Sources of Law

Analytical Positivist School of Thought- Austin said that the

term source of lawhas three different meanings:
1. This term refers to immediate or direct author of the law which means
thesovereign in the country.
2. This term refers to the historical document from which the body of
law can be known.
3. This term refers to the causes that have brought into existence the rules
that later on acquire the force of law. E.g. customs, judicial decision,
equity etc.
Historical Jurists- Von Savigny, Henrye Maine, Puchta etc. This
group of scholars believed that law is not made but is formed.
According to them, the foundation of law lies in the common
consciousness of the people that manifests itself in the practices, usages
and customs followed by the people. Therefore, for them, customs and
usages are the sources of law.
Sociological Jurists- This group of scholars protest against the orthodox
conception of law according to which, law emanates from a single
authority in the state. They believe that law is taken from many sources
and not just one.
Ehlrich said that at any given point of time, the centre of gravity of legal
development lies not in legislation, not in science nor in judicial
decisions but in the society itself.
Duguit believed that law is not derived from any single source as the
basis of law is public service. There need not be any specific authority in
a society that has the sole authority to make laws.
Salmond on Sources of Law- Salmond has done his own classification
of sources of law:
1. Formal Sources- A Formal Source is as that from which rule of law
derives its force and validity. The formal source of law is the will of the
state as manifested in statutes or decisions of the court and the authority
of law proceeds from that.

2. Material Sources- Material Sources are those from which is derived

the matter though not the validity of law and the matter of law may be
drawn from all kind of material sources.
a. Historical Sources- Historical Sources are rules that are subsequently
turned into legal principles. Such source are first found in an
Unauthoritative form. Usually, such principles are not allowed by the
courts as a matter of right. They operate indirectly and in a mediatory
manner. Some of the historical sources of law are:
i. Unauthoritative Writings
ii. Legal Sources- Legal Sources are instruments or organs of the state by
which legal rules are created for e.g. legislation and custom. They are
authoritative in nature and are followed by the courts. They are the gates
through which new principles find admittance into the realm of law.
Some of the Legal Sources are:
a. Legislations
b. Precedent
c. Customary Law
d. Conventional Law- Treatises etc.
Charles Allen said that Salmond has attached inadequate attention to
historical sources. According to him, historical sources are the most
important source of law.
Keeton said that state is the organization that enforces the law. Therefore,
technically State cannot be considered as a source of law. However,
according to Salmond, a statute is a legal source which must be
recognized. Writings of scholars such Bentham cannot be considered as a
source of law since such writings do not have any legal backing and
authority.
Legal sources of English Law- There are two established sources of
English Law:
1. Enacted Law having its source in legislation- This consists of
statutory law. A Legislation is the act of making of law by formal and
express declaration of new rules by some authority in the body politic
which is recognized as adequate for that purpose.
2. Case Law having source in Judicial Precedence- It consists of
common law that we usually read in judgments and law reporters.

Precedent could also be considered as a source of law as a precedent is

made by recognition and application of new rules by the courts whilst
administering justice. Thus, Case Laws are developed by the courts
whereas enacted laws come into the court ab extra.
3. Juristic Law- Professional opinion of experts or eminent jurists. These
are also sources of law. Though, they are not much accepted.
Sources of Law: Are they sources of Right too?
A Legal Right means a fact that is legally constitutive of a right. A Right
is the de factoantecedent of a legal right in the same way as a source of
law is de facto antecedent of a legal principle.
Legislation- Legis means law and latum means making. Let
understand how various jurists have defined legislation.

us

1. Salmond- Legislation is that source of law which consists in the

declaration of legal rules by a competent authority.
2. Horace Gray- Legislation means the forma utterance of the legislative
organs of the society.
3. John Austin- There can be no law without a legislative act.
Analytical Positivist School of Thought- This school believes that
typical law is astatute and legislation is the normal source of law making.
The majority of exponents of this school do not approve that the courts
also can formulate law. They do not admit the claim of customs and
traditions as a source of law. Thus, they regard only legislation as the
source of law.
Historical School of Thought- This group of gentlemen believe
that Legislation is the least creative of the sources of law. Legislative
purpose of any legislation is to give better form and effectuate the
customs and traditions that are spontaneously developed by the people.
Thus, they do not regard legislation as source of law.
Types of Legislation
1. Supreme Legislation- A Supreme or a Superior Legislation is that
which proceeds from the sovereign power of the state. It cannot be
repealed, annulled or controlled by any other legislative authority.

2. Subordinate Legislation- It is that which proceeds from any

authority other than the sovereign power and is dependant for its
continual existence and validity on some superior authority.
Delegated Legislation- This is a type of subordinate legislation. It is
well-known that the main function of the executive is to enforce the law.
In case of Delegated Legislation, executive frames the provisions of law.
This is also known as executive legislation. The executive makes laws in
the form of orders, by laws etc.
Sub-Delegation of Power to make laws is also a case in Indian Legal
system. In India, the power to make subordinate legislation is usually
derived from existing enabling acts. It is fundamental that the delegate on
whom such power is conferred has to act within the limits of the enabling
act.
The main purpose of such a legislation is to supplant and not to
supplement the law. Its main justification is that sometimes legislature
does not foresee the difficulties that might come after enacting a law.
Therefore, Delegated Legislation fills in those gaps that are not seen
while formulation of the enabling act. Delegated Legislation gives
flexibility to law and there is ample scope for adjustment in the light of
experiences gained during the working of legislation.
Controls over Delegated Legislation
Direct Forms of Control
1. Parliamentary Control
2. Parliamentary Supervision
Indirect Forms of Control
1. Judicial Control- This is an indirect form of control. Courts cannot
annul subordinate enactments but they can declare them inapplicable in
special circumstances. By doing so, the rules framed do not get repealed
or abrogated but they surely become dead letter as they become ultra
vires and no responsible authority attempts to implement it.
2. Trustworthy Body of Persons- Some form of indirect control can be
exercised by entrusting power to a trustworthy body of persons.

3. Public Opinion can also be a good check on arbitrary exercise of

Delegated Powers. It can be complemented by antecedent publicity of the
Delegated Laws.
It is advisable that in matters of technical nature, opinion of experts must
be taken. It will definitely minimize the dangers of enacting a vague
legislation.
Salient Features of Legislation over Court Precedents
1. Abrogation- By exercising the power to repeal any legislation, the
legislature can abrogate any legislative measure or provision that has
become meaningless or ineffective in the changed circumstances.
Legislature can repeal a law with ease. However, this is not the situation
with courts because the process of litigation is a necessary as well as a
time-consuming process.
2. Division of function- Legislation is advantageous because of division
of functions. Legislature can make a law by gathering all the relevant
material and linking it with the legislative measures that are needed. In
such a process, legislature takes help of the public and opinion of the
experts. Thus, public opinion also gets represented in the legislature. This
cannot be done by the judiciary since Judiciary does not have the
resources and the expertise to gather all the relevant material regarding
enforcement of particular principles.
3. Prospective Nature of Legislation- Legislations are always
prospective in nature. This is because legislations are made applicable to
only those that come into existence once the said legislation has been
enacted. Thus, once a legislation gets enacted, the public can shape its
conduct accordingly. However, Judgments are mostly retrospective. The
legality of any action can be pronounced by the court only when that
action has taken place. Bentham once said that Do you know how they
make it; just as man makes for his dog. When your dog does something,
you want to break him off, you wait till he does it and beat him and this is
how the judge makes law for men.
4. Nature of assignment- The nature of job and assignment of a
legislator is such that he/she is in constant interaction with all sections of
the society. Thereby, opportunities are available to him correct the failed
necessities of time. Also, the decisions taken by the legislators in the
Legislature are collective in nature. This is not so in the case of Judiciary.

Sometimes, judgments are based on bias and prejudices of the judge who
is passing the judgment thereby making it uncertain.
5. Form- Enacted Legislation is an abstract proposition with necessary
exceptions and explanations whereas Judicial Pronouncements are
usually circumscribed by the facts of a particular case for which the
judgment has been passed. Critics say that when a Judge gives Judgment,
he makes elephantiasis of law.
Difference between Legislation and Customary Law
1. Legislation has its source in theory whereas customary law grows out
of practice.
2. The existence of Legislation is essentially de Jure whereas existence of
customary law is essentially de Facto.
3. Legislation is the latest development in the Law-making tendency
whereas customary law is the oldest form of law.
4. Legislation is a mark of an advanced society and a mature legal system
whereas absolute reliance on customary law is a mark of primitive society
and under-developed legal system.
5. Legislation expresses relationship between man and state whereas
customary law expresses relationship between man and man.
6. Legislation is precise, complete and easily accessible but the same
cannot be said about customary law. Legislation is jus scriptum.
7. Legislation is the result of a deliberate positive process. But customary
law is the outcome of necessity, utility and imitation.
Advantage of Court Precedents over Legislation
1. Dicey said that the morality of courts is higher than the morality of
the politicians. A judge is impartial. Therefore, he performs his work in
an unbiased manner.
2. Salmond said that Case laws enjoys greater flexibility than statutory
law. Statutory law suffers from the defect of rigidity. Courts are bound by
the letter of law and are not allowed to ignore the law.

Also, in the case of precedent, analogical extension is allowed. It is true

that legislation as an instrument of reform is necessary but it cannot be
denied that precedent has its own importance as a constitutive element in
the making of law although it cannot abrogate the law.
3. Horace Gray said that Case law is not only superior to statutory law
but all law is judge made law. In truth all the law is judge made law, the
shape in which a statute is imposed on the community as a guide for
conduct is the statute as interpreted by the courts. The courts put life into
the dead words of the statute.
4. Sir Edward Coke said that the function of a court is to interpret the
statute that is a document having a form according to the intent of them
that made it.
5. Salmond said that the expression will of the legislature represents
short hand reference to the meaning of the words used in the legislature
objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted
principles of interpretation.
Precedent as a Source of Law
In India, the judgment rendered by Supreme Court is binding on all the
subordinate courts, High Courts and the tribunals within the territory of
the country.
In case of a judgment rendered by the High Court, it is binding in nature
to the subordinate courts and the tribunals within its jurisdiction.
In other territories, a High Court judgment only has a persuasive value. In
Indo-Swiss Time Ltd. v. Umroo, AIR 1981 P&H 213 Full Bench, it was
held that where it is of matching authority, then the weight should be
given on the basis of rational and logical reasoning and we should not
bind ourselves to the mere fortuitous circumstances of time and death.
Union of India v. K.S. Subramanium- AIR 1976 SC 2435- This case held
that when there is an inconsistency in decision between the benches of the
same court, the decision of the larger bench should be followed.
What is the meaning of Precedent as a source of law?
Till the 19th Century, Reported Court Precedents were probably followed
by the courts. However, after 19th century, courts started to believe that

precedence not only has great authority but must be followed in certain
circumstances. William Searle Holdsworth supported the pre-19th century
meaning of the precedence. However, Goodheart supported the post19th century meaning.
Declaratory Theory of Precedence- This theory holds that judges do not
create or change the law, but they declare what the law has always been.
This theory believes that the Principles of Equity have their origin in
either customs or legislation. However, critics of this theory say that most
of the Principles of Equity have been made by the judges and hence,
declaratory theory fails to take this factor into regard.
Types of Precedents
1. Authoritative Precedent- Judges must follow the precedent whether
they approve of it or not. They are classified as Legal Sources.
2. Persuasive Precedent- Judges are under no obligation to follow but
which they will take precedence into consideration and to which they will
attach such weight as it seems proper to them. They are classified as
Historical Sources.
Disregarding a Precedent- Overruling is a way by which the courts
disregard a precedent. There are circumstances that destroy the binding
force of the precedent:
1. Abrogated Decision- A decision when abrogated by a statutory law.
2. Affirmation or reversal by a different ground- The judgment
rendered by a lower court loses its relevance if such a judgment is passed
or reversed by a higher court.
3. Ignorance of Statute- In such cases, the decision loses its binding
value.
4. Inconsistency with earlier decisions of High Court
5. Precedent that is sub-silentio or not fully argued.
6. Decision of equally divided courts- Where there is neither a majority
nor a minority judgment.
7. Erroneous Decision

Custom as a Source of Law

Salmond said that Custom is the embodiment of those principles which
have commended themselves to the national conscience as the principles
of justice and public utility.
Keeton said that Customary laws are those rules of human action,
established by usage and regarded as legally binding by those to whom
the rules are applicable, which are adopted by the courts and applied as
a source of law because they are generally followed by the political
society as a whole or by some part of it.
However, Austin said that Custom is not a source of law.
Roscoe Pound said that Customary Law comprises of:
1. Law formulated through Custom of popular action.
2. Law formulated through judicial decision.
3. Law formulated by doctrinal writings and scientific discussions of
legal principles.
Historical School of Jurisprudence- Von Savigny considered that
customary law, i.e.law which got its content from habits of popular
action recognized by courts, or from habits of judicial decision, or
from traditional modes of juristic thinking, was merely an expression
of the jural ideas of the people, of a peoples conviction of right of its
ideas of right and of rightful social control.
However, it is the Greek historical School that is considered as the
innovator of custom as source of law.
Otto Van Gierke, a German Jurist and a Legal Historian, said
that every true human association becomes a real and living entity
animated by its own individual soul.
Henry Maine believed that custom is the only source of law. He said
that Custom is a conception posterior to that of themestes or judgment.
Ingredients of Custom
1. Antiquity
2. Continuous in nature.

3. Peaceful Enjoyment
4. Obligatory Force
5. Certainty
6. Consistency
7. Reasonableness.
Statutory Interpretation
1. Rule of Literal Construction- The first and most elementary rule of
construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of
technical legislations are used in their technical meaning if they have
acquired one, and otherwise in the ordinary meaning, and the second is
that the phrases and sentences are to be constructed according to the
rules of grammar. Therefore, it is desirable to adhere to the words of the
Act of the Parliament giving to them the sense which is their natural
import in the order in which they are placed[1]. The length and detail of
modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of Literal
Construction as the only safe rule[2].
2. Mischief Rule or Purposive Construction- When the true intention of
the legislature cannot be determined by the language of the statute in
question, it is open to the court to consider the historical basis underlying
the statute. The court may consider the circumstances that led to the
introduction of the bill, also to the circumstances in which it became the
law. However, when judges are allowed to probe into questions of policy
in interpreting statutes, there is bound to be some uncertainty. It is
maintained that the judges may look at the law prevailing before the
enactment of the Act and the mischief in the law that the statute sought to
remedy. The act is to be construed in such a manner as to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy. This rule is known as Mischief
Rule. The Heydons Case laid down following considerations while
construing an Act:
a. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
b. What was the mischief or defect for which the common law did not
provide?
c. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease?
d. What is the true reason of the remedy?
And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction
as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro

private commando, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,pro bono publico[3].
Smith v. Hughes[4]- Lord Justice Parker tried to find out mischief in the
Street Offences Act, 1959. Under the Street Offences Act, it was a crime
for prostitutes toloiter or solicit in the street for the purposes of
prostitution. The defendants were calling to men in the street from
balconies and tapping on windows. They claimed they were not guilty as
they were not in the street. The judge applied the mischief rule to
come to the conclusion that they were guilty as the intention of the Act
was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.
3. Golden Rule- It is a modified version of the Rule of Literal
Construction. Although it is useful to adhere to the literal rule of
construction, yet if the ordinary meaning is at variance with the intention
of the legislature, it is to be collected from the statute itself. If it leads to
manifest absurdity or repugnance, the language may be varied to avoid
such inconvenience. Secondly, if the language is capable of more than
one interpretation, one ought to discard the more natural meaning if it
leads to absurdity and adopt that interpretation that leads to a practicable
and reasonable result. Therefore, court when faced with two possible
constructions of legislative language, looks at the result by adopting each
of the alternatives in the quest for ascertaining the true intention of the
parliament. Thus, the Golden Rule is that the words of a statute
must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning unless it can be
shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a
different meaning.
4. construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat- The Courts strongly
lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute
or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it
effective and operative . It is an application of this principle that courts
while pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute start with a
presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer a construction which
keeps the statute within the competence of the legislature[5].
Where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be
chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system
which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be
rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the
working of the system[6]. Therefore, in accordance with these principles,
the courts should avoid interpretations which would leave any part of the

law to be interpreted without affect. The courts will not narrow down the
enactments but it may give a wide sense to the words in the statute.
5. Rule of Beneficial Construction- If a section in a remedial statute is
reasonably capable of two constructions that construction should be
preferred which furthers the policy of the act and is more beneficial to
those in whose interest the act may have been passed; and the doubt, if
any, should be resolved in their favour. So in case of an exception which
curtails the operation of beneficent legislation, the court, in case of doubt,
would construe it narrowly so as not to unduly expand the area or scope
of operation. The court will also not readily read words which are not
there and introduction of which will restrict the rights of persons for
whose benefit the statute is intended.
The construction of a statute must not so strain the words as to include
cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the language.
Therefore, Beneficial Construction is a way of relaxing the strict
principles of interpretation and that is the reason why it is called
beneficial construction.
6. Restricted Construction- Before adopting any proposed construction
of a passage susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to
consider the effects or consequences which would result from it, for they
often point out the real meaning of the words. There are certain objects
which the legislature is presumed not to intend, and a construction which
would lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided. It is not infrequently
necessary, therefore, to limit the effect of the words contained in an
enactment (especially general words), and sometimes to depart, not only
from their primary and literal meaning, but also from the rules of
grammatical construction in cases where it seems highly improbable that
the words in their wide primary or grammatical meaning actually express
the real intention of the legislature. It is regarded as more reasonable to
hold that the legislature expressed its intention in a slovenly manner, than
that a meaning should be given to them which could not have been
intended.
Sometimes the meaning of words is so plain that effect must be given to
them regardless of the consequences; but more often a construction
should be adopted with due regard to the consequences which must
follow it[7].
7. Construction to avoid collision with other provisions- If two
sections of an Act cannot be reconciled, as they may be absolute
contradiction, it is often said that the last must prevail[8]. But this should

be accepted only in the last resort. It is not doubt true that if two
sections of an Act of Parliament are in truth irreconcilable, then prima
facie the latter will be preferred. But these are the arguments of the last
resort. The first duty of the court must be, if the result is fairly possible, to
give effect to the whole expression of the parliamentary intention[9].
8. Generalia Specialibus non derogant- Generalia specialibus non
derogant literally means the general does not detract from the
specific.
Where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and
sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt
with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special
legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force
of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to
do so[10].
If a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded
from the general provision. Apart from resolving conflict between two
provisions in the Act, the principle can also be used for resolving a
conflict between a provision in the Act and a rule made under the Act[11].
9. General Clauses Act, 1897- The General Clauses Act, 1897, is a
consolidating and amending act. The purpose of the act is to avoid
superfluity and a repetition of language; and to place in a single Act,
provisions as regards definitions of words and legal principles of
interpretation which would otherwise have to be incorporated in many
different Acts and Regulations. The definition and the rules of
interpretation contained in the General Clauses Act have to be read in
every Statute governed by it, provided the statute does not contain
anything repugnant to them in the subject or context or does not exhibit a
different intention[12]. The Act is also applicable for interpretation of the
Constitution[13].

2. Interpretative Process: Hans georg gadamer to Stanley fish

Hans-Georg Gadamer- Hermeneutics could be defined as a constructive

process of Interpretation. This Constructive Process comprises of
Theories that are universally accepted in the interpretative process.
Negative Hermeneutics Process- It starts from the assumption that very
notion of Universal Valid Interpretation is not tenable.
Gadamers Approach- He said that Statutory Interpretation involves
creative policy making by judges and the courts figure out the answers
that were put in the statute by the enacting legislature.
"We are a product of our history. We can never know historical work as it
originally appeared to its contemporaries. It is not possible to ascertain
the intention of the author or the original context of production of that
historical work. These works pass through endless stages of changing
interpretations, which gets richer and more complex as the time passes."
Gadamer claims that it is not really we who address the texts of tradition,
but the traditional texts that address us. Our conceptions, prejudices,
cultural horizon etc. are brought into the open in the encounter with the
past.
The authority of a text is recognized by engaging with it in textual
interpretation and explication, thereby entering into a dialogical
relationship with the past. This movement of understanding has been
termed by Gadamer as the fusion of horizons. While interpreting, at
first, the text appears alien, however with time we gain a better and more
profound understanding not only of text but also of ourselves.
But, in order to obtain fusion of horizons, one must engage with the text
in a productive manner. There is no short cut trick for this. It is more like
a tacit capacity, which we acquire by following the example of others.
The knowledge at stake can only be exhibited in the form of pathbreaking judgments and interpretations.
However, the interpreter can never completely recreate or understand the
texts horizon. Interpreters goal is to find a common ground and such
common ground is possible because the temporal gulf is filled with
traditions and experiences that inform the current horizon and link it with
the previous one.
Gadamer further believed that time is no longer primarily a gulf to be
bridged, because it separates, but it is actually the supportive ground of

process in which the present is rooted. Hence temporal distance is not

something that must be overcome. It is not a yawning abyss, but is filled
with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which all that
is handed down presents itself to us.
He also said that the one would not understand a legal text in abstract
without application of the text to a specific problem. Finding the meaning
of any provision in a Statute is not a mechanical operation. It often
involves interpreters choice among several competing answers.
Therefore, this creative supplementing of interpreting the law is a task
that is reserved for the judges.
Pragmatic Hermeneutics- This is also a type of constructive
interpretation. It is mostly prevalent in the American School of
Jurisprudence. William James and Charles Pierce are considered to be its
pioneers.
This branch of hermeneutics holds that Legal Interpretation is interpretive
and revealing in character and it is different from other types of
interpretation such as:
1. Scientific Interpretation- This is generally done by the scientists to
give meaning to the phenomenon they observe.
2. Conversational Interpretation- It is a process by which the readers
and the listeners understand their communicative utterances and a
standard view of this kind of interpretation holds that the listener or the
reader understands by duplicating or substituting themselves with the
propositional attitude of the author. This method is commonly used in
literature.
Ronald Dworkin- Dworkin also followed the line of Gadamer
in Interpretative Process.
Pragmatic Hermeneutics and Dworkin
Dworkin said that the most important aspect of legal interpretation is
creative or constructive interpretation. This form of legal interpretation
has 2 characters:
1. Legal Practice
2. Legal Concepts

The need for creative interpretation arises when the community

develops a complex interpretative attitude towards the rules and the
interpretation is called for when a text or a practice is regarded as
authoritative. The legal practice with regard to a statute in a legal system
is interpretative precisely because it grants authority to the past
political decisions that are represented by the statute.
Dworkin did not agree with many jurists. According to a lot of jurists,
jurisprudence is not interpretative because there is no point in making the
practices adopted by the judges authoritative for legal theories. However,
Dworkin said that the general theories propounded by a legal philosopher
involves a constructive interpretation because the philosopher tries to
show the legal practice as a whole in its best light to achieve equilibrium
between the legal practice and the justification of that practice. Hence,
according to Dworkin, no firm line divides Jurisprudence from
adjudication or any other aspect of interpretation such as Legal
Practice.
Thus, we see that there are three kinds of interpretations liable for the
Interpretative Process.
1. The text that judges and others within a particular legal culture
are obligated to interpret and obey.
2. The text created by judges within some particular legal culture
which consists of judicial practices in construing statutes and
constitutions.
3. The work of prior legal theories, some of whom seek to describe
the judges jurisprudence within some particular legal system and
others who seek to do non-culture specific or general jurisprudence.
Neo-Pragmatism- This version of Pragmatism was developed
by Richard Rorty. It was subsequently carried forward by Stanley Fish.
Previously, Pragmatic Hermeneutics believed in the dualism of mind and
matter andsoul and body. But, this dualism has slowly vanished. Now,
it is based more on interpreting in a practical manner. For a pragmatist,
interpretation derives meaning not from the antecedents and perception
but from the consequences of action.
While developing neo-pragmatism, Stanley Fish gave a new formula for
interpretation. He said that Action is guided by the tacit knowledge and

not by application of general rules, principles or theories. Thus,

metaphysical theories are not essential for activities like judging. A judge
is not a theorist of any kind while he is deciding a case.
It is in this context that Fish advanced his theory of Interpretative
Community. Fish believed that any written word derives its meaning
from the society in which it is used. A Statute comes into operation in a
society once it has been enacted by the legislature. Within this society, a
community emerges that is so closely associated with the working of the
said statute that it actually imparts meaning to the provisions of that
Statute. Stanley Fish believed that this meaning should be the governing
factor in interpretation of the said Statute by the courts. In Stanley Fishs
theory, the Community that gives the controlling meaning to the Statute
is called as the Interpretative Community.
However, critics of this theory say that if there is more than one
Interpretative Community at same point of time, then it would lead to a
lot of confusion in the mind of the judges as to the interpretation of said
Statute.

3. Ratio Decidendi

The literal meaning of ratio decidendi is the reason for deciding.

Blacks Law Dictionary has provided many definitions of this term. Let
us discuss some of them.
1. The principle or rule of law on which a courts decision is founded.
2. The rule of law on which a later court thinks that a previous court
founded its decision.
3. It is a general rule without which a case must have been decided
otherwise.
4. The phrase the ratio decidendi of a case is slightly ambiguous. It
may mean either (1) the rule that the judge who decided the case intended
to lay down and apply to the facts, or (2) the rule that a later concedes
him to have had the power to lay down[1].
5. There are two steps involved in the ascertainment of ratio decidendi.
First, it is necessary to determine the facts of the case as seen by the
judge; secondly, it is necessary to discover which of those facts were
treated as material by the judge[2].
Goodharts View on ratio decidendi
However, Goodhart did not accept the classical definitions mentioned
above. His criticisms were:
a. That every case must contain an ascertainable principle of law, even
though there may be no opinion delivered by the judge.
b. That the statement of law may be too wide or too narrow.
While defending his definition, he said that the whole point of my
article was based on the proposition that every case must contain a
binding principle, but that this binding principle is not necessarily to be
found in the statement of the law made by the judge.
He also said that the judges must interpret statutes, but it would be
misleading to say that they are therefore constructing them[3].
He even said to the extent that the phrase ratio decidendi is
misleading because the reason which the judge gives for his decision is
not binding and may not correctly represent the principle.

He suggested that the principle of the case could be found by

determining
(a) The facts treated by the judge as material, and
(b) His decision as based on them.
The judge, therefore, reaches a conclusion upon the facts as he sees
them. It is on these facts that he bases his judgment, and not on any
others. It follows that our task in analysing a case is not to state the facts
and the conclusion, but to state the material facts as seen by the judge and
his conclusion based on them. It is by his choice of the material facts
that the judge creates law[4].
Thus, Goodhart placed all the emphasis on the material facts as seen by
the judge, and not on the material facts as seen by anyone else.
Current Trends in the English Legal System
Most of contemporary English authors are of the view that it is not the
decision that binds (or is overruled); it is the rule of law contained within
the decision. This element of the decision is termed as the ratio
decidendi, and not every statement of law made by a judge in the case
forms part of this ratio[5].
Every decision contains the following basic ingredients:
1. Findings or material facts, both direct and inferential;
2. Statements of the Principles of law applicable to the legal problems
disclosed by the facts; and
3. A judgment (or judgments) based on the combined effect of 1 and 2.
Please note that an inferential finding of fact is the inference that the
judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts. For example, negligence
may be inferred from the direct facts of the speed of a vehicle, the length
of skid marks, and the state of the road. Negligence is thus as inferential
finding of fact.
For the purposes of the parties, point number 3 is the material element in
the decision, for it is what ultimately determines their rights and liabilities
in relation to the subject matter of the case. However, for the purpose of
the doctrine of precedent, point number 2 is the vital element in the
decision, and it is this that is termed the ratio decidendi. Thus the ratio

decidendi may be defined as the statement of law applied to the legal

problems raised by the facts, upon which the decision is based[6].
Not every statement of law in a judgment is binding; only those statement
that based upon the facts and upon which the decision is based are
binding. Any other statement of law is superfluous and is described
as obiter dictum (it means by the way). It should not, however be
concluded from this that obiter dicta are of little or no weight or
importance.
Obiter Dicta
There are two types of obiter dicta.
1. A statement of law is regarded as obiter if it is based upon facts that
either were not found to be material or were not found to exist at all.
2. Even where a statement of law is based on the facts as found, it will be
regarded asobiter if it does not form the basis of the decision. A statement
of law made in support of a dissenting judgment is an obvious example.
Although obiter dicta lack binding authority, they may nevertheless have
a strong persuasive influence[7].

4. Important Supreme Court Cases

1. Krishena Kumar & another v. Union of India & Others[1] - The ratio
decidendihas to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and
the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a preexisting rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise
consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate
consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out
with difficulty in order to be bound by it.
Therefore, we find that it is the ratio decidendi which is a binding
precedent. The other material part of a judgment is the Obiter Dictum.
However, in the present article we are not concerned with it.
2. State of Orissa v. Sudhanshu Shekhar Mishra[2] - A decision is only
an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a
decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what
logically follows from the various observations made in it.
3. Dalveer Singh v. State of Punjab[3] - Even where the direct facts of an
earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the Court,
the Judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier
case.
4. Fazlunbi v. K. Khader Vali & Another[4] - Precedents of the Supreme
Court are not to be left on the shelves. Neither could they be brushed
aside saying that precedents is an authority only on its actual
facts. Such devices are not permissible for the High Court when
decisions of the Supreme Court are cited before them not merely because
of the jurisprudence of precedents, but because of the imperatives of
Article 141.
5. A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Another[5] - Per incuriam are those
decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent
statutory provision or some authority binding on the Court concerned so
that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning
on which it is based is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.
If a decision is given per incuriam, the Court can ignore it.
6. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar[6] - A decision not expressed, not
accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on conscious consideration
of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding
effect as is contemplated by Article 141. That which has escaped in the
judgment is not ratio decidendi in the technical sense when a particular
point of law was not consciously determined (this is the rule of subsilentio).