only justly be considered once”, Staki} Trial Judgement, paras 903-
904.
290
Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 40 endorsed in Akayesu Appeal Judgement, para. 414.
291
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 777.
292
Ibid., para. 763.
293
Staki} Trial Judgement, para. 920 cited from Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 847 and Sikirica et al. Sentencing
Judgement, para. 110.
294
295
This factor is considered in more details in sub-section IX. B. 1. (b).
296
Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 464.
297
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 788, Erdemovi} 1998 Sentencing Judgement, para. 16.
43
by an accused and any assistance given to the victims by an accused,298 limited participation in
alleged acts of violence,299 voluntary surrender,300 the age of the accused,301 absence of previous
criminal record and the accused’s family and social situations.302
E. Sentencing Ranges
157. Rule 101 (A) of the Rules, which grants the power to sentence a convicted person for a term
up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life, shows that “a Trial Chamber’s
discretion in imposing sentence is not bound by any maximum term of imprisonment applied in a
national system.”303
158. Pursuant to Article 24 (1) of the Statute and Rule 101 (B) (iii) of the Rules, in determining
the sentence, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the “general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.” However, it is settled jurisprudence of this
Tribunal that Trial Chambers are not bound by this “general practice”. The Trial Chamber notes
that it is difficult to identify such “general practice” in the absence of a functioning judiciary during
the period in question, especially in relation to those crimes heard before this Tribunal. Rather, Trial
Chambers should take into account the applicable written law and today’s practice – if any – of
courts of the States in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in relation to serious violations of
International Humanitarian Law.304
159. For this purpose and to seek guidance based on comparative research in this terrain, the
Trial Chamber admitted into evidence the Sentencing Report by Prof. Sieber prepared in the
Dragan Nikolić case and the transcripts of his testimony in that case.305
1. Former Yugoslavia
160. The section of the Sentencing Report relating to the former Yugoslavia comprises both a
normative and an empirical section, the latter being based on semi-standardized interviews with 17
judges from different parts of the former Yugoslavia306 on questions relevant to the punishment of
298
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 775-76, Serushago Appeal Judgement, para. 24.
299
Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 236.
300
Serushago Appeal Judgment, para. 24, Plav{i} Sentencing Judgement, para. 84.
301
Jelisi} Appeal Judgement, para. 131, Erdemovi} 1998 Sentencing Judgement, para. 16.
302
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 408, Erdemovi} 1998 Sentencing Judgement, para. 16.
303
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para 377.
304
Tadić Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, para. 21, Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para 418, Jelisić Appeal
Judgement, para 117, Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para 813.
305
See supra para. 22.
306
Of the 17 judges interviewed, 6 were from BiH (3 from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 3 from the
Republika Srpska), 5 judges from Croatia, 3 judges from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 3 judges
from Montenegro, Sieber Testimony, T. 368.
44
the crimes encompassing the acts alleged in the Indictment.307 With respect to the legal significance
of the empirical data, Prof. Sieber stated that “this study can give you some indication, but
definitely […] it’s not a sample where you can do analysis, especially based on the various
republics.”308 The Trial Chamber shares this view.
161. The crimes to which the Accused pleaded guilty occurred in the Municipality of Bratunac,
which is today part of BiH, in concreto: its entity Republika Srpska. The Trial Chamber is therefore
particularly interested in the sentencing laws and practices in this region.
162. The Trial Chamber will begin with a brief chronology of the applicable law in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, starting in 1992 when the crimes to which the Accused has pleaded guilty
were committed, until the present day.
163. The sentencing law in BiH was regulated in 1992 by the Criminal Code of the SFRY,
adopted by the Federal Assembly on 28 September 1976, and in force since 1 July 1977 (hereinafter
the “Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77”), and by the Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 June 1977 (hereinafter the “Criminal Code of BiH of 1977”). The
Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77 regulated the general aspects of criminal law and a few specific
offences, such as crimes against the security of the SFRY, genocide, and war crimes, while the
Criminal Code of BiH of 1977 regulated primarily specific offences, and some general matters not
addressed by the Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77.309 Both criminal codes initially remained in
force after BiH declared its independence in 1992.310
164. In 1998 BiH’s constituent entity of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted its
own criminal code, consisting of its own general and special parts. The Republika Srpska entity and
the Br~ko District followed suit shortly thereafter, adopting their own criminal codes in 2000.311 In
March 2003 the Office of the High Representative enacted a new Criminal Code for both entities
within the State of BiH and the Br~ko District (hereinafter “OHR Criminal Code of 2003”).312 In
August 2003 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska adopted new
Criminal Codes (hereinafter “FedBiH Criminal Code of 2003” and “RS Criminal Code of 2003”
respectively). The OHR Criminal Code of 2003 and the Criminal Codes of the two entities within
307
Sentencing Report, pp. 17-20.
308
Sieber Testimony, T. 413.
309
Sentencing Report, pp. 27, 29.
310
Ibid., p. 27, citing Presidential Decree of 8 April 1992 on the state of war, Presidential Decree of 11 August 1992 on
the application of traditional laws, and Law of 1 June 1994 on the Retroactive Confirmation of the later Presidential
Decree. The independence of BiH was recognized by the European Community on 6 April 1992. On 22 May 1992, BiH
was admitted as a member state of the United Nations.
311
Ibid., p. 35.
312
Ibid.
45
BiH of 2003 each contain their own general and special parts. While the OHR Criminal Code of
2003 does not regulate “ordinary” crimes such as murder or rape in its special part, it contains
criminal provisions that are relevant to – and applicable in – the whole state, such as, inter alia, war
crimes and crimes against humanity.313
165. The Trial Chamber will now turn to consider the range of sentences available under the
aforementioned laws in BiH in 1992 when the crimes to which the Accused has pleaded guilty were
committed. Under the Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77, the range of penalties existing in 1992
consisted of a fine, the confiscation of property, imprisonment, and capital punishment. The
maximum term of imprisonment was 15 years, except for offences punishable with the death
penalty, committed under “particularly aggravating circumstances,” or causing “especially grave
consequences,” in which cases the maximum term of imprisonment was 20 years.314
166. Punishment for the specific offences in 1992 was regulated by the Criminal Code of BiH of
1977. Murder was punishable with imprisonment of not less than five years, and in aggravated
cases – which included murder committed in a cruel way, carried out violently, by endangering the
life of others, or by motive of greed – with imprisonment of not less than ten years or the death
penalty.315 If murder was committed in “time of war, armed conflict or occupation,” under the
Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77 this offence was qualified as a war crime and was punishable
with imprisonment of a minimum of five years or, alternatively, the death penalty.316
2. The Applicability of the Principle of lex mitior
167. The principle of lex mitior317 forms part, inter alia, of the criminal law applicable in BiH
throughout the relevant period. Article 4 of the Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77 stated:
(1) The law that was in force at the time when a criminal act was committed shall be applied to
the person who has committed the criminal act.
(2) If the law has been amended one or more times after the criminal act was committed, the law
which is less severe in relation to the offender should be applied.
The principle is also contained in the present national criminal codes of BiH, the Republika Srpska,
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.318
313
Sieber Testimony, T. 373.
314
Article 38 of the Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77; Sentencing Report, p. 30. In this context, the Trial Chamber
wishes to emphasize that it does not share the view that a sentence of life imprisonment is the harsher sentence in
comparison to capital punishment, cf. John R.W.D. Jones/Steven Powles, International Criminal Practice, 3rd ed.,
Oxford (2003), 9.119.
315
Article 36 of the Criminal Code of BiH of 1977; Sentencing Report, pp. 32-33.
316
Article 142 (war crime against the civilian population), Article 143 (war crime against the wounded and sick) and
Article 144 (war crime against prisoners of war) of the Federal Criminal Code of 1976/77; Sentencing Report, p. 34.
46
168. However, upon closer examination of the content of the principle of lex mitior, the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that the principle applies only to cases in which the commission of a criminal
offence and the subsequent imposition of a penalty took place within one and the same jurisdiction.
169. The Trial Chamber notes that the provisions mentioned above do not state that the principle
of lex mitior also applies in cases where the offence was committed in a jurisdiction different from
the one under which the offender receives his punishment. In the event of concurrent jurisdictions,
no state is generally bound under international law to apply the sentencing range or sentencing law
of another state where the offence was committed. With respect to the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Tribunal and the jurisdictions in the former Yugoslavia,319 the Appeals Chamber adopted without
further explanation the same approach when it stated that the principle, that Trial Chambers are not
bound in sentencing by the practice of the courts in the former Yugoslavia,
applies to offences committed both before and after the Tribunal’s establishment. The Appeals
Chamber can therefore see no reason why it should constitute a retrospective increase in sentence
to impose a sentence greater than what may have been the maximum sentence available under
domestic law in the former Yugoslavia at the time the offences were committed.320
170. In conclusion, the Tribunal, having primacy vis à vis national jurisdictions in the former
Yugoslavia, is not bound to apply a more lenient penalty – if any – under these jurisdictions.
However, such penalties shall be taken into consideration, but as only one factor among others
when determining a sentence.
3. Other Countries
171. In addition to the section relating to sentencing law and practice in the former Yugoslavia,
the Sentencing Report provides an overview of the law relating to sentencing in 23 other countries.
The Sentencing Report focused on the sentencing law of serious crimes, including murder, but
without going into the specifics of any particular case. The Sentencing Report identifies the
penalties applicable in 1992, the year the crimes were committed, as well as penalties in 2003.
Generally speaking, the close analysis shows that in almost all national legal systems under survey,
murder attracts rather severe penalties. In particular, a large number of these legal systems prescribe
a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the case of murder by participation in shooting. A
comparison between the law in effect in the year 1992 and the current law shows that only a few
countries have changed the sentencing range applicable for these crimes during this period. Most of
317
For a detailed discussion on the applicability of this principle see Dragan Nikoli} Sentencing Judgement, paras 157-
65.
318
See also: Article 4 (2) of the OHR Criminal Code of 2003; Article 5 (2) of the FedBiH Criminal Code of 2003;
Article 4 (2) of the RS Criminal Code of 2003; Sentencing Report, pp. 35-36, 38-39 and 42.
319
Article 9 (1) of the Statute provides that the Tribunal and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute
persons for the statutory crimes.
47
these changes relate to a replacement of the death penalty by life imprisonment as the maximum
punishment.321
172. From a general perspective, the minimum penalty to be imposed for one act of murder
committed by participation in shooting and/or motivated by ethnic bias (hereinafter “Aggravated
Murder”) ranges from a fixed term of imprisonment up to life imprisonment in countries such as
Argentina, Austria, Canada, Chile, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, South
Africa, Sweden, and Turkey.
173. The maximum penalties for such one act of Aggravated Murder in the various countries
range from a prison sentence of 25 years to the death penalty.322
174. In Argentina,323 Belgium,324 Canada,325 Germany,326 England,327 Finland,328 Italy,329 and

South Africa,330 one act of Aggravated Murder attracts a mandatory life sentence.
175. The sentence of life imprisonment or, in the alternative, a maximum fixed term of years is
envisaged by the relevant statutory provisions of the following countries: Austria,331 Poland,332 and
Sweden.333 In Chile and France, Aggravated Murder attracts sentences from a minimum of five
years’ imprisonment – Chile – and 2 years’ imprisonment – France334 – up to life imprisonment.
176. Finally, it appears that Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and Portugal335 limit sentencing to a fixed
term of imprisonment, even in the most serious cases. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that the
abolition of life imprisonment does not necessarily mean that the sentence to be finally served is
less than in States providing for life imprisonment with an optional or mandatory review after 15 or
20 years.
177. The overview shows that in most countries a single act of Aggravated Murder attracts life
imprisonment or the death penalty, as either an optional or a mandatory sanction. When adopting
320
êlebi}i Appeal Judgement, para. 816.
321
For example, Country Report Greece, p. 3; Country Report Poland, p. 2; Country Report South Africa, p.2; Country
Report Turkey, p. 2.
322
Sentencing Report, p. 93.
323
Country Report Argentina, pp. 5, 11.
324
Country Report Belgium, p. 17.
325
Country Report Canada, p. 2.
326
Country Report Germany, p. 2.
327
Country Report England, pp. 8, 14.
328
Country Report Finland, p. 2.
329
Country Report Italy, pp. 9, 18.
330
Country Report South Africa, p. 9.
331
Country Report Austria, pp. 8, 14.
332
Country Report Poland, p. 14.
333
Country Report Sweden, pp. 10, 17.
334
Country Report Chile, pp. 8, 15; Country Report France, p. 10.
335
See already Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 932 (footnote 1660).
48
the Statute in 1993, the Security Council was apparently cognisant of this practice and decided to
vest broad discretion to the judges in determining sentences, instead of giving concrete sentencing
ranges for each specific offence. In line with the general UN policy on the abolition of the death
penalty, the Security Council limited the applicable sentences to imprisonment.336 Acting pursuant
to Article 15 of the Statute, the Plenary of this Tribunal specified Article 24 (1) of the Statute by
phrasing Rule 101 of the Rules in its relevant part:
(A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the
remainder of the convicted person’s life.
336
Article 24 (1) of the Statute; see also Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 15 December 1989, aiming at the
abolition of the death penalty, and already Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR of 28 April 1983, concerning the abolition of the
death penalty; see also Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 932.
49
IX. FACTS RELATED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT OF THE
ACCUSED
A. Gravity of the Offence and Aggravating Circumstances
1. Submissions of the Parties
178. The Prosecution argues that the gravity of the crime is a primary consideration for the Trial
Chamber.337
179. The Prosecution submits that “the crime for which Miroslav Deronjić is to be sentenced is
precisely the type of crime about which the Security Council expressed its grave alarm in
Resolution 808. The events in Glogova on the 9th of May 1992 are a classical case of ethnic
cleansing, and precisely the reason why the Security Council established this Tribunal. The attack
on Glogova was not an isolated or random event, but a critical element in a larger scheme to divide
Bosnia and Herzegovina and create Serb-ethnic territories.”338
180. It further submits that the crime to which the Accused has pleaded guilty, the crime of
Persecutions, is “inherently very serious”. Due to its distinctive feature, a discriminatory intent, this
crime “justifies a more severe penalty”.339
181. The Prosecution submits that the aggravating circumstances set out below are exclusively
based on the Factual Basis: (i) Miroslav Deronji}’s superior position as a political leader in the
Municipality of Bratunac, his role in ordering the attack on Glogova, and the (ii) vulnerable and
helpless situation of the victims of the 9 May 1992 attack on Glogova.
182. The Defence submits that the Trial Chamber has an “overriding obligation” to
“individualize a penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the
crime”340 and that “[t]he determination of the gravity of the crime requires a consideration of the
particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of the participation of the
accused in the crime.”341 The Defence submits that all aggravating circumstances of the crime are
already subsumed in the offence of Persecutions.342 The Defence continues by stating that “only
337
338
Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 188.
339
340
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 25 referring to êlebi}i Trial Judgement, para. 1225.
341
Ibid., para. 26 quoting Kupre{ki} et al. Trial Judgement, para. 852.
342
50
those circumstances directly related to the commission of the offence charged and to the offender
himself when he committed the offence […] may be considered in aggravation.”343
183. Regarding Miroslav Deronji}’s superior position, the Defence states:
A high rank in the political field does not, in itself, lead to a harsher sentence. But, a person who
abuses or wrongly exercises power deserves a harsher sentence than an individual acting on his or
her own. The direct participation of a high level superior in a crime under Article 7(1) – planning,
ordering, instigating – is an aggravating circumstance, although to what degree depends on the
actual level of authority and the form of participation.344
2. Discussion
184. Trial Chambers are required pursuant to Article 24 (2) of the Statute to take into account
such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.
This Trial Chamber reiterates that the gravity of the crime is of primary importance in determining
the sentence.345
185. Furthermore, Rule 101 (B) (i) of the Rules requires the Trial Chamber to examine any
aggravating circumstances in relation to the crimes of which the Accused stands convicted. In this
regard, it has been established that only those circumstances directly related to the commission of
the offence charged may be seen as aggravating.346
(a) Large Number of Victims
186. As a result of the persecutory acts to which the Accused pleaded guilty, 64 identified
Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed. In addition, an unspecified number of Bosnian Muslim
civilians were forcibly displaced and deprived of their property. The Accused was aware of the
substantial likelihood that such crimes could occur as an accepted result of his criminal conduct.
(b) Deronji}’s Superior Position as a Political Leader in the Municipality of Bratunac
187. The Accused is individually criminally responsible pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the Statute
for committing acts of Persecutions in Glogova. His position as a political leader aggravates the
offence. It was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in Kupreškić et al.347 that:
[…] a Trial Chamber has the discretion to find that direct responsibility, under Article 7 (1) of the
Statute, is aggravated by a perpetrator’s position of authority. 348
343
Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 850 as quoted in Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 34.
344
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 36 referring to Krsti} Trial Judgement, paras 708-709.
345
See supra para. 154.
346
Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 850.
347
Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 451.
51
188. The Accused held several positions of authority in his municipality. He was President of the
Municipality of Bratunac Board of the SDS from September 1990 to the end of April 1992. On 6
September 1991, he was appointed member of the SDS party Commission on Personnel and
Organisation by the Executive Board. The Accused was President of the Bratunac Crisis Staff from
the time it assumed authority from the Executive Committee of the Municipality and the organs of
the Municipal Assembly from the end of April 1992 to the time of its transformation to a War
Commission established by the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in June
1992. He was also appointed a member of the War Commission of the Municipality of Bratunac.349
189. Due to his aforedescribed insight in the SDS’ political strategies, the Accused became
already in 1991 aware of the Bosnian Serb leadership’s objective to establish a Serbian state.350 In
April 1991, the Accused learned of the planned arming of the Serbs and was told by Rajko Djukić
that he himself and Goran Zekić would be tasked with the arming of their municipalities.351 Only a
few weeks later, in early May 1991, the Accused personally participated in organising a weapon
delivery to Serbs in Bratunac.352 On this occasion, he also found out about the position of the
political and state leadership to create an exclusively Serb area 50 kilometres from the Drina, which
would include the Municipality of Bratunac.353
190. The Accused unequivocally subscribed to this policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership and
implemented it in his aforementioned leading capacities. In particular, he actively participated in
achieving the objective to transform the Municipality of Bratunac into a Serb ethnic territory.354 In
October 1991, the Accused received a set of documents on an extended Main Board meeting from
the Presidency of the SDS for the organisation of the Serb people. He followed these instructions,
organised public fora to promote the political positions of the SDS and established the Crisis Staff
of the Serbian People, of which he became president.355
191. Upon receiving the confidential written instructions from the SDS, dated 19 December
1991, he immediately started to adopt and to implement the directives outlined by the Main Board
of the SDS. He established the SDS Crisis Staff, which replaced the two-month-old Crisis Staff of
the Serbian People, and was also elected as its president.356 Towards the end of April 1992, he
became President of the just-formed Crisis Staff of the Municipality, which lasted until the creation
348
See also Krsti} Trial Judgement, para. 708.
349
Indictment, para. 1; see supra para. 48.
350
Deronji} Testimony, T. 113, 127.
351
Ibid., T. 118, 124.
352
Ibid., T. 120-21.
353
Ibid., T. 121.
354
355
356
Ibid., T. 127.
52
of the War Presidency in June 1992.357 The Accused also implemented other measures to establish
Bosnian Serb control, such as the division of the police in Bratunac, as far as was possible for him,
given the specific nature of the situation in Bratunac.358
192. His political offices gave him de facto and de jure control over the TO and de facto control
over the police forces in the Municipality of Bratunac.359 The Accused used this authority to
execute and to further the idea of transforming the Municipality of Bratunac into a purely Serb-
ethnic area. The attack on the predominantly Muslim village of Glogova constituted an important
part of this support. It was a critical element in the larger scheme to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina
and create Serb-ethnic territories.360 The Trial Chamber accepts the submission of the Prosecution
and agrees that it was the Accused’s plan to ethnically cleanse Glogova361 and that the events of 9
May 1992 in Glogova were indeed “a classical case of ethnic cleansing”.362
193. The Accused, in his authority to control police and TO forces, was ready to use violent
means to achieve this objective. Observing the events in neighbouring municipalities during April
1992, the Accused concluded for himself that the use of force was one element in the strategy to
create a Serb Republic.363 This assumption was unequivocally confirmed to him in a conversation
with Goran Zeki} on the 5th of May 1992.364 Realizing that the violent methods were part of the
political plans, the Accused decided to attack Glogova.365 The applicable use of force included in
his view the violent transfer of the population, the conduct of “volunteers” units and the JNA, the
use of a tank and also the killing of people.366
194. His position of authority as an influential civilian leader, due to his status as President of the
Crisis Staff and of the Municipal Board, gave the Accused a particular responsibility towards the
population in his municipality.367 However, he abused this authority vested to him. As the Trial
Chamber in Stakić and Dragan Nikolić has expressed:
The commission of offences by a person in such a prominent position aggravates the sentence
substantially.368
The Appeals Chamber endorsed that:
357
As clarified in Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 276.
358
359
Indictment, para. 8 (a).
360
361
Ibid., T. 190.
362
Ibid., T. 188.
363
364
Ibid., T. 134.
365
Ibid., T. 136, 145.
366
Ibid., T. 137.
367
See Simić et. al. Trial Judgement, para. 1082.
368
Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 913; Dragan Nikolić Sentencing Judgement, para. 183.
53
[…] the Accused’s seniority or position of authority [may be considered as] aggravating his direct
responsibility under Article 7(1).369
195. The Trial Chamber accepts that the mere fact that the Accused held a high political rank at
the time of the attack does not as such constitute an aggravating factor.370 In this case however, the
Accused indeed abused his political power to commit the crimes he is charged with.
(c) Miroslav Deronji}’s Role in the Disarmament of the Citizens of Glogova
196. Prior to the attack, the population, inter alia, of Glogova was ordered to hand over their
weapons by soldiers and through an ultimatum.371 By 27 April 1992, Glogova became a disarmed
and undefended village.372
197. The Accused did not order the disarmament of Glogova. The disarming of the Bosnian
Muslim population of the Municipality of Bratunac was initiated by the JNA. However, in a
meeting of the Crisis Staff the Accused was informed about this by Mr. Relji}, the captain of the
JNA unit in Bratunac, and asked to confirm (“authorize”)373 the decision. The Crisis Staff and the
Accused, in his position as its president, gave this confirmation. The Accused approved of the
disarming action, regarded it as justified and accepted the decision as his own.374 Moreover, the
Accused personally participated as a member of the TO in the disarming of the village of Pod~aus
in the Municipality of Bratunac.375
198. In supporting the disarmament this way, the Accused is directly responsible for leaving the
population of Glogova at the disposal of the armed forces in the attack of 9 May 1992. The Trial
Chamber accepts the submission of the Prosecution and agrees that the fact that the population of
Glogova was disarmed well before the attack and offered no resistance during the attack aggravates
the crime376.
(d) Deronji}’s Role in Ordering the Attack on Glogova
199. In the evening of 8 May 1992, the Accused, in his capacity as the President of the Crisis
Staff of the Municipality of Bratunac, ordered the attack on Glogova.377 He had made this decision
in order to forcibly displace the Bosnian Muslim population from that area.378 The Accused
369
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 745; see also Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 183.
370
See also Krsti} Trial Judgement, para. 709.
371
372
373
374
Deronji} Testimony, T. 143-44, 158-59.
375
Ibid., T. 143.
376
377
Indictment, para. 8 (e).
378
Kraji{nik Trial, Exh. JS-26, T. 1056.
54
intended to secure purely Serb control over the village, because of Glogova’s strategic importance
halfway along the key road between Bratunac and the Serb region of Kravica.379 He used his de
facto and de jure control over the TO and his de facto power over the police in the Municipality of
Bratunac to order the attack on the village, burn part of it down, and forcibly displace its Bosnian
Muslim residents.380
200. Lacking the authority to command the JNA units, the Accused “only asked them whether
they would participate in this”381 and “that the army take an active role rather than simply
observing”.382 According to the Accused, “Mr. Reljić, the commander of this unit, told me they
would participate in this action”,383 and “one of his [Reljić’s] deputies who was present […] said at
a certain point, ‘Yes, the army will participate, Mr. Deronjić’”.384 According to the Factual Basis
agreed among the Parties, Deronji} urged to fire a shell at a building in Glogova to sow fear and
panic among the Muslim population and break down potential resistance.385
201. The own words and acts of the Accused illustrate his leading position in the operation.
(e) Deronji}’s Role during the Attack on Glogova
202. The Trial Chamber considers the fact that the Accused personally planned and ordered in
the attack to be an additional aggravating factor. It has been endorsed by the Appeals Chamber in
Kupreški} et al. that a commander’s participation in the attack that he himself ordered and planned
can aggravate his criminal liability.386
203. The Accused coordinated and monitored the attack on the village of Glogova.387 He was
present while the operation was carried out. He joined a TO unit. That unit’s objective was to
prevent any attempt of escape from Glogova and to block off any possible surprise attack of
Muslims coming from the direction of Srebrenica.388
204. The Accused held a post on an elevated spot about one kilometre away from Glogova389
from where he could observe the events in the village. From that location, he was able to see that
the Serb forces moved into Glogova from all directions, that the vehicles for the deportation of the
379
Ibid., T. 1055-56.
380
381
Ibid.
382
Ibid., T. 146.
383
Ibid., T. 144.
384
Ibid., T. 148.
385
Ibid., T. 146-47, 149. See however supra para. 89.
386
Kupre{kić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 454; see Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 862.
387
388
Ibid., T. 150-51.
389
See Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 321-22 and supra footnote 196.
55
villagers arrived, that the first buildings were being torched, and he was able to hear shootings.390
During the attack, the Accused had radio contact with an officer in Glogova who stated that the
attack was going well.391
205. After the village was taken and the attacking forces started to forcibly remove the
population, the Accused left his post and entered the village.392 The soldiers accompanying him
searched some of the remaining houses along the road for Muslims. When asked what was to be
done with the abandoned homes, the Accused gave an order to burn them down. Later on, he
ordered the commander of a platoon to torch several more buildings.393
206. The Accused pleaded guilty to having committed the killings of 64 Bosnian Muslims.394 The
Trial Chamber recalls that the Accused did not physically commit these murders. However, the
Accused accepted his individual criminal responsibility for the death of these 64 human beings.
(f) Vulnerability and Helplessness of the Victims of the 9 May 1992 Attack on Glogova
207. The Trial Chamber in Banovi} accepted that “the position of inferiority and the vulnerability
of the victims as well as the context in which the offences were committed are relevant factors in
assessing the gravity of the offence.”395 The Trial Chamber recognises that the inhabitants of
Glogova were subjected to a position of special vulnerability.
208. Prior to the attack, the village of Glogova had been deliberately disarmed, rendering the
Muslim residents vulnerable and defenceless396. Subsequently, the unarmed population offered no
resistance against the attacking forces.
209. Moreover, at the end of April 1992, the villagers of Glogova had been told that they would
not be attacked because they had turned over their weapons. This statement was made by Milutin
Milo{evi}, Chief of the Serb SUP, who declared that he was speaking on behalf of Miroslav
Deronji}. The Accused was not present during that statement, but he agreed with it and accepted the
actions of Mr. Milo{evi}.397 The given assertion created the false feeling of safety to the Muslim
population and made them stay in Glogova. Without this presentation, in fact amounting to an
ambush, in all likelihood far more of them might have fled in time. The Trial Chamber finds that
this has to be considered in aggravation of the sentence.
390
Deronji} Testimony, T.151-52.
391
Ibid., T. 152, 158.
392
Ibid., T. 153.
393
Ibid., T. 154.
394
Plea Hearing, T. 71.
395
Banovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 50; see also Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 352.
396
397
Ibid., T. 159.
56
(g) Long-term Effects of the 9 May 1992 Attack on Glogova on the Victims
210. The consequences of the crime for the victims are relevant to the sentencing of the
offender.398 Within this aspect, the extent of the long-term physical, psychological, and emotional
suffering of the immediate victims is a relevant factor in determining the gravity of the offence.399
211. Many of the former residents of Glogova suffer to this day from the lasting effects of the
horrors of the attack on their village.
212. A victim stated that:
It is getting from bad to worse every day.400
213. Another victim even stated that:
Sometimes it is so difficult that you wish that you had not survived.401
214. As a result of the attack, several victims lost numerous family members. One of them lost 14
members of her extended family,402 others 9 members.403
215. Others still have problems sleeping and suffer from recurring nightmares,404 for example,
one victim states:
I wish that I could go to sleep at night. I have pain all over my body and I have to keep the
windows open as I feel that I would suffocate otherwise. When I do go to sleep, I wake up often
because of nightmares about the Chetniks who are chasing us. Only a few nights ago I woke up
screaming after seeing such a nightmare and could not explain to my children what I had seen.405
216. A victim reports having flashback of the events of 9 May 1992:
I have flash backs during some nights and I do not have sound sleep. I wake up and think that the
war is still on and run for shelter. Some times I run out of the house. That is the reason that I sleep
only on the ground floor.406
217. Two victims state that they still need tranquilizers to manage their lives.407 Another victim is
still suffering from the physical effects of the mistreatment to which he was subjected during the
attack:
398
Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 852.
399
Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 512.
400
Exh. PS-19/6, para. 2.
401
402
Exh. PS-19/4, para. 2; see infra Section XII.
403
Exhs. PS-19/2, para. 4; PS-19/5, para. 8; see infra Section XII.
404
Exhs. PS-19/1, para. 3; PS-19/6, para. 3; PS-19/7, para. 5.
405
406
407
.Ibid., para. 3; Exh. PS-19/6, para. 3.
57
I had excellent health before the attack on Glogova. Afterwards I have had pain in my lungs. The
doctors say that this may have been caused by my standing submerged in the water for a long time.
Recently I have also not feeling very well and lost consciousness a couple of times. I have not
been able to see the doctor as yet. As I was beaten severely on the head during the attack on
Glogova I fear that this may be the reason for my recent problem. 408
218. One victim states that also her son, who had to witness the horrible events as a child, still
suffers from lasting psychological effects:
My youngest son who is about 23 years old now is also suffering and has health problems. I had
managed to hide him in my clothes in the day Glogova was attacked while the men were being
killed. He has been very badly affected by this. He can not go to sleep and his legs go numb. I am
afraid that he might loose his mind. He often has nightmares and after he wakes up from them he
runs to the window to get some fresh air. He sometimes can not dare to go back and try to sleep on
his own.409
219. Moreover, the scope and impact of the crime did not only affect specific individuals, but
also the entire Bosnian Muslim community.410 The victims report unanimously that the Muslim
community of Glogova completely disappeared after the attack.411 Muslim families are only slowly
returning to the village, because they still have difficulties to overcome the fear and the terrifying
memories of what happened to them.412 Many of them do not dare to go back413 or still have strong
reactions of fear and panic when they visit the village, for example one victim states:
I have myself gone to Glogova for about 10 times and each time when I come back from that
place, I feel that I am dead.
[…] I can not help remembering that my daughter who was just 13 was taken away by soldiers
when I pass that spot. There is fear inside me and I do not dare to be alone when I am in Glogova.
I feel as if someone would come from behind the houses or the wood and hurt me.414
220. A number of victims are still forced to live in refugee centres in very poor and confined
conditions.415 One victim explains:
There are about 180 families living in this centre. About 8 families would share a unit
compromising of 8 rooms and only two toilets.416
221. All these results of the persecutory acts to which Miroslav Deronjić pleaded guilty are
attributable to him, because he was aware of the substantial likelihood that such crimes would occur
as an accepted result of his criminal conduct.
408
409
410
See also Momir Nikolić Sentencing Judgement, para. 107.
411
Exhs. PS-19/1, para. 7; PS-19/3, para. 12; PS-19/5, para. 12.
412
Exh. PS-19/1, paras 8, 11.
413
Exhs. PS-19/4, para. 7; PS-19/6, para. 8.
414
Exh. PS-19/7, para. 9 (emphasis added).
415
Exhs. PS-19/3, para. 5; PS-19/6, paras 4-5.
416
Exh. PS-19/3, para. 11.
58
3. Conclusion
222. In conclusion, evaluating the abovementioned circumstances, the Trial Chamber accepts the
following factors as aggravating:
(i) The large number of civilians who were killed, subjected to the risk of being
killed, forcibly displaced, and deprived of their property.
(ii) The Accused launched a meticulously planned attack on Glogova in order to

facilitate the scheme of creating Serb-ethnic territories by forcefully displacing
Bosnian Muslim population from the entire Municipality of Bratunac that was
designed by the Bosnian Serb leadership already in 1991.
(iii) The Accused abused his capacity as President of the Crisis Staff of the
Municipality of Bratunac when he ordered the attack of the village of Glogova.
(iv) The Accused ordered additional torching of houses immediately after the attack.
(v) The Accused accepted a statement given by Milutin Milo{evi} on his behalf that
deceivingly suggested safety to the Muslim population of Glogova prior to the
attack. This exacerbated the vulnerability and defencelessness of the victims, who
had been disarmed well before the attack, had offered no resistance and were not
informed about their fate.
223. In conclusion, taking into consideration only the gravity of the crime and all the accepted
aggravating circumstances, the Trial Chamber unanimously finds that only an extremely serious
punishment could be imposed. There are, however, mitigating circumstances to which the Trial
Chamber will now turn.
B. Mitigating Circumstances
224. The Prosecution submits that “mitigating circumstances relate to the assessment of a penalty
but do not derogate the gravity of the crime” and that “it is more a matter of grace than a
defence.”417
225. The Defence submits that “[m]itigating circumstances need only be proven on the balance of
probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt” and that the Trial Chamber has a discretion “to
consider any factors which it considers to be of a mitigating nature.”418
417
Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 41 quoting Kambanda Judgement, para. 56.
59
226. The Trial Chamber will give consideration to all mitigating factors presented by the Parties,
but will focus mainly on (i) the guilty plea of the Accused and (ii) the substantial co-operation by
the Accused.
1. Guilty Plea
(a) Submissions of the Parties
227. The Prosecution submits that the Accused’s early guilty plea, i.e. before commencement of
trial, is a mitigating factor because: “[o]ne, it obviates the need for victims to give evidence and
saves considerable time and resource of this ad hoc Tribunal; two, it is important in establishing the
truth about what happened; and three, it is a fundamental step in contributing to reconciliation.”419
228. The Defence reiterates what has been stated by the Prosecution in respect of the early guilty
plea by the Accused and adds that “Mr. Deronji}’s admission of guilt demonstrates his sincerity and
acceptance of responsibility for the criminal offences committed in Glogova on the 9th of May
1992”. It continues by stating that the admission of guilt is important for the Tribunal in order to
encourage people to tell the truth and that the “acceptance of responsibility for these crimes and his
personal responsibility will contribute to rendering justice for the victims, to deterring others from
committing similar crimes, and will provide the basis for reconciliation in a very sensitive area of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”420
(b) Discussion
229. In order to make an assessment of the mitigating effect of the guilty plea, the Trial Chamber
turns first to a discussion of the concept of a guilty plea or confession in different legal jurisdictions
as well as plea bargaining, basing its analysis on the country reports tendered into evidence as part
of the Sentencing Report prepared by Prof. Sieber and the Max Planck Institute.421 Thereafter, the
Trial Chamber will analyse the relevant jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the ICTR.
(i) Analysis of the country reports submitted by the Max Planck Institute
230. In those countries where a guilty plea is regulated by law or exists in practice, it is accepted
as a mitigating factor leading to a reduction of the sentence to different degrees: in Canada, within
418
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 37 quoting Simi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 40-41.
419
Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 192; Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 47 quoting Obrenovi} Sentencing
Judgement, para. 177.
420
Defence Closing Statement, T. 231; Defence Sentencing Brief, paras 40-42.
421
Exh. JS-17; see supra para. 22.
60
the sentencing range of each offence;422 in China, either within the lower part of the prescribed
sentencing range or even under this range;423 in England, up to one-third of a sentence;424 in Poland,
up to the level agreed between the parties, but applicable only for misdemeanors when the penalty
does not exceed ten years of imprisonment;425 in Russia, by one-third, but only for crimes for which
the punishment does not exceed ten years of imprisonment;426 in the United States, a decrease of the
offense level by two levels for the acceptance of responsibility, and additionally by one level for
timely provision of complete information to the government about the offender’s involvement in the
offense or timely notification to the authorities of the intention to enter a plea of guilty.427 However,
in the majority of the countries covered by the study a guilty plea does not affect the maximum
statutory penalty and does not apply to serious cases, e.g. first degree murder.428
231. There are primarily pragmatic grounds for reducing the sentence if a guilty plea results from
the willingness of an offender to co-operate in the administration of justice.429 Additional
justifications for a reduction are remorse, acknowledgment of responsibility, and sparing the
victims from testifying and being cross-examined.430 In considering the reduction of a sentence, the
relevant factor is the stage of proceedings at which the offender pleads guilty431 and the
circumstances in which the plea is tendered432.
232. Similar provisions on guilty pleas or plea bargaining exist in other countries under survey,
e.g., Argentina,433 Brazil,434 Chile,435 and Italy.436 However, these provisions are usually applicable
422
Assuming the facts were not so horrific as to demand the maximum punishment. The sentence may be reduced as a
result of a plea bargain, i.e. when the accused is convicted of a lesser charge than murder, Country Report Canada, pp.
4-5.
423
The Procedure, which functionally resembles a guilty plea, is called a voluntary surrender and applies only for minor
offenses. It means that a perpetrator after having committed an offense voluntarily tells the truth about his own offense
and therefore helps the judicial organs to find the truth about the offense. Prior to 1997 the punishment varied only
within the originally regulated range of sentences for this offense, e.g. within the lowest third of that range, Country
Report China, pp. 3-4.
424
Country Report England, p. 4. In Australia, up to 35% in Western Australia and between 10-25% in New South
Wales, Country Report Australia, p. 4.
425
A plea bargain became available only under the new Polish Criminal Code, Country Report Poland, p. 4.
426
Country Report Russia, p. 3.
427
Sentencing Guidelines 1997 Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual, Chapter 3, Part E, p. 280; see also Country
Report U.S.A.: The judge may impose a sentence more or less severe than the guideline range, i.e. “depart” from the
guideline sentencing range. A departure is justified by the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance which
is not adequately taken into consideration in the guidelines, p. 5.
428
See also Country Report Australia, p. 6; Country Report Canada, p. 4; Country Report England, p. 9.
429
Country Report Australia, p. 4.
430
Country Report Canada, p. 5.
431
Country Report Australia, p. 4; Country Report England, p. 4.
432
Country Report England, p. 4.
433
If there is an agreement between the prosecutor and the accused with regard to offences with a sentence inferior to
six years and by which the suspect/accused recognizes the existence of the conduct and his/her participation in it, the
sentence finally imposed by the Tribunal must not exceed the one demanded by the Prosecutor (and accepted by the
accused), Country Report Argentina, p. 3.
434
The procedure similar to plea bargaining is called a criminal transaction, which was introduced in 1995. It is
admitted, however, only in less serious offenses, in which the maximum possible imprisonment does not exceed two
years, Country Report Brazil, p. 3.
61
for minor crimes and therefore cannot be taken into account in the present case. In Germany, a
“consensual solution” (Verständigung im Strafverfahren) takes place only under the control of the
Judge(s) in order to avoid any abuse or unsupported confession.437
233. In some countries under survey, the mere confession – as opposed to a guilty plea that
enables the Trial Chamber immediately to enter a finding of guilt and to instruct the Registrar to set
a date for the sentencing hearing without any further trial proceedings – is regarded as a mitigating
factor. In Belgium, a voluntary confession, if accepted by the court, leads to a mandatory reduction
of the sentencing range.438 In Chile, a confession is a mitigating factor if the responsibility of the
accused could only be established through his spontaneous confession or because he collaborated in
the interests of justice.439 In Finland, any effort of the accused to cooperate with the judicial organs
in order to help solving the crime itself and/or its consequences might be taken into account as a
mitigating factor.440 In Germany, a credible confession, even if not made out of genuine feelings of
remorse and guilt, but supplied for tactical reasons at trial, must be considered as mitigating in
every case, although not necessarily “significantly mitigating”.441 In Spain, a confession by the
perpetrator prior to knowing that legal proceedings are being taken against him, or attempts at
restitution before or during the procedure are regarded as mitigating factors.442 In Sweden, a
confession after apprehension can only attract mitigation if there is another factor requiring a milder
sentence.443 In Greece, a confession as such is not recognized as a mitigating factor, although it may
be indirectly taken into account in the court’s assessment of the Accused’s showing of remorse and
willingness for reparation.444
(ii) Jurisprudence of the International Tribunals
435
The newly introduced (on 12 October 2000) procedure of procedimiento abreviado (abbreviated trial) has a system
with bargaining elements. The defendant agrees to have his case put on trial under the abbreviated procedure and
accepts the facts as established in the indictment. In the event that his guilt is established through this procedure he
receives a sentence fixed previously by the public prosecutor. Nevertheless this procedure is limited only to those cases
where the previously fixed final sentence is below 5 years; therefore this procedure only applies to cases where the
minimum sentencing range is lower than 5 years, Country Report Chile, p. 4.
436
The procedure of so-called “patteggiamento” involves a defendant and a public prosecutor applying to the judge for
a sentence which they agree upon amongst themselves. A sentence reduced by up to one-third may be imposed if this
sentence does not exceed five years imprisonment, Country Report Italy, p. 5; Cf. Italian Code of Penal Procedure,
Article 444 as amended by the Law of 12 June 2003, No 134.
437
BGH, BGHSt 43, p. 195 (198).
438
Life imprisonment will be commuted to fixed-term imprisonment, Country Report Belgium, pp. 3-4.
439
Since 2002 the substantive collaboration of the accused to the clarification of the facts is now a specific mitigating
factor, Country Report Chile, p. 3.
440
Country Report Finland, p. 3.
441
Mitigation for confession is not applied if a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is provided, Country Report
Germany, pp. 2-3 and 5.
442
Country Report Spain, p. 3.
443
The fact of a voluntary surrender may lead to a less severe sentence than the sentence set out for that offence,
Country Report Sweden, p. 5.
444
Country Report Greece, pp. 6-7.
62
234. In the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the ICTR, several reasons have been given for the
mitigating effect of a guilty plea, such as the showing of remorse445 and repentance,446 the
contribution to reconciliation447 and establishing the truth,448 the encouragement of other
perpetrators to come forth,449 and the fact that witnesses are relieved from giving evidence in
court.450 Furthermore, Trial Chambers took into account that a guilty plea saves the Tribunal the
“effort of a lengthy investigation and trial”,451 and special importance was attached to the timing of
the guilty plea.452
(c) Conclusion
235. The Trial Chamber accepts this jurisprudence when considering the appropriate sentence.
236. The Trial Chamber finds that, in contrast to national legal systems where the reasons for
mitigating a punishment on the basis of a guilty plea are of a more pragmatic nature,453 the rationale
behind the mitigating effect of a guilty plea in this Tribunal is much broader, including the fact that
the accused contributes to establishing the truth about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and
contributes to reconciliation in the affected communities. The Trial Chamber recalls that the
Tribunal has the task to contribute to the “restoration and maintenance of peace” and to ensure that
serious violations of international humanitarian law are “halted and effectively redressed”.454
237. In the present case the Trial Chamber recognises the importance of Miroslav Deronji}’s
guilty plea as his acceptance of individual criminal responsibility. The Trial Chamber recalls the
final word of Miroslav Deronji} at the Sentencing Hearing, where he stated:
I accepted responsibility for Glogova, and I did not accuse anyone of the things that I am guilty of.
I did not understand my guilt only in the legal sense, but in a broader, human sense. Even the
things that I did not understand in the best way at the time or the things that I did not know, I was
obliged to know and understand. Because I know, Your Honours, that I am capable of it.
That is why my guilt is greater and more profound. I am aware of it completely, and that is why I
admitted it. When I realised what really happened in Glogova, and I understood that for the first
time completely when I was here listening to certain testimonies of survivors in other cases, I
decided without much thinking to admit my guilt because what is my life in relation to the lives of
those innocent victims? What is its value? And what can we measure it by? I did not calculate in
445
Plavšić Sentencing Judgement, para. 70.
446
Ruggiu Judgement and Sentence, para. 55. See also Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 127: “[A]lthough the Trial
Chamber considered the accused’s guilty plea out of principle, it must point out that the accused demonstrated no
remorse before it for the crimes he committed.”
447
Plavšić Sentencing Judgement, para. 70; Obrenović Sentencing Judgement, para. 111.
448
Momir Nikolić Sentencing Judgement, para. 149.
449
Erdemović 1998 Sentencing Judgement, para. 16.
450
Momir Nikolić Sentencing Judgement, para. 150; Todorović Sentencing Judgement, para. 80.
451
Erdemović 1998 Sentencing Judgement, para. 16; Todorović Sentencing Judgement, para. 81.
452
Sikirica et al. Sentencing Judgement, para. 150. In the Simić Sentencing Judgement, “some credit” was given for the
guilty plea despite its lateness, para. 87.
453
See supra subsection IX. B. 1. (b) (i)
454
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), S/3217, 25 May 1993.
63
any sense, particularly not in relation to a sentence which may be passed down. I did not think at
that time, nor am I thinking about the sentence today. I have too many years and too much guilt to
permit myself to think about that.
I will accept my punishment in the same way that I accepted my guilt, aware that it cannot in any
way be greater than the one I passed on myself, having permitted myself to be in the position that I
am in and of which I am ashamed, aware that no punishment can [...] settle my debts to the living
and the dead.455
238. The Trial Chamber accepts that his guilty plea tends to contribute to the process of
reconciliation in Bratunac in particular and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general. The Trial
Chamber, in particular, refers to the Prosecution witnesses who have expressed their opinion
regarding Miroslav Deronji}’s guilty plea. One of the witnesses stated:
I saw Miroslav Deronji} plead guilty on the television. The Bosnian Muslims in the community
that I have spoken to, felt relieved because he admitted his guilt. This is a positive thing and can
heal the wounds of the community provided that he is punished adequately. A mild punishment
however would not serve any purpose; he does not deserve any compassion as he did not show
any, not only to people of Glogova but also to the other Muslim Bosnians of Bratunac and
Srebrenica.456
239. Another witness stated that:
I saw Miroslav Deronji} plead guilty and I felt glad that he admitted his guilt. I do not however
understand how is it possible to give him any lenient term of imprisonment after what he himself
has confessed.457
240. The Trial Chamber in this respect accepts the submission by the Defence on the importance
of the admission of guilt and that the “most important is to prove that a crime was committed, and
therefore to unmask the policy on any of the three sides which led to this crime. In this sense, a
sentence is a relative category because [...] there is no sentence that can give the victims full
satisfaction for their losses.”458
241. Finally, the Trial Chamber concludes that Miroslav Deronji}’s guilty plea and his readiness
to testify in other trials assists the Tribunal in its search for the truth and prevents historical
revisionism. It also spares the victims and witnesses from being required to come and testify about
painful and traumatic events. The Trial Chamber agrees that the Accused’s early guilty plea
contributes to the public advantage and saves the Tribunal’s costs, however, the latter having not a
significant mitigating effect.
455
Final word of the Accused at the Sentencing Hearing, T. 246.
456
Exh. PS-19/1, para. 14.
457
Exh. PS-19/4, para. 10.
458
The Defence presents here the common standpoint which was expressed by victims at a conference on admission of
guilt before the Tribunal and its influence on the victims which was held in Sarajevo on 5 and 6 December 2003 and
was organised by the Sarajevo Human Rights Centre and the Outreach Program of this Tribunal. Defence Closing
Statement, T. 233.
64
2. Substantial Co-operation by the Accused
242. The Prosecution submits that “substantial co-operation depends on the extent and quality of
the information provided by the accused, and can include the prior giving of evidence on behalf of
the Prosecution, the provision of new information replete with identities and names of perpetrators,
substantiation and corroboration of existing information, and future cooperation, including
testifying on behalf of the Prosecution.”459 The Prosecution further submits that the co-operation
provided by Miroslav Deronji} to the Prosecutor has been “substantial within the meaning and the
intent of [the Rule 101(B) (ii) of the Rules].”460 A term of ten years imprisonment was conditionally
recommended by the Prosecution based on Deronji}’s “full and substantial co-operation”461 and
“precisely because of the level and the extent of Mr. Deronji}’s co-operation”.462 According to the
Prosecution, from 1997 through 2002, Deronji} provided his statements “without any promises of
reward or benefit.”463
243. The Defence reiterates the Prosecution’s submissions in respect of the co-operation by the
Accused and adds that the Accused has passed all the stages of the co-operation process, starting as
a potential witness, then as a suspect, and finally as an accused.464 The Defence submits that the
Accused provided information “under substantial risk for his own safety and the safety of his
family”, and that “the extent, quality, and sincerity of the Accused’s co-operation […] transcends
anything yet seen before the Tribunal.”465 Finally, the Defence concludes that “[p]ractically
Miroslav Deronji} is a crown witness.”466
(b) Discussion
244. The Trial Chamber reiterates the conclusions reached by another Trial Chamber in the
recent sentencing judgement of Ranko ê{i}, where it was held that “[t]he extent and quality of the
information provided to the Prosecution are factors to take into account when determining whether
the co-operation has been substantial.”467 Thereby, the Trial Chamber, “in the absence of any
information to the contrary”, relied on the Prosecution’s assessment of ê{i}’s degree of co-
459
Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 194; Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 48.
460
Ibid.; Ibid., para. 50.
461
Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 49 quoting the Plea Agreement, para. 11(a)
462
463
Ibid., T. 195-96; see however supra para. 32.
464
Defence Closing Statement, T. 236; Defence Sentencing Brief, paras 64, 66, 69.
465
Ibid.; Ibid., para. 68.
466
467
ê{i} Sentencing Judgement, para. 62.
65
operation as well as on his commitment to testify if called by the Prosecution. It concluded that this
substantial co-operation would be taken into account in determining the sentence.468
245. The Trial Chamber in the present case follows a similar approach and notes that the facts
supporting the submission on the Accused’s co-operation, which are laid down in the now
following subsections (i) through (iv) of the Judgement, are based on the Prosecution’s assessment
of the Accused’s testimonies and his provision of any additional information. The Trial Chamber
stresses again that it is not seized of the entire evidence emanating from the Accused’s co-operation
and it is not for this Trial Chamber to assess the general and forensic value of the Accused’s
testimonies as a witness in other proceedings before this Tribunal. However, the Trial Chamber
finds that the early readiness and commitment by the Accused to provide such co-operation has to
be taken seriously into consideration. In conclusion, taking all above mentioned factors into
account, the Trial Chamber accepts the submissions of both Parties that the co-operation by the
Accused was substantial and therefore regards it as a mitigating factor in determining the Accused’s
sentence.
(i) Provision of unique and corroborative information to the Prosecution
246. Both Parties in this case submit – and the Trial Chamber fully accepts and seriously takes
into consideration when determining the appropriate sentence – that Miroslav Deronji} provided
unique information to the Prosecution, including information which corroborates evidence that is
already in the Prosecution’s possession. Miroslav Deronji} started his co-operation with the
Prosecution as early as 1997 as a potential witness. From December 1997 to April 2002 the
Accused held six interviews with the Prosecution.469 While in detention the Accused conducted 11
interviews with the Prosecution in June and July 2003.470 The latter were conducted, inter alia, in
preparation of the guilty plea by the Accused and under the conditions of the document titled
“Understanding of the Parties”.471
(ii) Testimony of Miroslav Deronji} in other proceedings before the Tribunal
247. The Trial Chamber takes into consideration the fact that the Accused has testified in other
proceedings before this Tribunal, namely as a court witness in the Momir Nikoli} sentencing
hearing, the Krsti} appeal and the Blagojevi} et al. trial, and as a Prosecution witness in the
Milo{evi} and Kraji{nik trials.
468
469
Exhs. DS-1 through DS-6; see supra para. 33 and footnote 68.
470
Exhs. DS-7/1 through DS-7/11; see supra para. 33 and footnote 68.
471
Exh. JS-15; see supra para. 32.
66
248. In preparation for his testimony in other proceedings, the Accused provided an extensive
and lengthy witness statement of 71 pages on 25 November 2003, in which he described events
ranging over a period of almost five years, from 1990 until 1995.472
249. As part of the Plea Agreement, the Accused “agrees to testify truthfully in any trials,
hearings and proceedings before the Tribunal where the Prosecutor deems his evidence may be
relevant, whether those matters are presently before the Tribunal or may be in the future.”473
250. The Trial Chamber takes into consideration the Prosecution submission that Miroslav
Deronji} agreed to testify “in other cases pending before this Tribunal as well as cases where
persons [...] are fugitives”.474 The Trial Chamber relies upon the evaluation given by the
Prosecution and acknowledges that, in the view of the Prosecution, Miroslav Deronji} has co-
operated substantially.
251. However, the Trial Chamber has also to take into account the view of another Trial
Chamber in the Momir Nikoli} case, stating:
[...] it is for the Trial Chamber to make an assessment of the credibility of Momir Nikoli}, which
ultimately impacts upon the value of such co-operation. Of primary importance to the Trial
Chamber is the truthfulness and veracity of the testimony of Momir Nikoli} in the Blagojevi}
Trial, as well as how forthcoming the information was.475
252. In this respect the Trial Chamber opines that it is not for it to assess evidence in other
proceedings before this Tribunal where Miroslav Deronji} acted as a witness, and some testimonies
in other proceedings are without any context to the case before this Trial Chamber, which makes it
impossible to assess his credibility as a witness in general. However, the Trial Chamber recalls that
the Accused himself acknowledged that he had provided partly untruthful statements in his prior
interviews with the Prosecution.476
253. As opposed to his testimonies in other proceedings, in the present case all material
discrepancies and inconsistencies, which, according to the Accused’s own admission, occurred “due
to my mistake” 477, were clarified and resolved during his own testimony in this case on 27 January
2004 and by the Parties during the Continued Sentencing Hearing primarily based on agreed facts.
472
Exh. DS-8 and DS-8a; see supra para. 35 and footnote 68.
473
Plea Agreement, para. 12.
474
Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 211-12.
475
Momir Nikoli} Sentencing Judgement, para. 156.
476
Blagojevi} et al. Trial, Exh. PS-12, T. 6182-83, 6190-91, 6327, 6407; See also Sentencing Hearing, T. 106-107.
477
Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 339.
67
(iii) Provision of original documentation to the Prosecution
254. The Trial Chamber takes into account the fact that the Accused has provided the Prosecution
with two volumes of “important original documentation in the form of minutes of meetings that
took place in Bratunac in the SDS from 1990 to 1995”.478 Extracts were admitted into evidence in
this case.479 The Trial Chamber accepts the Prosecution submission, that these documents are
important because “they provide us with insight into the manner in which the Crisis Staff and the
SDS in Bratunac implemented, for example, the variant A and variant B instructions, the manner in
which the Crisis Staff operated in general.”480 In addition to that, the Accused provided the
Prosecution “with four original documents” relating to “war commissions and the creation of war
commissions”, some of them signed by Radovan Karadži}.481 The Trial Chamber accepts this fact
and takes it into account for sentencing purposes.
(iv) Identification of new crimes and perpetrators unknown to the Prosecution
255. The Trial Chamber accepts the Prosecution submission that Miroslav Deronji} has provided
the Prosecution “with specifics about a crime that was committed in Bratunac in 1992; specifically,
the arrest of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica in Montenegro”, including identification of people
associated with that.482 The Accused has also provided the Prosecution with the identities of
perpetrators who were unknown to the Prosecution.483 The Trial Chamber takes this factor into
account for sentencing considerations.
3. Contribution to Prevention of Revisionism of Crimes Committed in Srebrenica
256. The Prosecution submits that “acknowledging [that] these massacres occurred [in Srebrenica
in 1995] remains very difficult for many people in the Republika Srpska and remains a significant
impediment to reconciliation.”484 The Prosecution states that the guilty pleas by Dragan Obrenovi}
and Momir Nikoli} and their public acknowledgement that the massacres occurred have contributed
to the process of reconciliation as well did the public acknowledgement by Miroslav Deronji},
because he provided information “about those same events [which] can only contribute to the
478
479
Exhs. JS-29 and JS-29/a through JS-33 and JS-33/a, respectively.
480
481
Ibid.
482
Ibid.
483
Ibid.
484
Ibid., T. 204.
68
process of establishing the truth and advancing reconciliation.”485 The Prosecution submits that “in
the Republika Srpska, there is still a considerable effort to deny these events at Srebrenica.”486
(b) Discussion
257. The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence a document which represents one of the worst
examples of revisionism in relation to the mass executions of Bosnian Muslims committed in
Srebrenica in July 1995. This document, titled “Report about Case Srebrenica (the First Part)” was
prepared by the Documentation Centre of Republika Srpska, Bureau of Government of Republika
Srpska for Relation with ICTY on 1 September 2002.487 Throughout this report reference is made to
the “alleged massacre”488 and this misrepresentation of the historical events culminates in the final
conclusion of this report, which reads:
[…] the number of Muslim soldiers who were executed by Bosnian Serb forces for personal
revenge or for simple ignorance of international law […] would probably stand less than 100.489
258. Another example of revisionism is the “Declaration of the Republika Srpska Civilian Affairs
Committee for Srebrenica” No. 07-27/95, dated 17 July 1995,490 which was signed by the Accused
in this case, Miroslav Deronji}, Civil Affairs Commissioner for Srebrenica, Nesib Mandì},
Representative of the Civilian Authorities of the Enclave of Srebrenica, and Major Franken, an
UPROFOR Representative, Dutch Battalion Commander, at the time. This document in its
operative part states that
- The civilian population can remain in the enclave or evacuate, dependant upon the wish of each
individual;
- in the event that we wish to evacuate it is possible for us to choose the direction of our movement
and have decided that the entire population is to evacuate to the territory of the County of Kladanj;
- It has been agreed that the evacuation is to be carried out by the Army and Police of the Republic
of Srpska, supervised and escorted by UNPROFOR.
[…]
During the evacuation there were no incidents on either of the sides and the Serb side has adhered
to all the regulations of Geneva Conventions and the international war law, as far as convoys
actually escorted by UN forces are concerned.491
259. The Trial Chamber accepts the submission by the Prosecution that Miroslav Deronji} with
the encouragement of Radovan Karadži} prepared this document, whose “contents [according to the
Accused] did not correspond with the truth” and that it was done in order “to mislead the
485
Ibid.
486
Ibid.
487
Exh. PS-23.
488
Ibid., see e.g. p. 27.
489
Ibid., p. 34.
490
Exh. PS-24 for B/C/S and PS-24a for the English version.
491
Exh. PS-24a.
69
international community”.492 Consequently, the Trial Chamber agrees that the Accused’s admission
is important for two reasons: 1) “[it is] important to diffuse any suggestion in trials that are ongoing
or will be coming up in the future about Srebrenica that the Bosnian Muslims left the enclave
because of their own free will” and 2) “[it is] important to negate the arguments of future
revisionists that might use this document for the proposition that the forcible displacement of the
Bosniaks from Srebrenica was a mere humanitarian evacuation conducted in accordance with the
principles of international law.”493
260. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber accepts the importance of the Accused’s statement about
details of the mass execution of Bosnian Muslims committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 and about
individual persons’ roles in it, and that he prepared the aforementioned document,494 leaving,
however, the final assessment to those Chambers seized of these crimes. The Trial Chamber agrees
that the Accused’s and others’ acknowledgement of these crimes serves two purposes: it establishes
the truth and it undercuts the ability of future revisionists to distort historically what happened.495
Therefore, the Trial Chamber attributes significant weight to this factor in mitigating Miroslav
Deronji}’s sentence.
4. Remorse
261. Both Parties agree that a genuine and sincere expression of remorse is a relevant mitigating
factor to be taken into account in determining an appropriate sentence.496 The Prosecution submits
that it is not aware of “any public expressions of remorse by the accused for the crimes for which he
is responsible”497, however, it acknowledges that “Deronji} has made expressions of remorse to
investigators from the International Tribunal.”498
262. In referring to the sentencing judgement in Banovi}, where it was held that “the statements
made by the Accused, both during the interviews with the Prosecution and at the Sentencing
Hearing, are expressions of sincere remorse”499, the Defence submits that Deronji} “expressed his
deepest remorse” during the interviews with the Prosecution.500
492
493
Ibid., T. 210-11.
494
Ibid., T. 205.
495
Ibid.
496
Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 52; Defence Closing Statement, T. 234; Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 43.
497
498
Ibid., footnote 54.
499
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 44 quoting Banovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 72.
500
70
(b) Discussion
263. The Trial Chamber accepts that the Accused expressed his remorse publicly during the
Sentencing Hearing. The Trial Chamber, in particular, recalls the following statement by the
Accused:
Your Honours, I bow to the spirit of innocent victims in Glogova. Everything that I did in this
Tribunal, for whatever it's worth, I dedicate to them in the hope that it will at least somewhat
alleviate the pain of their dear ones. I am familiar with that pain because I also carry that pain. I
regret the expulsion that I committed, and I express my remorse about all the victims of this war,
no matter in which graveyards they lie. I apologise to all those […] to whom I caused sorrow and
whom I let down.501
264. Additionally, the Trial Chamber accepts the submission by the Defence that Deronji}’s
remorse resulted in his admission of guilt, his substantial co-operation with the Prosecution and his
public expression of remorse,502 both during the Sentencing Hearing and in the interviews with the
Prosecution as reflected in the records of these interviews.503 Therefore, the Trial Chamber takes it
into consideration as a mitigating factor in determining the Accused’s sentence.
5. No Opportunity for Voluntary Surrender
265. The Defence submits that voluntary surrender is a mitigating factor that “may inspire other
indictees to similarly surrender themselves, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the
Tribunal.”504 The Defence maintains that “Deronji} was arrested in front of his home in Bratunac
on 6 July 2002 less than 72 hours from the moment the Indictment against him had been issued and
before he was even aware that the Indictment against him existed.”505 Thus, he was deprived of the
opportunity to voluntarily surrender and thereby receive credit for it.506 The Defence further argues
that in his interview with the Prosecution given as a suspect, “Deronji} expressed his willingness
and readiness to come voluntarily to the Hague and face charges against him.”507 The Defence
asserts that Deronji} not only complied with the summons of the Prosecution to be interviewed by
the investigators508 but also expressed his willingness to appear voluntarily whenever so
501
Deronji} Final Word, Sentencing Hearing, T. 247.
502
503
See also Exh. DS-4, p. 6-7 and Exh. DS-7/11, pp. 16-17.
504
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 47 quoting Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 868.
505
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 48 (footnotes omitted).
506
Ibid., para. 54; Defence Closing Statement, T. 235.
507
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 49 referring to an interview of 1 July 1998, pp. 3-4, Exh. DS-3.
508
Ibid., para. 51 referring to an interview of 12 March 2001, p. 1, Exh. DS-5.
71
requested.509 The Defence submits that the Accused’s willingness to surrender voluntarily has been
clearly demonstrated and should therefore be considered as a mitigating factor.510
(b) Discussion
266. The jurisprudence of both Tribunals recognises the fact of voluntary surrender as a
mitigating factor.511 The Trial Chamber accepts that Miroslav Deronji} was arrested even though he
had offered to surrender voluntarily already the first time when he was informed of his status as a
suspect. The Trial Chamber considers the Accused’s willingness to surrender voluntarily, as
expressed in the records of an interview with the Prosecution investigators,512 to be a factor in
mitigation of his sentence.
267. However, as for the significance of this factor for the sentencing considerations, the Trial
Chamber reiterates the conclusions reached by the Trial Chamber in Obrenovi}, where it stated:
[…] since the Trial Chamber would have to speculate in order to determine whether Dragan
Obrenovi} would in fact have voluntarily surrendered if given the opportunity, the Trial Chamber
attached little weight to this factor.513
The Trial Chamber concurs with this conclusion.
6. The Accused’s Character, Behaviour and Possibility for Rehabilitation
268. The Defence submits that until the time of the offence, the Accused led an honest and
honourable, professional and social life. He displayed no prior criminal, aggressive or
discriminatory behaviour, had no criminal record and was under no criminal investigation.514 He
praised democracy and tolerance.515 The Defence states that Deronji} is a family man, being a
father of four children, three of whom are minors.516
509
Ibid., referring to an interview of 8 April 2002, p. 2, Exh. DS-6.
510
Ibid., para. 56; Defence Closing Statement. T. 235.
511
Serushago Appeal Judgement, para. 24, Plav{i} Sentencing Judgement, para. 84. Kupre{ki} Appeal Judgement, para.
430.
512
This willingness to come voluntarily, if indicted, to the Tribunal was again conveyed by the Accused to Dr. Najman.
Najman Report, Exh. JS-16a, p. 11.
513
Obrenovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 136 (emphasis in the original).
514
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 77; Defence Closing Statement, T. 217-18, 237.
515
Ibid.; Ibid., T. 218, 220, 237.
516
Ibid., paras 78, 80; Ibid., T. 237.
72
269. The Defence further asserts that “[f]rom the moment of Deronjic’s arrest, he has always
shown co-operation and respect for the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor” and “[w]hile at the
UNDU he has fully complied with the terms and conditions imposed upon him.”517
270. The Defence submits that “[t]he overall behaviour of Mr. Deronji} since 1997 to this day,
indicates that the rehabilitation process is well underway”518 and “[i]f additional conditions are
provided ... this process will be speeded up ... bearing in mind the positive character features of the
accused.”519 The Defence further asserts that the same standard as applied in the Obrenovi} case,
i.e. “affirmative steps toward rehabilitation are a factor in mitigation of sentence”520, should be
applicable to Miroslav Deronjic, “bearing in mind his genuine remorse expressed on numerous
occasions during his contacts with OTP Investigators”.521
(b) Discussion
271. The Trial Chamber finds that while at the beginning of his political career in 1990, Miroslav
Deronji} praised democracy and called for a multicultural and tolerant society,522 he later, already
in 1991, chose to subscribe to the discriminatory policy promulgated by the Bosnian Serb
leadership, which resulted in ethnic cleansing not only in his own Municipality of Bratunac, where
he was born and lived until his arrest in 2002. One culmination of his criminal conduct was the
commission of the long-planned crime of Persecutions on 9 May 1992 in Glogova. Miroslav
Deronji}, however, accepted these allegations in public knowing about the consequences for him
and his family.
272. Further, the Trial Chamber notes that, according to his own testimony, Miroslav Deronji},
on one hand, immediately took steps to prevent further violent criminal behaviour of the
“volunteers” in Bratunac by issuing a decision at the Bratunac Crisis Staff on 13 May 1993, which
ordered the expulsion of “volunteers” from Bratunac.523 On the other hand, the night prior to that
decision, Miroslav Deronji} took part in the transfer of 400 civilians,524 who were detained in the
hangar and were meant to be forcibly displaced out of Bratunac pursuant to the plan adopted at the
517
518
Ibid., para. 85.
519
520
Defence Sentencing Brief, para. 83 quoting Obrenovi} Sentencing Judgement, para. 146.
521
522
The Trial Chamber here refers to the speech held by Miroslav Deronji} on 1 September 1990 at the inaugurating
session of the SDA in Bratunac. Exhs. DS-13/11 and DS-13/11-A.
523
This document, which the Accused stated was in his possession in Milo{evi} trial: “₣…ğ I have a document dated the
13th of May that testifies that I expelled volunteers from Bratunac. I have a document about this. The JNA refused to do
it, so I did it myself.” (Exh. DS-11, T.29759), was not tendered into evidence and the existence of this document was
accepted by the Trial Chamber as an agreed fact. Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 329-30. See supra para. 111. See
also Exhs. JS-37/a and JS-38/a.
524
JS-39/a. List of 400 persons who were driven from Bratunac to Pale. See supra para. 110.
73
Crisis Staff meeting on 8 May 1992.525 Indeed, the Accused pleaded guilty to the fact that at the
Crisis Staff meeting on 8 May 1992, chaired by him, the Accused stated himself that “if everything
went well with the Glogova operation, the operation to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims
would continue in the following days in the town of Bratunac and the communities of Voljavica and
Suha”, and that this decision was adopted.526 The 400 civilians were transferred during the night of
12 and 13 May 1992 from Bratunac to Pale, the headquarters of the Bosnian Serb leadership at the
time,527 and their fate remains unclear until the present day.
273. The Trial Chamber also takes into account the behaviour and demeanour of Miroslav
Deronji} at the UNDU, which was described in the McFadden Report:
During this period [Deronji}] has shown respect for the Rules of Detention, management and staff
alike. He has integrated well with his fellow detainees and his presence has a positive effect on the
group. He is intelligent and well understands his position as a detainee.528
However, the Trial Chamber agrees and follows the conclusions reached by the Trial Chamber in
Momir Nikoli}, where it was stated that:
While [comportment in the UNDU] has been recognised as a mitigating factor in numerous cases
before this Tribunal, the Trial Chamber recalls that all accused are expected to comport themselves
appropriately while at the UNDU; failure to do so may constitute an aggravating factor.
Accordingly, this Trial Chamber will not accord significant weight to this factor.529
274. In ê{i}, the Trial Chamber came to the following conclusion when discussing good
character of the accused as a mitigating factor:
The evidence and the Factual Basis show that Ranko ê{i} was capable of both benevolent and
criminal behaviour at the same time. On the balance of probabilities, the Trial Chamber cannot
conclude from the evidence presented that Ranko ê{i} was of a genuine good character, so as to
allow this good character to be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor.530
275. For all the above mentioned reasons, this Trial Chamber comes to the conclusion that, on the
balance of probabilities, the facts presented above on character and behaviour can be seen neither as
mitigation nor as aggravating factors.
7. General Conclusion
276. Considering all the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances together and giving particular
importance to such factors as the guilty plea and the substantial co-operation by the Accused, the Trial
Chamber is convinced that a substantial reduction of the sentence deserved for the crimes as such is
warranted.
525
See supra paras 86, 107-108.
526
Factual Basis, para. 29; see also supra para. 86.
527
Deronji} Testimony, T. 164; see also supra para. 110.
528
Exh. DS-13/10.
74
X. DETERMINATION OF SENTENCE
A. Submissions of the Parties
277. The Prosecution stated that, considering the nature of the crime and the victims’
indescribable suffering, the acts for which the Accused bears responsibility merit the severest of
sentence. However, based on the existence of significant mitigating circumstances, the Prosecution
asks for the imposition of a sentence of lesser magnitude.531 Consequently, the Prosecution
recommended a term of imprisonment of ten years,532 with the caveat that the recommendation was
contingent on the Accused’s “full and substantial co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor”.533
This submission forms part of the Plea Agreement between the Parties. The Prosecution has later
acknowledged that the Accused has indeed co-operated in a substantial manner.534 Additionally, the
Prosecution took into account the guilty plea of the Accused535 and his acceptance of
responsibility,536 when recommending the sentence.
278. The Defence submits that a sentence of not more than six years of imprisonment is an
appropriate sentence for the Accused. In this, the Defence refers to acts in mitigation537, relying
above all on the Accused’s co-operation with the Prosecution as an especially mitigating
circumstance538. The Defence argues that:
1) by substantial co-operation he is contributing to the discovery of the truth. […]
2) Mr. Deronji}’s co-operation will lead to the establishment of the guilt of the actual
perpetrators and by doing so, will, at least in part, repair the damage resulting from the crime,
and
3) his acknowledgement of the facts and admission of guilt support the Tribunal in achieving its
fundamental goals: establishing the truth, rendering justice to victims, deterring further
crimes, (re)affirming the rule of law and contributing to peace, stability and reconciliation in
the region.539
279. Furthermore, the Defence adds that the Accused’s personality and character should be taken
into account as well as his progressing rehabilitation process.540
529
Momir Nikoli} Sentencing Judgement, para. 168; see also ê{i} Sentencing Judgement, para. 86.
530
531
Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 191-92.
532
533
Plea Agreement, para. 11 (a).
534
Prosecution Sentencing Brief, para. 50; Prosecution Closing Statement, T. 194-213.
535
Ibid., paras 42-47; Ibid., T. 192.
536
537
Defence Sentencing Brief, paras 88-89.
538
Defence Closing Statement, T. 237; Continued Sentencing Hearing, T. 338.
539
540
75
B. Discussion and Conclusion
280. Having balanced the gravity of the crimes and aggravating factors against the substantial
mitigating factors as presented by the Parties and taken into account the aforementioned goals of
sentencing, the Trial Chamber, by majority, accepts the recommendation given by the Prosecution.
C. Credit for Time Served Since Arrest
281. Pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the Rules, “credit shall be given to the convicted person for the
period […] during which the convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the
Tribunal or pending trial or appeal.”
282. The Trial Chamber regards 06 July 2002, the date of the factual deprivation of liberty of the
Accused, as the decisive date and recognizes that the Accused is entitled to credit for all the days
since that date.
76
XI. DISPOSITION
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, having considered all of the evidence and the arguments of
the Parties, the Trial Chamber
HAVING HEARD the guilty plea of Miroslav Deronjić, and
HAVING ENTERED A FINDING OF GUILT for the crimes contained in the charge of
Persecutions in the Second Amended Indictment,
HEREBY ENTERS A SINGLE CONVICTION against Miroslav Deronjić for Persecutions, a

Crime against Humanity,
incorporating:
the attack on the village of Glogova,
the killing of Bosnian Muslim civilians in Glogova,
the forcible displacement of Bosnian Muslim civilians of Glogova from the Municipality of
Bratunac,
the destruction of an institution dedicated to religion (the mosque in Glogova), and
the destruction of Muslim civilian property in Glogova, and
SENTENCES by majority, Judge Schomburg dissenting, Miroslav Deronjić to 10 years of

imprisonment and
STATES that, pursuant to Rule 101 (C) of the Rules, Miroslav Deronjić is entitled to credit for the
period during which he is detained in custody, calculated from the date of his deprivation of liberty,
i.e. the sixth of July 2002, including any additional time he may serve pending the determination of
an appeal, if any.
Pursuant to Rule 103 (C) of the Rules, Miroslav Deronjić shall remain in the custody of the
Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for his transfer to the State where his sentence
will be served.
77
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.
_______________________________
Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, Presiding
___________________ ____________________________________
Judge Carmel A. Agius Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba
Judge Wolfgang Schomburg appends a dissenting opinion to this Sentencing Judgement.
Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba appends a separate opinion to this Sentencing
Judgement.
Dated this thirtieth day of March 2004
At The Hague
The Netherlands
[Seal of the Tribunal]
78
XII. LIST OF KNOWN MURDERED PERSONS
Number Surname Given Name
1. ALIHROMI] Hajdar
2. BEGANOVI] Vahid
3. ]OSI] Ramiz
4. DELI] [e}o
5. DELI] Bego
6. DELI] Medo
7. DELI] Re|o or Redò
8. DELI] \afo or Dàfo
9. DELI] Hamed
10. DELI] Meho
11. DELI] Meva
12. GEROVI] [aban
13. GEROVI] Ramiz
14. GEROVI] Ramo
15. GOLI] [erif
16. GOLI] Avdo
17. GOLI] Ramo
18. GOLI] Rifat
19. GOLI] first name unknown
20. GUSI[ first name unknown
21. HASIBOVI] First name unknown
22. HUSEJNOVI] Nezir
23. IBI[EVI] Dèvad or \evad
24. IBI[EVI] Ilijaz
25. IBI[EVI] Jusuf
79
26. IBI[EVI] Kemal
27. IBI[EVI] Mehmed
28. IBI[EVI] Muharem
29. IBI[EVI] Mujo
30. IBI[EVI] Mustafa
31. IBI[EVI] Osman
32. IBI[EVI] Ramo
33. IBI[EVI] Refik
34. IBI[EVI] Sabrija
35. IBI[EVI] Ismail
36. IBI[EVI] [e}o
37. IBI[EVI] Zlatija (wife of [e}o)
38. JUNUZOVI] Abid
39. JUNUZOVI] Huso
40. JUNUZOVI] Adem
41. JUNUZOVI] Banovka
42. JUNUZOVI] Salih
43. MILAČEVI] Halid
44. MILAČEVI] Alija
45. MU[I] [aban
46. MEMI[EVI] Hajro or Hajrudin
47. OMEROVI] Mirzet
48. OMEROVI] Samir
49. OMEROVI] Selmo
50. OMEROVI] Selmo (Selman)
51. OMEROVI] Fejzo
52. OMEROVI] Nezir
80
53. OMEROVI] Mensur
54. OMEROVI] Nevzet
55. OMEROVI] Nermin
56. OMEROVI] Elvis (son of NEZIR)
57. RIZVANOVI] ]amil
58. RIZVANOVI] Jasmin
59. RIZVANOVI] Mensur
60. RIZVANOVI] Mustafa
61. RIZVANOVI] Nurija
62. [AČIROVI] Mujo
63. SELIMI] First name unknown
64. TALOVI] Uzeir
81
UNITED
NATIONS

IN TRIAL CHAMBER II

PROSECUTOR
v.
MIROSLAV DERONJI]
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE WOLFGANG SCHOMBURG
Mr. Mark B. Harmon

82
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHOMBURG
A. Introduction
1. I have authenticated this Judgement as Presiding Judge. I regret that as a member of the
bench, for fundamental reasons, I am not able to support the sentence.
2. The sentence is not proportional to the crimes it is based on and amounts to a singing from
the wrong hymn sheet. The Accused deserves a sentence of no less than twenty years of
imprisonment.
3. There are two main reasons leading me to the conclusion that the imposed sentence,
recommended by the Prosecutor is not within mandate and spirit of this Tribunal.
4. First, already the series of indictments, including the Second Amended Indictment,
arbitrarily present facts, selected from the context of a larger criminal plan and, for unknown
reasons, limited to one day and to the village of Glogova only.
5. Second, even based on these fragments of facts, the heinous and long planned crimes
committed by a high ranking perpetrator do not allow for a sentence of only ten years, which may
possibly even be a de facto deprivation of liberty of only six years and eight months, taking into
account the possibility of an early release.
B. Discussion
1. The Duty of the Prosecutor
6. “Da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus” – give me (all) the facts and I will present you the
applicable law (and a just decision). This wise Roman principle541 unfortunately is not part of our
Rules. However, under the mandate of this ad hoc Tribunal the Prosecutor, being part of the
Tribunal, is in principle duty bound to present all the evidence available. The fundament of our
Tribunal is the Statute based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations established as a
measure to maintain or restore international peace and security.542 However, there is no peace
without justice; there is no justice without truth, meaning the entire truth and nothing but the truth.
541
Dekretalen 2, 1, 6 (Alexander III.) quoted i.a. in Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 6th Ed.,
C.H. Beck, Muenchen, 1998.
542
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), approved in
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) under 1 of its operational part.
83
7. The International Prosecutor is not controlled de jure or de facto by independent judges or a
government in the selection of suspects to be indicted and in determining the scope of an
indictment, as it would be on a domestic level. The state's and the international community's
monopoly over the right to exercise force, however, urges the Prosecutor to act in a way that makes
victims of crimes and their relatives understand that the Prosecutor is acting on their behalf. When it
comes to prosecuting crimes against individuals, a Prosecutor acts with the goal to stop a never-
ending circle of “private justice”, meaning mutual violence and vengeance. This goal can only be
achieved if the entire picture of a crime is presented to the judges.
8. I accept and appreciate that judicial economy and, in concreto, the limited resources of this
Tribunal call for a limitation of charges, if only a just judgement remains possible. The test should
be, whether individual separable parts of an offense or several violations of law committed as a
result of the same offence are not particularly significant for the penalty to be imposed. In those
cases the prosecution may be limited to the other parts of the offense or violations of law.
9. However this test has not been met when conducting investigations, prosecution and
indicting Miroslav Deronji}.
a) With respect to the events in the Municipality of Bratunac, there was clearly a plan to
ethnically cleanse the entire Municipalty, not only Glogova on the 9th of May 1992, with all
the accompanying crimes committed in the usual pattern of conduct, observed in other
Variant B municipalities. These crimes are of a far more serious nature than those
committed in Glogova, if one compares the Second Amended Indictment with what the
Accused himself has admitted about events on the following days in the rest of his
Municipality.
b) With respect to the Killing/Murder of 64 (?) persons known by name in Glogova, it should
be noted that the Prosecutor dropped two charges of murder and deleted the supporting facts
from the indictment, already confirmed by an independent judge of this Tribunal. In
particular, the deletion of the allegation that Miroslav Deronji} was even present when some
of these killings happened543 (direct intent!), created doubts whether at all he had the dolus
eventualis as already accepted by him. This made it incumbent on the Trial Chamber to
continue with the Sentencing Hearing. Miroslav Deronji} stated, inter alia,
- in Blagojevi} et al., on 21 January 2004:
543
See, inter alia, indictment of 3 July 2002, para 23.
84
[…] that I did not order, that I did not kill, that I was not present, that I did not know of those
events […].544
- in Kraji{nik, on 18 February 2004:
[…] I never agreed to that […].545
c) Moreover, the Indictment remains silent about the fate of the other Muslims of Glogova.
What about other acts of violence, sexual assaults, or other killings in Glogova546? A Trial
Chamber can not enter into speculation or order the production of evidence it is not aware
of, even if it is in the possession of the Office of the Prosecutor. The result is that, in the
concrete case before us, the Judges have to determine a sentence based on a clinically clean
compilation of selected facts by the Prosecution.
d) Finally, having carefully read all the Accused's statements and testimonies, it remains
extremely questionable to me, why Miroslav Deronij} was not indicted as a co-perpetrator
in the joint criminal enterprise leading to the horrific massacre at Srebrenica in 1995. It
transpires on a prima facie basis that there should be enough reason to indict Miroslav
Deronij} for his participation in that massacre, based only on his own confession, and leave
it finally to a Trial Chamber to decide whether a criminal responsibility can be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Apparently Miroslav Deronij} was not afraid that this could
happen, as he stated himself:
[…] I was told after all the investigations were completed, that indictments in relation to
Srebrenica were being dropped against me. […] [T]he Prosecution stated that […] they have no
intention of prosecuting me further for the events in Srebrenica.547
10. One might say, under the Rules of this Tribunal, that it is for the Prosecutor alone to decide
whom, and under which charges, to indict. In principle, this is correct.548 However, it is also for the
Prosecutor to safeguard that justice is seen to be done and to convince, in particular, those people on
whose behalf this Tribunal is working that there is no arbitrary selection of persons to be indicted
and no arbitrary selection of charges or facts in case of an indictment. I am afraid that such an
unjustified premature procedure has been applied in the proceedings against Miroslav Deronij}.
11. I accept that, in order to break up a circle of silence among perpetrators, some promises can
be made by the Prosecutor vis à vis credible and reliable perpetrators. However, these promises
shall, proprio motu, be disclosed to the bench by the Prosecutor.
544
Blagojevi} et al. Trial, Exh. PS-12, T. 6370.
545
546
See e.g. supra para. 219 of the Judgement.
547
Blagojevi} et al. Trial, Exh. PS-12, T. 6166 (testimony of 19 January 2004).
548
85
a) Promises, furthermore, can not result in de facto granting partial amnesty/impunity by the
Prosecutor, particularly not in an institution established to avoid impunity.
b) Amnesty can only be granted after an appropriate sentence has been determined.
c) A limited amnesty or early release, if at all, can only be granted by those to whom this
power is or will be vested, based on a sentenced person's entire post-crime conduct, or in
order to restore peace.
12. There is no legal basis in the Statute or the Rules for the Prosecutor to promise in the
beginning of each statement that information provided by the Accused would never be used against
him. Such promise has been made in this case by the Prosecutor, formulated in the “Understanding
of the Parties”, paragraph 7 of which states: “The Prosecutor agrees that anything said by Mr.
Deronji} during the interview will not be used as evidence in legal proceedings against him before
the Tribunal.”549 This "Understanding of the Parties"550, for unknown reasons, did not form part of
the Plea Agreement presented to this Trial Chamber, even though this should have been the case
according to the Prosecutor’s own statement551. I believe that this promise has also been a
prerequisite for the Accused’s guilty plea, contrary to the submissions given by the Prosecutor552.
Furthermore, it was a misleading promise, amounting to unfairness to the Accused, as this
understanding can not be binding upon other courts also having jurisdiction over these crimes.
Additionally, it was not combined with a warning that the Accused has to tell the truth when called
as a witness before this Tribunal (consequences otherwise to be read in Rule 91 and being not under
the control of the Prosecutor553).
2. The Appropriate Sentence for the Crimes to which the Accused has Pleaded Guilty
13. The gravity of the crime before us can not be better defined than by the words of the
Prosecutor:
[…] the crime for which Miroslav Deronjić is to be sentenced is precisely the type of crime about
which the Security Council expressed its grave alarm in Resolution 808. The events in Glogova on
the 9th of May 1992 are a classical case of ethnic cleansing, and precisely the reason why the
Security Council established this Tribunal. The attack on Glogova was not an isolated or random
event, but a critical element in a larger scheme to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina and create Serb-
ethnic territories.554
549
Exh. JS-15, para. 7.
550
551
Ibid, T. 102.
552
Ibid, T. 104-5.
553
Ibid. T. 107.
554
86
14. A perpetrator deserves a proportional sanction for his crime, primarily defined by its gravity.
The mitigating weight of any post-crime conduct in general is, if at all, limited. In particular, in this
concrete case the mitigating factors are extraordinarily limited.
(a) Guilty Plea
a) An analysis555 of various national legal systems shows that a guilty plea is generally
accepted as a mitigating factor leading to a reduction of the sentence. Reasons justifying
such mitigation include the willingness of an offender to co-operate in the administration of
justice,556 the showing of remorse, acknowledgment of responsibility, sparing the victims
from testifying and being cross-examined,557 the stage of proceedings at which the offender
pleads guilty,558 and the circumstances in which the plea is tendered.559
b) It becomes evident from the analysis, however, that in the majority of the countries under
survey a guilty plea is given only little – if any – weight in relation to serious crimes. In
Australia,560 Canada,561 China,562 England,563 and Germany,564 first degree murder attracts a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment that can not be altered by the acceptance of the
guilty plea or confession of the accused. In Poland, a plea bargain is only possible in relation
to misdemeanours, but not crimes.565 Similar provisions on guilty pleas or plea bargaining
exist in other countries, e.g. Argentina,566 Brazil,567 and Chile.568
c) In the light of this analysis, and taking into consideration that a guilty plea can not derogate
from the gravity of a crime, I believe that the guilty plea of Miroslav Deronjić only warrants
little weight in sentencing.
(b) Co-operation with the Tribunal
15. The forensic value of his statements and testimonies is extremely limited, until the Accused
is prepared to clarify which details are true and which are not. The Accused himself admitted:
555
Ulrich Sieber (ed.), “The Punishment of Serious Crimes – A comparative analysis of sentencing law and practice”,
Vol. 1 (Expert Report) and Vol. 2 (Country Reports), Freiburg i.Br. 2004.
556
Ibid., Country Report Australia, p. 4.
557
Ibid., Country Report Canada, p. 5.
558
Ibid., Country Report Australia, p. 4; Country Report England, p. 4.
559
Ibid., Country Report England, p. 4.
560
Ibid., Country Report Australia, p. 6.
561
Ibid., Country Report Canada, p. 4.
562
Ibid., Country Report China, pp. 3-4.
563
Ibid., Country Report England, p. 7.
564
Ibid., Country Report Germany, pp. 7-8.
565
Ibid., Country Report Poland, p. 4. See also Country Report Russia, p. 3.
566
Ibid., Country Report Argentina, p. 3.
567
Ibid., Country Report Brazil, p. 3.
568
Ibid., Country Report Chile, p. 4.
87
So I did not give an entirely truthful statement […]. But I do not agree that those statements are
completely untrue. They are partially untrue […].569
16. I can not attach any mitigating weight to such an unsound mixture of truth and lies, creating
more confusion than assistance in the Tribunal’s search for the truth.
(c) Remorse
17. The remorse shown by the Accused is hardly credible, inter alia, because from testimony to
testimony given after his guilty plea, he wants to minimize his guilt.
a) On his responsibility for the killings, on 18 February 2004, he testified:
[…] I agreed to certain things, which I did, but I never agreed to that, nor did I ever order or wish
that people are killed.570
On the 19 February 2004 in the same testimony, he stated:
Later, after that period, different information reached me about the events in Glogova.571
- he continued that:
[…] I had the opportunity to read a book whose author is a man from Bratunac, and he mentioned
in this book that a certain number of people had been killed in Glogova.572
- then he stated that:
Some inquiry was done by my lawyers […].573
- and finally he concluded:
[…] I accepted the allegation of the Prosecutor […].574
b) On his responsibility for triggering the attack, on 30 September 2003, he pleaded guilty to
the fact that:
Miroslav Deronji} urged Captain Relji} to fire a tank shell into a house at the initial stage of the
attack in order to sow panic among the Muslim residents of Glogova.575
- then he confirmed it in his testimony on 27 January 2004:
569
Blagojevi} et al. Trial, Exh. PS-12, T. 6407 (testimony of 22 January 2004).
570
571
Ibid., T. 1243, lines 15-16.
572
Ibid., lines 19-21.
573
Ibid., line 25.
574
Ibid., T. 1244, lines 5-6.
575
Factual Basis, para. 35; Plea Hearing, T. 60.
88
Judge Schomburg: […] you yourself urged Captain Relji} to fire a tank shell into a house at the
initial stage of the attack in order to sow panic amongst the residents of Glogova.[…]
A.: Yes, Your Honour.576
- in Blagojevi} et al., on 21 January 2004, he testified:
I told them to shoot at the roof using, if possible, a lighter weapon. I didn't say they had
necessarily to shoot at the house itself. I said they could shoot at an auxiliary structure.577
- finally, out of the blue, he stated:
This grenade shell was not fired.578
If this were the truth, why would he not mention this in all his prior testimonies?
18. I need not repeat the aforementioned advantages Miroslav Deronjić has already received.
C. Conclusion
19. The crime before us, limited as it is described, has, however, all of the ingredients of one of
the most heinous crimes against humanity. Therefore, the appropriate sentence can only be found in
twenty years of imprisonment or higher, thereby adequately acknowledging the fate of the victims
and their relatives. Everything else could be seen as an incentive for politicians, who might in future
find themselves in a similar situation as Miroslav Deronjić was as of December 1991, to act in the
same manner. Even if this person were brought before criminal court he/she would believe that
he/she could buy him/herself more or less free by admitting some guilt and giving some information
to the then competent prosecutor.
20. As no victim or relative of a victim has been given the opportunity to address this Trial
Chamber in person, I should like to give the last word to one of them:
I saw Miroslav Deronji} plead guilty on the television. The Bosnian Muslims in the community
that I have spoken to, felt relieved because he admitted his guilt. This is a positive thing and can
heal the wounds of the community provided that he is punished adequately. A mild punishment
however would not serve any purpose; he does not deserve any compassion as he did not show
any, not only to people of Glogova but also to the other Muslim Bosnians of Bratunac and
Srebrenica.579
576
577
Blagojevi} et al. Trial, Exh. PS-12, T. 6366.
578
579
Exh. PS-19/1, para. 14.
89
_______________________
Judge Wolfgang Schomburg
At The Hague
The Netherlands
90
UNITED
NATIONS

IN TRIAL CHAMBER II

PROSECUTOR
v.
MIROSLAV DERONJI]
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MUMBA
Mr. Mark B. Harmon

91
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MUMBA
1. I agree with the decision of the Trial Chamber on the sentencing of Miroslav Deronji}. In
support, I propose to offer some further remarks on considerations of sentencing principles.
2. The Accused brought before the Tribunal has entered a guilty plea and has signed a Plea
Agreement with the Office of the Prosecutor. The Trial Chamber accepted the plea in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute and the Rules. The guilty plea is within the ambit of the
Indictment. In determining this sentence, I have been mindful of the objectives of international
criminal justice and the principle that punishment shall be proportionate to the crime’s gravity and
the moral guilt of the perpetrator. In addition to the objectives of prevention and deterrence, in
imposing a sentence, another key consideration, is the rehabilitation of the convicted person. A
guilty plea is accepted as a first step to rehabilitation of the offender and a positive factor towards
reconciliation of the offended community.
3. International justice in cases similar to these, in this Tribunal, is not about unfair retribution;
if that were the case, humanity should forget about reconciliation and its off-shoot, peace. It is my
humble view that this Tribunal is not about vengeance, using the pen as the firearm, much as the
victims’ plight has been acknowledged; that would be erroneous, such a practice would amount to
accepting the erroneous view that you can conquer hatred with hatred. This, in my view, does not
work. Vengeance may be manifested in terms of a harsh sentence for an accused person who has
pleaded guilty. In my humble opinion, rehabilitation, after turmoil, may serve to reduce the
incidence of political instability and conflict.
_____________________________________
At The Hague
The Netherlands
92
ANNEXES
A. List of Cited Court Decisions
1. ICTY
ALEKSOVSKI
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, 25 June 1999 (“Aleksovski
Trial Judgement”).
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000 (“Aleksovski
Appeal Judgement”).
BANOVI]
Prosecutor v. Predrag Banovi}, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 28 October 2003
(“Banovi} Sentencing Judgement”).
BLA[KI]
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000 (“Blaškić Trial
Judgement”).
“ČELEBIĆI”
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, a.k.a. “Pavo”, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, a.k.a.
“Zenga”, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 16 November 1998 (“Čelebići Trial Judgement”).
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, a.k.a. “Pavo”, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, a.k.a.
“Zenga”, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001 (“Čelebići Appeal Judgement”).
Ê[I]
Prosecutor v. Ranko ê{i}, Case No. IT-95-10/1, Sentencing Judgement, 11 March 2004 (“ê{i}
Sentencing Judgement”)
ERDEMOVI]
Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemovi}, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, 7 October 1997 (“Erdemovi}
Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemovi}, Case No. IT-96-22-T bis, Sentencing Judgement, 5 March 1998
(“Erdemovi} 1998 Sentencing Judgement”).
FURUNDŽIJA
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, 21 July 2000 (“Furundžija
JELISIĆ
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, 14 December 1999 (“Jelisić Trial
Judgement”).
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, 5 July 2001 (“Jelisić Appeal
Judgement”).
93
KORDIĆ AND ČERKEZ
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 26 February
2001 (“Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement”).
KRNOJELAC
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, 15 March 2002 (“Krnojelac
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, 17 September 2003

(“Krnojelac Appeal Judgement”).
KRSTI]
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001
(“Krstić Trial Judgement”).
KUNARAC, KOVAČ AND VUKOVIĆ

Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-
96-23/1-T, Judgement, 22 February 2001 (“Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement”).
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-
96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002 (“Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement”).
Z. KUPREŠKIĆ, M. KUPREŠKIĆ, V. KUPREŠKIĆ, JOSIPOVIĆ, (PAPI]) AND SANTIĆ

Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipovi}, Dragan
Papi} and Vladimir Santi}, a.k.a. “Vlado”, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 14 January 2000
(“Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement”).
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović and Vladimir
Santi}, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 23 October 2001 (“Kupreškić et al. Appeal
Judgement”).
KVOČKA, KOS, RADIĆ, ŽIGIĆ AND PRCAĆ

Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radić, Zoran Žigić and Dragoljub Prcać,
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 2 November 2001 (“Kvočka et al. Trial Judgement”).
MILUTINOVI], [AINOVI] AND OJDANI]

Prosecutor v .Milan Milutinovi}, Nikola [ainovi} and Dragolijub Ojdani} (Interlucotory), Case No.
IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani}’s Motion challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal
Enterprise, 21 May 2003 (“Ojdani} Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise”)
NALETILI] AND MARTINOVI]

Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletili} and Vinko Martinovi}, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgement, 31 March
2003 (“Naletili} and Martinovi} Trial Judgement”)
D. NIKOLIĆ
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-02-S, Sentencing Judgement, 18 December 2003
(“Dragan Nikolić Sentencing Judgement”).
M. NIKOLIĆ
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 2 December 2003
(“Momir Nikolić Sentencing Judgement”).
94
OBRENOVIĆ
Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 10 December
2003 (“Obrenović Sentencing Judgement”).
PLAVŠIĆ
Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing Judgement, 27 February 2003
(“Plavšić Sentencing Judgement”).
SIKIRICA, DOŠEN AND KOLUNDŽIJA

Prosecutor v. Duško Sikirica, Damir Došen, Dragan Kolundžija, Case No. IT-95-8-S, Sentencing
Judgement, 13 November 2001 (“Sikirica et al. Sentencing Judgement”).
B. SIMIĆ, M. TADI], S. ZARI]

Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simi}, Miroslav Tadi}, Simo Zari}, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgement, 17
October 2003 (“Simi} et al. Trial Judgement”).
M. SIMIĆ
Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 17 October 2002 (“Simić
Sentencing Judgement”).
STAKIĆ
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003 (“Stakić Trial
Judgement”).
D. TADIĆ
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis, Judgement in Sentencing
Appeals, 26 January 2000 (“Tadić Judgement in Sentencing Appeals”).
TODOROVIĆ
Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 31 July 2001
(“Todorović Sentencing Judgement”).
VASILJEVIĆ
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgement, 29 November 2002 (“Vasiljević
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, 25 February 2004 (“Vasiljević
2. ICTR
AKAYESU
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998 (“Akayesu
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement, 1 June 2001 (“Akayesu
RUGGIU
Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 1 June 2000
(“Ruggiu Judgement and Sentence”).
95
SERUSHAGO
Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons for Judgement, 6 April 2000
(“Serushago Appeal Judgement”).
3. Other Decisions
R. v. ARKELL
R. v. Arkell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695.
R. v. BLOOMFIELD
R. v. Bloomfield, [1999] NTCCA 137.
R. v. MARTINEAU
R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
R. v. M.(C.A.)
R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500.
BGHSt 43, p. 195 (198).
BVerfG, BVerfGE 45, 187 (245, 255F).
BVerfG, BVerfGE 63, 45 (69).
BVerfG, BVerfGE 90, 145 (173).
B. List of Other Legal Authorities
John R.W.D. Jones/Steven Powles, International Criminal Practice, 3rd ed., Oxford (2003), 9.119.
Radke in Münchener Kommentar, Strafgesetzbuch, Vol. 1, §§1-51 (München, 2003).
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808

(1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993.
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), S/3217, 25 May 1993.
C. List of Abbreviations
According to Rule 2 (B), of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the masculine shall
include the feminine and the singular the plural, and vice-versa.
Accused Miroslav Deronjić

APCs Armoured personnel carriers
Continued Sentencing Hearing held on 5 March 2004 to assist the Trial Chamber in
Hearing determining an appropriate sentence.
a.k.a. Also known as
BGH Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court)
96
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (Decisions of
BGHSt the German Federal Supreme Court in criminal matters) <accessible
through website: http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de>
Bosnia and Herzegovina (consisting of two entities: the Republika
BiH Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Br~ko
District)
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court)
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidung (Decisions of the German
BVerfGE Federal Constitutional Court) <accessible through website:
http://www.bverfg.de>
cf. [Latin: confer] (Compare)
Criminal Code of BiH Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
of 1977 adopted on 10 June 1977
DS. Defence Exhibit
Defence The Accused, and/or the Accused’s counsel
The Testimony of the Accused given in Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case
Deronji} Testimony
No. IT-02-61, on the 27 January 2004.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
ECHR Freedoms of 4 November 1950 (European Convention of Human
Rights)
Exh. Exhibit
Exhs. Exhibits
Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case No. IT-02-61, Factual Basis filed on 30
Factual Basis September 2003 as part of the Plea Agreement, supporting the facts in
the Indictment.
FedBiH Criminal Code Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted
of 2003 on 1 August 2003
Federal Criminal Code Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adopted
of 1976/77 on 28 of September 1976 and entered into force on 1 July 1977
Federation of Bosnia and
Entity of BiH
Herzegovina
Psychological Report on Miroslav Deronji}, by Ana Najman, specialist
Najman Report in Clinical-Medical Psychology, Court appointed expert, dated 18
December 2003
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the
ICCPR UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966. Entry into force on 23
March 1976
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
ICTR Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January
1994 and 31 December 1994
97
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
ICTY Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
Indictment Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, 30 September 2003
inter alia Among other things
JS. Trial Chamber Exhibit
Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (Army of the Socialist Federal Republic of
JNA
Yugoslavia)
“Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht”,
Max Planck Institute Günterstalstraße 73, D-79100 Freiburg i. Br., Germany,
<www.iuscrim.mpg.de>
OHR Office of the High Representative (BiH)
OHR Criminal Code The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina enacted by the OHR on
of 2003 1 March 2003
PS. Prosecution Exhibit
p. Page
pp. Pages
para. Paragraph
paras Paragraphs
Prosecutor v. Deronji}, Case No. IT-02-61, Plea Agreement, dated 29
Plea Agreement
September 2003
Status Conference held on 30 September 2003 at which the Accused
Plea Hearing
pleaded guilty
Principle according to which an accused has the right to benefit from
Principle of lex mitior the most lenient penalty in cases where the law has changed between
the time of the criminal conduct and the date of sentencing
Prof. Full Professor
Prosecution Office of the Prosecutor
Republika Srpska Entity of BiH
RS Criminal Code of 2003 Criminal Code of Republika Srpska adopted on 1 August 2003
Rules Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY
SDS Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Hearing held from 27 to 28 January 2004 to assist the Trial Chamber in
Sentencing Hearing
determining an appropriate sentence
98
“The Punishment of Serious Crimes: a comparative analysis of
sentencing law and practice” provided by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber from
Sentencing Report
the Max Planck Institute, filed on 12 November 2003, in its final
version including Country Reports (the latter on CD-Rom)
SFRY Former: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SUP Secretariat of Internal Affairs
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Statute
established by Security Council Resolution 827 (1993)
Transcript page from hearings. All transcript page numbers referred to
are from the unofficial, uncorrected version of the transcript, unless not
specified otherwise. Minor differences may therefore exist between the
T. pagination therein and that of the final transcripts released to the public.
The Trial Chamber accepts no responsibility for the corrections of or
mistakes in these transcripts. In doubt the video-tape of a hearing is to
be revisited.
TO Territorial Defence
Tribunal See: ICTY
UN United Nations
United Nations Detention Unit for persons awaiting trial or appeal
UNDU
before the ICTY
99
100

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Case No.

: IT-02-61-S 30 March 2004

International Tribunal for the Case No. IT-02-61-S

Before: Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, Presiding

Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis

Judgement of: 30 March 2004

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Mark B. Harmon

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr. Slobodan Cvijeti}

Case No.: IT-02-61-S 30 March 2004

II. THE ACCUSED .................................................................................................................................. 2

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................................. 4

V. THE FACTS ...................................................................................................................................... 13

VIII. SENTENCING LAW ................................................................................................................... 38

XII. LIST OF KNOWN MURDERED PERSONS ............................................................................. 79

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHOMBURG...................................................................... 83

13. The Accused has no criminal record.23

A. Overview of the Proceedings

26. The terms of the Plea Agreement are as follows:

C. Testimony of the Accused

E. Continued Sentencing Hearing

(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;

(ii) the guilty plea is informed;

(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and

Plea Agreement Procedure

(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly;

(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate;

52. In 1991, an atmosphere of increasing inter-ethnic tension existed in Bosnia and

59. At a meeting convened in Sarajevo on or about 19 December 1991, presided over by

C. Preparations for Persecutions in Glogova

1. Attack on the Village of Glogova

(b) First Mass Killing

(c) Second Mass Killing

(d) Third Mass Killing

3. Forcible Displacement of Civilians from Glogova

E. Events Following the Attack on Glogova

(a) the existence of an armed conflict;

(f) the accused intended to commit the violation;

B. Trial Chamber’s Findings

137. In Staki}, this Trial Chamber recalled that:

B. Principles and Purposes

1. Submissions of the Parties

143. Regarding rehabilitation, the Appeals Chamber in “Čelebići” held that:

147. In Staki}, the Trial Chamber stated that:

an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly

C. Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 101 of the Rules

1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In

(i) any aggravating circumstances;

D. Gravity of the Crime, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

2. The Applicability of the Principle of lex mitior

174. In Argentina,323 Belgium,324 Canada,325 Germany,326 England,327 Finland,328 Italy,329 and

A. Gravity of the Offence and Aggravating Circumstances

1. Submissions of the Parties

183. Regarding Miroslav Deronji}’s superior position, the Defence states:

(a) Large Number of Victims

(b) Deronji}’s Superior Position as a Political Leader in the Municipality of Bratunac

The Appeals Chamber endorsed that:

(c) Miroslav Deronji}’s Role in the Disarmament of the Citizens of Glogova