BH Tif08
BH Tif08
BH Tif08
In the multidivisional structure, each business that the firm engages in is managed
through a division.
True
False
Answer: True Page: 247
Difficulty: Easy
Chapter Objective: 1
4.
All firms that use the multidivisional structure use the same criteria for defining
the boundaries of profit-and-loss centers.
True
False
Answer: False Page: 247
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 1
6.
The M-form structure is designed to create checks and balances for managers that
increase the probability that a diversified firm will be managed in ways consistent
with the interests of its equity holders.
True
False
Answer: True Page: 247
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 1
9.
15. Research has shown that separating the roles of CEO and board chair is positively
correlated with firm performance when firms operated in high-growth and very
complex environments.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 251
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
16. To the extent that a board of directors begins to operate a business on a day-to-day
basis, it goes beyond its capabilities.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 251
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
17. A board of directors typically consists of 15 to 30 individuals drawn from a firm's
top management group and from individuals outside the firm.
True
False
Answer: False
Page: 250
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 2
18. The title chairman of the board often, but not always, identifies the firm's senior
executive.
True
False
Answer: False
Page: 250
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
19. Institutional owners are usually pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies,
or other groups of investors that have joined together to manage their investments.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 252
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
20. In 1970, institutions owned 62 percent of the equity traded in the United States; by
1990, institutions owned 48 percent of this equity and by 2002, they owned only 32
percent of this equity.
True
False
Answer: False
Page: 252
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 2
21. The senior executive in an M-form organization has two responsibilities: strategy
formulation and strategy implementation.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 254
Difficulty: Easy
Chapter Objective: 2
29. By adjusting for a divisions earning and accounting for the cost of investing in a
division, economic value added is a much more accurate estimate of a divisions
economic performance than are traditional accounting measures of performance.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 261
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
30. If a well-managed diversified firm uses both accounting and economic measures it
will be able to unambiguously evaluate divisional performance.
True
False
Answer: False
Page: 261
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 3
31. To the extent that a firm exploits real economies of scope in implementing a
diversification strategy, it will be able to unambiguously evaluate the performance
of individual division in that firm.
True
False
Answer: False
Page: 262
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 3
32. In zero-based budgeting each project has to stand on its own merits each year by
being included among the important projects that a firm can afford to fund and no
project receives funding for the future simply because it received funding in the
past.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 263
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
33. Intermediate products or services are those products or services that are produced
in one division of a diversified firm that are used as inputs by another division.
True
False
Answer: True
Page: 263
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
34. In a diversified firm, market prices are the set by a firms corporate management to
accomplish corporate objectives while transfer prices are determined by the market
forces of supply and demand.
True
False
Answer: False
Page: 263
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
Chapter Objective: 1
44. The M-form structure is designed to create checks and balances for managers that
increase the probability that a diversified firm will be managed in ways consistent
with
A. the interests of all of its stakeholders.
B. an exclusively short-term perspective.
C. an exclusively long-term perspective.
D. the interests of its equity holders.
Answer: D
Page: 247
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 1
45. In an agency relationship, the party that delegates decision-making authority to
another individual is known as the
A. stakeholder.
B. principal.
C. agent.
D. stockholder.
Answer: B
Page: 248
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 1
50. In examining the question of whether the roles of CEO and chairman should be
combined, empirical research on this question suggests
A. that combining these roles is always positively related with firm performance.
B. that separating these roles is always positively related with firm performance.
C. that combining these roles is positively correlated with firm performance when the
firm operates in slow-growth and simple competitive environments.
D. that separating these roles is positively correlated with firm performance when the
firm operates in slow-growth and simple competitive environments.
Answer: C
Page: 251
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 2
51. The _________ is the subcommittee of the board of directors that is responsible for
ensuring the accuracy of accounting and financial statements.
A. audit committee
B. finance committee
C. nominating committee
D. personnel and compensation committee
Answer: A
Page: 251
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
52. The _________ is a subcommittee of the board of directors that maintains the
relationship between the firm and external capital markets.
A. nominating committee
B. audit committee
C. personnel and compensation committee
D. finance committee
Answer: D
Page: 251
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
53. In the United States, approximately what percent of the firms in the Standard &
Poor's 500 have their founding families still involved in day-to-day management?
A. 50%
B. 66%
C. 33%
D. 25%
Answer: C
Page: 252
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 2
54. In which country are all 20 of the largest 20 firms in the economy family
dominated?
A. the United Kingdom
B. Mexico
C. Argentina
D. New Zealand
Answer: B
Page: 252
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
60. The primary responsibility of the ________ is to provide information about the
firm's external and internal environments to the firm's senior executive.
A. corporate staff
B. board of directors
C. division general managers
D. shared activity managers
Answer: A
Page: 255
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
61. The divided loyalties that divisional staff managers have between corporate staff
managers and functional managers is potentially the most problematic in _______
staff functions.
A. marketing
B. accounting
C. logistics
D. production
Answer: B
Page: 256
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
62. In an M-form organization the management of day-to-day operations is delegated
to
A. divisional general managers and to corporate staff managers.
B. corporate staff managers and to functional managers who report to corporate staff
managers.
C. divisional general managers and to functional managers who report to division
general managers.
D. the board of directors and corporate staff managers who report to the board of
directors.
Answer: C
Page: 257
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 2
63. ____________ have full profit-and-loss responsibility and typically have multiple
functional managers reporting to them.
A. Division general managers
B. Corporate staff managers
C. Senior executives
D. Shared activity managers
Answer: A
Page: 257
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
64. When compared to the strategy implementation responsibilities of senior executives
in U-form organizations, when implementing strategy division general managers in
M-form organizations
A. tend to have to deal with less conflict.
B. have to compete for external capital funding.
C. tend to have to deal with substantially more conflict.
D. must cooperate with other divisions to exploit corporate economies of scope.
Answer: D
Page: 257
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
Chapter Objective: 1
87. If SpandoCorp used a ________ budgeting process it would assume that no project
would received funding for the future simply because it was funded in the past and
required each project to stand on its own merits each year to be included in a list of
important projects that the firm can afford to fund.
A. zero-based
B. cost plus
C. dynamic
D. traditional
Answer: A
Page: 263
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
88. If the bulk materials division of SpandoCorp sold its reams of Spandex to the
military division and set the transfer price of these reams equal to the bulk
materials actual cost of production, SpandoCorp would be using the _______
transfer pricing scheme.
A. exchange autonomy
B. mandated full cost
C. mandated market based
D. dual pricing
Answer: B
Page: 265
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
89. If SpandoCorps Board of Directors wanted to ensure that changes in the CEO's
compensation would be closely linked to changes in the firms performance they
should
A. use a compensation package that includes only a salary for the CEO.
B. use a compensation package that includes a salary and a cash bonus for the CEO.
C. use a compensation package the includes a salary, a cash bonus and stock options
that represent only a relatively small percentage of for the CEOs total
compensation package.
D. use a compensation package that includes a salary and stock options that represent
only a relatively substantial percentage of for the CEOs total compensation
package.
Answer: D
Page: 266
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 4
90. If SpandoCorp wanted to implement an international strategy and was not
especially concerned with global integration but wanted to be sure to choose the
organizational structure that was the most locally responsive, the company should
use a
A. decentralized federation.
B. transnational structure.
C. centralized hub.
D. coordinated federation.
Answer: A
Page: 271
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 4
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 1
92. Define what constitutes an agency relationship, the roles of the principal and the agent,
and discuss how the agency relationship is reflected in the context of corporate
diversification, when the agency relationship can be effective, and identify two common
agency problems.
An agency relationship exists whenever one party to an exchange delegates decision-making
authority to a second party. In the agency relationship the party delegating the decision making
authority is called the agent and the party to whom the authority is delegated is called the
agent. In the context of corporate diversification, an agency relationship exists between a
firms outside equity holders (as principals) and its managers (as agents) to the extent that
equity holders delegate the day-to-day management of their investment to those managers.
The agency relationship between equity holders and managers can be very effective as long as
managers make investment decisions in ways that are consistent with equity holders interests.
Thus, if equity holders are interested in maximizing the rate of return on their investment in a
firm, and if managers make their investment decisions with this objective in mind, then equity
holders will have few concerns about delegating the day-to-day management of their
investments to managers. Unfortunately, in numerous situations the interests of a firms
outside equity holders and its managers do not coincide. When parties in an agency
relationship differ in their decision-making objectives, agency problems arise. Two common
agency problems have been identified including:
1. Managers can decide to take some of a firms capital and invest it in managerial perquisites
that do not add economic value to the firm but do directly benefit those managers.
2. To the extent that very risky investments may jeopardize a firms survival and thus
management's compensation and positions, managers to be more risk averse in their
decision making than equity holders would prefer them to be.
Page: 248
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 1
93. Describe the nature and role of the board of directors in an M-form organization,
discuss who generally serves on the board, the role of outside members on a board of
directors and when the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board should be combined
or separated.
In an M-form organization the board of director's primary responsibility is to monitor decision
making in the firm, to ensure that it is consistent with the interests of outside equity holders. In
principle, all of a firms senior managers report to the board. A board of directors typically
consists of 10 to 15 individuals drawn from a firms top management group and from
individuals outside the firm. A firms senior executive (often identified by the title president or
chief executive officer or CEO), its chief financial officer (CFO), and a few other senior
managers are usually on the boardalthough outsiders typically outnumber managers on the
board. The firms senior executive is often but not always the chairman of the board (a term
used here to denote both female and male senior executives). The task of managerial board
membersincluding the board chairis to provide other board members information and
insights about critical decisions being made in the firm and the effect those decisions are likely
to have on a firms equity holders. The task of outsiders on the board is to evaluate the past,
current, and future performance of the firm, and of its senior managers, to ensure that the
actions taken in the firm are consistent with equity holders interests. Outside directors, as
compared to insiders, tend to focus more on monitoring a firms economic performance rather
than other measures of firm performance. Outside board members are also more likely than
inside members to dismiss CEOs following poor performance. Also, outside board members
have a stronger incentive than inside members to maintain their reputation as effective
monitors. This incentive by itself can lead to more effective monitoring by outside board
members. Moreover, the monitoring effectiveness of outside board members seems to be
substantially enhanced when they personally own a substantial amount of a firms equity.
There is currently some debate about whether the roles of board chair and CEO should be
combined or separated, and if separated, what kinds of people should occupy these positions.
Empirical research on this question suggests that whether these roles of CEO and chairman
should be combined or not depends on the complexity of the information analysis and
monitoring task facing the CEO and chairman. Some researchers have found that combining
the roles of CEO and chairman is positively correlated with firm performance when firms
operate in slow-growth and simple competitive environmentsenvironments that do not
overtax the cognitive capability of a single individual. This finding suggests that combining
these roles does not necessarily increase conflicts between a firm and its equity holders. This
research also found that separating the roles of CEO and board chair is positively correlated
with firm performance when firms operate in high-growth and very complex environments. In
such environments, a single individual cannot fulfill all the responsibilities of both CEO and
chairman, and thus the two roles need to be held by separate individuals.
Pages: 249-251
Difficulty: Hard
Chapter Objective: 2
Chapter Objective: 2
95. Identify the responsibilities of the senior executive in an M-form organization and
discuss the three different roles in the office of the president and the responsibilities of
each role.
The senior executive (the president or CEO) in an M-form organization has two
responsibilities: strategy formulation and strategy implementation. Strategy formulation
entails deciding in which set of businesses a diversified firm will operate. At the broadest
level, deciding which businesses a diversified firm should operate in is equivalent to
discovering and developing valuable economies of scope among a firms current and potential
businesses. If these economies of scope are also rare and costly to imitate, they can be a source
of sustained competitive advantage for a diversified firm. The senior executive is uniquely
positioned to discover, develop, and nurture valuable economies of scope in a diversified firm
but the senior executive in an M-form organization should involve numerous other divisional
and functional managers in strategy formulation to ensure complete and accurate information
as input to the process and a broad understanding of and commitment to that strategy once it
has been formulated. Strategy implementation focuses on encouraging behavior in a firm that
is consistent with this strategy and almost always involves resolving conflicts within and
between each of the major managerial components of the M-form structure: corporate staff,
division general managers, and shared activity managers.
It is often the case that the roles and responsibilities of the senior executive in an M-form
organization are greater than what can be reasonably managed by a single individual. This is
especially likely if a firm is broadly diversified across numerous complex products and
markets. In this situation, it is not uncommon for the tasks of the senior executive to be
divided among two or three people: the chairman of the board (responsible for the supervision
of the board of directors in its monitoring role), the chief executive officer (responsible for
strategy formulation), and the chief operating officer (responsible for strategy implementation).
Together, these roles are known as the office of the president.
Pages:
254-255
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
96. Discuss the role of division general managers in an M-form organization and compare
and contrast this role with that of senior executives in U-form organizations.
Division general managers in an M-form organization have primary responsibility for
managing the day-to-day operations of a firms businesses. Division general managers have
full profit-and-loss responsibility and typically have multiple functional managers reporting to
them. As general managers, they have both strategy formulation and strategy implementation
responsibilities. On the strategy formulation side, division general managers choose strategies
for their divisions, within the broader strategic context established by the senior executive of
the firm. Many of the analytical tools described in Parts I and II of this book can be used by
division general managers to make these strategy formulation decisions.
The strategy implementation responsibilities of division general managers in an M-form
organization parallel the strategy implementation responsibilities of senior executives in Uform organizations. In particular, division general managers must be able to coordinate the
activities of often conflicting functional managers in order to implement a divisions strategies.
In addition to their responsibilities as a U-form senior executive, division general managers in
an M-form organization have two additional responsibilities: to compete for corporate capital
and to cooperate with other divisions to exploit corporate economies of scope. Division
general managers compete for corporate capital by obtaining high rates of return on capital
invested in previous periods by the corporations in their business. In most firms, divisions that
have demonstrated the ability to generate high rates of return on earlier capital investments
gain access to more capital, or to lower-cost capital, compared to divisions that have not
demonstrated a history of such performance. Division general managers cooperate to exploit
economies of scope by working with shared activity managers, corporate staff managers, and
the senior executive in the firm to isolate, understand, and use the economies of scope around
which the diversified firm was originally organized. Division general managers can even
become involved in discovering new economies of scope that were not anticipated when the
firms diversification strategy was originally implemented but nevertheless may be both
valuable and costly for outside investors to create on their own.
Page: 257
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 2
97. Discuss the role of accounting measures of divisional performance, identify three
different standards of comparison that can be used when evaluating the accounting
performance of a division along with the strengths and weaknesses of each standard,
and the potential weaknesses of accounting measures of divisional performance.
Common accounting measures of divisional performance include the return on the assets
controlled by a division, the return on a divisions sales, and a divisions sales growth. These
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
EVA =
The calculation of economic value added begins with a divisions adjusted accounting
earnings. These are a divisions traditional accounting earnings, adjusted so that they
approximate what would be a divisions economic earnings. Several adjustments to a
divisions accounting statements have been described in the literature. For example, traditional
accounting practices require R&D spending to be deducted each year from a divisions
earnings. This can lead division general managers to underinvest in longer-term R&D efforts.
In the EVA measure of divisional performance, R&D spending is added back into a divisions
performance, and R&D is then treated as an asset and depreciated over some period of time.
By adjusting a divisions earnings, and accounting for the cost of investing in a division,
economic value added is a much more accurate estimate of a divisions economic performance
than are traditional accounting measures of performance.
Pages:
260-261
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
99. Discuss the role of transfer pricing systems in a M-form organization, identify
difficulties with setting optimal prices, and identify four alternative transfer pricing
schemes.
The transfer of products or services produced in one division that are used as inputs for
products or services produced by a second division of a multidivisional firm is usually
managed through a transfer-pricing system in which one division sells its product or service
to a second division for a transfer price. Unlike a market price, which is typically determined
my market forces of supply and demand, transfer prices are set by a firms corporate
management to accomplish corporate objectives.
From an economic point of view, the rule for establishing the optimal transfer price in a
diversified firm is quite simple: The transfer price should be the value of the opportunities
forgone when one divisions product or service is transferred to another division. Setting
transfer prices equal to opportunity costs sounds simple enough, but it is very difficult to do in
real diversified firms. Establishing optimal transfer prices requires information about the value
of the opportunities forgone by the selling division. This, in turn, requires information about
this divisions marginal costs, its manufacturing capacity, external demand for its products, and
so forth. Much of this information is difficult to calculate. Moreover, it is rarely stable. As
market conditions change, demand for a divisions products can change, marginal costs can
change, and the value of opportunities forgone can change. Also, to the extent that a selling
division customizes the products or services it transfers to other divisions in a diversified firm,
the value of the opportunities forgone by this selling division become even more difficult to
calculate.
Even if this information could be obtained and updated rapidly, division general managers in
selling divisions have strong incentives to manipulate the information in ways that increase the
perceived value of the opportunities forgone by their division. These division general
managers can thus increase the transfer price for the products or services they sell to internal
263-265
Difficulty: Moderate
Chapter Objective: 3
100. Discuss the importance of compensation policies in diversified firms and identify the
CEO compensation package that most closely aligns the interests of the CEO with those
of stockholders.
A firms compensation policies constitute a final set of tools for implementing corporation
diversification. To the extent that compensation in diversified firms gives managers
incentives to make decisions consistent with stockholders interests, they can be an important
part of the process of implementing corporate diversification. Traditionally, the
compensation of corporate managers in a diversified firm has been only loosely connected to
the firms economic performance. Research indicates that differences in CEO cash
compensation (salary plus cash bonus) are not very responsive to differences in firm
performance but if a substantial percentage of a CEOs compensation came in the form of
stock and stock options in the firm, changes in compensation would be closely linked with
changes in the firm performance. These and similar findings reported elsewhere have led
more and more diversified firms to include stock and stock options as part of the
compensation package for the CEO to more closely align the interests of the CEO with those
of stockholders.
Page: 266
Difficulty: Easy
Chapter Objective: 4