Abbott v. Abbott, No. 08-645
Abbott v. Abbott, No. 08-645
Abbott v. Abbott, No. 08-645
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ABBOTT v. ABBOTT
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habitual resident of Chile; and both Chile and the United States are
contracting states. The ICARA instructs the state or federal court in
which a petition alleging international child abduction has been filed
to “decide the case in accordance with the Convention.” §§11603(b),
(d). P. 5.
(b) That A. J. A. was wrongfully removed from Chile in violation of
a “righ[t] of custody” is shown by the Convention’s text, by the U. S.
State Department’s views, by contracting states’ court decisions, and
by the Convention’s purposes. Pp. 5–18.
(1) Chilean law determines the content of Mr. Abbott’s right,
while the Convention’s text and structure resolve whether that right
is a “righ[t] of custody.” Minors Law 16,618, art. 49, provides that
“[o]nce the court has decreed” that one of the parents has visitation
rights, that parent’s “authorization” generally “shall also be required”
before the child may be taken out of the country. Because Mr. Abbott
has direct and regular visitation rights, it follows that he has a
ne exeat right under article 49. The Convention recognizes that cus
tody rights can be decreed jointly or alone, see Art. 3(a), and Mr. Ab
bott’s ne exeat right is best classified as a “joint right of custody,”
which the Convention defines to “include rights relating to the care of
the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the
child’s place of residence,” Art. 5(a). Mr. Abbott’s right to decide
A. J. A.’s country of residence allows him to “determine the child’s
place of residence,” especially given the Convention’s purpose to pre
vent wrongful removal across international borders. It also gives him
“rights relating to the care of the person of the child,” in that choos
ing A. J. A.’s residence country can determine the shape of his early
and adolescent years and his language, identity, and culture and tra
ditions. That a ne exeat right does not fit within traditional physical
custody notions is beside the point because the Convention’s defini
tion of “rights of custody” controls. This uniform, text-based ap
proach ensures international consistency in interpreting the Conven
tion, foreclosing courts from relying on local usage to undermine
recognition of custodial arrangements in other countries and under
other legal traditions. In any case, this country has adopted modern
conceptions of custody e.g., joint legal custody, that accord with the
Convention’s broad definition. Ms. Abbott mistakenly claims that a
ne exeat right cannot qualify as a right of custody because the Con
vention requires that any such right be capable of “exercis[e].” When
one parent removes a child without seeking the ne exeat holder’s con
sent, it is an instance where the right would have been “exercised but
for the removal or retention,” Art. 3(b). The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
that a breach of a ne exeat right does not give rise to a return remedy
would render the Convention meaningless in many cases where it is
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
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No. 08–645
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No. 08–645
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siders the Pérez-Vera Report “the ‘official history’ ” for the Convention
and “a source of background on the meaning of the provisions of the
Convention available to all States becoming parties to it.” Legal
Analysis of Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
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Analysis).
4 ABBOTT v. ABBOTT
12, 14, 15, and 16, as if the single travel restriction at issue in this case
were on a par with the multiple rights commonly exercised by custodial
parents. Chile’s statutory ne exeat provision is better characterized as
a restriction on the travel of both the minor and the custodial parent
than as a bundle of “rights” possessed by the noncustodial parent.
6 ABBOTT v. ABBOTT
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11 See Art. 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
10504–10505.12
Putting aside any concerns arising from the fact that the
Department’s views are newly memorialized and chang
ing, I would not in this case abdicate our responsibility to
interpret the Convention’s language. This does not seem
to be a matter in which deference to the Executive on
matters of foreign policy would avoid international con
flict, cf. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U. S.
60, 76 (1993) (acknowledging that “the nuances of foreign
policy ‘are much more the province of the Executive
Branch and Congress than of this Court’ ” (quoting Con
tainer Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S.
159, 196 (1983))); the State Department has made no such
argument. Nor is this a case in which the Executive’s
understanding of the treaty’s drafting history is particu
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12 The State Department explained to the Senate at the time it sought
rary international consensus the Court claims has now emerged, “that
view was not generally formulated when the Convention was drafted in
1980.” Ante, at 14. I understand the Court’s reference to contemporary
consensus to depend on the views of contemporary scholars and indi
vidual signatory states developed postratification, including the views
of the Special Commission, a voluntary post hac collective body with no
treaty-making authority, see ibid. Even assuming that the Court is
correct that consensus has emerged after the Convention was written
and ratified that ne exeat rights should be “rights of custody,” in my
view this provides no support at all for the position that the Conven
tion’s drafters had these types of rights in mind and intended for the
Convention to treat them as rights of custody. To the contrary, I think
it tends to prove the opposite point.
14 This is somewhat surprising given that in 1999 the Department
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15 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Fed. Constitutional Ct. of
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16 The Canadian high court also observed that construing a perma