Class 8 Case Digests

1) Reyes v. Reyes
FACTS:
Three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered
owners of several parcels of land, to wit; Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the
Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
22161, and also Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066. Petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes
filed, in the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of possession over all
the lots covered by both Certificates of Title above referred to. Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes
opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in possession of the lots covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to, the
possession thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale
(not recorded) from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third
(1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots. The court a quo issued the writ of
possession sought by petitioners. Subsequently, petitioners commenced before the same Court
of First Instance, an ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots, or
their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This
case was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659. Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval
Reyes) answered the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots,
alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or opposition to the motion
for issuance of writ of possession Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners
presented in the cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval
Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed this motion. The court a quo denied petitioners'
motion, on the ground that the parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in
Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the merits by it. Petitioners
subjected the foregoing order to a motion for reconsideration, but without success; hence, the
present appeal.
ISSUE:
Who, between petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee, has a better right to the
possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title?
HELD:
The petitioners have a better right. In a decided case, this Court has already held that the owner
of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the
certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than
one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the
possession thereto. It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent
civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim
for partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and
considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on notice
of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of

recording the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case
No. 3659, there is no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners'
duplicates of certificates of titles.

2) Ponce de Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.

FACTS:
Jose Ponce De Leon and Francisco Soriano both obtained a loan worth 10,000 from PNB. The
loan was secured by a mortgaged land located at Barrio Ibayo, Paranaque, Rizal. This land was
covered by an OCT which stated that the land was in the name of Francisco, married to Tomasa
Rodriguez. De Leon then applied for an industrial loan worth 800,000 with RFC. He offered the
same land mortgaged to PNB as his security for the loan. RFC then paid the loan to PNB. Since
De Leon failed to pay the loan which he applied with RFC, the latter foreclosed the said
mortgage. Afterwards, RFC purchased the said land during the auction sale. Consequently,
Francisco Soriano tried to exercise his right to redeem said land through an offer of 14,000.
However, RFC rejected his offer and scheduled the public sale of the land it bought from the
auction sale. In order to prevent the said sale, De Leon filed an action restrain RFC from
conducting the said public sale, arguing that RFC was delayed in releasing the loan to De Leon,
typhoons had destroyed his sawmills, and the sale by the sheriff was void because the said land
was sold at a grossly inadequate price. Francisco Sorianos successors, hereinafter referred to
as Sorianos, filed a third party complaint against RFC and De Leon, contending that the
mortgage of the said land in favor of RFC was void because it lacked Franciscos consent since
he is the owner under the OCT, and that the land belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Francisco and Tomasa, who were both dead at the time the mortgage was executed. The Court
of First Instance dismissed De Leons complaint. As to the Sorianos third party complaint, the
CFI ruled that Francisco signed the mortgage with knowledge of the contents and with
consideration; however, the mortgage and sale to RFC is void as to the share because the
land is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgage and sale was valid considering the question of the mortgaged land
being part of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The Court held that the land mortgaged to RFC did not form part of the conjugal partnership and
upheld the validity of the mortgage and sale. The OCT does not establish the time of acquisition
of land by the registered owner. Thus, proof of acquisition during marriage is a condition for the
operation of the presumption that land belongs to the conjugal partnership. The Sorianos have
not succeeded in proving that the land was acquired "during the marriage" of their parents
Francisco and Tomasa. Had the property been acquired during marriage, it would have been
registered, in the name of the spouses Francisco and Tomasa and not "Francisco, married to
Tomasa." It is also difficult to believe that the Sorianos did not know of the mortgage constituted
by their father Francisco on 1951. Being aware of the mortgage since 1951, the Sorianos did
not question its validity until 1957. Worse still, after the foreclosure sale in favor of RFC, they
tried to redeem the property for P14,000, and when the RFC did not agree, they even sought
the help of the Office of the President. Failure to contest the legality of the mortgage for over 5
years and the attempts to redeem the land constitute further indicia that the land belonged
exclusively to Francisco, not to the conjugal partnership. The attempts to redeem also constitute

an implied admission of the validity of its sale and of the mortgage. As such, the SC reversed
the CFIs decision.

3) National Grains Authority v. IAC

FACTS:
The spouses Vivas and Lizardo owned a 105,710 sq. m. parcel of land in Laguna. On
December 2, 1971, they sold it with a right of repurchase to the Spouses Magcamit and Cosico
(RESPONDENTS) for 30,000 wherein they were issued a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli.
The sale was made absolute by the spouse in favor of the respondents for 90,000; 50,000 of
such price was paid upon the execution of the Lasulatan ng Bilihan Tuluyan after being credited
with the 30,000 consideration in the 1st transaction. The balance of 40,000 was to be paid the
moment that the certificate of title is issued. From then on, the respondents have remained in
peaceful adverse and open possession of subject property. On February 27, 1975, an OCT was
issued covering the property in question but it was issued to in the name of the Sps. Vivas and
Lizardo without the knowledge of the respondents. On April 30, 1975, the Sps. Vivas and
Lizardo issued an SPA in favor of Ramirez authoring her to mortgage the property to the
National Grains Authority. After a few years, the NGA requested the sheriff of Sta. Cruz, Laguna
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage for the unpaid indebtedness of the spouses in
the amount of 63,948.80. A few days after, the Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale
on the property, scheduling the public auction sale on June 23. The NGA was the successful
bidder, so a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor The NGA sold the said real property in
favor of itself by a deed of absolute sale. TCT-T-15171 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Laguna in the name of NGA. The private respondents learned only in July 1974 that a title in the
name of the Sps. Vivas and Lizardo was issued and the property has been mortgaged n favor of
the NGA. The respondents offered to pay the NGA 40,000 which is the balance of their
transaction with the Sps. Vivas and Lizardo, but the NGA refused payment. The counsel of
respondents made formal demands on the Sps. Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their
obligation under the terms of the absolute deed of sale. This was reiterated to the NGA and
stated that the offer was in relation to the absolute deed of sale. The NGA in its reply informed
the counsel of the respondents that they are now the owner of the property in question and has
no intention of disposing it. They requested respondents who are in possession of the property
to vacate but they refused. The NGA filed an ejectment suit against the respondents but it was
dismissed.The Respondents then filed a complaint n the CFI against the NGA and the Sps.
Vivas and Lizardo, praying that they be declared the owners of the property in question and
entitled to continue in possession of the same; and if they are declared the owners then to order
its reconveyance. In its answer, the NGA maintained the ff points: It was never a privy to any
transaction between the respondents and the Sps. Vivas and Lizardo; it is a purchaser in good
faith and for value of the property; and that the title is not indefeasible thus the respondents
cause of action has already prescribed. The trial court ruled in favor of NGA. However, the IAC
set aside the trial courts ruling and ordered the NGA to execute a deed of reconveyance for the
purposes of registration and cancellation of its TCT and the issuance of another title in the
names of the respondents; and order the Sps. Vivas and Lizardo to pay the NGA 78,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the Sellers Vivas and Lizardo,
and the buyers, the respondents, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter upon its issuance,

constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by the NGA, who is
an innocent purchaser for value.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition, stating that it is axiomatic that while the registration of the
conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on 3rd persons, it is by provision of law
understood to be without prejudice to a third party who has a better right. In this case it will be
noted that the third party, NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has
obviously a better right than the private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the
suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the Sps. Vivas and
Lizarda and private respondents. Private respondents claim a better right to the property by
virtue of the Conditional Sale later changed to a Deed of Absolute sale which, although
unregistered through the Torrens System, allegedly transferred to them the ownership and
possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that there have been and are still in
possession of the same openly, continuously, and publicly under a claim of ownership adverse
to all claims since the purchased, and stressed that not until the July did the plaintiff learn that a
title ha been issued on the property. The court stated that land registration proceedings under
the torrents system is an action in rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants
is not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal with the property. Neither
may lack such personal notice vitiate the title issued in such proceeding. It is evident that
respondents right over the property was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration
was issued to the Sps. Vivas and Lizardo. It does not matter that they may have had some right
even the right of ownership BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title. Under Section 44 of PD
1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for
value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances which may be subsisting
and enumerated in the law. Under the provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except
those mentioned by law as existing against the land prior to the issuance of the certificate of title
are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon and the certificate so issued binds the whole
world, including the government.

4) Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the CFI of
Baguio 3 civil cases (all dated September 22, 1961) for the annulment of 3 Free Patents and the
corresponding Original Certificates of Title on the ground of misrepresentation and false data
and information furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and
Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. The land in question were comprised of Lots 1, 2 and 3 of
survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated
in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The
Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant. The Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated February 5,
1962 in the 3 civil cases, which were granted. The complaints in intervention alleged that a
portion of the titled lands in question is within the intervenor's ordinary timber license No.
140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on June 30, 1962 and another portion of
said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. But before the hearing on the merits of the 3 civil
cases, the Republic also filed in the CFI of Baguio 3 criminal cases for falsification of public

document against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung, and Dumyung
Bonayan, private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their
applications for free patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the 3 civil cases
were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases. After presentation of evidence, the
defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands
and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents. The CFI granted the
MTD in criminal cases. Thereupon, defendants also filed an MTD in the civil cases on the
following grounds: extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action
when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist; the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the crime charged renders
these civil cases moot and academic; the trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of
the patents issued by the Director of Lands; the certificates of title in question can no longer be
assailed; and the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the subject matter in litigation. The
CFI also granted MTD in civil cases, stating that the OCTs belonging to the defendants are now
indefeasible and CFI has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel
the same; and defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province and are members of the socalled Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province, so they are entitled to the benefits of Republic
Act 3872. The Republic and Lepantos MRs were denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Dumyungs are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872.
HELD:
The Court held the CFI decision as premature and set aside the order of dismissal, remanding
the case to the lower court for further proceedings. The principal factual issue raised by the
plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor
Lepanto, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are
timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the
trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free
patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became
the private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and
safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of
the defendants are now indefeasible. The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the
private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872. There is no evidence that
the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they have
continuously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of any land
secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, Lepanto claims
that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free
patents thereon. It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on
the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that
a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber
and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal
cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the

criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
the private respondents had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations.

5) Caraan v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Spouses Cosme filed a complaint (accion reivindicatoria) with damages against Dionisio
Caraan, alleging the following in the complaint: Spouses Cosme are the registered owners of
the real property located at No. 65 Commodore St., Veterans Subdivision,Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 214949; they had been paying realty
taxes on the property from 1969 to 1993. Sometime in March 1991, Spouses Cosme discovered
that the land was being occupied by Caraan who had built his residential house. Such
occupancy by Caraan was effected through fraud, strategy and stealth without the Spouses
knowledge and consent. Demands to vacate, both oral and written, were made upon petitioner,
the last written demand having been received by petitioner on August 7, 1992, but said
demands went unheeded. The Spouses Cosme prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
Caraan and all persons holding title under him to vacate the subject premises and deliver
possession to the Spouses. Caraan stated in his defense that he had acquired the land in
question through extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years of continuous, public, open and
uninterrupted possession; and the Spouses Cosmes title, one of the numerous titles derived
from TCT No. 3548 in the name of Eustacio Morales and Vicente Villar doing business under
the style of Vilma Malolos Subdivision, which traced its origin to from (OCT) No. 614; and OCT
No. 614 had been declared null and void by the RTC, Quezon City (Branch 83) in another case,
since the TCT was based on a void title then their TCT is also void. The RTCs judgment
favored the Spouses Cosme. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment ordering petitioner Dionisio
Caraan to vacate subject premises and to deliver and surrender possession to the Spouses.
Dionisio Caraan died and his surviving heirs filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari with motion that said heirs be substituted as petitioners in this case. They argued
that Dionisio has the better right of possession because he had been in open, public, adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner of subject land for more than
thirty years; and the subject land is part of a large tract of public land not yet classified for
alienation to private ownership. TCT presented should not have been admitted into evidence
because it was a mere photocopy and not the original. The Spouses Caraan stated that a
certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, thus, TCT No. 214949 is valid and existing and
conclusive evidence of ownership unless it becomes subject of a direct attack through a
proceeding for cancellation of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caraan can collaterally attack a title in a case that is meant to determine
possession and not ownership.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition and stated that Caraan cannot collaterally attack the title
because the action filed against him was one of possession and not ownership. Citing Eduarte
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the hornbook principle that a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. Spouses Cosme presented TCT No. RT-71061, which is the reconstituted title of TCT

No. 214949, they have proven their allegation of ownership over the subject property. The
burden of proof then shifted to Caraan who must establish by preponderance of evidence their
allegation that they have a better right over the subject property In Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, the
Court defined a collateral attack on the title: when the object of the action or proceeding is to
nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The
attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when,
in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof. In the present case, the attack on the title is definitely merely collateral as the
relief being sought by private respondents in their action was recovery of possession. The
attack on the validity of Spouses Cosmes certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in
Caraans Answer filed with the trial court. Thus the Court cannot, therefore, resolve the issue of
the alleged invalidity of Spouses Cosmes certificate of title in the present action for recovery of
possession. Even Caraans claim that subject property could not have been titled in favor of
spouses Cosme because the same has not yet been classified for alienation for private
ownership, cannot be given consideration because, as clearly stated in Apostol vs. Court of
Appeals, "[t]he issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose."

6) Urbano Javier v. Honorable Concepcion

FACTS:
On October 17, 1959, respondents Lim Chua, Tan Tian On alias Tan Tian Una and Tan Sick Tan
alias Tan Shiok Tuan filed a case against petitioners spouses, Urbano Javier and Leonila
Albiela, with the Court of First Instance of the Province of Quezon, for the reconveyance to the
former of a parcel of land with improvements thereon, known as Lot 12 consisting of 50
hectares. Lot 12 is a portion of a big parcel of land designated as Lot 6, located in Quezon
Province and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16817 issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon Province. Respondents alleged that petitioner Javier took
possession of the same in 1945 up to the time possession is returned to them. Petitioner Javier
contended that they acquired Lot No. 12 partly by purchase and partly by inheritance and they,
as well as their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession of the same adversely,
publicly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of owners against the whole world since
the Spanish time up to the present; they have title to it granted by the Spanish government on
March 11, 1888; the lot in question had been adjudicated to defendants-petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (now Quezon) in the decision
dated January 14, 1930 rendered in Land Registration Cases Nos. 1509 and 1679; they have
declared the land for tax purposes since 1906 paying taxes therefor; they have cleared the land
and planted on it numerous trees, like coconuts, coffee, bananas, mangoes, lanzones, oranges,
avocado, jack fruits and bamboos, without any interference from plaintiffs-respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest; that plaintiffs-respondents had never been the owners and possessors
of Lot No. 12 or portion thereof, and if the same had been included in their title, i.e. TCT No.
16817 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province, the registration and issuance of the same
in their favor had been secured thru fraud and deceit, by making it appear in the application for
registration and the notices of publication that said Lot No. 6 belonged to them and is within the
jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon, which is not true since the same is within the jurisdiction of
Candelaria, Quezon, thus deceiving the whole world of the proper location of the land subject of
registration and publication; and if plaintiffs-respondents have cause or causes of action the
same have already been barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court declared the

plaintiffs (Respondents) as the owners of the land in question; ordered the defendants to
surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiffs; and ordered the defendants to render an
accounting of the fruits received by them from 1945 up to the time they shall deliver possession
to the plaintiffs, stating that the defendant could not acquire the property in question for the
simple reason that the same is titled in the name of the plaintiffs and as such the law and
jurisprudence says that no title to registered land may be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are barred by prescription.
HELD:
Petitioners assailed the registration of the land in question (Lot No. 12) as having been secured
through fraud and misrepresentation, considering that in the Notice of Initial Hearing in Land
Registration Case No. 365, Lot No. 6, which, as found by the lower court includes Lot No: 12,
was made to appear as situated in Barrio Ayusan, Municipality of Dolores only, when in fact it is
also situated in Barrio Masalocot Municipality of Candelaria, both of the province of Quezon,
thereby depriving the whole world, including the petitioners, defendants below, of their
opportunity to oppose the registration thereof. In this connection, respondent Court of Appeals
explicitly found that "after going over the records, the pleadings and the evidence adduced, we
found no trace of fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of the transfer certificate of
title. Petitioners contended that respondents' cause of action has already been barred by the
statute of limitations or by laches since they never asserted their right over the land in question
wire petitioners, defendants below, were in continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof
during the period from December 29, 1927 when the Original Certificate of Title was issued up
to October 17, 1959 when the complaint was filed, and, therefore, the land in question should be
reconveyed to them. Petitioners' position is untenable, the established rule being that one
cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse possession. Further, there
are no intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision
directing the return of Lot No. 12 to plaintiffs-respondents. Hence, the equitable defense of
laches will not also apply as against the registered owners in this case. As possessors in good
faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits received before their possession was legally
interrupted upon receipt of judicial summons in connection with the filing of the complaint for
reconveyance on October 17, 1959. However, the records do not show when the summons
were received by the defendants-spouses, Javier. Hence, the case was remanded to the court
of origin for the determination of the matter.

7) Halili v. CIR
FACTS:
In 1958, Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (Union) initially filed claims for unpaid
overtime pay of 897 union members against Fortunato Halili, then doing business under the
name Halili Transit. After Fortunatos death, the claims were settled amicably. The Union and the
Administratrix of Fortunatos estate reached a tentative agreement (tentative because of the
condition that the agreement be permitted by the court in the settlement of estates case),
whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees a 33,952 sq. m.-parcel of land,
situated in the Barrio of San Bartolome, Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal (subject

property) and pay an additional P25,000.00. In 1975, pursuant to the agreement, the
administratrix executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the land to the
Union in trust for the individual claimants. The land was registered without encumbrance in the
name of the Union on February 14, 1975. In 1982, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, the legal counsel
of the Union, filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) an urgent motion to
sell and dispose of the property. Atty. Pineda also filed a motion with the Supreme Court
requesting authority, but the Court merely noted the motion in a Resolution. Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela granted the Unions motion. Relying on the authority given by Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela, Atty. Pineda filed another urgent motion with the MOLE, praying that the Union be
allowed to sell the lot to respondent Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI). Labor
Arbiter Valenzuela likewise granted the motion to sell the subject property to MMPCI. On June
7, 1983, the sale of the property by the Union to MMPCI was consummated. Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued in the name of MMPCI. An October 18, 1983 Resolution of the Supreme
Court set aside the Orders issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela granting the Union the authority
to sell the subject real property, on the ground that said orders were issued without due process
of law. Union filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) seeking to
compel MMPCI to reconvey the Unions property it bought from Atty. Pineda because the latter
allegedly sold it without proper authority from the Supreme Court. The Chief of the Legal and
Enforcement Division of the NLRC refused to take cognizance of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
According to the NLRC, the cause of action raised is a proper subject of the regular courts.
Union filed a Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification claiming for the recovery of the subject
property from MMPCI claiming that the lot was sold without the authority from the owners or the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the recovery of the property will prosper.
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared that the action is a collateral attack which is not permitted under
Sec. 48 of PD 1529 or under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. In the present
petition, the Union seeks from respondent MMPCI the recovery of the subject property. It is
evident that the objective of the claim is to nullify the title of MMPCI to the property in question,
which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is
apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title. It is well settled that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on
the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim
ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
The fact that the subject real property was registered under the Torrens System of registration in
the name of makes the instant petition all the more dismissible, considering that the best proof
of ownership of a piece of land is the Certificate of Title. A certificate of title accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of

its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.

8) Padcom v. Ortigas
FACTS:
Petitioner PADCOM owns a lot and building located in Ortigas Center, Pasig. The lot was
originally owned by Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership, who sold it to Tierra Development
Corporation, who sold it to PADCOM. One of the conditions in the deed of sale was that the
transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for realty
owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. This condition was
annotated on the TCT covering the lot.The association in question was eventually organized as
Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (Ortigas) Respondent Ortigas demanded association fees from
PADCOM but the latter failed to pay. Hence Ortigas Center filed a case for collection against
PADCOM. PADCOM argues that the condition found in the deed of sale did not contemplate
automatic membership. Instead, the owner or long-term lessee becomes a member of the
Association only after applying with and being accepted by its Board of Directors; Ortigas
argued otherwise. The RTC ruled in favor of PADCOM, but the CA reversed it, hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PADCOM can be compelled to become a member by reason of the condition
stated in the deed of sale.
HELD:
The condition in the deed of sale provided for automatic membership was a lien and the Court
held that under the Torrens system of registration, claims and liens of whatever character,
except those mentioned by law, existing against the land binds the holder of the title and the
whole world. The given condition was also annotated at the back of the TCT issued to TDC.
When TDC sold the land to PADCOM, the Deed of Transfer stated that the property was free
from all liens and encumbrances, except those already annotated on it. This is so because any
lien annotated on previous certificates of title should be incorporated in or carried over to the
new transfer certificates of title. A lien is inseparable from the property as it is a right in rem, a
burden on the property whoever its owner may be. When the lot was bought by TDC from
OCLP, the sale bound TDC to comply with the condition that the transferee and its successor-ininterest must become members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the
area. Under the law on contracts, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts take
effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Since PADCOM is the successor-in-interest
of TDC, it follows that the stipulation on automatic membership with the Association is also
binding on the former.

9) Ragudo v. Fabella
FACTS:

Don Dionisio Fabella owns a land in Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,825sqm. Tenants of the
land organized themselves and created Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. (FETA) for the
purpose of acquiring the property and distributing it among themselves. Since FETA could raise
enough money to purchase the property from the heirs of Fabella, they applied for a loan from
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). As a precondition of the loan, all
tenants must be a FETA member so that the lot could be allotted to them. While all did become
a member, spouses Ragudo, who occupies the lot (105sqm.) in question, refused to join the
organization. Hence, the lot was awarded to Mrs. De Guzman (qualified FETA member). Later
on, FETA acquired the lot from the estate. FETA filed a case for unlawful detainer with the MeTC
of Mandaluyong, however, it was dismissed on the ground that it was not the proper remedy;
which should have been recovery of possession because the spouses has been occupying the
lot more than 1 year prior to the filing of the complaint. The RTC affirmed the dismissal. Hence,
FETA applied for a recovery of possession with the RTC-Pasig. The Sps. Ragudo, in their
defense, claimed that they had acquired ownership because they occupied the lot for more than
40 years; FETAs title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake because as appearing on TCT No.
2902, it was originally registered as OCT No. 13, a title which has been previously adjudged null
and void by RTC-Pasig in a much earlier case involving different parties; and FETAs right to
recover has been barred by laches. The RTC ruled in favor of FETA and ordered the spouses to
vacate the lot and pay 500 in rent, 50,000 in exemplary damages, and 20,000 attorneys fees.
The Sps. Ragudo Appealed to the CA; FETA filed with the trial court an motion for execution
pending appeal. Sps. Ragudo filed Rejoinder to Reply With Counter Motion to Admit Attached
Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident with the trial court, together with a
letter by Ragudos son stating their willingness to be a FETA member; a joint affidavit by three
residents of Fabella estate; and photographs of 3 alleged houses of De Guzman The trial court
admitted the evidence and dismissed the motion for execution pending appeal. FETA then filed
with the CA a motion to admit certain documentary evidence by way of partial new trial, which
was denied because it cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence under Rule 37. The
Sps. Ragudos motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in to warrant the continued
possession of the spouses.
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the Sps. Ragudos petition.The lot involved was parcel of land
registered under the Torrens system. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. A claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land. Article 1126 of the Civil Code states that prescription of ownership
of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Act No.
496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bar, petitioners possession of the subject lot
was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. If the claimants possession of the land is
merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latters right to recover possession is never barred by
laches. The private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
10) Fil-Estate v. Trono

FACTS:
Respondents George Trono, et al, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Pinas
City, an application for registration of a parcel of land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-228. The
land is located at Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas City, Metro Manila consisting of 245,536 square
meters. Petitioners Fil-Estate Management. Inc. filed their opposition to LRC Case No. M-228
alleging that as per Survey Plan Psu-31086, respondents property partly overlaps their lot. As
early as April 28, 1989, this lot was registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-9182 of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pinas City. Earlier, or on July 25, 1995, Ayala
Land, Inc. (Ayala Land) also filed an opposition to respondents application for registration
anchored on the ground that the land applied for overlaps the parcels of land covered by several
TCTs in its name in the Registry of Deeds, same city. Petitioners and Ayala Land filed their
respective motions to dismiss respondents application for registration on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, which the RTC denied. The CA granted certiorari, stating that the incontrovertibility
of a title prevents a land registration court from acquiring jurisdiction over a land that is applied
for registration if that land is already decreed and registered under the Torrens System. The
RTC was directed to dismiss case without prejudice. Petitioners filed for partial MR to dismiss
with prejudice, which the CA denied. Petitioners contend that the dismissal of a subsequent
application for original registration of title already covered by a Torrens title should be with
prejudice; that an action for annulment of title or reconveyance of the property involved has
prescribed; and that respondents application for registration is a collateral attack against
petitioners land titles. Respondents claim that they were misled by their lawyers and that what
they should have filed was a complaint for nullification of titles instead of an application for
registration of land.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed with prejudice; whether or not application for
registration is a collateral attack against petitioners land titles.
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the CA decision and dismissed the case with
prejudice, stating that the Regional Trial Court has the authority to act, not only on applications
for original registration of title to land, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration
of title. Thus, it has the authority and power to hear and determine all questions arising from
such applications or petitions. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Pinas City has no jurisdiction over LRC Case No. M-228 on the
ground that the land subject of respondents application for registration was already registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Las Pinas City. Respondents application for registration of a parcel of
land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against petitioners title not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that
a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not
it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose. Hence, whether or not respondents have the right to claim title over the property in
question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a
proper action. It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to
quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on
the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The land was registered in
petitioners name as early as April 28, 1989, or five (5) years before the filing of respondents
application for registration. Thus, it is too late for them (respondents) to question petitioners

titles considering that the Certificates of Title issued to the latter have become incontrovertible
after the lapse of one year from the decree of registration.

11) Erasusta Jr. v. CA

FACTS:
This case arose from the sale of four parcels of land by Prieto to Delos Reyes: Lot 11, 19A, 19C
and 34. Lot 11 was sold to Delos Reyes in 1955, Lot 19A in 1960, and Lot 19C and Lot 34 in
1959. Delos Reyes then transferred Lot 19C to Fortuno Amorin, the physical address of which is
933 Maria Luisa St. The respondent Pacific Banking Corporation, in 1973 sent the Amorins a
letter asking them to vacate the premises as the said land is a subject of a Real Estate
Mortgage by a certain Valenzuela. It turns out that Valenzuela defrauded Delos Reyes into
giving him the TCTs of the three lots Lot 19A, Lot 11 and Lot 34 under the pretense that he will
help Delos Reyes to transfer the title of the 3 lots into his childrens names. But instead, Delos
Reyes transferred the title to himself. Prieto who is not aware of the fraud, made the transfer of
the TCTs to Valenzuela who in turn used it as real estate mortgage with Pacific Banking
Corporation. It turned out that the physical addresses of Lot 19A and 19C were mixed up. Lot
19A was actually 933 Maria Luisa St and Lot 19C is 925 Maria Luisa St. So the one mortgaged
in the bank is 19A, and not 19C which is where the Amorins are. Three cases arose from this
sale: 2 Criminal Cases of Estafa by Delos Reyes against Valenzuela, where the court convicted
Valenzuela; an ejectment suit by the Amorins against Delos Reyes and the tenants, which was
dismissed by the court; and Recovery of Ownership w/ Damages by the Amorins against Delos
Reyes. Delos Reyes in turn instituted a cross claim against the Bank to nullify the deed of sale
and forged deeds of transfer of the subject lands, as well as a 3rd party complaint against Prieto
to correct the subdivision plan. The trial Court ruled in favor of Delos Reyes and ordered the
cancellation of the three (3) certificates of title issued to respondent Bank, the correction by the
Register of Deeds of the title of the Amorins to correspond to the master plan of the LRC, and
the correction of the subdivision plan pertaining to the property of the Amorins. The respondent
Bank argued on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering the cancellation of its TCTs despite
the fact that Valenzuela, the previous registered owner from whom it acquired the properties,
was not impleaded as an indispensable party in the case; and in allowing De Los Reyes to
collaterally attack the validity of said TCTs in the suit filed by the Amorins, notwithstanding that
the said titles were not involved in the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
and dismissed the appeal of Delos Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the titles of the subject lands can be collaterally attacked.
HELD:
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. What cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As it is, a certificate of title is the
document issued by the Register of Deeds in case of conveyance of real estates and is known
as TCT. But by title, the law refers to the ownership which a certificate of title merely represents.
Apparently, respondent Bank confuses a certificate of title with the title itself. Placing a parcel of
land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The respondent Bank did not

raise the issue of non-collateral attack on its titles as a defense in the trial court. Hence, it
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This defense, if at all, is deemed waived.

12) Heirs of Diaz v. Virata

FACTS:
Respondent Elinor Virata, the administratrix of the Estate of Antenor, filed with the RTC a
complaint against Enrique Diaz, John Doe, Richard Doe, and all others taking rights or title
under him, praying for the declaration of the validity of several TCTs, all issued in the name
ofAntenor and registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. Virata alleged
that in 1959, Anternor purchaed 2 parcels of land from Miguel Crisologo located in Imus, Cavite
and TCTs were issued in favor of Anternor. The two lots were thereafter subdivided by Antenor
into several lots, and titles were issued thereon in Antenors favor. In March 1992, Enrique Diaz
filed a claim with the DENR alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
continuous possession of the same lots owned by Antenor. Respondent Elinor Virata contends
that the claim of Enrique Diaz over the subject properties created a cloud which may be
prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now managed by his Estate. Virata
alleged that Enrique Diaz had fenced the subject properties and had constructed a driveway
thereon; despite respondents demand to desist from fencing the properties and using the same
as driveway, Enrique persisted in his occupation of the subject properties; and respondent will
suffer irreparable injury by the continued occupation, use, and construction of the driveway
traversing the subject properties. On the other hand, Enrique Diaz contends that he filed with
the DENR a protest action to enforce his valid and legitimate rights over the subject properties;
that the subject properties, since time immemorial, was publicly recognized as their familys
ancestral land, that their actual and peaceful occupation over the subject property was
uninterrupted until sometime in 1962, when Antenor claimed a portion of the same, on the
ground that Antenor purchased said portion from Miguela Crisologo; and that Crisologo, on the
other hand, acquired the same from a certain Simeon Marcial. Both Miguela Crisologo and
Simeon Marcial recognized and respected his ownership over the subject properties. Enrique
filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer. Alleging that he discovered a certification
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite, signifying that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in the
name of Miguela Crisologo, appeared to have been reconstituted but there existed no record in
the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative to such administrative reconstitution, which is a
vital defect, affecting not only the validity of the reconstitution of Miguela Crisologos title but
also Antenors title, which was derived therefrom. The RTC denied Enriques motion for leave to
file an amended answer on the ground thatEnriques allegation of the absence of any record in
the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, relative to the reconstitution of TCT
in the name of Crisologo, is a collateral attack to the decree of registration and the certificate of
title which had long been issued in favor of Antenor. The validity of a certificate of title can be
attacked only in an action expressly filed for the purpose. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision,
hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of an amended answer prayed for by the petitioners was a collateral
attack on the certificate of title in the name of Antenor.
HELD:

The Court held that it did. By express provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack, thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify
the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. In the
present case, the petitioners wanted to amend their answer on ground that it was discovered
that there was no record of the reconstitution of the title of Crisologo. Hence, if theres vital
defect in the reconstitution of the title then this would in effect, mean that Antenors title is also
defective. However, this constitutes a collateral attack. If petitioners believed that respondents
titles were spurious, they should have filed appropriate/direct proceedings therefor.

13) Republic v. Nillas

FACTS:
Lourdes Abiera Nila filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the RTC of Dumaguete City.
She alleged that on July 17, 1941, the CFI of Negros Oriental, acting as a cadastral court,
adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors
who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof
since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon
finality of the decision to issue the corresponding decree of registration. Lot No. 771 was
adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion. The parents of Nila eventually
acquired Lot No. 771in its entirety by way of Deed of Absolute Sale. Nilas acquired the said
parcel of land from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated June 30, 1994. The Abierra
spouses (parents of Nila) have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property
since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over the said lot despite
rendition of the CFI Decision. Nilas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of
the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The decision was rendered a few
months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of
1941. The RTC found merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordered the revival of the
1941 Decision, as well as directed the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.
The OSG appealed, arguing in main that the right of action to revive judgment had already
prescribed. The Court of Appeals held that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion refer to
ordinary civil actions and not to special proceedings such as land registration cases.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a
prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion are applicable to land registration
cases.
HELD:
The Court declared that the aforementioned provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is
not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. The purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person
of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom. The judgment (in cases like land registration) is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse
party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the
reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in
whom the land is ordered to be registered. Upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such
ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists
alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the
decree of registration. There is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in
order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
land registration cases in the first place. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 of
PD No. 1529 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of
the title. All the obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and
thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.