Strategi PKPPK

DOT/FAA/TC-13/12
Federal Aviation Administration

William J. Hughes Technical Center
Aviation Research Division
Atlantic City International Airport
New Jersey 08405
Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting

Strategies and Tactical
Considerations for New Large
Aircraft
April 2013
Final Report
This document is available to the U.S. public

through the National Technical Information
Services (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161.
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Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center at
actlibrary.tc.faa.gov
U.S. Department of Transportation

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1. Report No.
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
DOT/FAA/TC-13/12
4. Title and Subtitle
5. Report Date
AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING STRATEGIES AND TACTICAL

CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW LARGE AIRCRAFT
April 2013
7. Author(s)
8. Performing Organization Report No.
6. Performing Organization Code
Jack Kreckie
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
ARFF Professional Services, LLC

11 Lantern Lane
Milford, MA 01757
11. Contract or Grant No.
DTFACT-10-D-00008
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
U.S. Department of Transportation

Airport Engineering Division (AAS-300)
800 Independence Avenue SW
Washington, D.C. 20591
Final Report
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
AAS-300
15. Supplementary Notes
The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Research Division COR was Keith Bagot.
16. Abstract
The evolution of aircraft design and construction has brought about new challenges to Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF)
personnel. The New Large Aircraft (NLA) entering the market have introduced increased passenger capacities, fuel loads,
hydraulic pressures, and the use of advance composite materials. The most significant change is the introduction of the fulllength, upper-passenger deck on the Airbus A380 with certification for up to 853 total passengers. The B-747-8 was just
beginning flight service in the United States as this report was being developed. A supplement to this report will be issued
following additional research specific to the B-747-8.
This report examines previous incidents with multilevel aircraft, as well as research conducted in relevant areas such as aircraft
evacuations and advanced composite materials. In addition, accepted interior firefighting models were applied to the unique NLA
configurations, thereby providing guidance for emergency planning of such events.
This report provides a discussion of the primary topics, such as agent quantity, aircraft systems, and components, which are
pertinent to NLA firefighting strategies. Configurations and aspects of NLA layouts that require strategic consideration, and
influence ARFF tactical decisions and response preplanning, are discussed in this report, as well as recommendations for best
practices in NLA firefighting strategies.
17. Key Words
NLA, Composite, Tactics, Strategies, ARFF, A380, VLTA, B747-8, IAV, HRET, Evacuation, Ventilation, New Generation
Aircraft
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
Form DOT F 1700.7
(8-72)
18. Distribution Statement
This document is available to the U.S. public through the

National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield,
Virginia 22161. This document is also available from the
Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical
Center at actlibrary.tc.faa.gov
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified
Reproduction of completed page authorized
21. No. of Pages
138
22. Price
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author acknowledges the following people as intrinsic to the writing of this report:
Herbert Gielen, Airport Safety Manager, Airbus

Robert Mathis, Deputy Fire Chief, Boeing Fire Department
Gerry Moore, Station Manager, JFK International Airport, Emirates
Dominic Demerets, Assistant Station Manager, JFK International Airport, Air France
Ralph Strafaci, Assistant Station Manager, JFK International Airport, Korean Air
Christopher Michaels, JFK International Airport Duty Station Manager, Lufthansa
German Airline
Dana Larsen, Los Angeles City Fire Department, Los Angeles International Airport
Keith Bagot, Airport Safety Specialist, FAA Airport Research and Technology Branch
Nick Subottin,Airport Research Specialist, FAA Airport Research and Technology
Branch
John Hode, Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Research Specialist, SRA International, Inc.
Patricia R. Kreckie, President, ARFF Professional Services, LLC
iii/iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
xvii
1.
INTRODUCTION
2.
FIREFIGHTING AGENT QUANTITY CONSIDERATIONS
3.
EVACUATION SLIDES
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
6
7
8
8
Evacuation Slide Assistance

Mechanical Factors
Large Aircraft Evacuation
Obstruction to ARFF Operations
4.
INTERIOR ACCESS VEHICLE
10
5.
HISTORICAL REVIEWB-747 AND A380 EVACUATIONS
12
5.1
5.2
The B-747 Incidents

The A380 Incidents: Singapore Changi Airport
12
14
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.3.2
14
15
17
6.
7.
8.
Singapore Changi Airport: Singapore Airlines Flight 221

Singapore Changi Airport: Qantas Flight 32
The Finkenwerker Plant A380 Evacuation Test
HUMAN FACTORS
17
6.1
6.2
17
18
Passenger Demographics and Behavior

Emergency Responders
VENTILATION
19
7.1
7.2
7.3
Ventilation Objectives
Ventilation Strategies
Ventilation Methods
19
20
20
7.3.1
7.3.2
7.3.3
7.3.4
7.3.5
7.3.6
20
20
21
21
21
22
Horizontal Ventilation
Vertical Ventilation
Positive Pressure Ventilation
Hydraulic (or Forced) Ventilation
Oxygen Deprivation
Multideck Aircraft Ventilation Design
AIRCRAFT ACCESS
24
9.
10.
11.
EXTERIOR FIRES
26
9.1
9.2
9.3
27
27
27
Overall Size
Passenger Capacity
Obstructions to Exterior Streams
INTERIOR FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS
29
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
29
32
35
37
45
48
48
53
Access
Avionics Bays
Lavatory Fires
Lower-Deck Spaces Designed for Occupancy
Galleys
Main Cabin Fires
Initial Entry
Consideration for Interior Fire Attack
THE HRET OPERATIONS
59
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
59
61
61
64
67
The HRET Design and Capability

Using HRET for Remote Access to Aircraft Cabin
Using FLIR Cameras and TICs
Upper-Deck Piercing
Fires in Lower Deck (Belly Compartments)
12.
CARGO COMPARTMENT DOORS
71
13.
LANDING GEAR AND BRAKE HAZARDS
75
13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
76
76
78
78
78
Brake Overheat
Wheel Fires
Landing Gear Extension and Retraction System
Braking Systems
Steering
14.
HYDRAULIC AND COOLING SYSTEMS
79
15.
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
80
15.1
15.2
15.3
15.4
15.5
80
82
84
85
85
Composite Material Use

Advanced Composite Materials on the A380
Effects of Fire on Composite Materials
Extinguishment
Protection
16.
AUXILIARY POWER UNIT
85
17.
FUEL SYSTEM
87
vi
18.
THE U.S. AIRPORTS SERVING NLA
88
18.1
18.2
88
89
Cabin Configuration
First-Class Suites
19.
THE B-747-800 SERIES AIRCRAFT
92
20.
SUMMARY
93
21.
REFERENCES
95
22.
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION

APPENDICES
ASeating Charts for the A380
BFirefighting Practices for New Generation Commercial Composite Structures
CGalden HT135 Fluid MSDS and Safety Data Sheet
DARAC ARFF Recommendations Working GroupFinal Recommendation for
Quantity of Agent for NLA
EFuel Weight/Volume Conversion
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
Page
Upper-Deck Evacuation Slide Deployment Lengths
The A380 TCA/PCA Areas With Evacuation Slides Deployed
Approach of ARFF Vehicles With Slides Deployed
10
Slide Emergency Evacuation of a B-747-438View 1
13
Slide Emergency Evacuation of a B-747-438View 2
13
Singapore Airlines Flight 221, A380 Off Pavement
14
Gear of SQ Flight 221, A380 Off Pavement
14
Deplaning Passengers From QF Flight 32
15
Number 2 Engine of QF Flight 32
16
10
Forward Stairway Between Decks on Air France A380
22
11
Rear Stairway Between Decks on Air France A380
23
12
Service Elevator on A380
23
13
The ML4 Door, Interior View; Type A Passenger Door With Slide Container
24
14
The ML1 Door A380, Exterior Operation View
24
15
Exterior Door Operation DemonstrationStep 6
25
16
Exterior Door Operation DemonstrationStep 7
26
17
Korean A380 With Two Jet Bridges Extended at JFK
28
18
Training to Shut Down and Secure the Aircraft
30
19
Cockpit Window Operation
30
20
Emirates A380 Business-Class Cabin
31
21
Avionics Bay Locations
33
22
Access Hatch From Forward Fuselage Left Side to Main Avionics Bay
33
23
Access to the Upper Avionics Bay From the Landing at the Top of the Forward Stairs 34
viii
24
Upper Avionics Bay With Leaning Rail Raised, Exposing the Locked Door
34
25
Access to Upper-Deck Avionics From Lounge/Seating Area
35
26
Access Point to Upper-Deck Avionics Through the Lavatory
35
27
Typical Labels Seen on Compartments Used to Store Fire Extinguishers and Hoods
36
28
Upper-Deck Lavatory on Emirates A380
36
29
First-Class Lavatory/Shower on Emirates A380
37
30
Lavatory Door Locks
37
31
Lower-Deck Cabin Crew Rest Area, Individual Bunk (Air France)
38
32
Access Door From Main Deck to Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area
38
33
Access Ladder to Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area
39
34
Airtight Hatch Door to Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area
39
35
Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area, A380
40
36
Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area Lavatory, Lufthansa A380
40
37
Secondary Exit From Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area, Lufthansa A380
41
38
Emergency Exit Hatch From Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area, Lufthansa A380
41
39
Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area Fire Detection and Suppression
42
40
Main Deck Flight Crew Rest Areas Located Aft of Cockpit
43
41
Flight Crew Rest Areas Located Immediately Aft of the Flight Deck, in Air France,
Qantas, Lufthansa, and Korean Air Configurations
43
42
Cabin Crew Rest Areas (Emirates)
44
43
Crew Rest Area on Main Deck Aft (Emirates)
44
44
Galley Trash Compactor
45
45
Midship Galley Ovens
46
46
Galley Refrigerators
46
47
Galley Service Elevator
47
48
Galley Electrical Panel, Including Emergency Power Shutoff
47
ix
49
Gate at Top of Stairway
49
50
Rear Spiral Staircase
50
51
Gate and Curtain Stowed Position, Main Stairs
50
52
Gate in Operational Position, Top of Main Stairs
51
53
Folded Bed Storage in Lufthansa A380
51
54
Privacy Curtain in Operational Mode
52
55
The HRET Boom Used as a Waterway
52
56
Obstructions to Direct Attack Through Entry Doors
53
57
Fire Attack Resulting in Horizontal Ventilation During ARFF Training
55
58
Depth of Each Seat Row
57
59
Normal Cabin View With Good Visibility
57
60
Same Cabin Through a TIC
58
61
Overhead Compartments Located Over Every Seated Position
58
62
The HRET Using Boom Hydraulics for Penetration
60
63
The HRET Using Hydraulic Accumulators for Penetration
60
64
Discharge Pattern of ASPN on HRET
61
65
Testing the FAA HRET
61
66
The FLIR Cameras Identifying Heat Signatures
62
67
The Best Guidance for Piercing Locations
63
68
Testing to Understand the Effect of Piercing the Overhead Bin
63
69
Window Removal Using an HRET
64
70
Standoff Position and Approach for Upper-Deck Piercing
65
71
Piercing an Upper Deck, Angled Down
66
72
Proper Piercing Angle on Steeper Slope of Fuselage
66
73
Positioning With Increased Standoff Distance
67
74
Forward Portion of Aft Cargo Compartment, Known as the Tunnel
68
75
Lower Cargo Compartment Configuration
69
76
Cheek Area Inside Rear Cargo Compartment (42 in.)
69
77
Flare of Faring Between Cargo Compartment and Wing
70
78
Outside View of Wing Faring Flare
70
79
Aft Cargo Compartment With Cargo Net Separating the Bulk Cargo Compartment
71
80
A ULD in Position in Lower Cargo Compartment
72
81
Cargo Offloading Operations
72
82
Philadelphia Fire Fighters Attempt Forcible Entry on a DC-8 Cargo Door
73
83
Bulk Cargo Door Operation
74
84
Forward Cargo Door Operation
74
85
Aft Cargo Door Operation
75
86
The A380 WLG and BLGView From Front
77
87
Landing Gear Numbering System
77
88
Increased Use of Composite Materials
81
89
Construction of B-787
81
90
The ARFF Information on a B-747-8I
82
91
Composite Materials and Locations on the A380
82
92
The GLARE Locations on the A380, Highlighted
83
93
Comparison of GLARE and Aluminum Penetration Forces
84
94
The APU Emergency Shutdown Locations
85
95
Refuel/Defuel Panel
86
96
The APU Emergency Shutdown Controls in the Refuel/Defuel Panel
86
97
Nose Gear APU Panel
87
98
First-Class Suite: Emirates
89
xi
99
First-Class Cabins: Qantas (left) and Air France (right)
90
100
Raised Partition Around First-Class Seat on Lufthansa A380
90
101
Korean Air First-Class Seat
90
102
Emirates First-Class Shower
91
103
Emirates First-Class Lavatory Window
91
xii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Page
The FAA ARFF Index Comparison to ICAO and NFPA
Agent/Quantity Comparison
Category 10 AircraftAgent/Chassis Comparison
Slide Failures Listed in the ACRP Study
Sill Heights
Fire Classes (U.S.)
International Comparisons Fire Classes
Hose Line Characteristics
Hydraulic Systems Operation
Airports Serving NLA
The U.S. Airports With MoSs in Place for B-747-8
xiii
3
4
4
7
10
31
32
54
79
88
93
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

ACRP
AES
AFFF
ARAC
ARFFRWG
ARFF
ASPN
APU
BLG
CAG
CFR
CFRP
COF2
EASA
FAA
FLIR
GLARE
HF
HRET
IAP
IAV
ICAO
IFSTA
JFK
LEHGS
LGERS
MoSs
MSDS
NFPA
NLA
NLG
NTSB
PCA
PPE
PPV
Q1
Airport Cooperative Research Program

Airport Emergency Services
Aqueous film forming foam
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
ARFF Requirements Working Group
Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting
Aircraft skin penetrating nozzle
Auxiliary power unit
Body landing gears
Changi Airport Group
Code of Federal Regulations
Carbon fiber-reinforced plastic
Carbonyl fluoride
European Aviation Safety Agency
Forward Looking Infrared
Glass-reinforced aluminum laminate
Hydrogen fluoride
High-Reach Extendable Turret
Incident Action Plan
Interior Access Vehicle
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Fire Service Training Association
John F. Kennedy International Airport
Local Electro-Hydraulic Generation System
Landing Gear Extension and Retraction System
Modifications of Standards
Material Safety Data Sheet
National Fire Protection Association
New Large Aircraft
Nose Landing Gear
National Transportation Safety Board
Practical Critical Area
Personal protection equipment
Positive pressure ventilation
The quantity of water required to obtain a 1-minute control time in
the PCA.
xiv
Q2
Q3
QF
SCBA
SIN
SQ
SOG
TCA
TIC
U.S.
USAF
VLTA
WLG
The quantity of water required for continued control of the fire after the
first minute, for complete extinguishment of the fire, or both.
The quantity of water required for interior firefighting.
Qantas Flight
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
Singapore Changi Airport
Singapore Airlines
Standard Operating Guidelines
Theoretical Critical Area
Thermal imaging camera
United States
United States Air Force
Very-Large Transport Aircraft
Wing landing gear
Controlof a fire is considered to be achieved when the intensity of the fire is reduced by 90%.
FlashoverThe nearly simultaneous ignition of combustible materials in an enclosed space.
Flashover occurs when the material in an enclosed space is heated to their auto-ignition
temperatures.
Practical Critical Area (PCA)An area equal to 2/3 the size of the Theoretical Critical Area.
RolloverOften precedes a flashover. As fire gases are heated, the super-heated gases rise to the
overhead portion of an enclosed area. As the gases bank off the ceiling it appears as flames
rolling across the ceiling. Rollover often precedes a flashover.
Size-UpThe initial evaluation of an incident, conducted to develop a determination of
immediate hazards to responders, other lives and property, and also what additional resources
may be needed.
Theoretical Critical Area (TCA)The theoretical area adjacent to an aircraft in which fire must
be controlled for the purpose of ensuring temporary fuselage integrity and provide an escape area
for its occupants.
VentilationThe exchange of the interior atmosphere of a structure with the outside atmosphere.
xv/xvi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) services personnel at commercial airports worldwide
commonly respond to and train for incidents involving large aircraft carrying numerous
passengers. The introduction of aircraft with two full decks of passengers has increased the
challenges and the stakes presented to aircraft rescue fire fighters. Before the introduction into
service of the Airbus A380 by Singapore Airlines in the fall of 2007, the only aircraft to have an
upper deck was the Boeing 747, and that has only limited upper-deck seating. The full-length,
upper-deck passenger compartments allow for a dramatic increase in passenger capacity.
By definition, New Large Aircraft (NLA) are so categorized due to the increase of passenger
capacities, fuel loads, overall size, and the use of advanced materials. NLA being developed
today are taller, heavier, and carry more passengers than any aircraft recognized by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Rescue Fire Fighting Panel at the time that the
Theoretical Critical Area/Practical Critical Area (TCA/PCA) formulas were first developed.
These TCA/PCA formulas have never been recalculated to take into account the full upper deck
and additional height of these NLA. Certain portions of the A380 and B-747-8 commonly
referenced under the NLA category are constructed with composite materials. These aircraft
have double-deck passenger configurations and increased quantities of fuel and passengers.
Much of this report focuses on the A380. This aircraft represents the biggest changes because it
is the first aircraft with a full upper deck. It has the largest passenger capacity and the greatest
fuel capacity. Many tactics and strategies described in this report are applicable on other sizes
and types of aircraft. In fact, there are a number of aircraft that have entered the market, or are
currently in development, that offer different passenger cabin configurations, advanced
composites, and increased fuel loads. ARFF departments can take applicable information from
this report and apply it to other newer aircraft in service to their airports. The A340, B-777, B787, A380, and B-747-8 are all part of the broader category of New Generation Aircraft, which
may be a more appropriately categorized for new technologies and challenges to ARFF created
by the evolution of these aircraft. When this report was completed, the next generation B-747,
the 800 series, was just beginning passenger service in the United States. Deeper analysis into
concerns for firefighting tactics and strategies for that aircraft will be covered in a follow-on
report.
This report provides a discussion of the primary topics pertinent to strategies for NLA
firefighting. These topics include agent quantity, aircraft systems, and components. Information
from previous reports, regulatory data, and historical reviews related to NLA firefighting are
presented in this report. Also discussed are configurations and aspects of NLA layouts, which
require strategic consideration and could influence ARFF tactical decisions and response
preplanning. Recommendations for best practices in NLA firefighting strategies are offered
throughout this report.
xvii/xviii
1. INTRODUCTION.
Aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) personnel require a great deal of information to make
informed tactical decisions during aircraft incidents. Preplanning for such incidents saves
precious time in the deployment of firefighting assets and personnel. During preplanning, the
differences in aircraft size, composition, passenger loads, fuel quantities, as well as the use of
composites and advanced materials, change certain tactics and strategies that may lack the
capacity to be equally effective on New Large Aircraft (NLA).
The following topics were researched during the preparation of this report:
Quantities of firefighting agent

Evacuation slides
Interior access vehicles (IAV)
Historical review of evacuations
Ventilation
Interior and exterior fires
High-Reach Extendable Turret (HRET) operations
Access to cargo compartments
Landing gear
Hydraulic systems
Construction materials
Auxiliary power units (APU)
Fuel systems
NLA cabin configurations
The purpose of this report was to determine what, if anything, has remained the same from
previous generations of aircraft, and what has changed. Changes required further study to
determine if modified procedures or new technology may be appropriate to improve tactics and
strategies for access to NLA or in firefighting evolutions.
The development of NLA brings fundamental changes that are different from aircraft that flew
previously. These changes are what classify these aircraft as New Generation Aircraft.
Educating emergency responders as to how these changes impact existing firefighting tactics and
strategies is important to the safety and success of emergency management involving NLA.
These factors include:
Increased aircraft size

Increased hydraulic pressures
Increased use of advanced composite materials
Increased passenger loads
Increased fuel loads
Unique uses or configuration of space
Multideck configuration
Sill height for accessing upper decks

Crew rest areas on lower level (below main deck)
2. FIREFIGHTING AGENT QUANTITY CONSIDERATIONS.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) serves as the United States (U.S.) Governments
advocate with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations
specialized agency created to achieve safe, secure, and sustainable development of civil aviation
throughout the world. In that role, the FAA provides significant resources to support the ICAO
and its goal to establish a global aviation system through cooperation, partnership, and
harmonization of requirements.
ICAO Circular 305-AN/177, Operation of Newer Larger Aeroplanes at Existing Aerodromes,
[1] was released on March 14, 2005. It is important to understand the relevant information
included in the circular, and consider applying the intent and approach in any study of NLA.
It is interesting to note that the U.S. uses the phrase New Large Aircraft, whereas the ICAO
definition is New Larger Aeroplanes. The following quoted text was taken directly from
Circular 305 [1]. Note that the conversions to feet from meters were not in the original ICAO
text.
Foreword
In the early 1990s, the major aeroplane manufacturers announced that plans were
in hand to develop aeroplanes larger than the Boeing B747-400 currently the
largest passenger aeroplane in commercial service capable of carrying more
than 500 passengers.
In response to the stated need for appropriate ICAO provisions to facilitate
aerodrome development for these new larger aeroplanes (NLAs), ICAO undertook a
study with the participation of several States, selected international organizations and
aeroplane manufacturers. The results of that study led to Amendment 3 to Annex
14 Aerodromes, Volume I Aerodrome Design and Operations, which was
adopted by the ICAO Council in March 1999. A new aerodrome reference code
letter F to cover aeroplanes with wingspans from 65 m (213.25 feet) up to but not
including 80 m (262.46 feet), and an outer main gear wheel span from 14 m (45.93
feet) up to but not including 16 m (52.49 feet) was established. Consequent new
specifications on aerodrome physical characteristics for these aeroplanes were also
developed. The new code F specifications in Annex 14, Volume I, became
applicable from 1 November 1999. Aerodrome rescue and fire fighting (RFF)
specifications for aeroplanes with maximum fuselage widths in excess of 7 m,
(22.96 feet) and lengths greater than 76 m (249.34 feet) RFF category 10, had
already been developed and included in the Annex. (ICAO Circular 305-AN/177)
In 2004, the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) ARFF Requirements Working
Group (ARFFRWG) released a report [2] that, among other things, looked at certain issues
relative to NLA. Findings and conclusions documented by this working group are integrated
throughout this report, e.g., section 2.
Tables 1 through 3 were derived from information provided in the ARAC report [2]. The
primary relative points illustrated in this comparison chart are the additional ICAO and National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) categories created for aircraft longer than 249 ft (76 m), up
to 295 ft (90 m). In addition, both the ICAO and NFPA use a maximum fuselage width, as well
as overall length. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 139 [3] uses only overall
length in Index determination, and Index E is for all aircraft greater than 200 ft (61 m) long.
Table 1. The FAA ARFF Index Comparison to ICAO and NFPA
ICAO
Category
1
2
Aircraft
Length up to
but not
Including
(ft)
29 (9 m)
39 (12 m)
Width up
to but not
Including
(ft)
6.6 (2 m)
6.6 (2 m)
NFPA
Category
1
2
Aircraft
Length up
to but not
Including
(ft)
30 (9 m)
39 (12 m)
Width up
to but not
Including
(ft)
6.6 (2 m)
6.6 (2 m)
FAA
Index
GA-1
GA-1
Aircraft
Length
(ft)
NA
NA
GA-2
A
A
NA
<90
<90
3
4
5
59 (18 m)
78 (24 m)
91 (28 m)
9.8 (3 m)
13.1 (4 m)
13.1 (4 m)
3
4
5
59 (18 m)
78 (24 m)
90 (28 m)
9.8 (3 m)
13.0 (4 m)
13.0 (4 m)
B
C
90-126
126-159
6
8
127 (39 m)
160 (49 m)
16.4 (5 m)
16.4 (5 m)
6
7
126 (39 m)
160 (49 m)
16.4 (5 m)
16.4 (5 m)
159-200
200 (61 m)
22.9 (7 m)
200 (61 m)
23.0 (7 m)
>200
249 (76 m)
22.9 (7 m)
250 (76 m)
23.0 (7 m)
10
295 (90 m)
26.2 (8 m)
10
295 (90 m)
25.0 (8 m)
Sample
Aircraft
Cessna 182
Cessna
Caravan
Cessna 404
EMB120
CRJ-200,
Saab 340
DC-9, A320
B-757-200,
B-767200ER
A300, B757-300
A340-600;
B-777
AN-225,
A380
Table 2. Agent/Quantity Comparison
Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Index
GA-1
GA-1
GA-2
A
A
B
C
D
E
Water (U.S. Gallons)

Quantity for Aqueous Film Forming
Foam Production
NFPA
NFPA
Q1 and
Q1, Q2,
ICAO FAA
Q2
and Q3
61
120
120
177
200
200
317
370
670
634
100
740
1,340
1427
100
1510
2,760
2087
1500
2490
3,740
3197
3000
3630
4,880
4808
4000
5280
7,780
6419
6000
7070
9,570
8533
9260
14,260
Example Aircraft
Cessna 206
Cessna 414
Beech 1900
DHC-8-100
ATR-72
B-737-300; Emb-145
B-757
A300; B-767-300
B-747-200; A340-400
AN-225; A380
Note: Q1 is the quantity of water required to obtain a 1-minute control time in the Practical Critical Area.
Q2 is the quantity of water required for continued control of the fire after the first minute, or for complete
extinguishment of the fire, or for both.
Q3 is the quantity of water required for interior firefighting.
Table 3. Category 10 AircraftAgent/Chassis Comparison

Reference
FAA
ICAO
NFPA
Gallons for Q1-Q2

6000
8533
9260
Chassis
3
3
4
Of the three references (FAA, ICAO, and NFPA), only the FAA does not calculate additional
water for aircraft over 250 ft (76 m) long or over 23 ft (7 m) wide. The ICAO has increased
water quantities for Category 10 aircraft over the quantities required for Category 9 aircraft by
2114 gallons (8002 liters) or 33%. Without factoring in Q3 water for interior firefighting, the
NFPA has increased water quantities for Category 10 aircraft over the quantities required for
Category 9 aircraft by 2190 gallons (8290 liters) or 31%.
The ARAC report points out that accepted formulas for Theoretical Critical Area (TCA) and
Practical Critical Area (PCA) *, as defined in NFPA 403, are flawed when used to calculate
minimum agent requirements for multideck aircraft. These formulas are based on the aircraft
length and width and do not take into account the greater aircraft height, larger fuselage surface
area, greater fuel quantities, or increased fuselage footprint to accommodate the longer slides.
TCA is the area adjacent to an aircraft where fire must be controlled for the purpose of ensuring temporary fuselage integrity
and provide an escape area for its occupants. PCA is an area equal to 2/3 the size of the TCA.
The A380 is not significantly longer, nor is the fuselage appreciably wider, than other aircraft in
its Index. As a result, the agent requirement for an A380 only increases by 138 gallons when
using the current TCA/PCA formulas. The fuel capacity of the A380 is 44% greater than the
B-777 and 42% greater than the B-747-400. The larger fuel quantity increases the potential size
of a pool fire under the aircraft.
Another issue is the increased area that must be protected on a multideck aircraft for the footprint
of the evacuation slide deployment. Since the upper-deck evacuation slides are now higher, their
lengths have been increased to achieve a safe sliding angle. The upper-deck evacuation slides
touch the ground 12 ft further from the fuselage on each side than those deployed from the main
deck of the B-777. In order to protect the area that the slide touches the ground, additional foam
would need to be calculated for 12 additional feet on each side, a total of 24 ft for the length of
the fuselage, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1. Upper-Deck Evacuation Slide Deployment Lengths

The rationale recommended by the ARAC ARFFRWG increases the PCA by 12 ft on either side
to accommodate safe escape paths for passengers coming down the upper-deck evacuation
slides. Using this calculation, 2977 gallons are required for Q1, and 5656 gallons for Q2.
Combined water for aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) proportioning for Q1 and Q2 for an
A380 is 8633 gallons, using the ARAC ARFFRWG approach [2]. This does not increase the
agent quantities to include Q3, but rather to satisfy the FAAs implied goal of maintaining escape
paths, or as Gage-Babcock described that goal, allow ambulatory occupants to exit the aircraft
within tolerable heat conditions and move to a safe area [4].
A published report by Hughes Associates, Inc. [5] for the FAA reviewed the formula to calculate
agent quantities, the history behind the formula, and the purpose of each Q quantity and the time
when they are to be delivered. It also considered the amount of agent to protect egressing
passengers from a pool fire. This report proposes that, based on the justifications for the
quantities, those required in NFPA seem most adequate to meet the actual need.
3. EVACUATION SLIDES.
The first priority in an aircraft fire or significant incident is to evacuate or deplane passengers
and crew. Emergency evacuations of aircraft from heights above 6 ft from the ground require
the use of emergency evacuation slides. FAA certification of an aircraft requires a full-scale
demonstration where a full complement of passengers and crew deplane through half of the
emergency exits in the dark of night in 90 seconds or less. It is not unusual for slides to fail to
operate or become damaged or unusable due to emergency conditions present as a result of the
incident, hence the requirement for the evacuation test using half of the exits.
A safety study conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) [6] reviewed 46
evacuations involving 2651 passengers from September 1, 1997 through June 1, 1999. In these
cases, 6% of the aircraft occupants suffered minor injuries, and 2% suffered serious injuries.
Slide technology has evolved with the new aircraft being built. Certain slides onboard the
aircraft have the Tribrid Inflation System, which is connected to a sensing system within the
door. Activation of this system occurs if the door is opened in the emergency mode at an
abnormal attitude. The slide will inflate normally, and in addition, several feet of additional slide
will inflate to increase the chance for the slide to reach the ground.
A ramp slide is an evacuation slide with a small platform or landing between the exit and the
slide itself. Ramp slides are installed on aircraft primarily when the proximity of the exit to an
engine requires the slide to be angled away from the engine. Ramp slides are used for the overwing exits on A310, A340-60, A380, and B-747 aircraft. For certification of the A380, dual-lane
slides were required. These double-width slides can transport up to 70 passengers a minute.
Slides are typically constructed of urethane-coated nylon that is sprayed with grey aluminized
paint. The reflective paint is added to reflect heat from a nearby fire, extending its operation
time when adjacent fires are present for at least the 90 seconds of required slide use. The slides
must deploy in 6 seconds in temperatures ranging from -65 to 160F. The slides should be
capable of deploying and remaining useable in winds up to 25 knots.
The first priority of ARFF is the safety of the occupants of the aircraft. Slides facilitate
evacuation of the aircraft when conditions warrant and therefore contribute to the safety of the
occupants. The effectiveness of the slides is affected by certain human factors and mechanical
shortcomings. The increased number of slides from NLA also adds a level of difficulty and
increased tasking for ARFF.
3.1 EVACUATION SLIDE ASSISTANCE.
There is no FAA requirement for dedication of emergency personnel to staff the base of
evacuation slides, steady them in high winds, or assist passengers at the bottom of the slides.
Aircraft cabin crews may assign passengers to provide assistance at the base of slides. The vast
majority of passengers evacuating an aircraft during an emergency are doing so for the first time.
The hazards associated with evacuation are complicated by a number of factors, as identified in
an NTSB safety study, Emergency Aircraft Evacuation Study, [6] and an Airport Cooperative
Research Program (ACRP) study, Evaluation and Mitigation of Aircraft Slide Evacuation
Injuries [7].
6
According to the ACRP study [7], Wind had an adverse effect on slide use in 12.4 percent of
the accidents. In these cases, the wind blew the inflatable slides up against the sides of the
aircraft, preventing slide use. In the evacuation events where the slides were unusable, the mean
wind speed varied from 13 to 20 knots. The report claims historical data shows that when the
winds mean speed does not exceed 25 knots and one individual holds down the slide, the
inflatable evacuation slide remains stable. (NTSB 2000; Van Es and Post 2004).
3.2 MECHANICAL FACTORS.
The NTSB study [6] indicates that 37% (7 of 19) of the evacuations with slide deployments in
the study cases had at least one slide fail to operate. Redundancy of exits is included in the
safety margin, as per the requirement of evacuating 100% of the passengers using 50% of the
exits in 90 seconds or less. However, a failed slide adds to passenger anxiety and will delay at
least those passengers who were planning on evacuating through the exit with the failed slide.
Slide failures occur for a variety of reasons, as presented in table 4, which was extracted from the
ACRP study [7].
Table 4. Slide Failures Listed in the ACRP Study [7]
Identified Problem
Slide did not inflate
Aircraft attitude
Other
Wind
Slide burnt
Incorrect rigging
Slide ripped
Unknown
Amount (%)
28.1
15.7
13.5
12.4
11.2
7.9
6.7
4.5
The ACRP study looked at 142 emergency evacuation events for the period of January 1, 1996
through June 30, 2006. The data illustrated that during this time period approximately 50% of
emergency evacuations result in injuries, 90% of which were minor. This finding is
considered to be consistent with the aforementioned NTSB study [6], which looked at 46
incidents over 21 months (September 1997June 1999); the percentage of minor injuries was
the same, i.e., 90%.
The ACRP study [7] demonstrated that human reactions in situations requiring emergency
evacuation include panic and confusion. Some interviews indicated competitive behavior among
passengers trying to exit the aircraft. The ACRP made recommendations for the first responders
to (1) practice the initial stabilization and proper orientation of the slide, particularly during
windy conditions, and (2) realize that continued stabilization may be needed under such
conditions.
3.3 LARGE AIRCRAFT EVACUATION.

In addition, the ACRP study looked at the emerging issue (at the time of the study) of emergency
evacuation of Very Large Transport Aircraft (VLTA). Recorded evacuations involving B-747
aircraft and the certification test of A380 aircraft were included in the analysis. A mathematical
model was developed to study the relative speed at which a passenger travels down an evacuation
slide. The conclusion of the analysis shows that the rate and speed of a passenger traveling down
an evacuation slide from an upper deck of an A380 is the same as from an upper-deck slide on
a B-747.
Additional papers were written to further evaluate emergency evacuations from upper decks of
VLTA. One such paper was presented at the 2001 International Aircraft Fire and Cabin Safety
Research Conference in Atlantic City, New Jersey, by Jungermann and Colleagues [8].
Jungerman concluded that there was a need for further research, as a difference in hesitation time
between individuals evacuating from the upper deck and individuals evacuating from the main
deck was determined.
3.4 OBSTRUCTION TO ARFF OPERATIONS.
Evacuation slides are the primary means of egress of passengers from an aircraft. The
protection of these slides, as part of the escape path, is one of the primary concerns during
the initial attack response of the ARFF. During the critical period of evacuation and until
confirmation is received that all occupants are off the aircraft, the slides must be protected
and preserved in usable condition. Situations may require an attendant to stand at the base
of the slide to maintain a connection with the ground or to assist passengers to their feet and
direct them to safety as they exit the slide. Aircraft with two passenger decks have more
exits than those with a single deck. Additional slides increase the number of escape paths to
protect, as well as the number of attendants that may be required to assist with the slides.
Passengers may be assigned by cabin crews or voluntarily position themselves at the base of
evacuation slides. In some scenarios, this is a practical solution. In other scenarios,
particularly those involving pooled fuel or fire, it is not prudent to allow persons without
personal protection equipment (PPE) to remain in the affected area.
While deployed, the slides serve as obstructions to ARFF activities that will prevent foam
streams from being used to control a fuel fire or to cover a fuel spill. The 16 evacuation
slides create an intricate web; 6 are from the upper deck. All slides are two lanes wide, as
shown in figure 2. If the slides are intact, and the pool of fire is under control, hand lines
will be necessary for application and reapplication of a foam blanket.
Figure 2. The A380 TCA/PCA Areas With Evacuation Slides Deployed

Providing ARFF personnel to stabilize slides during an emergency evacuation will likely
reduce the number and severity of injuries. It will also likely reduce delays in passengers
jumping into the slides, as the anxiety of the event will be decreased at the sight of
emergency responders at the bottom of the slides to assist them.
With 16 evacuation slides, deployed access is restricted for ARFF operations. The slides from
the upper deck extend beyond the PCA, the area by which foam quantity calculations are
derived.
The slides from a two-deck aircraft, like an A380, block access to the majority of the
occupiable portion of the fuselage. Winds can raise or twist slides. Ramp slides from the
A380 wing actually route passengers under the midship upper-deck two-lane slide, putting
that evacuation point out of sight from emergency personnel who are outboard of the slides,
as shown in figure 3.
Approach of ARFF vehicles for the points aft of the wing is limited. The over-wing ramp slide
exit disappears from view behind the upper-deck, double-lane slide. Each slide on the A380 is
equipped with a re-entry line, installed to provide direct access for ARFF crews to both the main
and upper decks. This may be a physically challenging method of access, but it is an available
feature. Each evacuation slide is also equipped with three emergency lights.
Figure 3. Approach of ARFF Vehicles With Slides Deployed

4. INTERIOR ACCESS VEHICLE.
Mobile stair vehicles (also called air stairs), when correctly deployed, provide a safe and stable
platform for enplaning or deplaning passengers. Most airlines or fixed-base operators have such
vehicles in their fleet; however, availability during emergency operations cannot be guaranteed.
The majority of stair vehicles are designed to accommodate the sill heights of aircraft ranging
from a B-727 to an A340, which is 5.5 to 19ft (1.7 to 5.8 m). The A380 upper-deck sill height
can be as high as 26.25ft (8 m) in a normal aircraft attitude. Sill heights for normal, tail up, or
tail down attitudes are referred to as Normal Sill Height, Minimal Sill Height, or Maximum Sill
Height, as shown in table 5.
Table 5. Sill Heights
Sill Height
Normal
Maximum
Minimum
M1
17.06 ft
(5.2 m)
31.82 ft
(9.7 m)
7.87 ft
(2.4 m)
M2
17.06 ft
(5.2 m)
26.25 ft
(8.0 m)
10.50 ft
(3.2 m)
M3
17.06 ft
(5.2 m)
---
M4
17.06 ft
(5.2 m)
20.01 ft
(6.1 m)
8.53 ft
(2.6 m)
M5
17.06 ft
(5.2 m)
23.29 ft
(7.1 m)
5.25 ft
(1.6 m)
U1, U2, U3
26.25 ft
(8.0 m)
32.48 ft
(9.9 m)
20.34 ft
(6.2 m)
Note: M1-M5 refers to Main Deck, Door Positions 1-5. U1-U3 refers to Upper Deck Door Positions 1-3.
The FAA ARFF Research Program made use of the FAAs Civil Aerospace Medical Institute
evacuation simulation programs [9] to study how making closed exits available using an IAV
10
could improve evacuation times. The results of the study indicate that, in a total evacuation, an
IAV could significantly impact evacuation times, especially in double-aisle aircraft.
Currently, there are no U.S.-based manufacturers offering IAVs with the ability to reach upperdeck cabin sill heights. Rapid access to the aircraft may be critical to successful mitigation of an
onboard incident. Gaining access to emergencies onboard, whether the event is a medical
emergency, fire, investigation, or law enforcement incident, is, as a practical matter, the first step
upon arrival at the aircraft to deal with the problem. For airports serving multipassenger deck
aircraft, having equipment that can reach the sills of upper decks should be a primary
consideration when planning a purchase. If the mobile stair vehicle can also be equipped with
agent or equipment to better facilitate the ARFF mission and satisfy the Index requirements, the
vehicle can be used in the initial mitigation of the aircraft emergency rather than to be called out
afterward. The FAA ARFF Research Program is working with the aviation community to
develop a model for a piece of equipment that can provide immediate access to the aircraft to
gain access for emergency responders or to provide a safe exit for passengers. In addition, the
IAV may serve as a chassis/platform to provide firefighting agent and equipment to complement
agent carried on traditional ARFF vehicles.
The IAV has great merit and provides additional important roles to ARFF and the airport
community. In November 2009, the FAA conducted tests and practical evolutions to determine
the best methods for gaining forcible entry to an aircraft for which the doors are no longer
operable. The first challenge in these events is to gain control of a suitable work platform from
which to launch such an effort; a wide mobile stair platform has the necessary features. The IAV
research should include a chassis with the ground clearance and mobility to reasonably operate
off road, as would be the case for an aircraft that is off pavement.
In addition, the IAV can serve the airport during weather diversions and events that cause aircraft
to be remotely parked with passengers onboard. Access to these aircraft for medical
emergencies and other events often are delayed, as the airlines equipment and personnel are
already in high demand during such events. An IAV controlled by ARFF would be available for
such responses, as well as support to law enforcement, thereby minimizing delays in emergency
management.
Singapore Changi Airport (SIN) was the first airport outside of Europe to host the A380. It
arrived in November 2005 for airport compatibility verification tests. The A380s inaugural
commercial flight departed from SIN in 2006.
Preparation for A380 service at SIN began in 2003 and included several infrastructure
improvements that supported the A380 operations. ICAO Annex 14, Aerodromes, Volume I
Aerodrome Design and Operations, Chapter and ICAO Circular 305 [1]entitled Operation of
NLA at Existing Aerodromes provides the regulatory and guidance material used to prepare for
conducting flight operations with NLA. Circular 305 recognizes that the aerodrome
infrastructure recommendations made in Annex 14 do not cover all of the specific needs to safely
accommodate specific aircraft types at airports.
11
In terms of emergency services, SIN Airport Emergency Services (AES) conducted a needs
analysis and developed plans to satisfy the ICAO regulations and guidance, as well as to satisfy
SIN goals for NLA emergency preparedness.
In 2006, SIN AES procured two Rosenbauer rescue stair vehicles. Each is equipped with a
firefighting package, including 264 gallons (1000 liters) of water and a hose connection at the
top of the platform for rapid access to either NLA deck for interior firefighting. The standard
response for an incident involving an A380 at SIN calls for a response of six ARFF appliances,
including AES 2 (rescue stair vehicle).
5. HISTORICAL REVIEWB-747 AND A380 EVACUATIONS.
For the purpose of this study, only evacuations from upper decks were researched. The research
was conducted searching only for evacuations on B-747 and A380 aircraft.
5.1 THE B-747 INCIDENTS.
The NTSB lists 271 incidents or accidents involving B-747s. Only eight incident narratives
report that an evacuation was conducted. None of the narratives indicate that passengers were
evacuated directly from the upper deck.
From the 142 slide emergency evacuation events identified for the ACRP study [7], only 2 of
those events involved B-747 aircraft.
August 19, 2005, Agana, Guam. A B-747-200 landed with its nose gear retracted and an
emergency evacuation was initiated. Two minor injuries occurred during the evacuation
and no reports of the upper-deck evacuation slides being used.
May 1998, Tokyo, Japan. This event involved a B-747-400. There were no reports of
the upper-deck evacuation slides being used.
An article was published in the JulyAugust 2005 issue of Flight Safety Australia, titled
Evacuate. Evacuate. Evacuate [10]. The article describes a B-747-438 slide emergency
evacuation event that occurred in Sydney, Australia, on July 2, 2003. The captain ordered the
evacuation upon hearing the report that the aircrafts brakes were smoking.
During the B-747-438 evacuation, the L2 and R4 slides did not deploy. The upper-deck, rightslide deployed, but it was reported to be blocked by a vehicle. Ground crews freed the slide from
the vehicle and turned it to the correct position in reference to the ground. Upper-deck
passengers used the stairway to the main deck and evacuated via the main deck slides. The
copilot evacuated from the upper-deck, right-side slide and was carrying a 6.6-lb fire
extinguisher. The copilot reported he could not control his ascent, and he let go off the fire
extinguisher while sliding. He landed heavily on his shoulder and fractured his collar bone.
There were a total of 350 passengers and 14 crewmembers onboard. Four serious injuries
occurred, including one to a crewmember during the emergency evacuation. Figures 4 and 5
show the slide deployment after the Sydney evacuation. In figure 5, a deflated ramp slide is
visible. The slide deflated 32 seconds after it was inflated. The failure occurred while a woman
12
wearing high-heeled shoes was on the slide. She fractured a vertebra when she landed hard on
the concrete apron. The Transportation Research Board was not able to conclusively determine
the cause of the slide failure, but did confirm that it was used successfully by several passengers
before the failure occurred.
Figure 4. Slide Emergency Evacuation of a B-747-438View 1

(Photo Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau)
Figure 5. Slide Emergency Evacuation of a B-747-438View 2

(Photo Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau)
13
5.2 THE A380 INCIDENTS: SINGAPORE CHANGI AIRPORT.

There have been two cases reporting a need to evacuate or deplane passengers as a result of an
incident or accident involving an A380. Both incidents occurred at SIN. Neither incident
involved passengers being deplaned via slides or air stairs directly from the upper deck. In both
cases, the passengers came down the interior stairs from the upper deck to the main deck to exit
the airplane.
5.2.1 Singapore Changi Airport: Singapore Airlines Flight 221.
The first A380 evacuation on record occurred at SIN. On January 10, 2010, Singapore Airlines
(SQ) Flight 221 became disconnected prematurely from a push-back tractor, and the aircraft
rolled off pavement and into the soft turf adjacent to Terminal 3. The aircraft was deplaned and
recovered from the grass strip, as shown in figures 6 and 7.
Figure 6. Singapore Airlines Flight 221, A380 Off Pavement
Figure 7. Gear of SQ Flight 221, A380 Off Pavement
14
5.2.2 Singapore Changi Airport: Qantas Flight 32.

The second evacuation of an A380 also occurred at SIN. The incident on November 4, 2010,
unfolded as Qantas (QF) Flight 32 left Singapore bound for Sydney, Australia. The A380
suffered an uncontained engine failure of its Number 2 engine just 6 minutes into the flight. The
engine failure and subsequent flying shrapnel cut electrical cables and hydraulic lines in the
wings. The wings forward spar was damaged, and two wing fuel tanks were ruptured. As fuel
leaked out, an imbalance was created between the wings. The electrical problems meant the
pilots were unable to transfer fuel forward, and the aircraft became tail heavy. The pilots
struggled to maintain balance and keep the A380 from losing lift, which would cause the aircraft
to stall, while fielding 54 alarms of system failures or impending failures in the cockpit. The
flaps and landing-gear doors were inoperable, and the Number 2 engine was on fire. The pilots
were able to use gravity to lower the landing gear.
During landing, the brake temperature exceeded 1650F (900C), causing four flat tires. The
possibility of the leaking fuel reaching the hot brakes was a significant threat of fire
development. The pilots rolled out the plane the full length of the runway so it would be close to
ARFF vehicles to facilitate the application of foam under the aircraft. Upon landing, the crew
was unable to shut down the Number 1 engine. SIN AES were forced to discharge high volumes
of foam into the engine, which choked the engine and forced it to shut down.
The events that unfolded in this incident certainly would have justified the pilot to order
evacuation by slides; however, in spite of the combination of events, he elected to deplane the
passengers over air stairs provided by the Changi Airport Group (CAG) AES, on the scene, as
shown in figures 8 and 9.
Figure 8. Deplaning Passengers From QF Flight 32
15
Figure 9. Number 2 Engine of QF Flight 32

The following media statement was issued by CAG:
An A380 Qantas flight, QF 32, bound for Sydney, Australia, departed Singapore
Changi Airport at 0956 hours today. For technical reasons, the aircraft turned
back to Changi and landed safely at 1146 hours.
Changi Airport Groups Airport Emergency Service (AES) responded with six
fire vehicles, in accordance with standard operating procedure for such incidents.
In response to the pilots request, checks were conducted on the aircraft by AES.
Once the checks were completed, passengers and crew began disembarking from
the aircraft at Runway 2. Buses were arranged to ferry them to the airport
terminal. Disembarkation of all 469 passengers and crew on board was
completed by 1340 hours.
SIN AES Emergency Stair Unit (ES2) was capable of reaching the upper deck of the A380.
When the decision was made to disembark all passengers from the A380, ES2 was positioned at
the MR-2 door. During this evacuation, a determination was made to deplane all passengers
from the main deck since there were far fewer passengers on that deck (business class) and all
were capable of climbing down the interior stairs. The main deck had a number of elderly
passengers and children. Had it been necessary, ES2 could have reached the upper deck just
as easily. Take note of the diversity in age and physical characteristics of the sampling of
passengers in the figure 8. An evacuation slide exit, if not required by the situation, puts
some passengers at risk more than others. The evacuation of the 469 passengers and crew on
the aircraft took nearly an hour because there were only two buses used to ferry passengers from
the aircraft.
A great deal is known about the frequency of evacuations, percentage and types of injuries,
effects of wind, and passenger behavior during evacuations.
16
The ACRP study focused on slide emergency evacuations from upper decks of very large
transport aircraft [7]. Several initial parameters were changed to see the effect they had on the
velocity of an individual as a function of position on the slide. The graphs in this study show and
compare the results between sliding down from the upper deck of the Airbus A380 versus the
B-747.
5.3.2 The Finkenwerker Plant A380 Evacuation Test.
According to a first-hand account of the evacuation test published in Flight International on
April 6, 2006 [11], over 1000 volunteers were assembled at Airbuss Finkenwerker Plant in
Hamburg on March 26, 2006, for the A380 evacuation test. Approximately 50% of the
volunteers were Airbus employees and 50% were members from a local gym. Prior to being
approved to participate, an agility test was conducted, which was designed to cull out the very
elderly or clinically infirm. Prior to boarding the aircraft for the evacuation test, warm up
exercises were conducted with the group.
The passenger loading for the A380 Maximum Capacity Simultaneous Evacuation Trial
included 315 passengers and 7 crew on the upper deck, 538 passengers and 11 crew on the main
deck, and 2 crew in the cockpit. For this test, the aircraft was not equipped with a main deck
crew rest area.
6. HUMAN FACTORS.
Certification requirements are based on a single evacuation trial. The subjects used to conduct
the evacuation test were prepared for the evacuation and were properly dressed for an
evacuation. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the FAA regulations require
that 35% of the participants must be over age 50, a minimum of 40% must be female, and 15%
must be female and over 50.
One common report during emergency evacuations was that passengers insist on
retrieving their personal belongings, such as luggage and briefcases. Injuries have been
documented associated with this action [6].
There is a noted hesitation by passengers evacuating via upper-deck evacuation slides

versus main-deck slides [6].
The most serious evacuation-associated injuries occurred when occupants jumped out the
exits and off the wings [6].
6.1 PASSENGER DEMOGRAPHICS AND BEHAVIOR.

Obviously, to use a more diverse profile of age, condition, and health would put the occupants at
a higher risk for injuries. From the standpoint of emergency responders, it is unlikely that, with
passenger loads anticipated on large aircraft, all passengers would be fit enough to self-evacuate
in 90 seconds or less using half of the exits. The demographics standardized by the FAA and
EASA set a standard for evacuation testing for aircraft certification, but they do not accurately
describe the typical passenger load, which would nearly always include infants, small children,
17
elderly, handicapped, and obese passengers. Some passengers or cabin crewmembers will
almost certainly be occupied assisting those unable to evacuate on their own. The delays caused
by those who may block an aisle trying to self-evacuate or by those assisting others will
contribute to some occupants spending longer periods of time in the aircraft. There are multiple
references to human factors in each study evaluated that impact evacuation in actual
emergencies. The actions, reactions, and decisions made by each passenger will have an effect
on the overall process.
The height of the upper-deck slide is likely to cause apprehension in some passengers, thus
causing them to turn around once reaching the door and refusing to jump, particularly if the
emergency condition prompting the evacuation is not visible to the passenger. Jumping into the
slide may seem like a greater danger than staying onboard. This may contribute to the migration
of passengers from the upper deck to the main deck using the interior connecting stairway. This
action will increase the time to evacuate the upper deck, and disrupt the evacuation process
underway on the main deck. The cabin crew is responsible to coordinate, communicate, and
direct all passengers. The large number of passengers in an A380 or B-747 may increase the
anxiety and panic level of the passengers.
Beyond the initial certification test, there can be no prediction as to how aircraft crews or
passengers will react in an evacuation. Statistically, it is very common for aircraft doors or slides
to malfunction during evacuations; this gauge prompted the requirement for completing the
evacuation test in 90 seconds or less using half of the exits. The unknown is which door(s) will
be located in areas of the aircraft safe for evacuation and whether or not those doors are found to
be operational when needed.
6.2 EMERGENCY RESPONDERS.
Emergency responders must be prepared with any combination of scenarios and respond and
react to overcome each challenge, regardless of the cause. Whether an evacuation slide
malfunctions due to airframe damage or improper packing and installation, the effect on
passenger evacuation is the same. The responders first priority is the safety of the passengers.
The strategy for protecting the passengers may require removing them from the aircraft, or
perhaps creating a safe environment inside the aircraft. The condition of doors, evacuation
slides, and access or egress points to the aircraft will be taken into consideration in the
development of an Incident Action Plan (IAP).
Gaining rapid access to the interior of the aircraft is essential to the assessment of interior
conditions, assisting with evacuation, treatment of the ill or injured, and mitigation of the
emergency condition. Equally important to gaining access is that the entry must never restrict
the flow of passengers coming off the aircraft. In the case of the A380 or B-747, additional
decks mean additional access points.
Fire commanders or entry teams need to quickly assess the aircraft to determine the best location
to gain entry. By having an IAV capable of reaching every deck, the greatest number of
opportunities is available. The IAV can be used to gain access, to assist passengers left onboard,
and to launch interior fire attack.
18
The additional access points on these NLA also create obstructions for gaining access. Deployed
evacuation slides block the approach to doors and must be deflated or removed prior to
positioning an IAV at a door.
Positioning of the IAV should be done such that support for the greatest number of anticipated
missions is provided. If passengers are evacuating through main deck doors only, then
positioning the IAV on the upper deck will provide access for rescue or entry teams without
obstructing an exit. If passengers are all evacuating through forward doors, positioning the IAV
at an accessible rear door follows a similar strategy. Positioning an IAV at a door at which the
slide failed to deploy creates an access point or exit not previously available.
If an IAV is not capable of reaching the upper deck, the versatility of the device is significantly
reduced.
7. VENTILATION.
In every aspect of firefighting, ventilation is a key factor in fire development, as well as control.
Ventilation is the exchange of the interior atmosphere of a structure with the outside atmosphere.
Buildings are designed to breathe, and the exchange is continuous and ongoing. When on the
ground, aircraft move air in the same way through open doors and outflow valves. This process
is ongoing in all structures and does not normally involve heat, smoke, and toxic products of
combustion (gases).
When a fire occurs in the fuselage of an aircraft, ventilation involves supply of air (oxygen) to
the fire and exhaust of smoke and hot gases from the fire. This description is what is occurring
at the fire itself. The scale of this ventilation process is different (scalable) based on the size, fire
load, and location. During assessment of a fire in an aircraft, if smoke is observed, ventilation is
taking place. Each time the amount of ventilation or the position of the ventilation changes, it
will have an effect on the fire. The change or extent of that effect may occur as a result of
tactical steps taken in firefighting, such as opening a door to gain access, removal of a window,
or as a result of burn through of the fuselage.
The operative point is that ventilation is occurring if there is a fire. Ventilation extent and effect
will change throughout the event, whether it is done intentionally as part of a ventilation strategy,
accidently as a byproduct of intentional tactical operations, or naturally as a result of fire growth.
ARFF personnel must be aware of the ventilation occurring and be able to anticipate the effects
of ventilation changes incurred by the actions of ARFF crews.
7.1 VENTILATION OBJECTIVES.
Before determining the need, strategy, or method of ventilation, the objective for ventilation
must be clear. Ventilation is performed for one of the following reasons.
LifeIf there are occupants in the aircraft, or if fire fighters must make entry, ventilation
is performed to improve conditions in the aircraft by removing heat, smoke, and gases
while introducing fresh air.
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FireOpening doors, windows, or creating openings in the aircraft to control fire

direction or growth may be used as part of an attack strategy while advancing hand lines
or using aircraft skin-penetrating nozzles (ASPN).
SafetyUsed when the risk analysis indicates that entry is not warranted as part of a
defensive firefighting operation.
7.2 VENTILATION STRATEGIES.

In any aircraft fire, there are two general strategies that may be employed to manage a change in
ventilation.
Tactical VentilationPlanned implementation of methods designed to remove heat,

smoke, and gases while introducing fresh air (such as opening doors and removing
windows.)
Tactical Oxygen DeprivationPlanned implementation of methods designed to trap heat,

smoke, and gases while excluding introduction of fresh air (such as closing doors and
blocking windows.)
If the change in ventilation is not planned or managed, an unplanned change in ventilation will
occur.
7.3 VENTILATION METHODS.
Ventilation during aircraft fire attack is necessary regardless of the size of the aircraft. NLA,
with multiple decks, more doors, windows, stairways, etc., provides additional opportunities for
introducing ventilation as well as complications created by those same opportunities. Sections
7.3.1 through 7.3.7 describe the ventilation methods.
7.3.1 Horizontal Ventilation.
On an intact aircraft, horizontal ventilation is the easiest to achieve. To be effective, it may
actually require a combination of tactical ventilation (opening doors or removing windows) and
tactical oxygen deprivation (as described in section 7.3.5). If the aircraft has been evacuated,
most doors will be open. The air flow provided through the open doors on multiple decks with
interior staircases between the main deck and the upper deck on A380 and B-747 aircraft will
influence fire behavior. By selecting which doors to open and which to close, ventilation can
help to control fire behavior.
7.3.2 Vertical Ventilation.
On an intact aircraft, vertical ventilation is the most labor intensive. Structural fire fighters
employ vertical ventilation by opening roof scuttles and skylights or making roof cuts. It is
essential to release superheated smoke and gases that are trapped in the higher deck of a
structure, particularly in a stairwell, to reduce the temperatures to a safe level for entry to the
upper decks. If the aircraft is in normal orientation, there are no hatches or scuttles on the
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aircraft roof over the main cabin. Roof cuts on the top of a fuselage are difficult and dangerous
for fire fighters. The level of effectiveness of a roof cut for vertical ventilation will vary based
on a number of factors. If the aircraft is configured for passengers, the roof cut will open into a
compartment above the upper deck passenger compartment. Between the fuselage and the cabin,
there are a number of obstructions including but not limited to, ventilation ducts, electrical
wiring, insulation, and interior finish (ceiling). If the ceiling is intact at the time of the roof cut,
the majority of the heat and smoke may be trapped below the ceiling. If the fire is on the lower
deck, a roof cut may actually encourage the fire to travel toward the source of fresh air being
introduced through the roof cuts. If the fire is left unabated, it will eventually breach the
overhead and self-vent vertically.
7.3.3 Positive Pressure Ventilation.
This method involves using mechanical fans to force air into the fuselage and direct the air
toward an outlet vent opening. The intention is to rapidly release heat and smoke. Many airports
mount positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fans on their mobile stair trucks or IAVs. Some
airports have large truck-mounted PPV fans of sufficient capacity to ventilate an entire aircraft
deck on a wide-body aircraft. PPV methods and strategies are very effective if used correctly.
The effectiveness of the PPV is dependent upon the amount of air moved being sufficient to have
the desired effect in the aircraft. Ventilating a larger space or attempting to move air a greater
distance will require larger-capacity PPV fans. An open door, window, or access panel can
significantly reduce the effectiveness of a PPV ventilation strategy. These challenges are greater
on larger, multideck aircraft.
7.3.4 Hydraulic (or Forced) Ventilation.
This method can be used to supplement vertical and horizontal ventilation. All that is required is
a charged hand line and a fog nozzle. As an immediate follow up to knocking down the fire,
forced ventilation can be used to quickly improve the conditions and visibility in the aircraft
cabin. Fire fighters position themselves inside the cabin near an open door. The hand line is
then positioned a few feet from the door opening, and the nozzle is set to a wide fog pattern. The
nozzle is opened, and the fog stream is positioned so it covers most of the opening. At this time,
heat and smoke are drawn into the stream and forced out of the aircraft. Rotating the nozzle may
increase the Venturi effect of the spray and draw out the heat and smoke faster. This method
works well through an open window, but the larger door opening is more efficient. This method
is not recommended until after the fire is knocked down. If a high heat condition still exists, this
method will produce steam, which can be dangerous to fire fighters.
7.3.5 Oxygen Deprivation.
This method confines the fire to a given area by closing openings, limiting fire travel paths, and
restricting the additional introduction of oxygen. European fire fighters have seen great success
in employing oxygen deprivation methods in structures. There are a number of factors that
determine the long-term effectiveness of oxygen deprivation in an aircraft. However, if there are
no occupants, oxygen deprivation is a reasonable method to use if interior attack teams are not
immediately available. When interior attack teams are available, oxygen deprivation becomes
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part of the tactical ventilation strategy. Doors that are selected to be open or closed should be
based upon the needs of the attack team and the intent of the tactical ventilation strategy.
7.3.6 Multideck Aircraft Ventilation Design.
The unique configuration that includes an upper deck of an A380 or a B-747 aircraft provides a
circulation of air between decks on the aircraft. There are no doors to separate or isolate the
upper-deck cabin from the main-deck cabin. If the aircraft has power, and the aircraft doors and
windows are closed, the A380 ventilation system is designed to pressurize the stairs and cabins
in a way that limits any travel of smoke between decks. When the smoke exceeds the capacity of
the ventilation system, when power is lost, or when doors are open, smoke from a fire on either
deck will enter both cabins. The PPV system on the A380 is designed for use in flight.
Conditions on the ground with doors open and power secured will not allow the system to
operate as designed. An understanding of this system is important for fire commanders and fire
fighters. A report from the pilot in flight may indicate that smoke is contained to one area,
passengers have been relocated, and they are perhaps even calm. That condition may change
rapidly once the doors are opened. If smoke rushes through the cabin as a result of the aircraft
PPV system being overcome by conditions, the survivability of the atmosphere, as well as the
level of anxiety of the passengers, may dramatically change.
The B-747-400 has ten exit doors and a crown escape hatch in the cockpit. The B-747 has one
passenger stairway connecting the main-deck cabin with the upper-deck cabin. The A380 has 16
door openings and interior stairs connecting the main- and upper-deck cabins located forward
and aft, as shown in figures 10 and 11. Both aircraft have operable escape windows in the
cockpit. The A380 also has service elevators located in the middle and rear galleys, as shown in
figure 12. Ventilation occurs at all times on these aircraft. Controlling the airflow as part of the
ventilation strategy will be an essential component to successful interior firefighting operations.
Figure 10. Forward Stairway Between Decks on Air France A380
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Figure 11. Rear Stairway Between Decks on Air France A380
Figure 12. Service Elevator on A380
23
8. AIRCRAFT ACCESS.
The A380 is equipped with:
Six type A upper-deck passenger doors

Eight type A main-deck passenger doors with slide containers (figure 13)
Two type A main-deck emergency exits without slide containers
The designations for the doors have a prefix of M for main-deck doors, or U for upper-deck
doors. Hence, the forward door on the main-deck left side is designated ML1 (figure 14), and
the rear door on the upper deck on the right side is designated UR3.
Figure 13. The ML4 Door, Interior View; Type A Passenger Door With Slide Container
Figure 14. The ML1 Door A380, Exterior Operation View

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The exterior door operations/steps are as follows:

1.
Verify the cabin pressure status. If the red indicator light is flashing in the window, the
cabin is still pressurized. If the cabin is still pressurized, communications with the
cockpit is the best method for de-pressurization. If the cockpit crew is unresponsive
(overcome) the outflow valves can be forcibly opened.
2.
Verify the emergency evacuation slide status by looking through the window indicator.
3.
Push the outer door flap and grab the door control handle.
4.
Lift the door control handle. This will lift the door and expose the OPEN/CLOSE
buttons.
5.
Press and hold the OPEN button. The door will start swiveling.
6.
Lift the handle fully and ensure it is lined up with the green bar, as shown in figure 15.
The handle should stay in that position when released.
7.
With the handle raised, the door is unlocked and the OPEN/CLOSED buttons are fully
exposed, as shown in figure 16.
Figure 15. Exterior Door Operation DemonstrationStep 6
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Figure 16. Exterior Door Operation DemonstrationStep 7

9. EXTERIOR FIRES.
The greatest risk involving fires on the exterior of any aircraft is fuel. Certainly, there are other
areas at risk for fire, but as individual events, they are not much different on NLA than on other
aircraft. Fires involving engines, APUs, wheels, etc., are approached with tactics and strategies
similar to those used for the same type of fire on a different type of aircraft. Familiarization of
each aircraft providing service to an airport is required for all ARFF members.
Fuel quantities on larger aircraft are greater than in smaller classes of aircraft. The large quantity
of fuels carried is not limited to B-747-8 or A380 type aircraft. Other aircraft (listed below) that
have been in service for a number of years also carry large quantities of fuel that raise the risk
profile of a ground emergency involving fuels.
B-777-300 ER47,890 gallons

A340-60051,750 gallons
B-747-40063,500 gallons
B-747-8I (Intercontinental)64,055 gallons
A38083,290 gallons
B-78733,528 gallons
The trend is toward larger aircraft with greater carrying capacity and greater fuel capacities.
From a tactical fire attack standpoint, the B-747 and the A380 offer the greatest challenges. The
greatest risk is based on the quantities of fuel carried (see above). There are three other
important considerations: overall size, passenger capacity, and obstructions to exterior streams.
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9.1 OVERALL SIZE.

The overall size, not just the length of aircraft, has increased. The height of an aircraft is not
factored into traditional TCA/PCA formulas used to calculate minimum agent requirements. The
sill height is increased for the upper deck and tends to be beyond the reach of many traditional
stair trucks, which is generally less than 20 ft.
Upper-deck sill height for B-74725.60 ft

Upper-deck sill height for A38026.25 ft
9.2 PASSENGER CAPACITY.

Compliance with the weight and balance limits of any aircraft is critical to flight safety.
Operating an aircraft above the maximum weight limitation compromises its structural integrity
and adversely affects its performance. For this reason, the certified maximum number of
passengers will never be combined with the maximum fuel capacity. These numbers must be
adjusted to satisfy maximum allowable weights for safe flight. On a shorter route, the quantity
of fuel carried can be reduced, thereby allowing a larger passenger load. As fuel is reduced, the
passenger-carrying capacity increases and range decreases.
B-747-400416 passengers on two decks

B-747-8467 passengers on two decks
A380certified maximum of 853 passengers/555 typical maximum
9.3 OBSTRUCTIONS TO EXTERIOR STREAMS.

Protection of the passenger evacuation path is a primary requirement for ARFF crews. This
protection is crucial when fuel has been released under an aircraft or if fuel released under the
aircraft is involved in fire.
Burning fuel under the aircraft poses an immediate hazard to the integrity of the evacuation
slides and evacuating passengers and crew. Application of AFFF from ARFF vehicle-mounted
turrets and/or hand lines is used to knock down, control, and extinguish the fire. Once controlled
or extinguished, the foam provides a vapor-sealing blanket on the surface of the fuel. Complete
coverage of the spill area for initial application, as well as re-application, is required to prevent
the escaping fuel vapors from finding an ignition source. The foam water mixture also provides
cooling to hot aircraft components that may serve as an ignition source to escaping flammable
vapors.
An aircraft away from the gate that is being evacuated due to a ground emergency will have
some, or all, evacuation slides deployed. The evacuation slides are a critical safety component of
the aircraft and absolutely essential to rapidly evacuate passengers, particularly on a large aircraft
with hundreds of passengers.
These evacuation slides are at risk from the effects of heat, direct-flame impingement, wind, and
the force of water and foam streams being used to fight the fire or provide a protective blanket of
27
foam over the fuel. Operators of turrets, extendable turrets, and hand lines have to deal with the
obstructions of the evacuation slides. When the slides are coming from two passenger decks, the
obstruction is greater. In the case of an A380, 14 separate evacuation slides extend outward from
the fuselage creating a great deal of obstruction to streams, as well as the conditions under the
aircraft. The over-wing slide uses a ramp slide and reaches the ground behind an upper-deck
slide, completely blocking the view of passengers evacuating on that slide.
AFFF is very slippery, and it will accelerate the speed of passengers if it is on the slides surface.
Also, the ground at the base of the slides, as well as the entire area around the aircraft, becomes
very slippery for evacuating passengers and ARFF crews.
An NLA at the gate may have additional encumbrances blocking accessibility for ARFF
vehicles. The left side of the aircraft may have one to three jet bridges attached to the aircraft.
One jet bridge blocks a significant area for access by ARFF vehicles. That blocked area is
proportionately increased with the typical A380 boarding arrangement, which uses two jet
bridges, one for each deck. An example of two jet bridges extended to an A380 illustrates
(figure 17) the restricted access by ARFF to the left side of the aircraft. Airbus reports that 11
airports in the world that already have or plan to have A380 service are considering plans to add
a third jet bridge to certain gates. These airports are Heathrow (LHR), Suvarnabhumi (BKK),
Singapore Changi (SIN), Dubai (DXB), Charles de Gaulle (CDG), Johannesburg (JNB), John
F. Kennedy (JFK), Shangai Pudong (PVG), Beijing Capital (PEK), Kansai (KIX), and Hong
Kong (HKG).
Figure 17. Korean A380 With Two Jet Bridges Extended at JFK
In addition to the jet bridges, access around an A380 is severely restricted. Most airports have
had to make a number of adjustments to provide gate space large enough to accommodate the
A380 and all support vehicles required to provide service. If the aircraft is being serviced at the
28
gate, and the adjacent gates are occupied, there will be very limited access to the area adjacent to
the aircraft for ARFF operations.
10. INTERIOR FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS.
Interior firefighting operations on NLA offer additional challenges not found on single-deck
aircraft. In preplans, a number of factors must be considered. The NLA configuration varies
significantly by carrier, and ARFF crews are required to become familiar with each type of
aircraft with service to the airport. An understanding of the configuration of each carrier flying
that particular type of aircraft is essential for ARFF crews, since each carrier makes different use
of the space.
The B-747 has been flying since January 1970, so the concept of a second (upper) deck is
something that Index E airports have been dealing with for over 40 years. The B-747 has grown
over the years, become more sophisticated, and increased its fuel and passenger payload, as well
as its use of composite materials.
The A380 is the first aircraft to have a full-length, upper passenger deck. In addition, some
carriers are using the lower deck (below the main deck) for a crew rest area. The options for
lower-deck crew rest area configurations provide more than one area for rest. For ARFF fire
fighters, this means there are potentially three occupied decks on certain A380s. Familiarization
of unique carrier configurations will ensure that, during training and prefire planning, ARFF
crews know all the areas where occupants may be located, rather than after an incident during
search, rescue, and recovery.
10.1 ACCESS.
Gaining safe and rapid access to the aircraft for immediate intervention of the risk or hazard is
important. When away from the jet bridge, these mammoth aircraft have no convenient access
points. Airline mobile air stairs or IAVs are necessary tools for gaining access with ARFF
personnel and equipment.
Approaching the aircraft with an IAV or attempting to board by any other means must be
coordinated and approved by the Pilot in Command. This will also help to coordinate with the
cabin crew who, if still onboard, can often assist with opening doors to make entry or to assist
with evacuation.
If the cockpit is unattended, or if the flight crew is no longer in command of the aircraft, it
should be ensured that the aircraft is secured in position before approaching to gain access.
Airline personnel may be helpful in providing wheel chocks or installing pins in the landing gear,
if appropriate.
Once onboard, if the aircraft is still running but no longer occupied, it may be necessary to make
entry to the cockpit to shut down the aircrafts engines and power. This may include pulling
back on the engine throttles, shutting off the battery switches, and setting the parking break. If
the fire involves engines or APUs, ARFF personnel should activate engine fire suppression
systems prior to securing the batteries. Once the batteries have been secured, lighting and
29
powered controls for doors, etc., will be inoperable. An illustration of the cockpits many
electrical components is shown in figure 18.
Aircraft familiarization training in the cockpit should also include window operation, as shown
in figure 19. ARFF fire fighters may need to open or close cockpit windows as part of a
ventilation strategy. The cockpit escape equipment associated with the windows should also be
reviewed in the event that the fire fighter needs an emergency exit point. With the assistance of
a cockpit certified trainer, learning to operate the seats would be extremely helpful if trying to
perform rescue of a member of the cockpit crew. Releasing the five-point seat belt, sliding the
seat back to keep the crewmembers feet from getting caught on pedals, and reclining the seat
make removal of a crewmember much easier. It will never be easy, especially in a smoke-filled
cockpit, but practice will help to sharpen the skill.
Figure 18. Training to Shut Down and Secure the Aircraft
Figure 19. Cockpit Window Operation

30
Cockpit familiarization should be completed by all ARFF members. Finding switches and
controls to secure the aircraft in a dark, smoke-filled cockpit without prior training will be time
consuming and potentially dangerous.
Most interior fires on intact aircraft can be expected to be in avionics, galleys, lavatories, or areas
housing electrical equipment. There is a tremendous amount of electrical equipment in the
interior cabins of the aircraft, primarily in the personal entertainment system components, as
shown in figure 20. The heat generated by normal operation of this equipment on the A380
requires using air conditioning on the upper deck to maintain the comfort levels of passengers.
Figure 20. Emirates A380 Business-Class Cabin

Fires are categorized in four different classes in the U.S., as listed in table 6. In a major fire,
water and foam can be used for all these classes since they are the agents that are available in the
largest quantity on the fire apparatus. In smaller fires affecting individual components, it may be
necessary to use specific agents designed for the particular class of fire being fought. In the
U.S., the following table represents the different classes of fires.
Table 6. Fire Classes (U.S.)
Fire Class
A
B
C
D
Description
Ordinary combustibles, wood,
paper, cloth, some plastics
Flammable Liquids (jet fuel,
aviation gas
Electrical Equipment
Combustible Metals
Typical Extinguishing Agent Carried by

ARFF Personnel
Water
Foam, dry chemical, Halon 1211, HalotronTM
CO2, dry chemical, Halon 1211, Halotron
Class D-rated dry powder
31
After securing power to the aircraft or the affected circuit, isolated electrical fires should be
fought using Class C agents, and full PPE must be worn. Electrical fires may spread to other
areas, including structural components. These changes in fire loads must be evaluated during
assessment and firefighting efforts to determine if additional or different classes of agent are
required. Most Class C agents are also rated for Class A and B fires.
It is important to recognize that fire classes are not universal internationally. It is possible that a
fire extinguisher found onboard an aircraft of European, Australian, or Asian origin may be
labeled for a class of fire recognized in that country, but different from the classes recognized in
the U.S. Table 7 provides a comparison of those fire classes.
Table 7. International Comparisons Fire Classes
U.S.
Class A
Class B
Class C
Class D
European
Class A
Class B
Class C
Class F/D
Class D
Asia-Australia
Class A
Class B
Class C
Class E
Class D
Type of Fire
Ordinary combustibles
Flammable liquids
Flammable hases
Electrical equipment
Combustible metals
10.2 AVIONICS BAYS.

The A380 has three avionics bays (main, upper, and aft), as shown in figure 21.
The main avionics bay contains most of the aircraft computers and the electrical power
center. This bay can be accessed from three locations: the forward cargo compartment,
through the floor hatch in the cockpit, and the exterior of the fuselage. Figure 22 shows
the exterior access hatch to the avionics bay.
The upper avionics bay contains the emergency electrical power center, the network
server, and the majority of the in-flight entertainment systems. The bay is accessible
through a door in the bulkhead on the upper deck at the top of the forward stairs. In some
configurations, a hinged portion of the leaning rail must be lifted to access the space.
The aft avionics bay is only accessible through a hatch on the outside of the aircraft.
Equipment in the aft avionics bay includes the trolley lift control center.
All three avionics bays and the in-flight entertainment centers are monitored by smoke detectors,
but have no automatic suppression systems. All three avionics bays have ventilation systems
that take air from the cabins and discharge it through the extract valve or the outflow valve when
in flight. On the ground, the air is discharged through the overboard valves.
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Figure 21. Avionics Bay Locations

(Compliments of Airbus)
Figure 22. Access Hatch From Forward Fuselage Left Side to Main Avionics Bay
33
The upper avionics bay is large enough for entry, and the entire space is not visible from the
access door on the upper deck. There are a multitude of systems, lines, and wire bundles that
could easily get caught on while crawling through this space. The space has smoke detection but
no suppression. It has ventilation that will vent the majority of any smoke created in the space
outside the aircraft, if the ventilation is still running.
The access points to the upper avionics bay are always in the same location aboard the aircraft,
but due to the different configurations, they are not easily identifiable. The access point is on the
right side of the aircraft on the upper deck. If ascending the forward staircase, turn left at the top
of the stairs. The space in front of that access door is used for different functions in every
configuration. It may be a lounge area, a rest room, or detailed for any function that suits the
needs of the air carrier. Figures 23 and 24 show the access door in a lounge area. There is a
leaning rail around the entire space. This railing is hinged in front of the door and needs to be
raised to open the door. There is no method for locking the rail in the open position, so the
railing will drop back in place when released. Figure 25 shows the access door in a lounge not
equipped with the rail, and figure 26 shows the access door inside a lavatory. Once inside the
upper avionics bay, the equipment mounting will be almost identical on all A380s.
Figure 23. Access to the Upper Avionics Bay From the Landing at the Top of the Forward Stairs
Figure 24. Upper Avionics Bay With Leaning Rail Raised, Exposing the Locked Door
34
Figure 25. Access to Upper-Deck Avionics From Lounge/Seating Area
Figure 26. Access Point to Upper-Deck Avionics Through the Lavatory

10.3 LAVATORY FIRES.
All lavatories have smoke detectors, as well as automatic fire-extinguishing systems in the waste
bin. These systems use Halon 1211 or DuPont FE 36, which is a low-toxicity, low ozonedepleting, clean, firefighting agent. Most lavatory fires are caused by a passenger sneaking a
cigarette and disposing of it in the waste bin. The waste bin suppression system should handle
this type of fire. Cabin crews are trained in the use of portable fire extinguishers to deal with
lavatory fires. There are portable fire extinguishers and smoke hoods located throughout the
cabins, as shown in figure 27.
35
Figure 27. Typical Labels Seen on Compartments Used to Store Fire

Extinguishers and Hoods
There are up to 17 lavatories on the A380; 10 on the main deck, and 7 on the upper deck. As an
added comfort feature for passengers, some lavatories that are against the fuselage have a
window, as shown in figure 28. This is important to keep in mind for penetration considerations.
Emirates Airlines include two showers for their first-class customers, as shown in figure 29.
These are located on either side of the forward part of the first-class cabin, but they do not have
windows like the lavatories do. If a lavatory fire exceeds the ability of waste bin suppression
system or occurs on the ground when the cabin is not attended, it should be treated as any small
interior fire. The size of an aircraft lavatory could be compared to a residential closet, and
locking mechanisms are shown in figure 30. The spread of a lavatory fire into the cabin is
reviewed in section 10.6.
Lavatory doors have privacy locks comparable to residential privacy locks in a home. As shown
in figure 30, raise the panel above the indicator to expose the lock release on the A380.
Figure 28. Upper-Deck Lavatory on Emirates A380

36
Figure 29. First-Class Lavatory/Shower on Emirates A380
Figure 30. Lavatory Door Locks

10.4 LOWER-DECK SPACES DESIGNED FOR OCCUPANCY.
Airbus offers a wide variety of A380 configurations. In addition to the main- and upper-deck
cabins, additional spaces in the lower deck may be occupied. Currently, Qantas and Air France
are using the lower-deck cabins for crew rest areas, as shown in figure 31. While these
compartments are not expected to be occupied during takeoff and landing, it is important to note
37
that there have been numerous incidents of aircraft fires at the gate area that require fire
departments to do a complete search of the aircraft for occupants. In these situations, it is very
possible that crewmembers or cleaning personnel could be located in these crew rest areas during
a fire emergency.
Figure 31. Lower-Deck Cabin Crew Rest Area, Individual Bunk (Air France)
As new aircraft are built, this space may be used for additional functions. The crew rest areas
may be crew rest modules installed in the forward portion of the aft cargo compartment, or in the
aft portion of the forward cargo compartment. Primary access is from the main deck through a
locked door, as shown in figure 32. Inside the door, is a steep set of stairs (best if used as a
ladder) leading into the crew rest area, as shown in figure 33.
Figure 32. Access Door From Main Deck to Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area
38
Figure 33. Access Ladder to Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area

Airbus offers a number of options for configuration on each of the three decks. Aircraft
familiarization training for each carrier conducting service is the only way for ARFF to
understand the layout and the challenges for access, rescue, or firefighting.
In preparation for the A380, ARFF crews can check the carriers websites to view the use of
space. The carriers should also be contacted to get individual crash charts of the A380 in that
carriers configuration.
When the lower-deck crew rest area is not installed or in use, this airtight hatch door is closed
and locked, as shown in figure 34. This access door is opposite door M3R on this particular
aircraft.
Figure 34. Airtight Hatch Door to Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area
39
The lower-deck crew rest area (figure 35) includes 12 sleeping areas, which are protected by
seven smoke detectors and a fixed fire-extinguishing system. Some lower-deck crew rest areas
may be equipped with a small lavatory, as shown in figure 36.
Figure 35. Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area, A380
Figure 36. Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area Lavatory, Lufthansa A380

The secondary exit from the lower-deck crew rest area is designated by an exit sign, as shown in
figure 37. The overhead panels in a designated bunk area are removable to access the escape
hatch leading into the main deck cabin.
40
Figure 37. Secondary Exit From Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area, Lufthansa A380
To use the emergency exit from the lower-deck crew rest areas, the overhead access panel must
be removed. These panels and the directions for removal are clearly identified with instructional
labels.
If the lower-deck crew rest area is located in the forward portion of the aft cargo compartment
space, as in the Air France and Korean Air configurations, the access hatch ends up in the center
seating area. It eliminates one seat to ensure the hatch is accessible. The row numbers will also
vary depending on the seating configuration used by each carrier.
If the lower-deck crew rest area is located in the aft portion of the forward cargo compartment, as
in the Lufthansa configuration, the escape hatch will be located in the middle of the left aisle
floor, as shown in figure 38. Lufthansa uses a red outline on the carpet around the hatch to make
it more visible, as shown in figure 38.
Figure 38. Emergency Exit Hatch From Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area, Lufthansa A380
41
The lower-deck crew rest areas are protected by smoke detectors and a fire suppression system,
as shown in figure 39. A fire in the lower-deck rest area that is not controlled by the fixed
suppression system will need to be fought from the inside. Before advancing hand lines down
the main access ladder, the escape hatch in the main deck will need to be opened with horizontal
ventilation to an open door to relieve smoke in the main cabin. Familiarity with these spaces
learned during aircraft prefire planning is essential to prepare entry teams.
Figure 39. Lower-Deck Crew Rest Area Fire Detection and Suppression
It would be impractical to advance a handline larger than 1.75 inches into this area due to the
narrow ladder, tight turns, and narrow passageway. Ventilating this space will be critical to
relieve the heat and smoke trapped in the space.
If the deck hatch in the main cabin is open, and fire and heat are not a factor at the entry door to
the lower-deck crew rest area, advancing a dry handline is much easier and less fatiguing than a
charged handline. If heat or fire is evident from the entry point, entry with an uncharged
handline is not an option. Fire fighters positioned to feed the hose through the main cabin
positioned at corners and pinch points will be necessary to allow the fire attack team to do their
job in the lower cabin. A backup handline should be positioned to support the attack team
operating in the lower cabin.
Without an understanding of configurations like this, a search in heavy smoke conditions would
be very confusing. This lower-deck crew rest area has difficult access for fire fighters wearing
full PPE and carrying equipment, due to the size of the entrance ladder and the limited
circulation space. Rescuing up to 12 people from this space would be very challenging.
42
Most carriers have their flight crew rest areas just aft of the cockpit, within the secured area of
the secure cockpit door, as shown in figures 40 and 41.
Figure 40. Main Deck Flight Crew Rest Areas Located Aft of Cockpit
Figure 41. Flight Crew Rest Areas Located Immediately Aft of the Flight Deck, in Air France,
Qantas, Lufthansa, and Korean Air Configurations (Compliments of Airbus)
43
In the Emirates configuration, both the flight and cabin crew rest areas are together in the aft of
the main deck, as shown in figures 42 and 43.
Figure 42. Cabin Crew Rest Areas (Emirates)
Figure 43. Crew Rest Area on Main Deck Aft (Emirates)
44
A crash axe is provided for the crews to use if they are unable to egress through the door.
It should also be noted that there is no fixed fire suppression system in these main deck crew rest
areas, but they do have smoke detectors and a portable fire extinguisher.
10.5 GALLEYS.
There are at least two galleys on each A380, regardless of cabin configuration. Typically, one
galley is aft near the rear stairway, and the second is midship. The galleys include trash
compactors (figure 44), ovens (figure 45), and refrigerators (figure 46). Each galley has a
service elevator (figure 47) to move carts between decks. A galley fire is likely to be electrical.
If the aircraft is still energized, there are local power panels (figure 48) in each galley. The
emergency power shutoff on the galley electrical panel should be secured before any firefighting
effort. Thermal imaging cameras (TICs) or hand-held infrared thermometers are excellent tools
for identifying the source of an odor or smoke in a galley.
Figure 44. Galley Trash Compactor
45
Figure 45. Midship Galley Ovens
Figure 46. Galley Refrigerators
46
Figure 47. Galley Service Elevator
Figure 48. Galley Electrical Panel, Including Emergency Power Shutoff
47
10.6 MAIN CABIN FIRES.

A fire in the main cabin that is confined to an individual space, such as a galley, lavatory, rest
area, or bar is comparable in size to a one-room fire in a commercial structure. Entry teams
should receive reports from flight crews or air traffic control, prior to making entry. These
reports should be used to perform assessments and make tactical decisions for entry and fire
attack. Fire fighters should check for fire extension and work with aircraft maintenance to
isolate power and other hazards associated with the event. If in service, the aircraft positivepressure ventilation system will handle a good deal of the smoke issues until the aircraft lands
and doors are opened. An electrical failure will also cause the PPV system to shut down.
Recommended steps for fire fighters to take for a reported cabin fire on an NLA would include
the following:
If available, establish communications with the aircraft via radio enroute to the aircraft
position.
If the aircraft is said to be occupied, activate internal and external procedures to provide
manpower and equipment necessary to evacuate or deplane passengers and crew as well
as for their transportation or safe harbor.
Upon arrival, establish command and begin populating Command Post.
Upon arrival, if evacuation is in progress, assist in the evacuation/deplaning.
Upon arrival, establish water supply and ready the attack line.
With the entry team in full PPE, make entry with firefighting agent or tools sized for the
reported threat and intelligence gathered through assessment.
10.7 INITIAL ENTRY.

It is not necessary or prudent to drag a fire hose into an aircraft cabin each time an odor or smoke
condition is reported. It can actually delay intervention for the majority of the incidents that
occur on aircraft. Frequently, the cause of the heat that caused an odor or smoke condition is
already secured through a tripped circuit breaker or actions by the aircraft crew. A tool box,
portable fire extinguisher, and a TIC are normally appropriate tools for initial entry for a report
of an odor of smoke. An ARFF vehicle capable of deploying an attack line should be positioned
at an appropriate entry point.
While the initial entry is in progress, ARFF vehicles on the exterior should be set up to protect
the aircraft, provide reports of thermal scans conducted using fixed forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) cameras on the ARFF vehicles, and be prepared to advance an attack line should the
event escalate.
If the interior of the cabin is on fire, the attack will be entirely different. Evacuation and rescue
should always be the first consideration. The assessment will determine if ventilation or oxygen
48
deprivation tactics are necessary. This tactic will be based on the number of doors open or
closed, their position relative to the fire, and wind direction or other environmental factors.
Interior fire loads in the cabin consist of a variety of materials. In many cases, the areas under
the seats, as well as the overhead bins, will contain personal effects. The furnishings, partitions,
and decorative finishes consist of a great deal of plastics.
The cabins are separated by partitions and curtains. All furnishings, partitions, galleys,
lavatories, etc., serve as an obstruction for firefighting streams. Conducting a search of these
cabins can be extremely labor intensive. Advancing hose lines around all the obstructions will
be challenging due to the number of things on which the line can get caught.
Curtains and gates are used during flight to discourage passengers from passing between decks.
Figure 49 depicts a gate that may be installed at the top of the rear stairway. (The rear stairs
ascend spirally.) If approaching the stairs from the lower (main) deck, they will turn to the left
before reaching the upper deck. As shown in figure 50, looking up the rear stairs from the lower
deck will not provide a visual of conditions on the upper deck without climbing the stairs.
Figure 49. Gate at Top of Stairway
49
Figure 50. Rear Spiral Staircase

The forward stairs are also equipped with a gate and a curtain. These are primarily used to
discourage passenger movement between decks. As shown in figure 51, when not in use, the
gate and curtain are secured in the open position at the top of the stairs on the right side when
looking from the bottom of the stairs. As shown in figure 52, when open, the gate locks securely
in place, and the curtain opens to block the view between decks. All gates and curtains should be
in the open and secure stowed position during taxi, takeoff, and landing.
Figure 51. Gate and Curtain Stowed Position, Main Stairs
50
Figure 52. Gate in Operational Position, Top of Main Stairs

Some A380s might have another curtained area to provide privacy for an ill passenger. As
shown in figure 53, in the Lufthansa configuration, a bed is folded and stored in the overhead
compartment over the seats in row 21. The bed can be installed over a row of seats in a
designated location. Once installed, a curtain can be pulled to give the person in the bed privacy,
as shown in figure 54.
Figure 53. Folded Bed Storage in Lufthansa A380
51
Figure 54. Privacy Curtain in Operational Mode

The typical length of an attack line on an ARFF vehicle seldom exceeds 200 ft. The selected
entry point for interior attack lines should be carefully selected. If entering through a forward
door (which is the most likely position for a jet bridge or stair truck to be positioned during
normal aircraft operations), it is quite possible that a 200-ft hose line will not be long enough to
reach the opposite end of the cabin. If the attack line is coming from a structural pumper rather
than an ARFF vehicle, this may not be a factor. Consideration should be given to using
additional lengths of hose, commonly referred to as a high-rise pack, which could be attached
to the penetrating nozzle discharge or other elevated water source at the door to allow for longer
reaches inside. As shown in figure 55, the HRET boom can be used as a waterway. Entering
through the door (or doors) located a safe distance from the area involved in fire while keeping
the largest uninvolved portion behind the interior attack team will protect that larger portion of
the cabin.
Figure 55. The HRET Boom Used as a Waterway

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10.8 CONSIDERATION FOR INTERIOR FIRE ATTACK.

There is no typical fire in any aircraft cabin. The decision to take an offensive or defensive
approach is a matter for on-scene incident commanders and safety officers. A risk analysis must
be conducted as part of the size-up to determine if an interior fire attack is appropriate. This
guidance is not directing a method but rather serves as guidance, using accepted firefighting
tactics if it is determined to be prudent.
The same initial decisions made by structural fire fighters every day are present in the decisionmaking process to establish an IAP. Departments should have Standard Operating Guidelines
(SOG) in place to assist crews in this initial action. Safety is always the primary factor in the
decision-making process. There are certain fire scenarios (e.g., small fires within easy reach of
an accessible entry point) that, if acted upon quickly, could be stopped upon arrival with minimal
water, thus minimizing damage. Without such SOGs, preplanning, and training, this type of
fast stop is less likely.
A fire that is beyond that scope, particularly one in a wide-body, multideck aircraft, should not
be approached without adequate resources, planning, and training. The determination of what is
adequate is the subject of preplanning.
A B-747 or an A380 is a multideck structure with up to three decks designed for occupancy. The
two primary decks have no suppression systems in the cabins. Each of those decks has multiple
obstructions and two aisles. Due to the obstructions of the seats, lavatories, business and firstclass seating pods, first-class suites in some configurations, crew rest areas, and the size of the
cabins themselves, a single attack hose line is not sufficient for a well-involved cabin fire, see
figure 56. Advancing hose lines through the cabin will require planning for hose line size and
manpower to man the nozzle, as well as to advance lines through pinch points and around
corners and bulkheads. The size of the hose line is a consideration that has been well defined in
structural firefighting.
Figure 56. Obstructions to Direct Attack Through Entry Doors

53
If an interior fire attack team enters through this door, obstructions eliminate the possibility of an
immediate direct attack from the entry door position, unless the fire is in this immediate area. If
the fire is accessible for a direct attack from the door position, fire fighters should stay low,
allowing the smoke and heated gases to escape through the top portion of the open door.
Hose line selection should be based on the flow rate required, the reach of the stream required,
the size of the space involved, and the size/intensity of the fire.
The following guidelines are provided by the International Fire Service Training Association
(IFSTA) Essentials of Fire Fighting, 5th edition [12], and are modified here to reflect a scenario
on a multideck aircraft. On a wide-body aircraft with two aisles, the recommended hose line
applies to each aisle, see table 8. If the fire is beyond the small developing fire stage, or is
located a distance from the closest access point, an appropriately sized line should be advanced
simultaneously in each aisle.
Table 8. Hose Line Characteristics
Size
Inches
(mm)
1.5 (38)
1.75 (45)
GPM
(LPM)
40-125
(160-500)
40-175
(160-700)
2 (50)
100-250
(400-1000)
2.5 (65)
125-350
(500-1400)
Applications on Multideck Aircraft

Reach
Maximum
Feet (m)
When Used
25-50
Small developing fire.
(8-15)
Anticipated to be easy stop.
25-50
Quick attack when ratio of
(8-15)
fuel load to area is relatively
light.
40-70
When intensity or size of
(12-21)
fire exceeds capability of
smaller line. When larger
water volume or longer
stream reach are required.
Requires adequate
manpower and water
supply.
Effective Area
(Estimate)
One to three cabins
on same deck.
One deck or more

with heavy fire
load.
50-100
(15-30)
Note: GPM = Gallons per minute. LPM = Liters per minute
Regardless of the type of attack, ventilation is an essential element to relieve the heat and gases
from the space, making it safe for fire fighter entry. Opening a door on the end of the aircraft
toward which the interior attack teams are advancing, along with the water stream, will help
ventilate the fuselage through the open doors. This is known as horizontal ventilation. In
54
figure 57, fire fighters demonstrate horizontal ventilation by initiating fire attack through the rear
door and forcing the smoke out the front door.
Figure 57. Fire Attack Resulting in Horizontal Ventilation During ARFF Training
(Photo compliments of Jeremy Souza PVD ARFF.)
The selected method of agent application should be based on the fire conditions, manpower, hose
line size, flow rate, and length available. The properties of water are used to cause a change in
the properties of fire. Water absorbs heat and therefore cools the fire and the space around it.
Water also can isolate or dilute oxygen, which has a smothering effect on a fire. When water has
absorbed enough heat to boil, it is converted to steam. When water is heated to its boiling point
(212F), it expands 1700 times. A single drop of water that has expanded 1700 times its original
volume occupies 1700 times as much volumetric space, allowing it to displace more hot gases
and absorb more heat. This steam conversion and expansion can be very effective in cooling and
ventilating a fuselage. It can also be very dangerous to occupants and fire fighters in the space.
In general, steam conversion is part of fire extinguishment. There is a significant increase in the
amount of heat absorbed when the expansion occurs through steam conversion. Fire fighters in
an interior attack need to possess a thorough understanding of this characteristic of water and
how to manage it during an interior fire attack.
The heat created by the fire, which is trapped and building in the aircraft cabin, may make entry
for fire fighters too dangerous. With an enclosed interior fire, thermal layering of gases occurs
according to temperature. The hottest gases rise to the highest levels and form the top layer.
55
Cooler gases form the lower layer. This leaves the lower levels safer for fire fighters. Improper
application of water to unventilated areas disrupts the thermal balance that has been created and
causes smoke and steam to circulate in all levels of the space. This disruption creates a
significant burn hazard to fire fighters.
The interior environment must be made tenable for entry teams. If the thermal balance is
disrupted, forced ventilation is required to reduce temperatures to safe levels for entry. If the
balance has not been disrupted, fire fighters may still be able to operate beneath the thermal
layering to initiate fire attack, depending on the location of the fire.
A direct attack may not be possible, as the fire will likely be shielded by bulkheads, seats, and
other obstructions. In this case, if entry crews enter the fuselage, they will be working directly
below the hot gas layer. This is extremely dangerous, as the conditions overhead may transition
to a flashover or rollover at any time. To make safe entry, gas cooling should be accomplished.
From the doorway, fire fighters can set their nozzles to a 40- to 60-degree fog pattern, and
discharge short, 1- to 2-second bursts into the overhead gas layer. This effort is designed to cool
the gases, allowing for safe entry, not to convert large quantities of steam. When water droplets
fall down from the overhead, it is an indication that the gas layer has been cooled. This method
may need to be repeated, as interior attack teams advance into the cabin. In narrow areas, the
discharge pattern may need to be tightened. In wide open areas, the pattern may need to be
opened wider.
A direct attack is considered the most efficient use of water on a fire. Water should be
discharged directly into the burning products in short bursts using solid or straight streams. This
technique is called penciling. The visual indicator that the method is working is when the fire
darkens down. Another direct attack method called painting can be used to cool the hot
surfaces of the fuel by applying a lighter spray over the hot material. This discharge should not
be constant, because it tends to produce more steam in the area occupied by fire fighters.
The cabin of a jumbo aircraft is very long; the length of the aircraft is a long crawl when
dragging a hose. During that time, fire fighters must remain aware of hazards. If the entry team
is conducting search and rescue, a TIC is highly recommended. Although the straight aisles are
easy to follow and maintain direction and orientation, the depth of the rows of seats, particularly
the center section shown in figure 58, make a hand search very time-consuming, and perhaps
beyond the capability of a single self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottle. If
ventilation and other efforts have not improved visibility, a TIC in each aisle will significantly
reduce the time required for a full search of the aircraft. The TIC is also helpful in finding hot
spots.
Due to the depth of each seat row, a search in a smoke-filled environment is very timeconsuming. A search should be conducted from both aisles between members who have
communications with each other and with the incident commander, with coordinated progression
clearing one row at a time. More manpower can be used to coordinate a faster search.
56
Figure 58. Depth of Each Seat Row

In a dark, smoke-filled cabin, visibility is zero. Figure 59 provides the view of an aircraft cabin
in normal visibility. In a fire condition, the same space would simply be black. Figure 60
provides the view of the same cabin through a TIC when blacked out with smoke. When using a
TIC, thermal images of anything with a heat signature different from the ambient temperatures
become apparent.
Figure 59. Normal Cabin View With Good Visibility
57
Figure 60. Same Cabin Through a TIC

The overhead storage bins are fastened directly to structural components and are designed to
carry the weight of the contents, as shown in figure 61. A hard landing, structural damage,
weight shift, introduction of additional weight from water, or exposure to fire, may affect the
integrity of the mounting system. Fire fighters must remain aware of this possibility on any
aircraft; if the mounting system fails, the loaded overhead bin would certainly cause injury if it
landed on a fire fighter or occupant. Fortunately, the design of the cabin builds in a relative level
of protection. The seat backs will likely absorb most of the energy of a falling overhead bin.
Contents may spill out, potentially striking a fire fighter or occupant; the addition of the bins and
the spilled contents will complicate passage in the aircraft. Fire fighters in the aisle, particularly
in a crawling position, would have a fair amount of protection from a falling bin. An exception
is when the compartments are over the center section seating pods, as in some carriers businessclass and first-class cabins.
Figure 61. Overhead Compartments Located Over Every Seated Position
58
11. THE HRET OPERATIONS.

A great deal of information on HRETs has been released by the FAA. Advisory Circular 1505210-23, ARFF Vehicle and High Reach Extendable Turret (HRET) Operation, Training and
Qualifications [13] provides operational information, tactical guidance, and training and
proficiency guidance. The FAA also released an ARFF Training DVD on HRETs, which has
been distributed to all certificated airports. Copies may be requested from the FAA Airports
Regional Offices.
HRETs provide an opportunity to introduce firefighting agent into an aircraft without having fire
fighters enter a potentially hazardous environment. Interior entry and firefighting is labor
intensive and certainly not without risk. A properly trained and equipped entry team may be able
to make a quick stop with an aggressive interior attack. An evaluation of resources available will
include a review of the specialized equipment available, as well as manpower and water supply.
Interior fire attack may require multiple platforms for boarding, or to open or close doors as part
of a ventilation strategy. Incident commanders must make decisions as to each action taken by
ARFF crews for each incident. Factors in the decision-making process include knowledge of the
aircraft, preplanning experience, SOGs, conditions present, and resources available.
If the HRET is to be deployed as the primary method of applying agent, or as part of an interior
fire attack strategy, these factors must be considered in the preplanning and in the IAP
development.
The use of HRETs and ASPNs to introduce agent is an advanced technology method of interior
firefighting. It affords fire fighters the opportunity to launch a direct attack without making
entry. The attack must be choreographed to include the required method of ventilation and
monitoring. The HRET, in the hands of a skilled operator, can be deployed quickly. If the area
involved in fire is known, and proper tactics are employed, a fast stop of fire progression is
possible.
11.1 THE HRET DESIGN AND CAPABILITY.
Piercing technologies have been developed to provide an opportunity for an ARFF vehicle
operator to pierce an aircraft fuselage and introduce agent through an ASPN. Currently
approved HRETs use an extendable boom mounted on the top of an ARFF vehicle. The boom
can be controlled and positioned by the driver or the operator in the right-hand seat.
HRETs are available in various lengths. The FAA does not differentiate the need for longer or
shorter booms, but rather, identifies the performance requirements necessary to pierce the tallest
aircraft with service at the airport. There are currently two different types of piercing technology
available for use on ARFF vehicles. The first uses boom hydraulics, with the piercing tip aligned
with the boom, as shown in figure 62. Once in position, the boom is extended forward and the
ASPN pushes through the fuselage. Once fully through the fuselage skin and interior trims, the
discharge holes on the ASPN are exposed to the interior of the fuselage and provide a wide spray
pattern inside the aircraft to extinguish the fire.
59
Figure 62. The HRET Using Boom Hydraulics for Penetration

The second technology uses hydraulic accumulators, as shown in figure 63. In this application,
the boom, which does not have to be aligned with the piercing tip, fires the tip quickly through
the skin and interior trims rather than pushing through. The ASPN is stored within a tube prior
to firing.
Figure 63. The HRET Using Hydraulic Accumulators for Penetration

Both types of technology provide a very similar discharge pattern through the ASPN, as shown
in figure 64. This pattern inside an enclosed fuselage covers a large area and provides a great
deal of cooling.
60
Figure 64. Discharge Pattern of ASPN on HRET

11.2 USING HRET FOR REMOTE ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT CABIN.
The HRET can be positioned at an aircraft door for interior firefighting. On certain doors,
HRETs can be positioned inside the aircraft using the boom-mounted lighting, optics, and turret
for evaluation and interior firefighting, as shown in figure 65.
Figure 65. Testing the FAA HRET

11.3 USING FLIR CAMERAS AND TICs.
One of the most valuable tools used in evaluating fire conditions onboard an aircraft is the FLIR
camera. The heat created by the fire onboard may present as a bright spot or bloom on the
FLIR cameras display. If visible, this bloom will identify the location and relative intensity of
the fire.
61
FLIR cameras were originally installed on ARFF vehicles to aid in low-visibility responses. The
cameras are able to see heat signatures at distances up to 1200 ft. They can assist drivers to more
safely drive in heavy fog or other periods of restricted visibility by picking up heat signatures of
runway lights, vehicles, personnel, and aircraft. TICs are usually hand held and are designed for
portable use during interior operations. These cameras read temperatures at a lower scale and
may be able to see heat signatures on the aircraft exterior not visible through a FLIR camera.
This technology is more likely to be helpful on passenger aircraft, as the heat is more easily
transferred through the aircraft window than through the solid fuselage of a freighter aircraft.
FAA testing has indicated that the shielding of heat through the aircraft skin, insulation, and
cargo liner may block as much as 800F of heat.
By combining the available technologies of FLIR cameras, TICs, and ASPNs, the greatest
benefits can be achieved by identifying the location and relative intensity of the fire inside the
aircraft. Using the heat signatures, as well as knowledge of aircraft construction, the ideal
piercing location can be selected.
FLIR cameras or TICs provide the advantage of monitoring the effectiveness of any action taken.
If the image provided through the camera indicates the firefighting efforts are not having the
desired effect (the bloom is not reducing in size despite the agent application), re-evaluation will
be necessary because it is likely the agent is not reaching the fire. On the other hand, if the
bloom is not growing in size or intensity and/or is diminishing in size or intensity, this indicates
that the action taken is having the desired effect upon the fire.
A thermal scan of an aircraft will identify all heat signatures on the exterior of the aircraft, as
shown in figure 66. Also visible in the scan is absorbed heat on the steel mockup, reflective heat
on the ground, and heat from the apparatus engine. Training helps develop an understanding of
normal heat signatures. As an assessment tool, a thermal scan of a closed compartment adds
valuable data to the risk analysis performed prior to decisions to open doors or pierce spaces.
47.4 C
45
40
35
30
Sp1
25
20
15
10
7.6
Figure 66. The FLIR Cameras Identifying Heat Signatures

62
It is important to recognize visual reference points (such as cabin windows) and use the FLIR
cameras or TICs to identify heat signatures and possible piercing locations, as shown in
figure 67.
Figure 67. The Best Guidance for Piercing Locations

(Graphic Compliments of Crash Rescue)
As a rule of thumb, when piercing into a passenger aircraft fuselage, the operator should try to
avoid any rivet lines and be approximately 10 to 12 above the top of the window. This
location should put the piercing tip above the seat backs and below the overhead bin. Piercing
lower on the passenger aircraft will result in the passenger seats blocking 50% or more of the
streams available discharged pattern from the ASPN.
Piercing into the overhead storage bins will reduce the effectiveness of the spray pattern. In tests
conducted by the FAA, piercing into the overhead compartment still provided the introduction of
agent into the aircraft cabin; however, the pattern and effectiveness were significantly reduced.
In each test, the storage compartment door was opened, or partially opened, either by the force of
the stream or by the contents being pushed against the door by the piercing tip, as shown in
figure 68.
Figure 68. Testing to Understand the Effect of Piercing the Overhead Bin
63
The piercing tip can be used very effectively in the removal of aircraft cabin windows.
Positioning the piercing tip and slowly extending the tip and pushing the window will cause the
window mounting clips to break, forcing the window to drop into the aircraft cabin. Although
the windows can be penetrated rather easily on most aircraft, as shown in figure 69, the seats can
block 50% or more of the effective fog spray. A removed window could be used as part of a
ventilation strategy or, if deemed appropriate, as an element of an indirect fire attack.
Figure 69. Window Removal Using an HRET

11.4 UPPER-DECK PIERCING.
Some HRETs with ASPN are capable of reaching the required height, gaining the proper angle,
and piercing into upper-deck cabins above the seats and below the overhead bins necessary for
NLA. However, this maneuver is much more challenging than piercing a lower deck. The
reasons are largely based on visibility and visual perception. To be within range of the boom to
reach the required elevation to pierce the upper deck, the ARFF vehicle must be positioned fairly
close the aircraft. The piercing heights for the three A380 decks are:
Lower deck: 13.6 ft

Main deck: 23 ft
Upper deck: 31 ft
The standoff position is the distance between the front bumper of the ARFF vehicle and the
fuselage, as shown in figure 70. To pierce higher on a fuselage, as may be required for the upper
deck of a B-747 or A380, the ARFF vehicle must be positioned closer to the fuselage. A vehicle
positioned closer to the aircraft is said to have a reduced standoff position. From this reduced
standoff position, the operators view is significantly reduced. The reference points for
positioning and alignment are achieved by looking up at 5060 degrees through the top of the
windshield. The piercing location for upper-deck piercing uses the same reference points as for
64
main-deck cabin piercing. The ideal position is between the top of the seat backs and the
overhead storage bins. The reference point is 10 to 12 above the top of the upper-deck cabin
window. This reference point is on the steeper angle of the fuselage curve, and beyond the
widest point or midpoint of the fuselage. As the standoff position of the ARFF vehicle reduces,
so does the view of the operator of this piercing location. FAA testing has found that, not only
does the view of that piercing location diminish, but due to the steeper angles of the curve, the
drivers perception to determine when the ASPN is level is nearly impossible.
Figure 70. Standoff Position and Approach for Upper-Deck Piercing

Some ASPNs have a tendency to skip or slide along the fuselage when on the curve. Positioning
the ASPN on an angle perpendicular to the surface curve will improve the chances of a
successful penetration, but the bad angle will impact the effectiveness of the spray pattern.
When piercing a cabin on a passenger aircraft, regardless of which deck, the ASPN should be
level and enter the aircraft between the top of the seats and the bottom of the overhead bin. This
position will allow the most effective spray pattern without being blocked by the seats. The view
and perception of the ASPN angle is affected by the reduced standoff position and the inability to
visually reference beyond the curve of the fuselage.
Figures 71 and 72 show the angle of the ASPN during FAA piercing tests where a skilled
operator repeatedly pierced at this angle, although confident that the orientation of the ASPN
was level. The downward angle reduced the effectiveness of the pattern, and the seats block
about 50% of the spray.
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Figure 71. Piercing an Upper Deck, Angled Down
Figure 72. Proper Piercing Angle on Steeper Slope of Fuselage

Positioning the ARFF vehicle at the greatest distance from the aircraft that the HRET can be
effective increases the drivers view and accuracy in piercing position and angle. Figure 73
shows an ARFF vehicle with HRET operating at the furthest possible point of the recommended
standoff position. The driver has achieved greater safety through distance and a full view of the
piercing operation. Developing proficiency in positioning the vehicle in the proper standoff
position required repetitive training.
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Figure 73. Positioning With Increased Standoff Distance

11.5 FIRES IN LOWER DECK (BELLY COMPARTMENTS).
The lower deck of the A380 is divided into three cargo compartments. The compartments on the
lower cargo deck are also referred to as belly bays or cargo holds. The most aft compartment is
the bulk cargo compartment (or bay). Loose freight or baggage that is not stored in ULDs is kept
in this compartment. The aft compartment begins aft of the main landing gear and ends just
forward of the bulk cargo compartment. The forward cargo compartment begins forward of the
main gear and ends just aft of the main avionics bay. On some A380s, the aft cargo
compartment extends forward into what the airlines refer to as a tunnel. As shown in figure 74,
the tunnel is narrower than the aft main cargo compartment. It will accommodate freight pallets,
which must be turned sideways on the rollers to fit into the narrower tunnel. Attempts to pierce
into the freight tunnel using current ASPNs on HRETs will not be effective. An ARFF vehicles
approach to that portion of the fuselage will be obstructed by wings and engines and make access
nearly impossible. If access could be made, the wing-to-body faring, the cheek area, and the
additional bulkhead in the tunnel create a 74-in. distance from the exterior skin. To effectively
penetrate the tunnel with the discharge holes of the ASPN exposed to allow full-rated flow
pattern, the piercing tip would need to be 82 to 84 in. long.
Cargo containers and cargo pallets are known as Unit Load Devices (ULD). The forward cargo
compartment has a loading door on the right side in the forward 1/3 of the cargo compartment.
This compartment can carry up to 22 LD-3 cargo containers or 7 cargo pallets. The aft cargo
compartment has a loading door on the right side in the aft portion of the cargo compartment.
The aft cargo compartment can carry up to 16 LD-3 cargo containers or 6 cargo pallets.
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Figure 74. Forward Portion of Aft Cargo Compartment, Known as the Tunnel
The bulk cargo compartment is the furthest aft portion of the aft cargo compartment, and carries
hand-loaded cargo, not cargo containers or ULDs. Both the bulk cargo compartment portion and
the aft cargo compartment are ventilated with recycled air from the cabin. The temperature in
the bulk cargo compartment is also regulated. Access to the bulk cargo compartment is available
through the aft cargo compartment and vice versa. There is also a dedicated bulk cargo door
located aft of the aft lower-deck cargo door on the right side of the aircraft.
The cargo compartments are equipped with smoke detectors that are monitored in the cockpit.
The cockpit crew can activate the cargo compartment extinguishing system controlled by the
Cargo Smoke panel in the cockpit. If the affected compartment is a ventilated cargo
compartment, the ventilation is automatically isolated.
Fires in cargo compartments equipped with detection and suppression systems have proven to be
quite effective. Typically, the fire suppression system uses a clean agent to flood the cargo
compartment. Opening the cargo door prematurely may provide oxygen to the oxygen-starved
fire, and allow re-ignition. FLIR cameras and TICs may be helpful in checking the heat in the
compartment before cargo doors are opened. The flight crew and the aircraft maintenance group
should be involved in the decision making with respect to actions to be taken after the firesuppression system has been activated in a cargo compartment, unless obvious fire conditions are
present.
The cargo compartments are isolated from the walls of the fuselage by bulkheads. These
bulkheads provide a clean space with vertical walls in a round space, separating the freight area
from the fuselage walls and the systems that are attached to them. The voids created between the
fuselage and the cargo compartments are called the cheek areas. These cheek areas are fairly
deep in large aircraft, i.e., 42 in. at the narrowest point on an A380. The cheek area locations are
shown in figure 75. The cheek areas contain wiring, piping, and other aircraft components.
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Figure 75. Lower Cargo Compartment Configuration

Piercing through the cheek area for a fire in the lower cargo compartment is not an effective
strategy because the ASPN is not long enough to pass through the cheek area and into the cargo
compartment. Figure 76 shows a measurement of the cheek area immediately inside the rear
cargo compartment door. At that position, the cheek area is 42 in. at the narrowest point on the
A380. However, if the fire is in the cheek area, an HRET with an ASPN may be very effective.
It may be difficult to determine whether a fire is burning in the cargo compartment or in the
cheek area. One of the best indications would be blistering paint or other signs of heat on the
skin.
Figure 76. Cheek Area Inside Rear Cargo Compartment (42 in.)
From the position between the rear cargo door and the wing root, the wing faring flares out on
the exterior of the aircraft. This increases the distance between the exterior skin and the open
cargo compartment. This is not a suitable area for piercing for three reasons.
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The distance is far greater than the length of ASPNs on HRETs.
The wing box structure is among the strongest components on the aircraft. Piercing
through that material is not an option.
The wings and engines present an obstruction to positioning the ARFF vehicle.
The flare of the wing faring, looking forward from the rear cargo compartment, is shown in
figure 77, and the outside view is shown in figure 78.
Figure 77. Flare of Faring Between Cargo Compartment and Wing
Figure 78. Outside View of Wing Faring Flare

If the fire is in the lower cargo compartment and the onboard suppression system did not succeed
in extinguishing the fire, the ASPN may be used to pierce through the cargo door itself. The
thickness of the cargo door is well within the ability of the ASPN to pass through. The edges of
the door and the door frame, attachments, and locking mechanisms should be avoided, as they
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are the most heavily reinforced points on the aircraft. A position should be chosen that is toward
the center of the door to avoid rivet lines or door controls. This is the best area to successfully
introduce agent into the lower cargo compartment with the ASPN.
FAA research has shown that Halotron has promising effects on fires in sealed cargo
compartments when used as a flooding agent through the ASPN. Typically, there are vents in
these compartments that are open when the aircraft is on the ground. Normal landing procedures
and depressurization opens the vents and outflow valves. If the cockpit crew is still onboard, it
may be possible to close the vents to reduce Halotron leakage. It is also possible to block the
outflow valves to reduce the leak rate.
Access into the lower rear cargo compartment can be achieved through the bulk cargo
compartment, which is the furthest aft door on the right side of the aircraft. This compartment is
used for hand-loaded luggage, and it is equipped with a door that easily opens manually. Once
inside, it may be necessary to remove luggage, but the door and compartment allow direct access
into the lower rear cargo compartment. The bulk cargo compartment and the aft cargo
compartment are separated by a cargo net, as shown in figure 79.
Figure 79. Aft Cargo Compartment With Cargo Net Separating the Bulk
Cargo Compartment
12. CARGO COMPARTMENT DOORS.
For a fire in the cargo compartment, careful consideration must be given to determine if there are
benefits in gaining access to the space. Cargo compartments are typically full of freight. The
freight is first loaded into ULDs or pallets, which are metal trays equipped with nets that hold the
freight in place. There is no circulation space or aisles where fire fighters can gain access to a
burning ULD. Figure 80 shows a ULD loaded in a lower cargo compartment. Removing the
ULDs to gain access to another ULD is not a good option. Maintaining the load and balance of
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an aircraft is critical to the safety of any operation. Removing a ULD in the wrong order could
cause the aircraft to tail tip, jeopardizing the safety of everyone involved. Unloading an aircraft
requires specialized equipment and training. Fire fighters who have not had special training in
unloading aircraft would be endangering themselves, others, and the aircraft. Allowing the
airline workers to unload the aircraft would require authorizing them to be in the hot zone.
Cargo offloading operations are shown in figure 81.
Figure 80. A ULD in Position in Lower Cargo Compartment
Figure 81. Cargo Offloading Operations

Once a decision has been made to access the cargo compartment, options for entry must be
considered. The easiest way to gain access to any structure is through the normal entries using
the same methods and controls that are used during nonemergency situations. This may be an
option depending on what power is still on in the aircraft and what damage has been caused by
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the fire. Aircraft familiarization and preplanning are the best times to determine the options
available for opening doors. Airline representatives can provide technical guidance during the
emergency. Crash charts and the ARFF Working Group ARFF database can provide detailed
instructions for opening doors electrically, hydraulically, and manually.
Forcible entry on a cargo door is not an option. The construction, locking mechanisms, and the
size and weight of the door make it impractical. In February 2006, Philadelphia, PA, fire fighters
were challenged with forcible entry on the main cargo door on a Douglas DC-8 (UPS 1307),
which landed at Philadelphia International Airport with a cargo fire onboard. The rescue
companys attempts to force the door by cutting the locking mechanisms proved futile, see figure
82. The A380 door is larger, heavier, and just as formidable as the DC-8 door.
Figure 82. Philadelphia Fire Fighters Attempt Forcible Entry on a DC-8 Cargo Door
The doors can be operated hydraulically with the toggle switches available on the cargo door
control panel, which is located to the right of the forward and aft cargo door. If the power to the
aircraft has been secured, electric operation of the door is not an option. The bulk cargo door can
be manually operated; procedures are shown on the fuselage or adjacent to the door, as shown in
figures 83 through 85.
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Bulk Cargo Door OperationDoor Opening

1. Press Push Button to release handle.
2. Move Handle to UNLATCHED, and open door partially.
3. Move Handle to LATCHED.
4. Open Door Until Latched and Push Handle into Recess.
Figure 83. Bulk Cargo Door Operation
ENSURE RED WARNING LIGHT INDICATING PRESSURIZED CABIN IS NOT FLASHING

1. Push in Flap to Grasp Handle.
2. Pull Handle to UNLATCHED/UNLOCKED.
3. Open Cargo Door Operation Access Panel.
4. Push Toggle Switch to OPEN Position until the Green Light is On.
Figure 84. Forward Cargo Door Operation
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Same Operation as Forward Door.

ENSURE RED WARNING LIGHT INDICATING PRESSURIZED CABIN IS NOT FLASHING
1. Push in Flap to Grasp Handle.
2. Pull Handle to UNLATCHED/UNLOCKED.
3. Open Cargo Door Operation Access Panel.
4. Push Toggle Switch to OPEN Position until the Green Light is On.
Figure 85. Aft Cargo Door Operation

Opening the cargo door on a loaded cargo compartment will only provide access to the cargo
containers immediately inside the door. Again, airline representatives should be consulted prior
to attempting access to these spaces. If removal of cargo containers is necessary, the aircraft
representatives must be on hand to oversee operations and safety.
A cargo loading platform may provide the best access to a cargo compartment. It will provide a
safe platform from which to work if access is necessary. A cargo loading platform is designed to
span the width of the door, and can be raised and lowered, as needed. Caution must be taken
because of the rolling casters located on the deck surfaces within the cargo compartments.
Airline personnel should be consulted for safe operation. These cargo loading platforms are very
large. They move very slowly and have no off-road capability and are designed to operate on
paved, level surfaces. If the aircraft is on or adjacent to a cargo ramp, these vehicles may be
nearby and using one may be a viable option. If the aircraft is located off the hard surface or at a
great distance from the cargo ramp, other options should be explored.
13. LANDING GEAR AND BRAKE HAZARDS.
Emergencies involving landing gear, wheels, brakes, and tires on NLA have the same types of
concerns as all other large aircraft. There are, however, certain differences of which emergency
responders should be aware. This section identifies specific guidance and procedures for issues
related to the undercarriage of the A380.
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13.1 BRAKE OVERHEAT.

The following guidance regarding brake overheats was provided by an Airbus representative:
Brake overheats can be caused by:

-
Aborted takeoff
Emergency braking
Frequent use of brakes
Braking system fault
Overweight or short landing
High brake temperatures may cause damage to gear, struts, and axles.
Hot brakes, if not treated properly, pose significant risk of tire explosion and rim
disintegration.
Hot brakes, combined with hydraulic leak or grease build up, can cause an undercarriage
fire.
Brake temperatures are monitored from the cockpit. ARFF communications with the
cockpit should be attempted to gain the pilots interpretation of the conditions.
If fusible plugs have melted and the tire(s) deflated, the wheels should be approached
from forward or aft, and water mist should be used to cool the wheels.
After brake temperatures drop (approximately 1 hour), when struts and axles are no
longer in danger of warping, brake fans or PPV may be used to aid in cooling.
CAUTION: Carbon fibers created in the brakes during braking may become airborne
when brake fans or PPV are activated. Full PPE, including SCBA, must be maintained
during this operation. Fan placement and downwind effects of airborne carbon fiber
should be considered.
13.2 WHEEL FIRES.

If wheels are burning, the danger of fire extension exists. ARFF personnel should not wait for
tires to deflate if fire attack can be launched safely. The preferred attack is from an ARFF
vehicle, which will provide some protection for firefighters in the event the wheel or tire
disintegrates. Attack the wheel fire by applying a blanket of AFFF using the turrets from a
forward or aft position to the aircraft. In addition to the physical protection offered by the truck,
the turret provides greater range and standoff distance from the fire and hazards presented.
The A380 has 22 wheels, as shown in figure 86, and:
One set of nose landing gear (NLG)
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Two sets of wing landing gear (WLG)

Two sets of body landing gear (BLG)
Figure 86. The A380 WLG and BLGView From Front

(Photograph taken from right side of aircraft)
What fire fighters commonly refer to as the main gear are specifically called wing and body
landing gear. WLG and BLG wheels are numbered for identification. Nose gear wheels are not
numbered. For the WLG and BLG, the numbering starts from the left side (just like engines),
and then moves aft. The first row of gear on the A380 is the WLG. From left to right, the
wheels are referred to as 1, 2, 3, and 4, as shown in figure 87. The next row of WLG starts with
5 on the left side, followed across as 6, 7, and 8. The BLG rows follow suit, with numbering
starting on each row at the left.
3
4
7
8
11
15
19
12
16
20
13
17
21
14
18
22
1
2
5
6
9
10
Figure 87. Landing Gear Numbering System

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The following systems are associated with the gear: landing gear extension and retraction
system (LGERS), braking system, and steering. The tire pressure, brake temperature, and
landing gear shock-absorber pressures are monitored from the cockpit.
Certain specific information relative to the operation of the landing gear and brakes are important
for ARFF personnel, based on the way pilots typically report failures. On the A380, a pilot is
likely to report a failure of the GREEN Hydraulic System or the YELLOW Hydraulic System.
An understanding of what is controlled hydraulically or electrically better prepares ARFF
personnel for potential effects of the reported anomaly.
As a quick reference:
GREEN Hydraulic System controls NLG, including steering and WLG, and associated
gear doors.
YELLOW Hydraulic System controls BLG, including BLG steering and associated gear
doors.
Sections 13.3 through 13.5 provide more detailed descriptions of these systems.
13.3 LANDING GEAR EXTENSION AND RETRACTION SYSTEM.
Normally, the landing gear on an A380 extends and retracts hydraulically. The unlocking
function, which allows it to release from its up and locked position, is controlled electrically.
The GREEN Hydraulic System controls the NLG and WLG and the associated gear doors. The
YELLOW Hydraulic System controls the BLG and the associated gear doors. In the event of a
failure that does not allow normal use of the LGERS, a gravity-assisted landing gear extension
may be performed. This is accomplished electrically through two free-fall control modules.
13.4 BRAKING SYSTEMS.
The A380 has 16 carbon brakes. There is one brake on each WLG wheel, and one brake on each
of the four forward-most wheels on each BLG. There are no brakes on NLG or on the rear two
wheels on each BLG. In normal braking, the GREEN Hydraulic System powers brakes in the
WLG. The YELLOW Hydraulic System powers brakes in the BLG.
In addition, there is a Local Electro-Hydraulic Generation System (LEHGS), which serves as an
independent hydraulic power source. The LEHGS has its own electrically powered hydraulic
pump, hydraulic reservoir, and controller. In abnormal braking scenarios, the LEHGS are used
as well as the hydraulic accumulators.
13.5 STEERING.
The A380 has steering systems for the nose wheels and for the rear four body wheels. Normally,
the nose wheel steering is powered by the GREEN Hydraulic System, which is backed up by the
LEHGS and nose wheel steering accumulators. The body wheel steering is powered by the
YELLOW Hydraulic System.
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14. HYDRAULIC AND COOLING SYSTEMS.

While the B-747-8 Intercontinental still makes use of a 3000-psi hydraulic system, which is the
typical hydraulic pressure on aircraft, the A380 includes eight engine-driven hydraulic pumps
rated at 5000 psi. There are two hydraulic systems on the A380; they are designated as the
GREEN Hydraulic System and the YELLOW Hydraulic System, as shown in table 9. Four
engine-driven pumps, two per engine, power each hydraulic system. Two engine-driven pumps
are sufficient to pressurize one hydraulic system. The pumps on the Number 1 and 2 engines
power the GREEN Hydraulic System. The pumps on the Number 3 and 4 engines power the
YELLOW Hydraulic System.
Table 9. Hydraulic Systems Operation
System
NLG/doors
BLG/doors
WLG brakes
BLG brakes
Nose wheel steering
Body wheel steering
Slats and flaps (redundant)
Number 1 and 2 Engines

GREEN
Number 3 and 4 Engines

YELLOW
The hydraulic systems operate constantly and power the landing gear systems, flight controls,
and cargo doors. The landing gear system includes braking and steering.
During emergency operations, ARFF should avoid cutting pressurized hydraulic lines. The
pressure of a rupture in a pressurized hydraulic line is dangerous to personnel. The fluid can
cause severe skin and eye irritation and degrade protective clothing properties. Airbus lists three
approved hydraulic fluids on their qualified manufacturers list, e.g., Exxon Mobil HyJet IV
APlus, HyJet V, and Skydrol LD-4. These are phosphate-based hydraulic fluids. Both hydraulic
systems (YELLOW and GREEN) contain 145 gallons (550 liters) each, for a total capacity of
290 gallons (1100 liters) per aircraft.
There is a cooling system that runs between both A380 decks to supply the chillers in the galleys.
Since it runs as one system between the decks, it too has a high pressure of 5000 psi. The fluid
used is Galden HT135; a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) and Safety Data Sheet, provided
by the manufacturer, are included in appendix C. Historically, Airbus has used Galden HT135 in
other aircraft besides the A380. At temperatures above 572F (300C), this fluid can break down
and, after prolonged heating or fire exposure, degrade, liberating hydrogen fluoride (HF) and
carbonyl fluoride (COF2). It should be noted that, according to the company, this fluid does
have FM Approval Standard 6930 [14] approval as having no flash or fire point and no explosion
hazards.
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15. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.

To meet the changing demands of the market the use of advanced materials and technologies in
aircraft design has increased. The A380 is an excellent example of the evolution and use of these
materials. The materials selected for each component of the aircraft are specifically chosen to
satisfy the need of the component, provide high strength, and provide resistance to the typical
causes of fatigue, damage, stability, and corrosion. The weight of the material is an important
factor, as weight is directly related to the cost of operating the aircraft. Production costs and
availability are also factors.
For the A380, the proportion of structural materials by weight still shows that aluminum alloys
make up the largest proportion (61%). A number of new construction practices were engaged on
the A380. Some made use of new alloys, while others used different sizes and runs of
conventional materials to reduce seams and fasteners to lighten the aircraft without
compromising strength.
Some of these changes involving metals include:
Aluminum lithium extrusions, used on main deck cross beams
7085 aluminum alloy for wing spars and ribs
Titanium alloys in place of steel; the percentage of titanium by weight on the A380
increased 2% in the A380 over previous Airbus models in the pylons and landing gear
alone.
A380 construction materials by weight are as follows:
61% aluminum
22% composite materials
10% titanium and steel
3% glass-reinforced aluminum laminate (GLARE)
2% surface protections
2% miscellaneous
15.1 COMPOSITE MATERIAL USE.

Increased use of composites is not only present on A380s and other NLA, but is also a part of the
evolution of aircraft construction in general. The Boeing Company has significantly increased
the quantity of composites in newer aircraft, as shown in figure 88.
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Figure 88. Increased Use of Composite Materials

(Compliments of The Boeing Company)
The B-787 is constructed of 50% composite materials by weight, as shown in figure 89. These
advanced materials offer new challenges to ARFF personnel, and a great deal still needs to be
learned. The FAA is conducting research to gain a better understanding of these advanced
materials and develop best practices for piercing and cutting them.
The B-747-8I
(Intercontinental) design does not include the same increase in proportion of composite
materials. Composites on the B-747-8I are located primarily on control surfaces, pylons,
fairings, and cowls, as shown in figure 90.
Figure 89. Construction of B-787

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Figure 90. The ARFF Information on a B-747-8I

15.2 ADVANCED COMPOSITE MATERIALS ON THE A380.
The increased use of carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) laminates has allowed the most
drastic weight reduction in the A380. The A380 has a CFRP composite center wing box, which
is a first in commercial aviation. In addition, the upper-deck floor beams, fin box, rudder,
horizontal stabilizer elevators, and rear-pressure bulkhead are made of CFRP. The CFRP has
replaced aluminum on lateral panels and secondary ribs. CFRP has also been introduced in mid
and outer flaps, flap track fairings, spoilers, and ailerons, as shown in figure 91.
Figure 91. Composite Materials and Locations on the A380

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Although the A380 includes GLARE fiber metal laminate in the overall construction of the
fuselage skin, the skin of the cheek areas for both the forward and aft cargo compartments is
aluminum alloy. GLARE is composed of several very thin layers of aluminum interspersed with
layers of glass fiber pre-preg bonded with a resin matrix.
GLARE panels are used for two sections of the skin, and they cover almost 5400 sq ft of the
aircraft fuselage, as shown in figure 92. GLARE has significantly better burnthrough resistance
than traditional aluminum used for aircraft skins. According to reference 15, tests have shown
that the burnthrough time for 0.039-in. (1-mm)-thick aluminum skin is 30 seconds, but GLARE
has resisted burnthrough for over 15 minutes. Where GLARE is not installed on the underside of
the aircraft, fire-resistive thermoacoustic insulation is used to meet the 5-minute burnthrough
resistance requirement, but the burnthrough time of the skin from direct flame impingement of a
pooled fuel fire will not significantly change. Fire exposure from the exterior of the A380 in the
GLARE-protected areas may increase the period of survivable temperatures inside the aircraft.
The increased burnthrough resistance of GLARE will also increase the resistance to breaching
the fuselage from a fire burning inside the cabin.
Figure 92. The GLARE Locations on the A380, Highlighted

Laboratory-scale experiments have compared the force to penetrate GLARE and CFRP to
traditional aluminum alloy as used for aircraft skins. Though this work is ongoing, initial results
indicate that GLARE takes more force to penetrate, but the force of retraction is greater for
aluminum, as shown in figure 93. This force on the ASPN should not cause any operational
problems, as long as the ASPN is withdrawn at the same angle and position as it was during the
piercing.
A concern has been raised anecdotally that, after piercing a GLARE panel, the GLARE material
may tend to bind on the ASPN due to the ASPN changing its angle during penetration. As
opposed to aluminum, which will continue to split once penetrated if the ASPN angle changes,
the greater strength of the GLARE from the fiber reinforcement prevents that. Planned full-scale
tests by the FAA will assess the potential for this to occur once the laboratory-scale experiments
are complete. It should be noted that this has not been observed in any of the laboratory-scale
experiments, but the ASPN being used travels in a very precisely controlled motion. In the field,
the boom has a lot of sway, and the ASPN can shift its angle due to the joints and flexibility built
into the system.
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Figure 93. Comparison of GLARE and Aluminum Penetration Forces

15.3 EFFECTS OF FIRE ON COMPOSITE MATERIALS.
A burning aircraft presents the effects of combustion on every aircraft component and the goods
being carried. A burning aircraft is a hazardous material incident and must be treated as such.
For ARFF personnel, understanding the unique characteristics of each product or material used,
both in construction and carried on the aircraft in fire conditions, is an important aspect in
emergency management and scene safety. Protection required and firefighting tactics do not
significantly differ from those for aircraft without composites. The highest level of protection
for fire fighters and the exposed population must be employed for all aircraft fires.
The components of advanced composite materials are all affected by fire. Resins and epoxy will
burn, particularly in the presence of an aviation fuel fire. Where aluminum will melt at 1220F
(660C), generally composites will burn between 572F (300C) and 932F (500C) but will
maintain their structural integrity during burning. Resins will ignite at 400-600F (204-315C).
Products of composite combustion will contribute to the toxicity of the smoke plume.
Carbon fibers combust at 1000F (538C), and burn with a glowing red color at 1400F (760C).
Kevlar fibers combust at 800-900F (427-482C). Glass fibers do not support combustion,
but they will melt and possibly form glass beads.
A composite material in a confined space may be very difficult to extinguish based on the
experiences of the United States Air Force (USAF). Currently, FAA research is working to
evaluate this evidence. USAF guidance on composite material hazards in their Technical Order
00-105E-09 [16] instructs ARFF to continuously apply water to cool smoldering composites and
to ensure they are cooled below 300F (149C). Cooling sufficiently is very important, as is
ensuring that all smoldering areas have been adequately overhauled to prevent reignition. Hosestream attack on smoldering composite structures may cause the release of superheated steam.
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15.4 EXTINGUISHMENT.
Class B foam is the preferred agent to use for composite material fires; however, water can be
used to cool deep-seated, smoldering epoxy composites since large volumes may be needed.
Pooled fuel fires should be controlled first, then burning composites. Smoldering composites
have a tendency to reflash if not sufficiently cooled.
15.5 PROTECTION.
Full PPE, including SCBA, is required for extinguishing composite material fires or if composite
fibers are airborne. Proper decontamination of PPE is necessary after exposure to these fires or
airborne fibers. ARFF should ensure areas downwind are protected from exposures of smoke
and airborne fibers. The Boeing Company has provided guidance to the ARFF industry in
Firefighting Practices for New Generation Composite Structures, which is provided in
appendix B.
16. AUXILIARY POWER UNIT.
The APU is located in the tail of NLA. The APU emergency shutdown switches are located in
the cockpit, the maintenance nose gear panel, and the refuel/defuel panel, as shown in figures 94
through 97. The APU fire-extinguishing system is designed to activate automatically when a fire
is detected if no action is taken or if the aircraft is left unattended.
Figure 94. The APU Emergency Shutdown Locations

(Provided by Airbus)
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Figure 95. Refuel/Defuel Panel
Figure 96. The APU Emergency Shutdown Controls in the Refuel/Defuel Panel
86
Figure 97. Nose Gear APU Panel

17. FUEL SYSTEM.
According to the A380 ARFF Chart provided by Airbus [17], the A380 has a fuel capacity of up
to 83,290 gallons (315,289 liters) of usable fuel. In addition to wing fuel tanks, there is a trim
tank, which holds 6,260 gallons (23,700 liters) in the horizontal stabilizer. If the pilot reports
that the aircraft must dump fuel prior to landing, fuel can be jettisoned at the rate of 49,254
gallons (186,446 liters) per hour.
This information is helpful when considering that the maximum gross takeoff weight for an
A380 is 1,234,588 pounds (560,000 kilograms), and that the maximum gross landing weight is
850,984 pounds (386,000 kilograms) for a fully loaded A380 that just departed and needs to
return due to a problem. Prior to consuming fuel for taxi and takeoff, that aircraft was 383,604
pounds (174,000 kilograms) above its maximum landing weight. To land within weight
restrictions, the A380 may need an hour or more to jettison fuel prior to landing. If there is a fire
onboard, an hour is a long time to delay landing. If the aircraft lands at a weight above
maximum gross landing weight, a greater risk for damage to the aircraft exists, which will likely
result in a release of fuel upon landing. Fuel released upon heavy landing could potentially find
an ignition source in the landing gear.
An incident of this nature occurred at JFK Airport on July 30, 1992. When TWA Flight 853, an
L-1011, aborted takeoff, it was loaded to gross departure weight. The aircraft came down hard
on the runway causing some structural damage to the aircraft, which resulted in fuel being
released from the wing tanks. The leaking fuel found an ignition source, and the aircraft was
consumed by fire after all 292 passengers and crew escaped without serious injury.
87
18. THE U.S. AIRPORTS SERVING NLA.

The list of NLA deliveries continues to grow, as do the routes and destinations. There are
hundreds of airports in the world that are in the process of completing modifications to
accommodate the NLA. The list in table 10 will continue to evolve as routes are approved and
aircraft are delivered.
Table 10. Airports Serving NLA
Current or
Planned Service
2013
U.S. Airport
HartsfieldJackson
Atlanta International
(ATL)
San Francisco
International (SFO)
John F. Kennedy
International (JFK)
Aircraft Type
A380
Operators
Korean Air
A380
Current
George Bush
Intercontinental (IAH)
Miami International
(MIA)
Los Angeles
International (LAX)
A380
Lufthansa and Air

France
Emirates, Air
France, Korean,
Lufthansa,
Singapore Airlines
Lufthansa
A380
Lufthansa
Current
A380
Current
Dulles International
(IAD)
OHare International
(ORD)
A380
B-747-8I
B-747-8F
Singapore, Korean,
Qantas, Lufthansa,
Air France
Air France
Lufthansa
British Airways
A380
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
18.1 CABIN CONFIGURATION.

Each operator that purchases an A380 has the opportunity to customize the design of their cabin
in terms of both seat style and seating arrangement. Currently, eight carriers operate A380s, and
two operate B-747-8s. Each carrier has its own design, layout, and configuration. While
economy and business class seats are more stylish, and sometimes larger than those on all other
passenger aircraft, they are nothing more than new designs of current seats. Where the actual
design of the seat is significant to ARFF is in first class. Airbus has enhanced the first-class
experience so dramatically that passengers do not purchase a seat in first class, but a rather a pod
that serves as a private suite. These pods provide obstructions to fire streams and increase the
level of effort required for search and rescue. ARFF departments that protect airports serving as
primary or alternate destinations for A380 service must be familiar with the configurations of
each carrier. These pods are not unique to A380 aircraft; they also exist on other aircraft
including certain B-777s. Carriers may also reconfigure aircraft at any time. This makes it
critical to ARFF to maintain communications with air carriers to stay current on aircraft layout
88
and passenger loads. Section 18.2 provides descriptions of some first-class configurations being
used at the time of this report.
18.2 FIRST-CLASS SUITES.
First-class suites are quite intricate, with a variety of detail features to improve comfort and
privacy for the passenger. Figure 98 shows the Emirates first-class suite.
Figure 98. First-Class Suite: Emirates

Singapore Airlines, Lufthansa, and Emirates are among the operators currently using first-class
suites with partitions that passengers can close for privacy. This same configuration is used in
Singapore Airlines B-777s employed on longer routes in business- and first-class cabins. By
closing the partition and raising a divider that separates adjoining suites, the passenger enjoys
what amounts to a personal suite, complete with widescreen television, cold drinks, vanity
mirror, fold-out table, bed, and an assortment of comfort controls. Qantas, Korean Air, and Air
France chose designs that are closer to the traditional style of first-class seats, as shown in figure
99. They have seats that convert to beds as well as many comfort controls and features, but the
suites do not have closing partitions and, therefore, are more open. Search and rescue operations
may be hampered by the need to reach into each seating pod to check for incapacitated victims.
To that end, each partition is electronically controlled, rendering them inoperable if the aircraft
power is disconnected. No information is available regarding whether the doors can be forced
open with the power off. It is possible to look over the walls of the suite, but this requires the
fire fighter to stand up into heat and heavy smoke normal to a fire condition. All carrier-specific
information is subject to change as airlines modify configurations and update furnishings. These
descriptions and photographs are provided to serve as examples of potential configurations.
Aircraft familiarization visits are essential for ARFF crews.
Cabin configurations may be unique to each aircraft. In some cases, carriers are using different
configurations on like aircraft based on the route and seating class designs for each route.
Figures 99 to 103 highlight the difference in first-class cabins, as well as show the amenities
available that would pose considerable hindrance to ARFF crews.
89
Figure 99. First-Class Cabins: Qantas (left) and Air France (right)
Figure 100. Raised Partition Around First-Class Seat on Lufthansa A380
Figure 101. Korean Air First-Class Seat
90
Figure 102. Emirates First-Class Shower
Figure 103. Emirates First-Class Lavatory Window
91
Familiarization with each carriers configuration will prevent the potential for penetrating into a
lavatory or a first-class suite, either of which will reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of the
penetration and interior fire-suppression effort. Singapore, Emirates, Lufthansa, and Qantas
have first-class seats and suites that can effectively block the ASPN spray pattern. It is also
important to note that while Qantas and Singapore have their first-class cabins on the main deck,
Emirates and Lufthansa have theirs on the upper deck. Korean Air has 94 business-class seats on
the upper deck, yet has kept first class on the main deck. There is no such thing as a standard
seating configuration on the A380.
19. THE B-747-800 SERIES AIRCRAFT.
While writing this report, The Boeing Company began deliveries of the B-747-800 series
aircraft. As of this report publication date, the following carriers are flying B-747-8 aircraft in
one of three models:
B-747-8I
B-747-8F
B-747-8 VIP
The carriers who have taken delivery thus far include:
AirBridge Cargo Airlines: B-747-8F

Atlas Air (operating for British Airways): B-747-8F
Boeing Business Jets: B-747-8 VIP
Cathay Pacific Airways: B-747-8F
Cargolux Airlines International: B-747-8F
DAE Capital: B-747-8F
Korean Air Boeing: B-747-8F
Lufthansa: B-747-8I
Nippon Cargo Airlines: B-747-8F
As of the publication of this report, only one U.S. airport has scheduled passenger service of the
B-747-8I. Lufthansa has service from Dulles International Airport (IAD) to Frankfurt
International Airport (FRA).
Currently, B-747-8 freighters have a larger presence at U.S. airports than B-747-8 passenger
service.
The airports listed in table 11 have Modifications of Standards (MoSs) in place for B-747-8
operations [18]. These airports are authorized to conduct flight operations of B-747-8 aircraft
based on established criteria for ICAO Code F/FAA Group VI design groups [1].
92
Table 11. The U.S. Airports With MoSs in Place for B-747-8 [18]
Airport (Location Identifier)
Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Massachusetts
Chicago OHare International Airport (ORD), Illinois
Chicago Rockford International Airport (RFD), Illinois
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Texas
Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW), Michigan
Denver International Airport (DEN), Colorado
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Georgia
Honolulu International Airport (HNL), Hawaii
Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Texas
Huntsville International Airport (HSV), Alabama
Indianapolis International Airport (IND), Indiana
John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), California
Miami International Airport (MIA), Florida
Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), New Jersey
Orlando International Airport (MCO), Florida
San Francisco International Airport (SFO), California
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Washington
Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport (ANC), Alaska
Toledo Express Airport (TOL), Ohio
Washington-Dulles International Airport (IAD), Washington D.C.
Region
New England
Great Lakes
Great Lakes
Southwest
Great Lakes
Northwest Mountain
Southern
Western-Pacific
Southwest
Southern
Great Lakes
Eastern
Western Pacific
Southern
Eastern
Southern
Western-Pacific
Northwest Mountain
Alaskan
Great Lakes
Eastern
20. SUMMARY.
This report provides an in-depth view into the various challenges, hazards, and unique
characteristics of NLA. It is evident that as the worlds aircraft evolve in size, sophistication,
and capability, the knowledge base, technology, and skill sets required for ARFF must evolve as
well. Knowledge is among the greatest tools the ARFF commanders and fire fighters possess.
The size, fuel-carrying capacity, passenger loads, cabin configurations, and increased footprint of
NLA with evacuation slides deployed are the issues that require the most attention as ARFF
crews plan, prepare, and train for NLA incidents.
The passenger capacity is the primary reason that the A380 was developed. The current average
of 525 passengers in a three-class configuration is already a staggering load to manage during
emergency operations. Responders need to plan for this number to increase as airlines look for
ways to capitalize on the capability of this aircraft to carry over 800 passengers. Plans for mass
casualty, evacuations, transportation, and shelter that were developed for B-747-400s need to be
doubled if this aircraft starts flying with the total number of passengers that it is certified to
carry.
93
NLA are capable of carrying 80,000 gallons of fuel, which is the equivalent of approximately
nine tractor trailer tankers full of jet fuel. This fuel is stored in various locations on the aircraft,
i.e., above, below, and alongside the fuselage, which seats hundreds of passengers. Improved
fire-resistant qualities of cabin finishes, improved burnthrough times offered by advanced
composites, and increasingly sophisticated technology aboard these aircraft certainly increase
overall safety for passengers. However, there is still a risk of an incident wherein fuel escapes
from the tanks, pools under the aircraft, and finds an ignition source. ARFF fire fighters need to
plan for the worst-case scenario, which would require controlling an 80,000-gallon fuel fire
under an aircraft carrying 550 or more passengers. This will require rapid response by qualified
ARFF fire fighters with sufficient equipment, quantities of foam, water, and techniques to
quickly provide protection to the occupants. This must be done before the temperature becomes
unbearable, or products of combustion entering the passenger cabin become an immediately
dangerous to life and health situation. Most ARFF fire fighters will never fight an 80,000-gallon
fuel fire. An event of this magnitude with an occupied aircraft would be the first in history.
Prudent planning and training are the only tools available to achieve success.
Evacuation slides play a vital role by providing passengers and crew a rapid method of escape
from a dangerous incident. Master streams from primary turrets and HRETs are needed to
quickly make the area safe. ARFF personnel must prioritize and balance the needs of emergency
operations. Initial priorities include extinguishing fires in rescue/escape paths and assisting
passengers as they evacuate the aircraft. Stabilizing the evacuation slides will increase safety
during evacuation. Using hand lines to apply a protective blanket of foam under and around the
web of slides will use less agent than turrets and allow for a more precise application in the areas
where the slides block access to the area under the fuselage. Turrets may damage the slides,
which are at risk for being moved by the force of the streams. The slippery foam will increase
the speed of a person on the slide, as well as increase the risk of falling on the ground. Hand
lines provide more precise placement of the foam and do not usually disrupt slides. The lower
pressure and volume of the hand lines, the reduced range of the pattern, and the personnel that
must be committed to deploy the lines all negatively impact the planning of an efficient
operation with finite resources during this critical stage of an emergency. These complications
are reality and must be factored into preplans by ARFF departments.
The sheer size of these NLA adds a level of difficulty for ARFF fire fighters during emergency
operations. Available technology can reduce the impact of these challenges if available and
properly deployed. HRETs can reduce the time and increase the efficiency of an interior attack.
Use of cameras on the tip of the device can provide remote monitoring of conditions and increase
fire fighter safety with the ability to operate the device from outside the aircraft. IAVs can
provide a safe work platform, a point of access for fire fighters to conduct interior operations,
and a means of supporting passenger evacuation and deplaning. Training, maintaining
proficiency, and well-thought deployment plans are critical components to the efficient use of
these tools.
Adequate supplies of firefighting agents with consideration to the increased footprint created by
upper-deck slide deployment should be factored into incident planning. Planning and
coordination for additional agent and supplies (Q3) quantities required for interior fire attack
must be determined in planning exercises and drills, not on the fire ground.
94
Preplanning for each NLA configuration is necessary in preparing for mitigation of an incident
or accident involving NLA. Areas of these aircraft designed for occupancy vary and will affect
planning for fire attack, rescue, and search and recovery. These plans must be dynamic, as
airlines may change these configurations based on passenger loads, routes, and the market
demands.
The challenges created by NLA continue to test the resourcefulness and capabilities of first
responders. Along with ARFF professionals who have the primary responsibility to protect these
aircraft, mutual aid responders must be included in aircraft familiarization, incident planning,
mass casualty, agent resupply, and every task that depends on those off-airport resources for
successful operations.
21. REFERENCES
1.
ICAO Circular 305-AN/177, Operation of Newer Larger Aeroplanes at Existing

Aerodromes, March 14, 2005.
2.
ARFF Requirements Working Group (ARFFRWG) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

FINAL RECOMMENDATION to ARAC Airport Certification Issues Group, 14 CFR
Part 139 Subpart D, March 2004.
3.
Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139, Certification of Airports.
4.
Cohn, B. and Campbell, J., Minimum Needs for Airport Fire Fighting and Rescue
Services, Report No. AS-71-1, January 1971.
5.
Scheffey, J., Darwin, R., and Hunt, S., A Technical Review of Methodologies for
Calculating Firefighting Agent Quantities Needed to Combat Aircraft Crash Fires, FAA
report DOT/FAA/AR-11/29, April 2012.
6.
Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Airplanes, Safety Study NTSB/SS-00/01,

Washington, DC, 2000.
7.
Motevalli, Monajemi, and Rassi, Evaluation and Mitigation of Aircraft Slide Evacuation
Injuries, Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP), Washington, DC, 2008.
8.
Jungermann, et al., Large Aircraft Evacuation, International Aircraft Fire and Cabin
Safety Research Conference, Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 22-25, 2001.
9.
Galea, Wang, Togher, and Lawrence, Predicting the Likely Impact of Aircraft PostCrash Fire on Aircraft Evacuation Using Fire and Evacuation Simulation, International
Fire & Cabin Research Conference, Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 29 - November
1, 2007.
10.
Evacuate. Evacuate. Evacuate, Flight Safety Australia, Vol. 9, No. 4, JulyAugust

2005.
11.
Daly, K., Airbus A380 Evacuation Trial Full Report: Everybody Off in Time, Flight
International, April 6, 2006.
95
12.
IFSTA, Essentials of Fire Fighting, 5th Edition, Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma
State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 2008.
13.
AC 150/5210-23, ARFF Vehicle and High Reach Extendable Turret (HRET) Operation,
Training and Qualifications, September 30, 2010.
14.
FM Approval Standard 6930, Flammability Classification of Industrial Fluids, FM

Approvals, April 1, 2009.
15.
Stilp, T., Introduction to A380 RFF Characteristics, Disabled Aircraft Recovery &
Airport Rescue Fire Fighting Workshop, Toulouse, France, April 11-12, 2006.
16.
USAF Technical Order (TO) 00-105E-9, Aerospace Emergency Rescue and Mishap
Response Information (Emergency Services), U.S. Air Force Technical Manual, May 1,
2005.
17.
A380 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Chart, Airbus Engineering and Maintenance
Technical Data, March 1, 2007.
18.
FAA, Modifications of Standards (MoSs) for A380s/B747-8s/New Large Aircraft, June

9, 2011, http://www.faa.gov/airports/engineering/nla_mos/, last visited 4/16/13.
22. ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION.

The following documents were specifically used for compiling information during the writing of
this report.
Aircraft Characteristics, 10th Edition, Burns & McDonnell, Kansas City, Missouri, 2010.
A380-800 Flight Deck and Systems Briefing for Pilots, presentation, Airbus Flight
Operations Support and Services, March 2006.
96
APPENDIX ASEATING CHARTS FOR THE A380

1. Singapore Airlines
A-1
2. Air France
A-2
3. Emirates
A-3
4. Qantas
A-4
5. Korean Air
A-5
A-6
APPENDIX BFIREFIGHTING PRACTICES FOR NEW GENERATION COMMERCIAL

COMPOSITE STRUCTURES BY BOEING
Firefighting Practices for New Generation Commercial

Composite Structures
Boeing has received a number of inquiries from the airport fire community and airport operators
related to the fire behavior associated with the increased usage of composite materials in the main
structure of the 787 aircraft.
In reference to the composite structure, Boeing is not recommending any major changes to
the standard way of fighting an aircraft fire. Extensive testing has been conducted in regards to
combustibility and toxicity related to the composite structure. The tests have proven very
successful and warrant the basis of our position. The structure is monocoque in its design
with multiple layers of uni-dimensional woven fabric. This design not only adds to the
strength of the product, but also makes it a good barrier to fire and heat. The structure does
not aid in the spread of fire and acts as a barrier creating greater difficulty for an exterior
fire to penetrate an intact fuselage. From a toxicity perspective, the composite structure
during fire testing poses no greater hazard than an aluminum fuselage aircraft. Also, note
that the burnthrough time on the composite structure is significantly longer than with the
aluminum fuselage which may inherently provide greater safety to both the rescue fire
responders and passengers in some scenarios.
Upon approach of a fire involving a 787 aircraft, the rescue fire services should deploy their
standard tactics as if they were addressing an aircraft with an aluminum fuselage. This may be
through the use of turrets or handlines, depending on the situation. Initial fire engagement
should include foam to knock down the flames and suppress any fuel vapor that may be on the
ground around the accident scene.
Gaining access to the 787 for rescue purposes should be in accordance with the local rescue fire
service procedures. Our testing concludes that cutting the composite structure is much
easier than cutting the aluminum fuselage. Testing has been conducted with the typical
rescue tools: circular saw, air chisel, and chainsaw. The most effective method to cut through
the composite structure is to utilize a circular saw with either a carbide tip blade or diamond tip
blade.
When performing handline operations and rescue activities, personnel should be in full protective
clothing with bunker gear and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The same level of
personal protective equipment (PPE) with SCBA should be worn regardless of aircraft
material.
All aircraft accidents involving fire should be considered a hazardous materials incident whether
the situation involves an aluminum fuselage or composite fuselage. With respect to this,
B-1
hot, warm, and cold zones should be established and maintained through the completion of
the accident investigation. Personnel entering to investigate the accident after the scene has
been stabilized, should be monitored, tracked, and checked to ensure they have appropriate
protection equipment, i.e. coveralls, gloves, hoods, and respirators are common PPE for these
types of situations.
Additional Information:
The Air Force has additional information available related to Military derivative composites
and provides information that may be helpful. Access to the link provided is through enrollment.
http://www.dodffcert.com/00-105E-9/index.cfm Chapter 3. Hazardous Material and Mishap
Hazards and 3.5 Composite Material Hazards is where the appropriate data resides. NOTE:
This data does not depict, nor indicate, the behavior of the new generation composite being
used on the 787 and is only provided as a resource for review.
The Federal Aviation Administration has done recent testing on more current composite materials
similar in design to the new commercial aircraft. These data are closer to the information gleaned
from
our
toxicity
testing.
These
test
data
can
be
accessed
at:
http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/TN07-15.pdf
Note: Boeing test data, as well as other data sources, reference that the composite material
itself does not usually burn, but the resin used to bond the carbon material will melt and may
ignite. When the surface area of the composite structure is exposed to heat and/or flame, it will
maintain its structure though it may be weakened. However, the composite structure will not
melt as with aluminum fuselages. Because of this, rescue fire personnel must use caution when
traveling across the surface area of the composite structure. Make sure to test the surface area if
suspected exposure to heat and flame are present.
Additional questions regarding issues related to Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF)
and Boeing aircraft can be directed to either of the following:
Boeing Fire Department
Attn: Robert Mathis, Captain Training & Safety P.O.
Box 3707, MC 17-WE
Seattle, Washington USA 98124
206-491-4005 (Cell)
robert.c.mathis@boeing.com
or
Boeing Airport Technology
P.O. Box 3707, MC 67-KR
Seattle, Washington USA 98124
425-237-1004
AirportTechnology@boeing.com
B-2
APPENDIX CGALDEN HT135 FLUID MSDS AND SAFETY DATA SHEET
SAFETY DATA SHEET

North American Version
GALDEN(R) HT LOW-BOILING
1. PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION
1.1. Identification of the substance or mixture
Product name
: GALDEN(R)
HT LOW-BOILING Product grade(s) :
HT55; HT70; HT90; HT110; HT135
Structural formula
Molecular Weight
Range of values :
1.2. Use of the Substance/Mixture
Recommended use
CF3-O-(C3F6O)n-(CF2-O )m-CF3
:
350 - 650
:
- Heat transfer medium

- For industrial use only.
1.3. Company/Undertaking Identification

Address
: SOLVAY SOLEXIS, INC.
10 LEONARD LANE
WEST DEPTFORD NJ
08086
United States
1.4. Emergency and contact telephone numbers
: 1 (800) 424-9300 CHEMTREC (USA & Canada)
Emergency telephone
Contact telephone number (product information): (856) 853-8119 (Product information)
2. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
2.1. Emergency Overview:
NFPA
H= 1
F= 0
Appearance
liquid
Colour
colourless
Odour
odourless
I= 0
General Information
Main effects
Not hazardous in normal conditions of handling and use

Ecological injuries are not known or expected under normal use.
Thermal decomposition can lead to release of toxic and corrosive gases.
2.2. Potential Health Effects:

Inhalation
No known effect.
Eye contact
Contact with eyes may cause irritation.

Redness
Skin contact
Symptoms: Redness, Irritation.
Ingestion
C-1
Ingestion may provoke the following symptoms:

Symptoms: Nausea, Vomiting, Diarrhea.
Other toxicity effects
See section 11: Toxicological Information
2.3. Environmental Effects:

See section 12: Ecological Information
3. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS
1-Propene, 1,1,2,3,3,3-hexafluoro-, oxidized, polymd.
CAS-No.
:
69991-67-9
:
Concentration
>= 99.9 %
4. FIRST AID MEASURES

4.1. Inhalation
Move to fresh air in case of accidental inhalation of fumes from overheating or combustion.
Oxygen or artificial respiration if needed.
4.2. Eye contact
Rinse immediately with plenty of water, also under the eyelids, for at least 15 minutes.
If eye irritation persists, consult a specialist.
4.3. Skin contact
Wash off with soap and water.
If symptoms persist, call a physician.
4.4. Ingestion
Drink 1 or 2 glasses of water.
Do NOT induce vomiting.
If symptoms persist, call a physician.
5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES
5.1. Suitable extinguishing media
Water
powder
Foam
Dry chemical
Carbon dioxide (CO2)
5.2. Extinguishing media which shall not be used for safety reasons
None.
5.3. Special exposure hazards in a fire
The product is not flammable.
Not explosive
In case of fire hazardous decomposition products may be produced such as: Gaseous hydrogen
fluoride (HF), Fluorophosgene
5.4. Hazardous decomposition products
Gaseous hydrogen fluoride (HF).
Fluorophosgene
5.5. Special protective equipment for fire-fighters
Wear self-contained breathing apparatus and protective suit.
When intervention in close proximity wear acid resistant over suit.
5.6. Other information
Evacuate personnel to safe areas.
Approach from upwind.
C-2
Protect intervention team with a water spray as they approach the fire.
Keep containers and surroundings cool with water spray.
Keep product and empty container away from heat and sources of ignition.
6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

6.1. Personal precautions
Ensure adequate ventilation.
Material can create slippery conditions.
Sweep up to prevent slipping hazard.
Prevent further leakage or spillage if safe to do so.
Keep away from open flames, hot surfaces and sources of ignition.
Refer to protective measures listed in sections 7 and 8.
6.2. Environmental precautions
Should not be released into the environment.
The product should not be allowed to enter drains, water courses or the soil.
In case of accidental release or spill, immediately notify the appropriate authorities if required
by Federal, State/Provincial and local laws and regulations.
6.3. Methods for cleaning up
Soak up with inert absorbent material.
Suitable material for picking up
Dry sand
Earth
Shovel into suitable container for disposal.
7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

7.1. Handling
No special handling advice required.
Ensure adequate ventilation.
Use personal protective equipment.
Keep away from heat and sources of ignition.
To avoid thermal decomposition, do not overheat.
Take measures to prevent the build up of electrostatic charge.
Clean and dry piping circuits and equipment before any operations.
Ensure all equipment is electrically grounded before beginning transfer operations.
7.2. Storage
No special storage conditions required.
Keep away from heat and sources of ignition.
Keep in properly labelled containers.
Keep away from combustible material.
Keep away from incompatible products
7.3. Packaging material
glass
Plastic material
7.4. Other information
Provide tight electrical equipment well protected against corrosion.
8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION

8.1. Exposure Limit Values
Remarks:
Threshold limit values of by-products from thermal decomposition
Hydrogen fluoride anhydrous
C-3
US. ACGIH Threshold Limit Values 2009 time weighted average = 0.5 ppm Remarks: as F
US. ACGIH Threshold Limit Values 2009
Ceiling Limit Value = 2 ppm
Remarks: as F
US. OSHA Table Z-1-A (29 CFR 1910.1000) 1989 time weighted average = 3 ppm
Remarks: as F
US. OSHA Table Z-1-A (29 CFR 1910.1000) 1989
Short term exposure limit = 6 ppm
Remarks: as F
Remarks: as F, Can be absorbed through skin.
US. OSHA Table Z-2 (29 CFR 1910.1000) 02 2006 time weighted average = 3 ppm
US. OSHA Table Z-1 Limits for Air Contaminants (29 CFR 1910.1000) 02 2006
Permissible exposure limit = 2.5 mg/m3
Remarks: as F
US. Tennessee. OELs. Occupational Exposure Limits, Table Z1A 06 2008 time weighted
average = 3 ppm
Remarks: as F
US. Tennessee. OELs. Occupational Exposure Limits, Table Z1A 06 2008
Remarks: as F
Carbonyl difluoride
US. ACGIH Threshold Limit Values 2009 time weighted average = 2 ppm
US. OSHA Table Z-1-A (29 CFR 1910.1000) 1989 time weighted average = 2 ppm
time weighted average = 5 mg/m3
US. OSHA Table Z-1-A (29 CFR 1910.1000) 1989
Short term exposure limit = 15 mg/m3
US. OSHA Table Z-2 (29 CFR 1910.1000) 02 2006 time weighted average = 2.5 mg/m3
Remarks: Dust
US. OSHA Table Z-1 Limits for Air Contaminants (29 CFR 1910.1000) 02 2006
Permissible exposure limit = 2.5 mg/m3
Remarks: as F
US. Tennessee. OELs. Occupational Exposure Limits, Table Z1A 06 2008 time weighted
average = 2 ppm
time weighted average = 5 mg/m3
US. Tennessee. OELs. Occupational Exposure Limits, Table Z1A 06 2008
Short term exposure limit = 15 mg/m3
-
ACGIH and TLV are registered trademarks of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.
SAEL = Solvay Acceptable Exposure Limit, Time Weighted Average for 8 hour workdays. No Specific TLV STEL (Short Term
Exposure Level) has been set. Excursions in exposure level may exceed 3 times the TLV TWA for no more than a total of 30
minutes during a workday and under no circumstances should they exceed 5 times the TLV TWA.
8.2. Engineering controls

Provide local ventilation appropriate to the product decomposition risk (see section 10).
Apply technical measures to comply with the occupational exposure limits.
For additional information, consult the current edition of The Guide to the Safe Handling of
Fluoropolymers published by the Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI) Fluoropolymer
Division.
8.3. Personal protective
equipment
8.3.1. Respiratory protection
No personal respiratory protective equipment normally required.
C-4
Wear self-contained breathing apparatus in confined spaces, in cases where the oxygen level is
depleted, or in case of significant emissions.
Use only respiratory protection that conforms to international/ national standards.
In case of decomposition (see Section 10), wear a suitable respirator with a combination
filter for organic vapor and particulate.
Use NIOSH approved respiratory protection.
Comply with OSHA respiratory protection requirements.
8.3.2. Hand protection
Rubber or plastic gloves

Latex gloves
Take note of the information given by the producer concerning permeability and break through
times, and of special workplace conditions (mechanical strain, duration of contact).
8.3.3. Eye protection
Safety glasses with side-shields

If splashes are likely to occur, wear: Tightly fitting safety goggles
8.3.4. Skin and body protection
Lab coat
8.3.5. Hygiene measures
Ensure that eyewash stations and safety showers are close to the workstation location.
When using do not eat, drink or smoke.
Wash hands before breaks and at the end of workday.
Handle in accordance with good industrial hygiene and safety practice.
9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

9.1. General Information
Liquid
Appearance
Color
Odor
Colorless
Odorless
9.2 Important health safety and environmental information

55 135 C (131 - 275 F)
Boiling Point/Boiling Range

Flash Point
Flammability
Explosive Properties
Oxidizing Properties
Vapor Pressure
Relative Density/ Density
Not Flammable
Not Flammable
Not Explosive
Non Oxidizing
7.7 300 hPa
1.65 1.72 g/cm3
Temperature: 25 C (77F)
Water Insoluble
Fluorinated Solvent s Insoluble
ca. 0.7 1.7 mPa.s
Solubility
Viscosity
9.3. Other data
Not Applicable
Melting Point/Range
Decomposition Temperature
> 290 C (554 F)
C-5
10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

10.1. Stability
Stable under recommended storage conditions.
metals promote and lower decomposition temperature
In presence of titanium and its alloys the decomposition temperature decreases to 260C.
10.2. Conditions to avoid
To avoid thermal decomposition, do not overheat.
Keep away from flames and sparks.
Keep at temperature not exceeding: 290 C ( 554 F )
10.3. Materials to avoid
Combustible material, Flammable materials
non-aqueous alkalis
Lewis acids (Friedel-Crafts) above 100C
Aluminum and magnesium in powder form above 200C
10.4. Hazardous decomposition products
Gaseous hydrogen fluoride (HF)., Fluorophosgene
11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Toxicological data
Acute oral toxicity
LD50, rat, > 5,000 mg/kg
Acute inhalation toxicity
LC50, rat, > 1,826 mg/l
Acute dermal irritation/corrosion
LD50, rat, > 2,000 mg/kg
Skin irritation
rabbit, No skin irritation
Eye irritation
rabbit, No eye irritation
Sensitisation
guinea pig, Did not cause sensitization on laboratory animals.
Chronic toxicity
Oral, 28-day, rat, NOEL: > 1000 mg/kg/day, Remarks: Subacute toxicity
Genetic toxicity in vitro
Not mutagenic in Ames Test.

Chromosome aberration test in vitro, negative
Remarks
Description of possible hazardous to health effects is based on experience and/or toxicological

characteristics of several components.
Thermal decomposition can lead to release of toxic and corrosive gases.
Exposure to decomposition products
Causes severe irritation of eyes, skin and mucous membranes.
12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

12.1. Ecotoxicity effects
Acute toxicity
Remarks: no data available
12.2. Mobility
12.3. Persistence and degradability
C-6
Abiotic degradation
Result: no data available
Biodegradation
12.4. Bioaccumulative potential

Result: no data available
12.5. Other adverse effects
no data available
12.6. Remarks
Ecological injuries are not known or expected under normal use.
13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

13.1. Waste from residues / unused products
Do not dump into any sewers, on the ground, or into any body of water. All disposal methods
must be in compliance with all Federal, State/Provincial and local laws and regulations.
Regulations may vary in different locations.
Waste characterizations and compliance with applicable laws and regulations are the
responsiblity of the waste generator.
Can be incinerated, when in compliance with local regulations.
The incinerator must be equipped with a system for the neutralisation or recovery of HF.
13.2. Packaging treatment
Empty containers can be landfilled, when in accordance with the local regulations.
13.3. RCRA Hazardous Waste
Listed RCRA Hazardous Waste (40 CFR 302) - No
14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

-
Sea (IMO/IMDG)
not regulated
Air (ICAO/IATA)
not regulated
U.S. Dept of Transportation
not regulated
It is recommended that ERG Guide number 111 be used for all non-regulated material.
Canadian Transportation of Dangerous Goods
not regulated
15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

15.1.
Inventory Information
Toxic Substance Control Act list (TSCA)

Australian Inventory of Chemical Substances
(AICS)
Canadian Domestic Substances List (DSL)
Inventory of Existing Chemical Substances
(China) (IECS)
Korea Existing Chemicals Inv. (KECI) (KECI
(KR))
Japanese Existing and New Chemical
Substances (MITI List) (ENCS)
New Zealand Inventory (in preparation) (NZ)
Philippine Inventory of Chemicals and Chemical
In compliance with inventory.

In compliance with inventory
C-7
Substances(PICCS)
EU list of existing chemical substances
(EINECS)
15.2.
not applicable, Product falls

under the EU-polymer
definition.
Other regulations
US. EPA Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) SARA Title III Section
302
Extremely Hazardous Substance (40 CFR 355, Appendix A)
not regulated.
SARA Hazard Designation (SARA 311/312)
Acute Health Hazard: No.
Chronic Health Hazard: No.
Fire Hazard: No.
Reactivity Hazard: No.
Sudden Release of Pressure Hazard: No.
US. EPA Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) SARA Title III Section
313 Toxic
Chemicals (40 CFR 372.65) - Supplier Notification Required
not regulated.
US. EPA CERCLA Hazardous Substances (40 CFR 302)
not regulated.
US. New Jersey Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act (New Jersey Statute Annotated
Section 34:5A-5)
not regulated.
US. Pennsylvania Worker and Community Right-to-Know Law (34 Pa. Code Chap. 301-323)
not regulated.
US. California Safe Drinking Water & Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65)
This product does not contain any chemicals known to State of California to cause cancer,
birth defects, or any other reproductive harm..
OSHA Hazard communication standard
This material is non-hazardous as defined by the American OSHA Hazard Communication
Standard.
15.3.
Classification and labelling
Canada. Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). WHMIS Ingredient Disclosure List (Can.
Gaz., Part
II, Vol. 122, No. 2)
Does not contain a controlled product
Remarks: This product has been classified in accordance with the hazard criteria of the Controlled
Products
Regulations and the MSDS contains all the information required by the Controlled Products
Regulations.
16. OTHER INFORMATION

Ratings :
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)
Health = 1 Flammability = 0
Instability = 0
C-8
Further information
-
Update
Distribute new edition to clients
Material Safety Data Sheets contain country specific regulatory information; therefore, the MSDS's provided
are for use only by customers of the company mentioned in section 1 in North America. If you are located
in a country other than Canada, Mexico or the United States, please contact the Solvay Group company in
your country for MSDS information applicable to your location.
The previous information is based upon our current knowledge and experience of our product and is not
exhaustive. It applies to the product as defined by the specifications. In case of combinations or mixtures,
one must confirm that no new hazards are likely to exist. In any case, the user is not exempt from
observing all legal, administrative and regulatory procedures relating to the product, personal hygiene,
and integrity of the work environment. (Unless noted to the contrary, the technical information applies
only to pure product).
To our actual knowledge, the information contained herein is accurate as of the date of this document.
However, neither the company mentioned in section 1 nor any of its affiliates makes any warranty,
express or implied, including merchantability or fitness for use, or accepts any liability in connection with
this information or its use. This information is for use by technically skilled persons at their own discretion
and risk and does not relate to the use of this product in combination with any other substance or any
other process. This is not a license under any patent or other proprietary right. The user alone must finally
determine suitability of any information or material for any contemplated use in compliance with applicable
law, the manner of use and whether any patents are infringed. This information gives typical properties
only and is not to be used for specification purposes. The company mentioned in section 1 reserves the
right to make additions, deletions or modifications to the information at any time without prior notification.
Trademarks and/or other products of the company mentioned in section 1 referenced herein are either
trademarks or registered trademarks of the company mentioned in section 1 or its affiliates, unless
otherwise indicated.
Copyright 2009, Company mentioned in Section 1. All Rights Reserved.
C-9
Galden HT 135
SOLVAY SOLEXIS, Inc.
10 Leonards Lane
Thorofare, NJ 08086
856-853-8119
Section 1 - Chemical product and Company information

Date Revised:
Product Name:
Chemical Name:
Chemical Family:
Synonyms:
Emergency Telephone:
May 24, 2005

Galden HT 135
Propene, 1,1,2,3,3,3-hexafluoro, oxidized, polymerized
Fluorocarbons, Perfluorinated polyethers
None
800-424-9300 (CHEMTREC, 24 hours)
856-853-8119
Emergency Overview:
Clear, colorless liquid. Thermal decomposition will generate hydrogen fluoride (HF), which is corrosive.
Section 2 - Compositional information

Name:
wt.): Propene, 1,1,2,3,3,3-hexafluoro, oxidized, polymerized
CAS#
69991-67-9
Approximate Weight (%
100
Section 3 - Potential Health Effects

Effects of Overexposure:
Eye Contact
Eye contact may cause slight irritation.
Skin Contact
Skin contact may cause slight irritation.
Inhalation
Inhalation of vapors or mists may cause respiratory tract irritation.
Ingestion
No ill effects are expected.
Section 4 - First Aid Measures

Eye Contact:
Flush eyes for 15 minutes with copious amounts of water, retracting eyelids often. Seek medical attention if
irritation persists.
Skin Contact:
Wash skin thoroughly with mild soap and water. Flush with lukewarm water for 15 minutes.
Inhalation:
C-10
If symptoms of irritation, discomfort or overcome by exposure, remove affected person to fresh air. Give oxygen
or artificial respiration as needed.
Ingestion:
If conscious, drink three to four 8 ounce glasses of water or milk. Call a physician. If unconscious, immediately
take affected person to a hospital. Do not give anything by mouth to an unconscious person.
Section 5 - Fire Fighting Measures

Flash Point:
Lower Explosive Limit:
Upper Explosive Limit:
Autoignition Temperature:
Extinguishing Media:
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
NotApplicable
Water (spray or fog), foam, dry chemical or carbon dioxide (CO2).
Unusual Fire Hazards:

Fluoropolymers will degrade upon prolonged heating or in a fire, liberating hydrogen fluoride (HF) and carbonyl
fluoride (COF2). This gas is toxic if inhaled or it comes into contact with moist skin. HF has an ACGIH PEL TLV
(8hr TWA) of 0.5ppm and a ceiling limit of 2 ppm (1.7mg/m3). COF2 has an ACGIH TLV of 2 ppm (5.4 mg/m3)
and an OSHA PEL TWA of 2 ppm (5 mg/m3).
Fire Fighting Procedures:
Use self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and skin protection for acid gas exposure. Do not enter fire area
without proper protection. Fight fire from safe distance. If possible, air monitoring should be performed.
Section 6 - Accidental Release Measures
Releases:
In case of a release or spill, absorb material onto vermiculite or similar inert absorbent. Use
Perfluorosolv0 PFS-1 as an aid in cleaning. Place spilled material into covered container for disposal. Dispose
of according to applicable local, state and federal regulations. Extinguish all ignition sources and evacuate the
area. Exercise caution; spill area may be slippery.
Section 7 - Handling and Storage
Wash hands after use and before handling food or applying cosmetics. Do not use tobacco products in the
immediate area. Keep containers closed. Keep away from heat, sparks and flames. Do not store near combustible
materials.
Section 8 - Exposure Controls/Personal Protection

ACGIH Threshold Limit Value (8 hr. time weighted
average): None established
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit Value (8 hr. time weighted average):
None established
Engineering Controls: Ventilation Requirements:
Local Exhaust: Vent vapors or mists generated by processing away from operating personnel. Local exhaust
ventilation
at a rate of 50 feet per minute.
Personal Protective Equipment: Respiratory Protection:
No occupational exposure standards have been developed for this material. In situations where exposure to vapors
or mists is likely, NIOSH/MSHA approved respirators are recommended. Respirator use limitations made
C-11
by NIOSH/MSHA or the manufacturer must be observed. Respiratory protection programs must be in accordance
with 29 CFR 1910.134.
Eye Protection:
Eye/Face Protection: ANSI Z87.1 approved safety glasses with side shields or equivalent.
Skin Protection:
Rubber or latex recommended but not necessary.
Section 9 - Physical and Chemical Properties
Appearance:
Clear
Colorless
liquid Color:
Odorless
Odor:
Vapor Pressure:
8 torr
Vapor Density (Air=1): Not
available Boiling Point: 135
C
Melting Point:
Not
available Specific Gravity: 1.7-1.9
Solubility in Water:
Insoluble
% Volatile by Volume:
0
Section 10 - Stability and Reactivity

Stability:
This material is stable.
Reactivity:
This material is not reactive.
Conditions to Avoid:
Heat, sparks, flames, and other ignition sources; avoid heating above 290 C/554 F.
Materials to Avoid:
Strong or non-aqueous alkali and Lewis acids above 100 C/212 F.
Hazardous Decomposition Products:
Thermal decomposition of this product will generate hydrogen fluoride (HF), which is corrosive, causing burns
on contact with skin and other tissue.
Incompatibility (Materials to Avoid):
Alkali metals and halogenated compounds.
Section 11 - Toxicological Information
Rat oral LD50: greater than 25.65 g/kg

Rat intraperitoneal LD50: greater than 25 g/kg
Rat dermal LD50: greater than 2 g/kg
Rabbit skin irritation: not irritating
Rabbit eye irritation: not irritating
Guinea pig sensitization: not a
sensitizer
Solvay Acceptable Exposure Limit 1000ppm
C-12
Section 12 - Ecotoxicological Information
No ecotoxicological information is available for this material.
Section 13 - Disposal Considerations
Waste Disposal: Material, as supplied, is not a hazardous waste. Landfill according to current federal, state and
local regulations, or incinerate in a high-temperature incinerator designed to burn fluorine-containing materials.
Processing, use or contamination may make this information inaccurate or incomplete.
Section 14 - Transportation information
Shipping Class: Not regulated by DOT.
Section 15 - Regulatory information
All components of this product are listed on the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Section 8(b) Chemical
Inventory and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) provisional domestic substances list (DSL). This
product is not a "hazardous substance" as defined by OSHA Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200).
This product is not a "controlled product" as defined by the Canadian Workplace Hazardous Materials Information
System (WHMIS).
SARA Section 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances: Not
listed
SARA 311/312:
Acute:
Chronic:
Fire:
Reactivity:
Sudden Release of Pressure:
No
No
No
No
No
SARA Section 313 Toxic Chemicals: Not listed
Section 16 - Additional Information
NFPA Ratings (Scale of 04): Health = 1

Fire = 0
Reactivity = 0
Material Safety Data Sheets contain country-specific regulatory information; therefore, the MSDSs provided are
for use only by customers of Solvay Solexis, Inc. in North America. If you are located in a country other than
Canada, Mexico or the United States, please contact the Solvay Group company in your country for MSDS
information applicable to your location.
The previous information is based upon our current knowledge and experience of our product and is not exhaustive.
It applies to the product as defined by the specifications. In case of combinations or mixtures, one must confirm that no
new hazards are likely to exist. In any case, the user is not exempt from observing all legal, administrative and
regulatory procedures relating to the product, personal hygiene, and integrity of the work environment. (Unless noted
to the contrary, the technical information applies only to pure product).
To our actual knowledge, the information contained herein is accurate as of the date of this document. However,
neither Solvay Solexis, Inc. nor any of its affiliates makes any warranty, express or implied, or accepts any
liability in connection with this information or its use. This information is for use by technically skilled persons
at their own discretion and risk and does not relate to the use of this product in combination with any other
C-13
substance or any other process. This is not a license under any patent or other proprietary right. The user alone
must finally determine suitability of any information or material for any contemplated use, the manner of use and
whether any patents are infringed.
Trademarks and/or other Solvay Solexis, Inc. products referenced herein are either trademarks or
registered trademarks of Solvay Solexis, Inc. or its affiliates, unless otherwise indicated.
Solvay Solexis, Inc. All rights reserved. Copyright 2004
C-14
APPENDIX DARAC ARFF RECOMMENDATIONS WORKING GROUP FINAL

RECOMMENDATION FOR QUANTITY OF AGENT FOR NLA
For instance, the new A380 has a fuel capacity 44% greater than a B777 and 42% greater than
a 747-400. Because of this there is a greater potential for a larger 2-D fuel fire from a ruptured
fuel tank. However the current calculations for the agent quantities Theoretical Critical Area /
Practical Critical Area (TCA/PCA) would only require an additional 138 gallons of agent. This
is due to the fact that the multiple passenger level aircraft are not significantly larger in length
and fuselage width but increase in height and fuel load. Both factors are not figured into
TCA/PCA.
Compounding this problem is the increase in number of emergency escape slides on these
aircraft. The upper level escape slides will deploy 12 further on each side than the B777. This
will increase the area which will need to be protected to maintain an adequate escape path for
the occupants. With the additional slide deployments and the increased length of the upper level
slides it will be harder to make an effective fire attack on a 2-D fire that is under the fuselage
jeopardizing the integrity of the aircraft. The figure below illustrates the additional slide
deployment length.
.
Before Guyers (BG) large fire test Gage-Babcock determined what area needed fire protection
and how big the area needed to be. The area needing fire protection was an area around the
aircraft which would allow ambulatory occupants to exit the aircraft within tolerable heat
conditions and move to a safe area. Dimensions were then determined (TCA-PCA) around the
aircraft that would allow a clear escape path. With a known area to extinguish, TCA, Guyers
large fire tests were then conducted.
The Airbus 380 is unique and challenging due to the amount of upper deck occupants and
their need to evacuate when necessary.
The Airbus 380 upper deck slide extends further from the fuselage than the largest singledeck airplane, the Boeing 777.
D-1
The early work of Gage-Babcock continues to be relevant to post-crash occupant safety.

The goal is not how large of an area of fire can be extinguished by a given quantity of
extinguishing agent but how can we assure an area around the aircraft that would allow
ambulatory occupants to exit the aircraft within tolerable heat conditions and move to a
safe area. That being our mission the slide length does become a new and different
challenge as the Airbus 380 enters service at our airports.
The following calculations demonstrate a method of using the NFPA accepted K factor table and
modifying it with an additional factor to accommodate multiple passenger level aircraft.
K Factor Modification:
(Q) is now defined as follows:
Where Q1 = water requirement for control of PCA
Q2 = water requirement to maintain control or extinguish the remaining fire or both
Q3 = water requirement for interior firefighting
The method for calculating the values for each component of Q are presented below.
Where PCA = (0.67)

TCA = L
TCA,
(K + W)
L = length of aircraft
W = width of fuselage
R = application rate of selected agent: AFFF = 0.13 gpm/ft2
T = time of application (1 minute)
K = values shown below:
K
Feet
= 39 where L = less than 39
= 46 where L = 39 up to but not including 59
= 56 where L = 59 up to but not including 79
= 98 where L = 79 and over
D-2
The current values of Q2 as a percentage of Q have been determined to be as shown:

Airport Category
1
2
3
4
5
Q2 % Q1
0
27
30
58
75
Airport Category
6
7
8
9
10
Q2 % Q1
100
129
152
170
190
Sample Calculation for A380 and Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF)
TCA = L
(K + W)
(98 + 21) = 28441 ft2
= 239
PCA = 2/3 TCA = 2/3 28441 ft2 = 19055 ft2

Q1 = 0.13 gpm/ft2
Q2 = 190%
19055 ft2
Q1 = 1.9
1 = 2477 gal
2477 = 4707 gal
Q3 = add 5,000 gallons

Sample Calculation for A380 w/ additional 24 slide and AFFF
TCA = L
(K + W)
(98 + 21 + 24) = 34177 ft2
= 239
PCA = 2/3 TCA = 2/3 34177 ft2 = 22898 ft2

Q1 = 0.13 gpm/ft2
Q2 = 190%
22898 ft2
Q1 = 1.9
1 = 2977 gal
2977 = 5656 gal

Sample Calculation for A380 w/ modified K factor and AFFF
TCA = L
(K + W)
= 239
(122 + 21) = 34177 ft2
PCA = 2/3 TCA = 2/3 34177 ft2 = 22898 ft2

Q1 = 0.13 gpm/ft2
22898 ft2
Q2 = 190% Q1 = 1.9
1 = 2977 gal
2977 = 5656 gal
New 5th K factor:

K = 122 where L = 79 and over with multiple passenger cabin levels. The new K factor is
based on the increased slide area, which would need to be protected.
D-3/D-4
APPENDIX EFUEL WEIGHT/VOLUME CONVERSION

(Conversion Factors: 6.7 lb/gal 3.04 kg/gal)
POUND
GALLONS
KILOGRAMS
GALLONS
2,000 lbs
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300 gal
746
1,492
2,239
2,985
3,731
4,478
5,224
5,970
6,716
7,463
14,925
22,388
29,850
37,313
2,000 Kg
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
658 gal
1,645
3,290
4,934
6,579
8,224
9,868
11,513
13,158
14,803
16,447
32,895
49,342
65,789
82,237
E-1/E-2

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DOT/FAA/TC-13/12

Federal Aviation Administration

Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting

This document is available to the U.S. public

U.S. Department of Transportation

This report is available at the Federal Aviation Administration William J.

Technical Report Documentation Page

2. Government Accession No.

3. Recipient's Catalog No.

AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING STRATEGIES AND TACTICAL

8. Performing Organization Report No.

6. Performing Organization Code

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

ARFF Professional Services, LLC

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

U.S. Department of Transportation

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

17. Key Words

Form DOT F 1700.7

18. Distribution Statement

This document is available to the U.S. public through the

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Reproduction of completed page authorized

21. No. of Pages

Herbert Gielen, Airport Safety Manager, Airbus

FIREFIGHTING AGENT QUANTITY CONSIDERATIONS

Evacuation Slide Assistance

INTERIOR ACCESS VEHICLE

HISTORICAL REVIEWB-747 AND A380 EVACUATIONS

The B-747 Incidents

Singapore Changi Airport: Singapore Airlines Flight 221

Passenger Demographics and Behavior

INTERIOR FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS

THE HRET OPERATIONS

The HRET Design and Capability

CARGO COMPARTMENT DOORS

LANDING GEAR AND BRAKE HAZARDS

HYDRAULIC AND COOLING SYSTEMS

Composite Material Use

AUXILIARY POWER UNIT

THE U.S. AIRPORTS SERVING NLA

THE B-747-800 SERIES AIRCRAFT

Upper-Deck Evacuation Slide Deployment Lengths

The A380 TCA/PCA Areas With Evacuation Slides Deployed

Approach of ARFF Vehicles With Slides Deployed

Slide Emergency Evacuation of a B-747-438View 1

Slide Emergency Evacuation of a B-747-438View 2

Singapore Airlines Flight 221, A380 Off Pavement

Gear of SQ Flight 221, A380 Off Pavement

Deplaning Passengers From QF Flight 32

Number 2 Engine of QF Flight 32

Forward Stairway Between Decks on Air France A380

Rear Stairway Between Decks on Air France A380

Service Elevator on A380

The ML1 Door A380, Exterior Operation View

Exterior Door Operation DemonstrationStep 6

Exterior Door Operation DemonstrationStep 7

Korean A380 With Two Jet Bridges Extended at JFK