F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH

April 23, 2007

UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

TENTH CIRCUIT

EDDIE L. ANDREW S, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOE HEATON, an individual; JOHN C.
PORFILIO, an individual; PAUL J.
KELLY, an individual; CARLOS F.
LUCERO , an individual; TERREN CE L.
O 'B RIEN , an individual; TIM O THY
TY M K O V IC H, an individual; WADE
B RO RB Y, an individual; ELISABETH A.
SH U MA K E R, an individual; D . W AYNE
LEE, an individual; JANET W RIGHT, an
individual; JOSEPH W . HARRIS, an
individual; TRAVIS W HITE, an
individual; ANGELA TARRON, an
individual; DAVID L. RUSSELL, an
individual; M ELANIE LESLEY, an
individual; ROBIN CAUTHRON, an
individual; JOSEPH STREALY, an
individual; TIM OTHY D. LEONARD, an
individual; VICK I M ILES-LAG RA NG E,
an individual; STEPHEN P. FRIOT, an
individual; RALPH G. THOM PSO N, an
individual; LEE R. W EST, an individual;
D O Y LE W. A RG O , an individual; BANA
ROBERTS, an individual; GARY M .
PU RCELL, an individual; V A LERIE K.
COUCH, an individual; ROBERT E.
BA CH AR AC H, an individual; RO NA LD
L. HO W LAN D, an individual; SHO N T.
ER W IN , an individual; R OB ERT D.
DEN NIS, an individual; LISA BO LD S,
an individual; PATRICK J. FISHER, JR.,

Nos. 06-6215, 06-6253, 06-6279

an individual; DEBRA STRUCK, an

individual; D EA N ELL R EEC E TACHA,
an individual; W ILLIA M J.
HOLLOW AY, JR., an individual;
ROBERT H. M cW ILLIAM S, an
individual; M ONROE G. M cKAY, an
individual; STEPHAN IE K. SEYM OUR,
an individual; STEPH EN H .
AND ERSON, an individual; BOBBY R.
BALDOCK, an individual; DAVID M .
EB EL, an individual; R OB ER T H.
HENRY, an individual; M ARY BECK
BRISCOE, an individual; M ICHAEL R.
M URPH Y, an individual; HARR IS L
HARTZ, an individual; M ICHAEL W .
M cCO NN ELL, an individual; DR EW
ED M O N D SO N , an individual; M ARTHA
R. KULM ACZ, an individual; HOW ARD
H. HENDRICK, an individual; RICHARD
W . FREEM AN, JR., an individual;
CHARLES L. W ATERS, an individual;
NANCY VONBARGEN, an individual;
DO UG HO UG HT, an individual; GA LE
F. SM ITH, an individual; THOM AS M .
BARTHELD, an individual; DAN NY R.
DEAVER, an individual; W INFORD
M IK E W A R REN , an individual; KALYN
C. FREE, an individual; CHRIS
W ILSO N , an individual; C HERYL
CERDA, an individual; CHUCK
COURTS, an individual; ERIC
YA RBO UR OU GH , an individual; RITA
PELOQU IN, an individual; LAURA
TORBETT, an individual; KEVIN
OPENHO USE, an individual; JAM ES
PHYLLIER, an individual; DAVID
CU M M INS, an individual; GLEN
D RESB AC K, an individual; TOM
PIXTO N, an individual; FAYE SM AR T,
an individual; CA RO LYN HA THCOA T,

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an individual; CELO HARREL, an

individual; JOHN W AM PLER, an
individual; STEPH EN BROOKS, an
individual; JAQUELINE DUNCAN, an
individual; PH YLLIS D ENNEY, an
individual; PA T VERSTEEG, an
individual; DOUGLAS E. CRESSLER, an
individual; L. BALLY, an individual;
RHONDA REYNOLDS, an individual;
SH AW NA FA HRENTHOLD, an
individual; DENISE GERHOLD, an
individual; JERRY L. ANDREW S, an
individual; TRACII ANDREW S, an
individual; PA ULETTE SCHULTZ, an
individual; DAN DEVERS, an individual;
and GAIL SM ITH, an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the W estern District Oklahom a
(D.C. Nos. CIV-06-510-W FD and CIV-06-652-W FD)

Submitted on the briefs. *

Eddie L. Andrews, Pro Se.
Linda Soper, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma A ttorney Generals Office,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; M artha R. Kulmacz, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Deborah J. Groom,
Assistant United States Attorney, Fort Smith, Arkansas; Joseph W . Harris, Tulsa
Oklahoma; Richard W . Freeman, Assistant General Counsel, Department of

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10 Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
This case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Human Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; John M . W ampler, District

Attorney, Greer County, M angum, Oklahoma; Patrick OHara, Jr., and Brian L.
Cramer, W hitten, Nelson, M cGuire, Terry & Roselius, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma;
and Glen L. Dresback, Altus, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before G OR SU C H, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges, and KR IEGER , District

Judge. **

G O R SU CH, Circuit Judge.

This case involves three appeals and an array of appellate motions filed by
Eddie L. Andrews arising from two federal lawsuits he brought seeking to compel
federal judges to enjoin state court proceedings and obtain damages from them.
A prior suit filed by M r. Andrews regarding the same subject matter resulted in an
additional two appeals before this court. As with that first lawsuit, we now
conclude that M r. Andrewss second and third lawsuits are without merit and
were properly dismissed by the district court. M r. Andrewss complaints
currently before us suffer from several fatal defects; among other things, they
seek to assert claims against defendants entitled to absolute judicial immunity,
fail to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and seek to enforce criminal statutes through a civil
action. Because of the vexatious nature of M r. Andrewss filings, the district

**

The Honorable M arcia S. Krieger, United States District Judge for the
District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
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court imposed restrictions on M r. Andrewss ability to pursue additional pro se

filings in the W estern District of O klahoma. W e modify these restrictions,
limiting them in scope to filings related to the subject matter of M r. Andrew ss
three related federal law suits, but we also extend them to preclude M r. Andrew s
from filing additional appeals in these or future related cases.
I
Although it is difficult to discern from the record, these appeals appear to
have their origin in a 2001 decision by the Oklahoma D epartment of Human
Services (D HS) to investigate complaints regarding various children in M r.
A ndrew ss care, at least one of whom appears to have been his daughter. DHS
ultimately decided that the children should be placed in protective custody and
then foster care, and that M r. Andrews should be denied custody and visitation
rights to his daughter (and potentially the other children as well). It appears that
M r. Andrews sought to regain custody through some sort of state court proceeding
but grew frustrated and eventually sought recourse in federal court. 1

Defendants Joseph Harris and Paulette Schultz maintain that M r.

Andrews never properly appealed in Oklahoma courts to regain custody of his
child or obtain visitation rights. In addition, they maintain that M r. Andrews has
not made any of his court-ordered child support payments (or properly sought
modification of the child support order) and, as a result, has an extant warrant for
felony child support charges. W e need not address, let alone resolve, any of these
contentions here.
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M r. A ndrewss first federal case in the W estern District of Oklahoma,

CIV-05-110, named various family members and three DHS agents as defendants;
alleged a criminal conspiracy and violation of his procedural due process rights;
and sought to enjoin undefined state court proceedings which, as best the district
court could discern, appear to have involved a non-party to the lawsuit. Federal
district court Judge Joe Heaton dismissed M r. Andrewss claims, holding that
most of the allegations fell outside the relevant statute of limitations and that a
federal court had neither the authority to enjoin the proceedings of an independent
sovereign judicial system under the circumstances nor the authority to enjoin
parties M r. Andrews had not named as defendants. M r. Andrewss case resulted
in two appeals to this court (filed on the same date), which were resolved together
and affirmed the district courts dismissal of his case.
M r. Andrews then filed his second federal lawsuit in the W estern District
of Oklahoma, CIV-06-510, naming some 21 defendants, including all of the
federal district and appellate judges who had issued orders adverse to him,
members of their staffs, and John and Jane Does 1 through 199. This lawsuit
alleged, among other things, that the named defendants had entered into a
criminal conspiracy to deprive M r. Andrews of his rights and defraud the United
States in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RIC O), 18 U.S.C. 1961, et seq.

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The claims against the federal judges and court employee defendants were
dismissed sua sponte 2 by Judge David L. Russell on M ay 17, 2006, because, the
court held, these defendants were entitled to absolute judicial immunity for the
alleged conduct in the complaint. Regarding the claims against the other
defendants, Judge Russell held that the claims for violations of criminal statutes
were not enforceable in a private civil action, the (generously read) civil RICO
claims failed to comply with the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b),
and there were no allegations regarding any acts by the John and Jane Doe
defendants. Judge Russell instructed M r. Andrews that if he wished to proceed
with his law suit he should file an amended complaint within 20 days. M r.
Andrews did not do so.
Instead, on M ay 30, 2006, M r. Andrews filed a motion to vacate Judge
Russells order, which was denied on June 12, 2006. Undeterred, four days later
M r. Andrews appealed Judge Russells ruling and filed a third federal law suit in
the W estern District of Oklahoma, CIV-06-652. This third suit listed more than
80 defendants, including all of the then-sitting judges of the Tenth Circuit Court

A district court may dismiss a case sua sponte under Federal Rule C ivil
Procedure 12(b) when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail
on the facts alleged. M cKinney v. State of O kla., Dept. of H uman Servs.,
Shawnee O K, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Baker v. Dir., U. S.
Parole Commn, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D .C. Cir. 1990); Huxall v. First State Bank,
842 F.2d 249, 249 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988)).
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of Appeals, all of the judges and magistrates in the W estern District of Oklahoma,
a great many members of judicial staff, together with several private attorneys. 3
Similar to his first two complaints, M r. Andrewss third complaint alleged a
vague yet vast criminal conspiracy. Given that every local judge w as named as a
defendant, the case was assigned to Judge W illiam F. Downes, a federal judge
from the D istrict of W yoming. Judge D ownes dismissed all of M r. Andrew ss
remaining claims because, the court held, M r. Andrews w as (again) impermissibly
attempting to enforce criminal statutes through a private civil action. 4 In
addition, Judge Downes established procedures for M r. Andrews to obtain
3

As part of his second law suit, M r. Andrews also filed three separate
m otions to strike and tw o motions to recuse or disqualify in June 2006, two
motions to strike in July 2006, one motion to strike in August 2006, one motion to
strike in September 2006, and a motion to Demand this Court Read All Pleadings
Plaintiff Files W ith This Court, and Adhere Only to Constitutionally Compliant
Law and Case Law, and M ore Particularly, The Bill of Rights in its Rulings in
September 2006.
4

Judge Downes was also asked to sit by designation to preside over the
remainder of M r. Andrewss second lawsuit. Although Judge Russell had already
effectively dismissed M r. Andrewss second complaint, judgment had not yet
been entered in the second law suit, presumably because the 20-day period to file
an amended complaint had been tolled while the district court considered M r.
A ndrew ss motion to vacate. Judge Downes proceeded to consolidate the two
cases and then dismissed the consolidated law suit. This sequence of events
creates some confusion in the record because Judge Downess order in the
consolidated case technically appears to redismiss the already dismissed second
complaint. There are at least two plausible explanations for this apparent
discrepancy. First, Judge Downes treated the third complaint as if it were the
amended complaint Judge Russell had ordered to be filed, or, more likely, Judge
Downess order simply addressed the only claims remaining in the consolidated
lawsuit, i.e., the claims contained in the third complaint. None of this, however,
is material to our decision.
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permission from the court before initiating any additional pro se lawsuits in the
W estern D istrict of O klahoma. Finally, Judge Downes cautioned M r. Andrews
about bringing another round of frivolous appeals to this court. 5 M r. Andrews,
however, promptly appealed.
All told, M r. Andrews has brought a total of five appeals in three federal
lawsuits, three of which relate to his second and third lawsuits at issue here.
Although it is often difficult to discern from his pleadings, M r. Andrews appears,
at the very least, to contest before us Judge Russells dismissal of his second
complaint; Judge D owness order dismissing the third complaint; and our orders
of August 7, 2006, and August 18, 2006, abating M r. Andrewss appeals of Judge
Russells and Judge Downess dismissal orders while his motion to reconsider
Judge Downess dismissal order w as pending in the district court. In addition to
his appeals on the merits of these rulings, M r. Andrews has also lodged two
motions seeking to institute a tribunal of special masters who are not now, nor
have they ever been federal circuit judges or members of any bar to hear his

Although it is difficult to discern from his filings, in just over a month

between the initiation of his third lawsuit and Judge D owness orders
consolidating and dismissing that case, M r. Andrews appears to have filed
approxim ately five motions for summary judgment, three motions to strike, tw o
motions for default judgment, three motions to recuse or disqualify, and one
objection to an entry of appearance. Subsequently, in the almost two months
between M r. Andrewss filing of the motion to reconsider Judge Downess order
and Judge Downess denial of that order, M r. Andrews filed an additional eight
self-styled motions and objections in that case.
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cases. Beyond even this, M r. Andrews has submitted to us two sets of objections
to our orders abating his appeals w hile the district court resolved his motion to
reconsider; three motions for default judgment; a motion to strike a defense
motion; and two motions to strike the various Appelleess Opening Briefs because
defense counsel of record, who include an Assistant United States Attorney, three
O klahom a A ssistant A ttorney G enerals, and an Assistant General Counsel of D H S
(the latter four attorneys are also named defendants in this matter), are allegedly
improper interlopers in this matter without authority to represent the
defendants.
II
W e read pro se complaints more liberally than those composed by lawyers
and dismiss them only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (internal quotation omitted). As extensively
elaborated by the district court judges w ho have addressed M r. Andrew ss
law suits, his federal claims are without merit and were properly dismissed in
accord with this steep standard.
First, dismissal of the claims against the judicial defendants was proper
because it is well established that [a]bsolute immunity bars suits for money
damages for acts made in the exercise of prosecutorial or judicial discretion.
Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1033 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing M ireles v. Waco,
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502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991)). Given that M r. Andrews alleges the judicial defendants
engaged in unconstitutional conduct only while presiding over his civil lawsuits,
these defendants were performing judicial acts and were therefore clothed with
absolute judicial immunity. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.
1994); see also Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002) (extending
judicial immunity to any judicial officer who acts to either [(1)] resolve disputes
between parties or [(2)] authoritatively adjudicate private rights. (internal quote
and alterations omitted)).
Second, even reading M r. Andrewss second federal complaint as
generously as possible, dismissal of M r. Andrewss second complaint was proper
because his vague and conclusory allegations of fraud failed to come anywhere
near satisfying the specificity requirements of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b).
See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1362
(10th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 9(b) requires that RICO predicate acts based
on fraud must be pled with specificity to provide clear notice of the factual basis
of the predicate acts to defendants). Judge Russell expressly noted this pleading
deficiency for M r. Andrews and invited him to file an amended complaint with
the requisite R IC O case statement and greater specificity, something M r. Andrew s
declined to do.

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Third, M r. Andrewss second complaint fails to include any allegations

regarding any acts by the unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants, and, therefore,
dismissal of these defendants was proper.
Finally, dismissal of M r. Andrew ss claims in his second and third
complaints alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. 241, 371, 1001, 1341, and 1503,
and 26 U.S.C. 7214(a)(1), (2), (7), and (8), was proper because these are
criminal statutes that do not provide for a private right of action and are thus not
enforceable through a civil action. See United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 547
(1878) (That act contemplated a criminal proceeding, and not a civil action . . . .
It is obvious, therefore, that its provisions cannot be enforced by any civil action
. . . .); Schmeling v. NO RDAM , 97 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 1996) ([W]e find
no evidence that Congress intended to create the right of action asserted by
Schmeling, and we conclude that such a right does not exist.). 6
Accordingly, we affirm the district courts dismissals of M r. Andrew ss
lawsuits. 7
6

To the extent that M r. Andrews asserts a qui tam action in his third
complaint, this claim also is meritless because qui tam actions cover fraudulent
attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money. United States ex
rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232-33 (1968)).
By contrast, M r. Andrews alleges only that the defendants have improperly
deprived him of sums in excess of one million dollars.
7

W e have reviewed as w ell the m any and various motions filed by M r.

Andrews in connection with his pending appeals and find them equally without
(continued...)
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III
Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive
litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.
See Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Assn., 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th Cir. 2006); Tripati
v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989). Specifically, injunctions
restricting further filings are appropriate where the litigants lengthy and abusive
history is set forth; the court provides guidelines as to what the litigant may do to
obtain its permission to file an action; and the litigant receives notice and an
opportunity to oppose the courts order before it is implemented. See Tripati, 878
F.2d at 353-54.
As part of his order dismissing M r. Andrewss consolidated lawsuit, Judge
Dow nes enjoined M r. Andrews from filing any further lawsuits pro se in the
W estern District of Oklahoma w ithout first obtaining permission of the Chief
Judge; the order, by its terms, does not affect M r. Andrewss right to pursue
actions of any kind with the benefit of counsel. Still, although it is beyond cavil
that M r. Andrews has a history of vexatious pro se filings and the district court
provided a mechanism by which M r. Andrews may receive approval for future pro
se filings, we are inclined to think the district courts order might be more
narrowly tailored, at least in the first instance. M r. Andrewss abusive pro se

(...continued)

merit.
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filing history is limited to pleadings filed in relation to state, and then federal,
court proceedings regarding the care and custody of his child(ren), and against
state and federal government officials and private attorneys related to these
matters. This history does not (at least as yet) suggest that M r. Andrews is likely
to abuse the legal process in connection with other persons and subject matters
and thus does not support restricting M r. Andrewss access to the courts in all
future pro se proceedings pertaining to any subject matter and any defendant.
See, e.g., Sieverding, 469 F.3d at 1345 ([T]here is no apparent basis for
extending [a similar advance review of pro se filings] restriction to include any
subject matter and any party [because] M s. Sieverding has not filed litigation
against random persons or entities.). The filing restrictions imposed on M r.
Andrews by the district court are therefore modified to cover only filings in these
or future matters related to the subject matter of M r. Andrewss three federal
lawsuits. See id. (approving of similar restrictions as a first response to abusive
filings); see also generally Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10th
Cir. 1986) (prohibiting the filing of complaints that contain the same or similar
allegations as those set forth in his complaint in the case at bar); Shuffman v.
Hartford Textile Corp. (In re Hartford Textile Corp.), 681 F.2d 895, 897-98 (2d
Cir. 1982) (barring further pleadings in that case or in future litigation with
regard to the same claims or subject matter); Judd v. Univ. of N.M ., 149 F.3d
1190, 1998 W L 314315, at * 5 (10th Cir. June 2, 1998) (unpub.) ([T]his court
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will not accept any further appeals or original proceedings relating to the parties
and subject matter of this case filed by appellant.). 8
In addition to the district courts filing restrictions we modify and approve,
we believe that parallel filing restrictions in this court are warranted. 9 M r.
Andrews has abused the appellate process in a manner similar to his abuse of the
district courts offices filing five frivolous appeals in three separate cases, all
involving essentially the same claims, along w ith a raft of equally meritless
motions and objections. See supra at 9-10. Accordingly, subject to Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Tenth Circuit Rule 35.1, we will not
accept any further pro se filings from M r. Andrews related to W estern District of
Oklahoma case Nos. CIV-05-110, CIV-06-510, or CIV-06-652; the Clerk of this
court shall return any such filings, unfiled, to M r. Andrews. Additionally, this
court will not accept any further pro se appeals or original proceedings filed by
M r. Andrews related to the subject matter of these cases. M r. Andrews shall have

In reaching our conclusion on this score we, of course, do not hold, or

remotely mean to suggest, that broader pro se filing restrictions can never be
justified even as an initial matter.
9

The district courts order requiring advance review of pro se filings

suggests, at one point, that it applies to proposed appeals. Dist. Ct. Order of
July 26, 2006, at 9. The order elsewhere clarifies, however, that it pertains only
to filings in the W estern District of Oklahoma. Id. at 9, 11. In any event, it is
settled in this circuit that [i]t is unreasonable for [a district court] to attempt to
limit access to this court or any other court of appeals. W e are capable of
deciding if filing restrictions are appropriate in this court. Sieverding, 469 F.3d
at 1344.
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ten days from the date of this order to file written objections, limited to 15 pages,
to these proposed sanctions. See Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir.
1994); Judd, 1998 W L 314315, *5; In re Hartford Textile Corp., 681 F.2d at 89.
If M r. Andrews does not file an objection, the sanctions shall take effect 20 days
from the date of this order. If M r. Andrews does file timely objections, these
sanctions shall not take effect until after this court has ruled on his objections; the
filing restrictions shall apply to any matter filed after that time. 10
*

The judgment of the United States District Court for the W estern District of
Oklahoma is affirmed, with the exception of that portion of the order placing
filing restrictions on M r. Andrew s; those restrictions are modified to cover pro se
filings in or related to the subject matter of W estern District of O klahoma case
Nos. CIV-05-110, CIV-06-510, or CIV-06-652. M r. Andrews is further enjoined
from additional pro se filings in this court in connection with W estern District of
Oklahoma case Nos. CIV-05-110, CIV-06-510, or CIV-06-652, or any further pro
se appeals related to the subject matter of these three cases, except as noted
herein. So ordered.

10

This court has the pow er to impose still further sanctions such as costs,
attorney fees, and double costs for the filing of frivolous appeals, as well as an
outright ban on certain appeals, whether pro se or counseled. See Fed. R. App. P.
38; Van Sickle, 791 F.2d at 1437. Although we have not chosen to impose such
sanctions here, we may do so if M r. Andrewss abusive filings continue.
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