Discussion Paper

Terrorism
Including Issues Related to Ideology,
Identity Politics, and Organized Crime

Independent Commission on Multilateralism

September 2015

The terrorism landscape has transformed radically since 9/11. Its manifestations are
multidimensional, complex, and pervasive. The multilateral system continues to be under severe
stress as the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism metastasize. While some have
argued that such malignancies are the consequences of inherently national problems, no one
doubts that the threats they pose have become transnational in origin and effect, and can only
be overcome through multilateral, global efforts.

Many factors drive and sustain todays terrorism. In essence, it is a phenomenon that
stems from a constellation of fault lines and imbalances caused by exclusionary, unaccountable,
and ideologically based governance; inequitable distribution of resources; and new and
emerging forms of geopolitical power rivalries that are reshaping the trajectory of these
imbalances and their outcomes. Deft use of web-based communication technologies, including
social media, has made it possible for terrorist organizations and organized crime networks to
make inroads into disgruntled and marginalized communities and rally them to their ranks on
the basis of social injustices and grievances created by these imbalances. Marginalized youth
have been a prime target. Armed nonstate actors that hold territory, command resources, and
engage in highly lucrative illicit economic activities have made these youth their primary
recruits.

Multilateral efforts primarily under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council have
provided various capacity development support and other measures to strengthen member
states domestic counterterrorism initiatives. However, certain ambiguities inherent in these
measures and in their uneven implementation have provided a convenient pretext for some to
pursue double standards in the fight against terrorism. A siloed approach to the problem and
an inability to determine a universal definition of terrorism have further hampered these
efforts.

The notion that the fight against terrorism can be won primarily by military force, law
enforcement measures, and intelligence operations is losing currency. The debate has slowly
turned to the need for a comprehensive and long-term approach, rooted in political and
socioeconomic strategies that encourage social inclusion, political participation, and equality as
well as bottom-up strategies that address root causes at the national level.

Defining Terrorism

The United Nations and the multilateral system more widely remains at a deadlock when it
comes to a universal definition of terrorism. The challenges posed by the lack of a universally
accepted definition further manifest themselves in the way in which the current framework of
international law, although prohibiting terrorists acts in multiple forums, is not capable of
addressing the full scope and the evolving nature of the terrorist threat.

The norms governing the use of force by nonstate actors have not kept pace with those
pertaining to states. This is not so much a legal question as a political one. Legally, virtually all
forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of [14] international counterterrorism conventions,
international customary law, the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes.1 However, it
1

United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 2, 2004

remains elusiveif not impossiblefor the United Nations to achieve the same degree of
normative strength concerning nonstate use of force as it has concerning state use of force. Lack
of agreement on a clear and well-known definition diminishes the normative and moral stance
against terrorism.2

The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues.3 The first is the
argument that any definition should include states use of armed forces against civilians [] The
second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a
definition of terrorism should not override this right.4 In the latter case, as the saying goes:
one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter.

Furthermore, the inability of member states to agree on an anti-terrorism convention,
including a definition of terrorism has prevented the United Nations from exerting its moral
authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic,
even for the most defensible of causes.5 Nevertheless, there is a question of what impact a
universal definition will have on the on-the-ground realities.

While the debate over a definition of terrorism may continue, there ought to be no
ambiguity on what constitutes acts of terrorism and strict implementation of a universal zero
tolerance norm. Overall, a consensus on the preeminence of universal non-tolerance for
deliberate attacks on non-combatants regardless of any justification should surpass the
technicalities of definitions.


Mapping the Landscape
In the aftermath of 9/11, the multilateral system found itself playing catch up with a
phenomenon that had escaped it. In many ways, the system that is now in place suffers from
the same catch up syndrome. Any horizon scanning must take into account the Al Qaeda
matrix constituted by the elements of transnationalization and franchising and how this matrix
has been adapted in the current reality.

Terrorism today has evolved into a direct threat to the society of states i.e., the
fundamental make-up of a multilateral order. The challenge that ISIL, Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab represent in their attempts to create a new political reality to supplant the state with
an alternative model is a fundamental threat to the core of the UN Charter and the
Sustainable Development agenda as well as to global peace and security more generally. In
other words, terrorist groups have evolved into entities with state aspirations and state-like
behavior, which serves as an existential threat to the state as an organizing entity of the
multilateral system. The global footprint of terrorist networks and their affiliates pays little
attention to traditional notions of borders and sovereignty. They recruit in one country, raise
funds in another, and potentially operate elsewhere. Terrorist networks of today are more

Ibid.
Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5
United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 2, 2004
3

loosely affiliated, transnational in nature, and difficult to monitor and penetrate than in the
past.
Violent extremist groups are mostly based in or operating in fragile and failed states,
parts of the world with the highest concentration of political injustice, corruption and proxy
wars. Recruits are a byproduct of that system i.e., failed citizens. Todays landscape is marked
by a shift from ideologically driven violence to motivations stemming from ethnic-religious
identity politics that manifests itself in exclusionary and unaccountable governance. Where
there is lacking social inclusion and participatory governance, extremism thrives.
A crucial element in the changed terrorism landscape is the lowered cost of committing
armed violence: a new unfettered access to weapons, finance and media allows extremist
groups to rival the state in unprecedented ways. Even the smallest of groups can access
markets, enabling access to political power and the possibility to contest the power of the state
and the notion of statehood itself.
Technology has placed increasingly lethal power in the hands of violent extremist
groups. The lines between conventional and non-conventional warfare have blurred to a point
of non-recognition. Terrorists use the Internet and social media in innovative ways for
fundraising, recruitment, disseminating propaganda, data mining, and coordination of their
activities. The Internet has proved its ability to quadruple the power base of local groups, while
keeping their anonymity and flexibility intact.

The challenge remains in trying to respond to such threats without mitigating civil
liberties and freedoms. Extensive counterterrorism measures that target the Internet often lead
to more authoritarianism, infringement on privacy and the free flow of information, and
restrictions on civil liberties. Indeed, this could yield a blowback of a different kind: the
securitization of political agendas where terrorist threats are apparently exaggerated. On the
societal level, blowback manifests itself in the rise of xenophobic groups, the increased
prominence of the extreme right, and the prevalence of hate-crimes, rendering fault lines of
identity politics more accentuated. In other words, maintaining support for the state is essential
in countering violent extremism; authoritarian and repressive measures implemented can serve
to undermine citizens support.
There is danger of focusing too much on Islamist groups, ignoring that there are other
extremisms on the rise which serve a threat to global peace and security. Beyond Islamist
extremist groups, a number of other terrorist organizations remain noteworthy on the peace
and security agenda: from Kahane Chai to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the National
Liberation Army (ELN), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to name a few.
Having said, many of these groups do not have the global attraction effect that AQ and ISIL
have/had. They are relatively more contained in terms of geography and "membership". In
some instances, states may be complicit in abetting terrorism and providing safe havens to
terrorists in pursuit of narrowly defined national interests.

The global response to certain religiously tinged incidents, however, can be imbalanced,
with most fixated on the Islamist variation of the phenomenon. A recent example is the
Anders Breivik massacre in Norway, the Christian coloring of which became understated and a
subject of heated debate. The response to such actswhere perpetrators are not immigrants of

a different race, religion, or backgroundis often different and disproportionate at the national
and international levels, particularly by the press. Rather than being characterized as terrorists,
such perpetrators are characterized as social outcasts or mentally disturbed. A more consistent
approach remains lacking.

Violent extremism once considered an external threat by many, has since evolved into
an internal one with the emergence of homegrown terrorist organizations/cells, several residing
in Western societies. In this instance, radical extremists mostly comprise second- and third-
generation immigrants, who turn against host societies where they have been born and raised.
In other cases, the key driver has been an identity crisis and a sense of alienation,
marginalization, and disillusionment: a lack of belonging to the Western society of their
upbringing or their ethnic countries of origin. Such individual aberrations independent from
(though often inspired by) transnational ideologies and groups range from the Boston marathon
bombing of 2013 to the Charlie Hebdo killings of 2015.

Terrorism is no longer local and can no longer be considered a menace in the distance,
which is evident in the proportion of people from different states across the world (foreign
terrorist fighters) who join these movements. With more than one hundred nationalities
fighting for ISIL, for example, questions abound as to the effects that the return of these fighters
will have on their respective home countries. It is expected that fighters will return so
radicalized, traumatized, or both that they will pose a serious danger. In a seminal study that
looked at outgoing foreign fighters from the West between 1990 and 2010, on average 1 in 9
became involved in militancy at home.6 Even if the ratio is significantly lower, given the sheer
number of foreign fighters today, blowback is clearly a major long-term security concern with
significant implications. However, the attention to foreign fighters must not eclipse the reality
that the proportions of recruitment are incomparably larger in the localities of the terrorist
groups, which are also the societies that bear the brunt of the violence.

Terrorist networks rely on a variety of illicit sources for funding their activities, such as
kidnapping, narcotics, illegal smuggling (e.g., drugs and weapons), and petty crimes. They also
draw support from front organizations, legitimate businesses, sympathetic backers (including
states) and nongovernmental organizations. In cases where the group exercises embryonic
state-like functions, it unabashedly levies taxes as an added source of revenues.


Drivers of Terrorism
It is hard to pinpoint the exact purpose of any terrorist as there are many factors - sociological,
economic and psychological - driving extremism, and thus, radicalization must be viewed as
highly individualized.

Traditional analyses of terrorism tend to identify causes through select or narrow lenses:
weak/fragile states; societies where freedom of expression is suppressed; socioeconomic
deficits, etc. Moving toward a more integrated analytical framework, the so-called 4-G

Thomas Hegghammer, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists Choice between
Domestic and Foreign Fighting American Political Science Review (February 2013)

framework,7 namely, Governance, Growth, God, and Geopoliticsdeveloped originally

to explain the drivers of contemporary conflictcould serve as an overarching structure for a
better understanding of the drivers and accelerators of terrorism.

Governance:
Terrorism flourishes in societies where governance structures are rudimentary,
inefficient, and exclusionary. Amid the backdrop of poverty and underdevelopment,
there is hardly a narrative of hope.
Terrorism and other violent forms of extremism also thrive in areas where the
government is simply absent or where service delivery is lacking, particularly in
marginalized areas and communities. Such vacuums have created the space for violent
groups to operate as welfare providers in the absence of the state.
Without sufficient faith in the governance model and a fair chance for upward mobility,
members in society, particularly youth, have a higher chance of being driven to
alternative paths of deliverance.
Nevertheless, the argument cannot be entirely based on socioeconomics: if that were
the sole factor, then terrorism hotspots would be located in sub-Saharan Africa, rather
than places such as Libya, which had the highest Human Development Index ranking in
Africa prior to the toppling of the Qaddafi regime in 2011.
With regards to recruitment, studies have failed to demonstrate that poor,
uneducated, and/or unemployed individuals are more likely to join a terrorist group. In
fact, it appears that terrorist recruits tend to have high levels of education and wealth.8
Moreover, the element of identity is seen to be an overriding factor from which
terrorists harvest their elements.
A key driver of identity-related grievances must be recognized in relation to
countermeasures as possible radicalizers, and there is a need to nuance thinking about
the potential effects of interventions and mass incarcerations in
counterterror/counter-crime policies.
Further, it must be recognized that freedom of speech is not exercised in a vacuum:
what represents freedom for some might be offensive to others, and can constitute a
driver for radicalization.

Growth:
While the global economy boasts unprecedented wealth and economic progress,
persistent inequality continues to serve as a threat to peace and security. The global
economy has tripled since 2000, with emerging economies driving growth for the past
five years.
This trend, however, has not resulted in a reduction of the inequalities that, in many
instances, have contributed to popular discontent, alienation, and a sense of
marginalization.
The grievances that emerge from inequalityas opposed to poverty specificallycould
be considered a driving catalyst for joining terrorist organizations.

7

Developed by Strategic Foresight Group (SFG), an international think tank that has worked with governments and
national institutions of more than fifty countries from four continents.
8
Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Malekova, Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Autumn, 2003)

God:
In the religious sphere, an era of radical faith-based extremism, from the Lords
Resistance Army to al-Qaida and beyond has been an integral part of the peace and
security picture for quite some time. Extreme interpretations of virtually all religions
including Pentecostal Christianity, Shia as well as Sunni Islam, Judaism, even Buddhism
and Hinduismare on the rise. Just as the Crusades of the twelfth century were about
competition for power in the name of God, so are those of the twenty-first.
Islamic extremism remains however the most prominent given the proliferation of such
groups from al-Qaida and its affiliates to ISIL. These actors have perverted the tenets of
Islam by using extreme religious interpretations to legitimize brutal tactics such as killing
innocent civilians and suicide bombing. Their global ambition is to create a new political
order, namely Islamic states based on radical interpretations of religious sharia law, e.g.,
Afghanistan under the Taliban rule or, more recently, the situation in areas in Syria and
Iraq under the control of ISIL.
The sustained onslaught of extremist ideology conditions some to a worldview that sets
them apart from the rest of the society. The use of religion is a powerful and persuasive
tool. The motivation to create a utopian society makes terrorism not simply a legitimate
but a necessary means to that end. And yet, terrorism that is seemingly religiously
driven may simply be perpetrated by regular criminals looking for gains, projects or
adventures that are justified by a higher purpose, or by individuals who are excluded
from society.

Geopolitics:
The post-Cold War order remains divided, with intra- and interstate fault lines of tension
and conflict emerging or re-emerging, while the leverage of major powers continues to
be in flux and, at times, waning. As a result, states have been known to resort to two
forms of terrorism as part of advancing geopolitical aims: state terrorism (government-
directed action targeting the general public) or state-sponsored terrorism (arming
violent rebel groups or harboring and providing safe havens for terrorist groups).
The Syrian quagmire is often cited as epitomizing the latter phenomenon, where some
armed factions/militias are considered as terrorists by one side and freedom fighters by
others, each serving as proxies for the geopolitical ambitions of their respective regional
or global masters.
Policy induced failures at the multilateral level have also contributed inadvertently to
empower terrorists. The way in which the policies in post-2003 Iraq and post-2012 Libya
created a breeding ground for violent extremists thus becomes imperative to consider.
An older driver though perhaps less relevant today than it was twenty years ago is
the Palestinian issue, which still represents a major injustice in Muslim communities and
thus remains a potential driver of Islamist extremism.


Terrorism and Organized Crime

Terrorism is not a monolith, and indeed, it often intersects with other transnational challenges.
In understanding the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, the way in which criminal
activity serves to undermine governance and the rule of law and create weaknesses in the state

structure for terrorists to exploit is of central importance, as well as the financial driver these
activities constitute.

Terrorism and organized crime are increasingly intertwined and interact in varied and
significant ways, to the detriment of global security interests. Although ideologies and
motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared
similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of
violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border
movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials. A
criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations.
Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal
activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass
political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale.9

A classic example of linkages is found in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), one of the oldest, most violent, and best-equipped terrorist organizations in Latin
America. It owes its longevity to its enormous profits derived not only from the drug trade but
also from extortion, illegal mining, and kidnapping ransoms. Other examples include the Taliban
in Afghanistan that has also consistently generated a considerable share of its revenues from
the drug trade. More recently, ISIL has generated significant revenue through the sale of illegal
oil. Such an illicit cash flow has helped it to swiftly transform into a lethal terrorist organization
drawing recruits from all over the world, with access to unprecedented military hardware and
equipment, most of which was left behind by Iraqi forces fleeing ISILs advance into Mosul.

While the nexus of organized crime and terrorism is important, the former constitutes
its own threat to global peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, organized crime has
gone from being a marginal issue affecting a few cities and regions to becoming a threat to
international peace and security. It undermines development and the rule of law and
perpetrates serious human rights violations, endangers health (and life), and plunders with
impunity some of the planets precious natural resources. Thus far, the response has been ad
hoc, reactive, and disjointed. There is insufficient information about the extent of the problem,
no mechanism to monitor implementation of the major instrument for fighting crime (namely
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime), and cooperation among
law enforcement agencies is insufficient.10
Organized crime is also exploited by states, which may be a significant obstacle to
multilateral cooperation in this field. In many cases the state is complicit and encouraging the
use of its territory for organized crime. States that are struggling to deliver a full range of
services progressively resort to delegate groups to govern themselves. Currently, there is a set
of measures to deal with organized crime, but the sanctions regime has focused more on the
political rather than the financial dimension of sanctions. Financial drivers remain
underestimated and understudied.


9

John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress,
Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, June 11, 2013.
10
Walter Kemp & Mark Shaw, From the Margins to the Mainstream: Toward an Integrated Multilateral Response to
Organized Crime, International Peace Institute (September 2014).

Multilateral Architecture Addressing Terrorism

Given the sheer scale of the challenge as well as its increasingly transnational nature, the fight
against terrorism is being pursued at the global, regional, and subregional levels. At the helm of
the multilateral response is the United Nations, though certain member states have often taken
the lead, operating independently or bilaterally. Nonetheless, a clear understanding of the role
played by regional organizations, intergovernmental agencies, and member states is needed to
assess the coherence and effectiveness of the overall multilateral counterterrorism architecture
in place today.

The United Nations

Counterterrorism has been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades, and the
organization remains the best placed in terms of coordinating an overall global counterterrorism
effort. Eighteen universal instruments (fourteen conventions and four amendments) against
international terrorism have been elaborated so far within the framework of the UN system.11
Member states, through the General Assembly, have been increasingly coordinating their
counterterrorism efforts and continuing their legal norm-setting work.

The Security Council remains at the forefront of efforts to combat terrorism.12 However,
it is important to recall that the General Assembly, along with other UN bodies, had launched
their initiatives to counter terrorism before the Security Council emerged as a dominant player
on the scene in the aftermath of 9/11. To consolidate these efforts, the Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established by the Secretary General in 2005 to enhance
coordination and coherence of counterterrorism activities within the UN system. The CTITF now
includes some thirty entities,13 ranging from Interpol to the World Health Organization, which is
indicative of the coordination and harmonization challenges that transgovernmental actors
confront as they work under a broadened definition of what constitutes counterterrorism. In
this way, the strategy and the task force serve as an operational bridge linking
intergovernmental political decisions to their implementation at the technical,
transgovernmental level.14 In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Security Council
established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), under Resolution 1373.15 The CTC was
established with the ultimate aim to increase the ability of states to fight terrorism. To assist the
CTCs work, the Security Council, through its Resolution 1535, set up a Counter-Terrorism
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 and
to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to member states.16

In September 2006, member states embarked upon a new phase in their
counterterrorism efforts by agreeing on a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) in the
General Assembly. The strategy marked, for the first time, that all member states of the United
Nations had agreed to a common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism. The
11

See Annex I.
For a detailed description of Security Council resolutions, committees, and subsidiary bodies, see Annex II.
13
See Annex III.
14
Alistair Millar, Multilateral Counterterrorism: Harmonizing Political Direction and Technical Expertise, Policy
Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, December 2010.
15
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1373
16
UN Security Council Resolution 1535 (March 26, 2004), UN Doc. S/RES/1535.
12

strategy forms a basis for a concrete plan of action: to address the conditions conducive to the
spread of terrorism; to prevent and combat terrorism; to take measures to build state capacity
to fight terrorism; to strengthen the role of the United Nations in combating terrorism; and to
ensure the respect of human rights while countering terrorism. The second biennial review of
the GCTS was carried out in September 2010. Thus, the GCTS is predicated on dissuasion, denial,
and cooperation while giving due consideration to human rights.

Much debate has abounded as to whether the current UN edifice is adequate or not.
Criticisms have been raised with regard to the fragmented and siloed approach of respective UN
instruments. In recent times, the United Nations Secretariat and membership were considering
a significant change to the UNs counterterrorism architecture: the creation of a position of a
single UN counterterrorism coordinator. The creation of such a position would allow the UN
better to leverage its comparative advantages as a convener, a norm-builder, a global
monitorand above all, as a strategic leader.17 The focus of these discussions were quickly
drawn to a number of intricate institutional, budgetary, and human resources questionseach
loaded with significant political implications.

Whether or not they march to the beat of one drum, UN bodies have important and
diverse roles to play in advancing the global fight against terrorismincluding monitoring the
emergence of terrorism in the field; supporting victims to play a leadership role in mobilizing
social resistance to terrorism; helping states ensure that their counterterrorism efforts
reinforce, rather than undermine, human rights; or resolving the conflicts that create conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism.18

To deal with underlying conditions and root causes, the UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has established programs to encourage interreligious and
cultural dialogue and promote moderate perspectives in educational, religious, and cultural
institutions to prevent them from becoming platforms of incitement and recruitment. Similarly,
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has programs that indirectly contribute to
counterterrorism efforts. By maintaining a long-term presence in most developing countries,
UNDP plays a vital role in support of strategic linkages particularly vis--vis civil society and the
private sector. UNDP supports UN member states in constructive engagement with disaffected
groups prone to violence and promoting political and social inclusion as a means of helping to
address grievances. Although it remains reluctant to do so, UNDP also has a potentially
significant role to play in emphasizing the inherent linkages between development and security
and ensuring better coordination between development assistance and counterterrorism
capacity-building efforts.19

Regional and Subregional Organizations

Beyond the UN system, numerous regional and subregional institutions play an important role in
counterterrorism. Regional multilateral bodies at this level have a number of strengths:
specialized knowledge of a region/political platform, substantive expertise of local conditions,
17

James Cockayne et al., Reshaping United Nations Counterterrorism Efforts, Washington, DC, The Global Center,
March 2012.
18
Ibid.
19
Millar, Multilateral Counterterrorism.

unique approaches grounded in a particular culture or context, and enhanced information

sharing. They also are often able to undertake region-specific initiatives that complement and
boost global efforts. Overall, they provide a resource that has not been used enough by the UN
system to the greatest advantage. Specifically for implementation of UN mechanisms, regional
organizations can contribute in terms of: 1) developing region-tailored implementation
strategies, timetables, and evaluation plans; 2) mobilizing political will and support in fulfilling
implementation commitment by regional governments; and 3) facilitating cross-regional
assistance and cooperation so that regional organizations that have developed expertise and
experience can provide support to those still developing these capacities.20

Certain regional and subregional entities have adopted counterterrorism treaties to
augment their members capacity to coordinate the investigation, prosecution, and extradition
of terrorist suspects. When endowed with proper resources and mandate, they have been
effective transmission belts between what is adopted at the global level and the states trying to
implement that framework.21 For example, some regional bodies, such as the Organization of
American States (OAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have developed uniquely holistic counterterrorism
programs. Various other regional bodies have been much less successful, offering only rhetorical
statements of the need for a more holistic approach. Unfortunately, this is occurring in the parts
of the world that are most plagued by terrorism threats: West Africa, the Sahel, South Asia,
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Incidentally, these are also regions where member states
are often the most lacking in their capacity and, in some cases, in the political will to confront
the threat.22 In the case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), this
deficit has been largely addressed by its 2013 Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation
Plan, which has a stated purpose to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related criminal acts
in West Africa.23

The lack of a definition of terrorism also explains the different approaches taken at the
regional and subregional level. For example, a tension has always been at the heart of the
relationship of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to the global counterterrorism
architecture, given the bodys contention with the denomination of groups resisting foreign
occupations as terrorist entities.24



20

Xiaohui (Anne) WU, A Regional-Global Paradigm for Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy, Defence Against Terrorism Review 2, No. 2 (Fall 2009): 8398.
21
Millar, Multilateral Counterterrorism.
22
For a more detailed explanation of the role of regional organizations in this context, see: Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar,
Jason Ipe, and Michael Healey, The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional and Subregional Bodies:
Strengthening a Critical Partnership, Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, October
2008.
23
See Institute for Security Studies, The New ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Its Implications for West
Africa, March 13, 2013, available at www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-new-ecowas-counter-terrorism-strategy-and-
its-implications-for-west-africa .
24
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on
Combating International Terrorism, Annex to Resolution No: 59/26-P, July 1999, Article 2(a), available at
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e6646.html .

10

Other Transgovernmental and Technical Bodies

Transgovernmental cooperation is quite effective in tackling terrorism at a more technical and
operational level. This is exemplified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), whose objectives
it is to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational
measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the
integrity of the international financial system. The FATF is therefore a policymaking body,
which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and
regulatory reforms in these areas. Although the FATF is an ad hoc coalition of thirty-six members
based on strict membership criteria, it is replicating its efforts by helping establish FATF-Style
Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in all regions, including Africa and the Middle East.

In response to mandates handed down from the intergovernmental level, technical
bodies have proven quite valuable to counterterrorism.25 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) has turned its Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) and Global Programme against
Money-Laundering into highly effective capacity builders, giving technical assistance to help
countries join and implement the universal instruments against terrorism. This assistance has
included legislative drafting and training for criminal justice professionals. TPB has delivered
country-specific assistance throughout the world, extended aid to other countries via regional
and subregional workshops, and trained hundreds of lawmakers and criminal justice officials on
ratification and implementation of the universal treaties against terrorism. UN specialized
bodies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs
Organizations (WCO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) also have developed,
adopted, and disseminated counterterrorism-related standards. These bodies have provided
training and other forms of assistance in their specialties and, likewise, advised states on how to
uphold global counterterrorism norms.26

Several other programs have contributed significantly to the disruption of terror
networks at an operational level. For example, the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL) has a particularly extensive counterterrorism program. It gathers, stores, evaluates,
and exchanges information about suspected individuals and groups and coordinates the
circulation of alerts and warnings on terrorists, dangerous criminals, and weapons to police
among its 190 member countries.

From Counterterrorism to Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism

The paradigm shift from counterterrorism (CT) to countering violent extremism
(CVE), has allowed for greater awareness of the root causes that lead to terrorism and the need
to move beyond traditional methods based on the application of military force, public
diplomacy, pressure to democratize, or broad-based poverty alleviation.27 Rather than
envisioning counterterrorism efforts as a war fought through military tactics, this soft approach
to CVE re-positions military intervention as one tool among many.28

25

Millar, Multilateral Counterterrorism.

Ibid.
27
Daniel P. Aldrich, Mightier than the Sword: Social Science and Development in Countering Violent Extremism,
Frontiers in Development, 2012, available at www.equalaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/Daniel-P.-Aldrich.pdf .
28
Ibid.
26

11

While the terminology and the policy framework of CVE is relatively new, it builds on
longstanding bodies of work to counter radicalization and prevent violence, and it draws on a
number of related areas of practice, including public diplomacy, strategic communications,
development, and conflict prevention or mitigation. Today, CVE is an articulated interest of
numerous international organizations and associations, including the United Nations, the
European Union, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). However, establishing a clear
definition of CVE remains a challenge.29 A substantial debate exists about the definition of CVE
and, therefore, the subsequent policy implications.

The deep interconnectedness of security and development is central in CVE. An
implication for the multilateral system is in this sense to bring the peace and security and
development intersections onto the agenda and involve the UNDP or other development
agencies to have a partnering role. This plays into the UNs comparative advantage in that it
focuses on inter-sectoral partnerships to address the multiple dimensions of preventive
measures, and has the potential of adding more tools into the toolbox of multilateral
approaches.

As part of the transition in thinking from counterterrorism to CVE, practitioners have
advocated for a greater incorporation of peacebuilders in a CVE approach. The peacebuilding
community and its related methods and practices can help develop a more expansive
understanding of violent extremism and its causes and a more localized, inclusive, and
sustainable approach to countering it.30

In this regard, the role of youth cannot be underestimated. Multilateral institutions are
not configured towards youth: communication channels are limited and ineffective and
mechanisms are not inclusive enough. The majority of youth represent great partners in working
for peace and are capable of real agency. The argument should not solely be based on
employment: research shows that livelihoods alone are not enough to circumvent
confrontational tendencies in youth, but that peace skills must accompany employment. Such a
powerful combination not only helps to avoid unrest and/or radicalization, but also enables
youth to become partners in peace building and agents of positive change.

The role of civil society and the private sector has taken greater importance in light of
the shift toward the CVE paradigm. Practitioners have argued for a greater emphasis on building
the capacity of civil society, and therein local ownership, in making CVE programming more
effective. This will, in turn, strengthen the resilience of communities susceptible to
radicalization.31 Practitioners have also recognized the role of civil society members in
strengthening rule-of-law-based terrorism prevention and CVE, and as interlocutors between
communities and local law enforcement institutions.32 Further, implementation of UN and

29

Ibid.
Georgia Holmer, Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective, Special Report, Washington, DC, US
Institute of Peace, August 29, 2013, available at www.usip.org/publications/countering-violent-extremism-
peacebuilding-perspective .
31
Ibid.
32
Global Center on Cooperative Security, Strengthening Rule of Law-Based Responses to Terrorism and Violent
Extremism in South Asia: What Role for Civil Society? workshop, Singapore, December 2014.
30

12

multilateral strategies will require popular support, which can only be built and sustained with
the support and cooperation of civil society.33

The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism,
as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state
needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to
successfully counter this phenomenon.34 Such public-private partnerships are therefore a crucial
component to move forward.

The role of the private sector in strengthening the nexus of counterterrorism and
commerce has not been fully appreciated.35 The private sector should be viewed as a source of
financial resources and partnership in transportation, communication, media (internet and
online messaging), and security.36 Corporations may be regarded as collectors and holders of
information, stewards of critical infrastructure and material that could be used in an attack, and
as important actors in preventing and responding to attacks.37


Multilateral Architecture Addressing Organized Crime
Organized crime only became a threat to international peace and security after the end
of the Cold War. Therefore, the institutions and legal instruments that have been created to
deal with the threat are relatively new. One challenge is the fact that there are a plethora of
organizations that deal with organized crime including more than a dozen bodies within the
UN, plus INTERPOL, and a number of regional organizations. There is no one body to coordinate
these various players. Multi-lateral governance designed to deal with organized crime therefore
can be significantly improved.

Within the UN, much of the action takes place in Vienna through the United Nations on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and governance bodies like the UN Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and the Conference of the Parties to
the UNTOC. However, issues relating to the impact of organized crime on security are usually
discussed in New York. This gap needs to be bridged more effectively.

There is limited information about crime data and trends. For example, there is no
World Crime Report. Could indicators be developed (e.g., in relation to a relevant SDG) to
enable self-assessments to be carried out and to measure progress (inter alia in relation to

33

Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe, Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
Opportunities and Challenges, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2008.
34
OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A
Community-Policing Approach, Vienna, OSCE, February 2014.
35
See also, The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. available at
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtmlSee also Strategy
for Partnerships between States and Business to Counter Terrorism, approved by the G8
Global Forum for Partnerships between States and Businesses to Counter Terrorism, Moscow,
November 30, 2006, available at http://en.g8russia.ru/page_work/32.html .
36
Stanley Foundation, Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 42nd Conference on the
United Nations of the Next Decade June 813, 2007.
37
James B. Steinberg, Information Exchange between the Public and Private Sector for Homeland Security, 2003.

13

implementation of the Palermo Convention)? There are also few experts within the UN system
to counter-act this global problem.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

The current multilateral architecture dealing with the threats of terrorism and organized crime
is not sufficient. The bulk of efforts remain bilateral or unilateral. And yet, given that the
challenge is increasingly multifaceted with global/national/local dimensions, it is essential to
synergize strategies between all of these levels, and to bolster the one mechanism best suited to
lead the way: the United Nations. It is uniquely placed to be a convener and a mobilizer of a
multi-stakeholder strategy operating at the global, regional and local levels. While it is hard to
change or shape the policies of key member states, there is a possibility of changing the
structure of the mechanisms and the processes themselves.

The following presents a series of conclusions seen through three lenses (Leadership;
Effectiveness and Efficiency; and Partnerships) from which to form recommendations for the
United Nations and multilateral system at large. At the heart of the conclusions are three
concrete recommendations:
1. A new compact among Member States that reflects the challenges ahead and reaffirms
that there is no alternative but cooperation, solidarity and transparency.
2. An effectively devised and efficiently amplified global counter-narrative to neutralize
and dilute the violent extremist narrative.
3. Institutional reforms at the United Nations and elsewhere to help realize the above
aims.

Leadership and Norm Setting

Reaffirm norms and a new compact: While a universal UN definition of terrorism
continues to be elusive, there ought to be stricter implementation of a universal zero
tolerance norm. This can be achieved through the start of an intergovernmental
process, one in which Member States reaffirm their political will to implement the zero-
tolerance strategy. Within this suggested new compact, Member States must pledge
not to engage in the arming of rebels or support illicit non-state military actors. Indeed,
there is enough evidence to suggest that non-state violent actors cannot metamorphose
into large-scale terror outfits without the support of organized entities (including States,
mafias and organized crime groups). The State has the responsibility to follow civilized
values as a means to preclude the future existence of terror outfits.

Centralize leadership: with the United Nations at the helm of such an initiative, it must
step up to its role as the leader of a multilateral effort. The Secretary General in close
coordination with Member States should carefully review the potential of creating the
position of a single UN counterterrorism coordinator. The creation of such a position
would allow the UN better to leverage its comparative advantages as a convener, a
norm-builder, a global monitorand above all, as a strategic leader. The designated
person must be empowered to carry out his/her functions.

Messaging and production of counternarrative: as part of a concerted multilateral
approach to counter and prevent violent extremism, a new narrative needs to be

14

produced to neutralize and dilute the violent extremist narrative. Political sensitivities
may prevent the UN from devising the message itself but it remains best suited to be
the messenger. Such a message can be developed through the creation of a Taskforce or
Ad-Hoc Committee comprising individuals from civil society, religious leaders, private
sector and, above all, youth actors from around the globe and led by an
organization/institution which can provide adequate political space for such a
discussion.

Consistent application of new concepts and trends: As the transition from CT to CVE
continues to unfold and become more accepted by players around the globe, the UN
must shore up its efforts to see this being reflected in core programming across its
agencies and departments. The soon to be launched UN Counterterrorism Strategy
developed by the Office of the Secretary General in coordination with existing UN CT
bodies should produce clear and tangible guidelines for such a process
A Global Crime Control Strategy: Devise a Global Crime Control Strategy on the model
of the Counterterrorism Strategy. Such a strategy would strengthen implementation of
the Palermo Convention and its Protocols, enhance coordination among the relevant
parts of the UN family, and enable member states to engage a broader spectrum of
partners, including regional organizations, the private sector, and civil society.

Efficiency and Effectiveness:

Removing bureaucratic restraints: The UNs CT strategy is at times driven by

bureaucratic restraints, not by strategic considerations. Its ability to lead strategically
must be more dynamic and responsive its CT policies are too reactive and not
anticipatory enough, and the current response time is too long. Similarly, siloed
approaches can often render responses ineffective. Strategies are often developed
without identifying the links between different challenges or taking the root causes into
account. As such, a specific silo-busting review of the existing counter-terrorism
architecture could be pursued. Specifically, this review ought to consider how agencies
and departments are not left insulated from the UNs CT machinery38 and how to
overcome the problem of siloed budget lines, which continues to compromise efforts,
particularly at the field level.
Enhanced communication and information sharing: Enhanced communication between
and within agencies would further improve coordination particularly where there is
significant overlap. A strategy could be devised for how particular UN hubs directly
dealing with the nexus of terrorism and organized crime (i.e., UNODC and the UNTOC in
Vienna, and CTC and the CTITF in New York, among many others) can communicate
more effectively. Cooperation is synonymous with information and intelligence sharing,
which can be pursued both vertically and horizontally at local, regional, and
international levels.
Improved early warning: The United Nations often suffers from short attention spans. A
focus on a short list of priority areas or abrupt switches from one crisis to another risks
diverting resources and attention from regions not currently on the priority list but
that are nonetheless fragile and vulnerable, which could be counter-productive to

38

One salient example is the need to consider multilateral drugs regulatory policy as of fundamental strategic
importance for the CT agenda.

15

combating future threats. Input from technical experts internal and external - is
essential to keep those who set the agenda from putting all the attention on a narrow
set of current hot spots and, thus, missing opportunities to prevent future hubs of
terrorism from emerging.39 Similarly, warning signs about organized crime should be
factored into threat assessments.
Improved legal frameworks: In spite of considerable progress in law enforcement and
countering financing of terrorism, gaps remain within the international legal framework
against terrorism. For instance, an early finalization of the proposed Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), still under the consideration of the UN,
would be helpful in filling the gaps and addressing a host of unregulated issues.
Development to Reduce Vulnerability: Underdevelopment can increase vulnerability to
criminality and extremism. Similarly, extremism and crime can hamper development.
Therefore, consistent with Sustainable Development Goal 16 to promote peaceful and
inclusive societies for sustainable development, work to reduce all forms of violence and
trafficking, promote the rule of law, and substantially reduce corruption and bribery in
all its forms (including through more effective implementation of the UN Convention
against Corruption).
Strengthening national capacity: Ultimately, it is up to member states to counter
violent extremism and organized crime. Therefore, consistent with SDG 16, efforts
should be made to strengthen relevant national institutions, including through
international cooperation, for building capacities at all levels, in particular in developing
countries, for preventing violence and combating terrorism and crime.
Cutting the financial flows: terrorist acts require funding, while organized crime is
motivated by profit. Cutting the financial flows to terrorists and from criminals would
increase the risks of their activities. Therefore, more action is needed to combat
terrorist financing, reduce illicit financial and arms flows, and strengthen recovery and
return of stolen assets.


Partnership:
Engaging Youth: Any multilateral CVE effort that is to have any impact must include a
strong youth component. A more defined and prominent role must be played by the UN
Special Envoy for Youth to serve as a face for a multilateral CVE strategy, assist with the
creation of the aforementioned counter-narrative, and identify relevant influential
youth actors at the regional and local level around the globe.
International Partnerships: The United Nations must use all the tools at its disposal for
its efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism and organized crime. In that regard,
by engaging with regional and subregional organizations, there is an opportunity to
improve response time and share capabilities and burdens- and create synergies across
different areas through greater cooperation. Regional organizations have a lot of
resources and experiences and there is a need to look into how the multilateral system
can draw upon the strengths of each organization to determine where effective
partnerships can be forged. Such partnerships can also add legitimacy to the multilateral
strategy against extremism and organized crime.
Local Partnerships: Partnerships with local groups, civil society and the private sector
are indispensable in combining responses to terrorism and organized crime. Such groups
could be particularly helpful when it comes to needs assessments as well as impact
39

Ibid.

16

assessments of UN operations on the ground. Through local partnerships, the

multilateral system may improve its diagnosis of the problem and better gauge the
impact of its policies by achieving a more thorough understanding of perceptions on the
ground.
Selectivity and prudence: The sheer number of actors operating at the different levels
in the CVE/PVE area has produced a web of overlapping mandates and structures that
could effectively hinder overall effectiveness. Duplication remains a risk. By
indiscriminately recruiting every actor with a plausible counterterrorism connection, the
efforts within the United Nations run a significant risk to their effectiveness on the
ground.40 Similarly, the space for civil society is complex and contested and the UN
should show prudence and develop a more effective selection process for all its
partnerships.

40

Millar, Multilateral Counterterrorism.

17

Annex I
International Conventions
Fourteen major legal instruments and additional amendments addressing terrorism exist within the UN
context, as follows:
1.

1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Aircraft
Convention)
o Applies to acts affecting in-flight safety;
o Authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint,
on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit
such an act, where necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft; and
o Requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and to return control of the
aircraft to the lawful commander.

2.

1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft

(Unlawful Seizure Convention)
o Makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight to unlawfully, by force
or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that
aircraft or to attempt to do so;
o Requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by severe penalties
o Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or
submit the case for prosecution; and
o Requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought
under the Convention.

3.

1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Civil
Aviation Convention)
o Makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of
violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger
the safety of the aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; to attempt such
acts; or to be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such
acts;
o Requires parties to the Convention to make offences punishable by severe penalties;
and
o Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or
submit the case for prosecution.

4.

1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons (Diplomatic Agents Convention)
o Defines an internationally protected person as a head of state, minister for foreign
affairs, representative or official of a state or international organization who is entitled
to special protection in a foreign state, and his/her family; and

18

Requires parties to criminalize and make punishable by appropriate penalties which

take into account their grave nature the intentional murder, kidnapping, or other
attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, a violent attack
upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of
such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act constituting
participation as an accomplice.

5.

1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention)

o Provides that any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to
continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an
international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of
this Convention.

6.

1980
Convention
on
the
Physical
Protection
of
Nuclear
Material
(Nuclear Materials Convention)
o Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, or theft of nuclear material and
threats to use nuclear material to cause death, serious injury, or substantial property
damage.

Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
o
o

Makes it legally binding for states parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in
peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport; and
Provides for expanded cooperation between and among states regarding rapid
measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any
radiological consequences or sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

7.

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety)
(Airport Protocol)
o Extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass
terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

8.

1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(Maritime Convention)
o Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation
that is similar to the regimes established for international aviation; and
o Makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control
over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a

19

person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to
place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety
of ships.

2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation
o
o

o
o

Criminalizes the use of a ship as a device to further an act of terrorism;

Criminalizes the transport on board a ship of various materials knowing that they are
intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage
to further an act of terrorism;
Criminalizes the transporting on board a ship of persons who have committed an act of
terrorism; and
Introduces procedures for governing the boarding of a ship believed to have committed
an offence under the Convention.

9.

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol)
o Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental
shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation.

10. 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
o Adapts the changes to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation to the context of fixed platforms located on the
continental shelf.

11. 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic
Explosives Convention)
o Designed to control and limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives
(negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing);
o Parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control over
unmarked plastic explosive, i.e., those that do not contain one of the detection agents
described in the Technical Annex to the treaty;
o Generally speaking, each party must, inter alia, take necessary and effective measures
to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives; prevent the
movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; exercise strict and
effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or
imported prior to the entry into force of the Convention; ensure that all stocks of
unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed,
marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary
measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police are
destroyed, consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen

20

years; and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives
manufactured after the date of entry into force of the Convention for that state.

12. 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(Terrorist Bombing Convention)
o Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of
explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public places with
intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction
of the public place.

13. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(Terrorist Financing Convention)
o Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists,
whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social, or cultural
goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking or gun running;
o Commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly, or
administratively liable for such acts; and
o Provides for the identification, freezing, and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist
activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other states on a case-by-
case basis. Bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to cooperate.

14. 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
(Nuclear Terrorism Convention)
o Covers a broad range of acts and possible targets, including nuclear power plants and
nuclear reactors;
o Covers threats and attempts to commit such crimes or to participate in them, as an
accomplice;
o Stipulates that offenders shall be either extradited or prosecuted;
o Encourages states to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information
and assisting each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition
proceedings; and
o Deals with both crisis situations (assisting states to solve the situation) and post-crisis
situations (rendering nuclear material safe through the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)).

***

21

Annex II: Security Council Counterterrorism Resolutions, Committees, and Subsidiary Bodies

The presidential statement adopted by the first-ever Security Council Summit held in January
1992 against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War had expressed its deep concern over acts
of international terrorism. Since then, acting under Chapter VII in confronting the scourge of
terrorism, the Security Council had adopted various resolutions and imposed sanctions regimes
that had made mandatory the thrust of non-binding provisions of various terrorism-related
conventions. In pursuance of Article 30 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has set up
various subsidiary bodies to carry out its work.

The Security Council imposed sanctions against states considered having links to certain
acts of terrorism, including Libya (1992); Sudan (1996); and Afghanistan (1999, expanded to
include al-Qaida in 2000 by Resolution 1333).

The Security Council set up the 1267 Committee in 1999 by its Resolution 1267 and
tasked it with monitoring the sanctions against the Taliban (and subsequently al-Qaida as of
2000). An analytical support and sanctions monitoring team comprising experts in
counterterrorism and related legal issues, arms embargoes, travel bans, and terrorist financing
was appointed to assist the committee. Through its Resolution 1269 (1999), the Council urged
countries to work together to prevent and suppress all terrorist acts.
The mandate of the 1267 Committee stems from Security Council Resolution 1267 (of
1999). The mandate of the 1267 Committee was subsequently updated including through
Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009), which inter alia established the Office of
Ombudsperson to handle the delisting requests from the Consolidated List. The core
responsibility of the 1267 Committee is to work with member states to implement sanctions
against al-Qaida and the Taliban, and their associated groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed,
Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Security Council established the Counter-
Terrorism Committee (CTC), under Resolution 1373 (2001). The sweeping provisions of this
resolution requests all states to: criminalize the financing of terrorists; freeze without delay any
funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism; deny all forms of financial support for
terrorist groups; suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance, or support for terrorists;
share information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts;
cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition, and
prosecution of those involved in such acts; and criminalize active and passive assistance for
terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice and implement effective border control
measures. The resolution also calls on states to become parties, as soon as possible, to the
relevant international counterterrorism instruments.

The CTC was established with the ultimate aim to increase the ability of states to fight
terrorism. Unlike the 1267 Committee, it is not a sanctions body, nor does it maintain a list of
terrorist organizations or individuals. To assist the CTCs work, the Security Council through its
Resolution 1535, set up a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to
monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 and to facilitate the provision of technical
assistance to member states.

22

Through Resolution 1540 (2004), which calls on states to prevent nonstate actors
(including terrorist groups) from accessing weapons of mass destruction, the Security Council
established the 1540 Committee.

The Security Council in subsequent resolutions urged member states to take action
against groups and organizations engaged in terrorist activities that were not subject to the
1267 Committees review. Resolution 1566 (2004) established the 1566 Working Group made
up of all Security Council members to recommend practical measures against such individuals
and groups, as well as to explore the possibility of setting up a compensation fund for victims of
terrorism.

On the margins of the 2005 World Summit, the Security Council held a high-level
meeting and adopted Resolution 1624 (2005) condemning all acts of terrorism irrespective of
their motivation, as well as the incitement to such acts. It also called on member states to
prohibit by law terrorist acts and incitement to commit them and to deny safe haven to anyone
guilty of such conduct.

Through a number of additional resolutions, the Security Council has in the past few
years strengthened the work of its counterterrorism bodies. In its Resolution 2133 (2014), it
called on states not to pay ransom to terrorist kidnappers. Recently, through Resolution 2178
(2014), it called on member states to prevent suspected foreign terrorist fighters from traveling
to member states and create legislation to prosecute them. The resolution defines foreign
terrorist fighters as individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in,
terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with
armed conflict.

23

Annex III: CTITF Entities

Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
Department of Public Information (DPI)
Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
Expert Staff of 1540 Committee
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
Monitoring Team of 1267 Committee
Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA)
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
Office of the Secretary-General (OSG)
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering
terrorism
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
World Customs Organization (WCO)
World Bank
World Health Organization (WHO)

Observers

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)
United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

24

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