Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers International Union, Cio, Et Al. Oil Workers International Union, Cio, Et Al. v. Mercury Oil Refining Co

187 F.
2d 980
MERCURY OIL REFINING CO.

v.
OIL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, et al.
OIL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, et al.
v.
MERCURY OIL REFINING CO.
Nos. 4143, 4144.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

March 17, 1951.
Leon Shipp, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.

Lindsay P. Walden, Denver, Colo., Wayne Quinlan and Willian N.
Christian, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellees and cross-appellants.
Before BRATTON, HUXMAN and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The Oil Workers International Union, CIO, a labor organization representing

employees of the Mercury Oil Refining Company, and Roy Goodall brought
this action against the company to enforce a purported award made by an
arbitration board constituted under an arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement.1 The company contended that this award was ineffective
and asked that a prior award of the same board be enforced. The trial court held
that both awards were without effect and directed further arbitration
proceedings. D.C., 89 F.Supp. 702. Both parties have appealed.
The dispute submitted to the arbitration board grew out of the discharge of
Goodall from the employ of the company. On February 21 and 22, 1949, the
board investigated the dispute and heard evidence of the parties. On February
26, a decision was agreed upon by the company representative and the neutral
member who had been selected in accordance with the terms of the contract. It
was signed by these two members and delivered to the parties. This decision
was to the effect that Goodall should not have been discharged but demoted
without pay. It also directed that Goodall be reclassified and given employment
by the company without designating what that employment should be.2 The
union, Goodall, and the union representative, complained about the decision
and without further hearing or the taking of additional evidence the union
representative and the neutral member undertook to rewrite and modify the
former award. On March 21, 1949, they executed and delivered another award
which in part reversed the former. This decision provided that the discharge of
Goodall should be modified to demotion and named the position to which he
should be employed. It further directed that he be paid his wages from the date
of discharge less income received from other sources after the discharge. It is
this award that the union and Goodall seek to enforce.
3
The different actions of the arbitration board present two questions: 1. Was the
first award sufficiently definite to be enforced? 2. After the publication of the
first award did the board have authority to enter the second award?
Arbitration is designed to settle controversies and disputes between parties by a

method other than through the regularly established tribunals of justice. Its
purpose is to eliminate future disputes and litigation. To accomplish this,
decisions arrived at by arbitrators must be final and complete and leave no
doubt as to the manner in which they are to be made effective. The award need
not be in technical or exact language but certainly is an essential and
indispensable element to its validity. It must be sufficiently definite that only
ministerial acts of the parties are needed to carry it into effect. 3 Am.Jur.,
Arbitration and Award, Sec. 125; 6 C.J.S., Arbitration and Award, Sec. 84, p.
231; Baldwin v. Moses, 319 Mass. 401, 66 N.E.2d 24; McInnish v. Lanier, 215
Ala. 87, 107 So. 377; In re E. A. Laboratories, Sup., 50 N.Y.S.2d 222; Albert v.
Goor, 70 Ariz. 214, 218 P.2d 736. It is clear that this first award does not meet
the requirements necessary to make it effective. It did no more than say that
Goodall should be reinstated to such employment which he was competent and
capable of doing. The classification and the nature of the employment was left
entirely to the judgment of the company. It did anything but eliminate future
disputes and litigation. The employment offered by the company was promptly
rejected by the union and Goodall who were willing to accept the demotion
fixed by the subsequent action of the arbitration board.
The first award purported on its face to be complete and final. It did not
indicate in any manner that the arbitrators had not settled the questions
submitted to them or that there was any intention to reserve to themselves any
matters for further or future consideration and determination. The neutral
member testified that he prepared the original award, signed it and understood
that it would be final and a binding award if another member of the board
signed it.3 Oklahoma has no statute providing for proceedings when arbitration
is agreed upon. Labor contracts are specifically excluded from the federal
arbitration act. 9 U.S.C.A. 1. International Union etc., v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 4 Cir., 168 F.2d 33; Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 3 Cir., 151 F.2d
311, certiorari denied 327 U.S. 777, 66 S.Ct. 522, 90 L.Ed. 1005; Gatliff Coal
Co. v. Cox, 6 Cir., 142 F.2d 876. It is a general rule in common law arbitration
that when arbitrators have executed their award and declared their decision they
are functus officio and have no power or authority to proceed further. City of
St. Charles v. Stookey, 8 Cir., 154 F. 772; Citizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 5 Cir., 120 F.2d 982; Cases Collected in Pierce Steel
Pipe Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 179 A. 558, 104 .AL.R. 710. It follows
that the attempt of the two members of the arbitration board to rewrite the
decision formerly agreed upon and published was without effect.
6
There remains for consideration that portion of the judgment which directs
further arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract. It is a general
rule that in the absence of statute or contract provision, courts ordinarily may
not require specific performance of an arbitration clause in a private contract.
Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 500; Williston on Contracts, Vol. 5, Sec.
1421; Texas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 276, 279;
Utility Workers Union v. Ohio Power Co., Ohio Com. Pl., 77 N.E.2d 629;
Sydnor Pump & Well Co. v. County School Board, 182 Va. 156, 28 S.E.2d 33,
39. We find it unnecessary to decide that point now. Here there was no demand
in the pleadings for further arbitration. Both parties challenge that provision of
the judgment. There is no indication that either party has refused or will refuse
in the future to arbitrate under the provisions of the contract which are still
effective.
The jurisdiction of the federal court has its source in 29 U.S.C.A. 185 (a)
where it is said, 'Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, * * * may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.' This statute is
for the purpose only of giving jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases
involving labor contracts. It does not give the federal courts any different or
additional power than a state court would have if the action had been brought
there. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts in their discretion may
grant relief of a kind not requested in the pleading of either party,4 but there is
nothing in this case to indicate that further arbitration should be forced on the
parties against their wishes. They may desire to dispose of the dispute other
than by the institution of further arbitration proceedings.

8
Judgment of the District Court holding the two awards of the arbitrators invalid
is affirmed. That portion of the judgment directing additional arbitration is
reversed.
Pertinent provisions of the contract are:

'Section 1. For the purpose of adjusting grievances and disputes which may
arise, it is agreed that the following procedure shall govern:
'(a) The employee shall first seek adjustment with the Superintendent under
whom he is employed.
'(b) If the employee fails to secure an adjustment, he may submit his grievance
to the Workmen's Committee.
'(c) The Workmen's Committee may take the complaint up in writing with the
General Manager, who shall be given five (5) days, Saturdays and Sundays
excluded, to investigate and then shall discuss same with the Workmen's
Committee at the next regular meeting, at which time he shall render a written
decision. The Committee, failing to agree with this decision, the complaint shall
progress to the next stage.
'Section 2. In the event that any grievance or dispute shall arise which cannot be
settled by and between the two contracting parties, the dispute shall be
submitted to arbitration and in the following manner: Each party shall select an
arbitrator within five (5) days after notice of arbitration has been given by one
party or the other. The two arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator within five
(5) days thereafter. This time may be lengthened or shortened by mutual
agreement. In the event of failure by both parties to agree to the nomination of
a third arbitrator, the third arbitrator shall be appointed by the Bureau of
Conciliation, United States Department of Labor. The decision of the Board of
Arbitration shall be binding and final. Normal procedure as to taking of
testimony and presentation of argument shall apply. The Company assumes and
agrees to pay, in the event of arbitration proceedings, the cost of its arbitrator;
the Union assumes and agrees to pay the cost of its arbitrator. The cost of the
third arbitrator and any other costs arising out of the arbitration proceedings
will be borne equally by the Company and the Union.'
'1. The Board unanimously finds from the evidence as related herein that Mr.
Goodall was not a safe employee as a Stillman and that the Company was
justified in removing him from this classification

'2. The Board further finds from the evidence that Mr. Goodall was promoted
to the position of Stillman on February 1, 1946, as the result of a conference
between the working committee of the Union and the Superintendent of the
plant; that he was to be given a reasonable length of time to determine his
competency for this job.
'3. That at the time Mr. Goodall was reclassified the Union insisted that he be
given the job, or a chance to determine his competency therefor, but the
Superintendent of the plant was of the opinion at the time that Mr. Goodall was
not a competent employee and could not hold the job.
'4. The Board finds from the evidence that Mr. Goodall never did qualify for
the job and was never a safe employee in this position, by reason of which he
should have been demoted and given a job in some lesser classification for
which he possessed the necessary skill and competency.
'5. The Board further finds that by reason of the foregoing Mr. Goodall should
not have been discharged but should have been demoted and given employment
in some other classification.
'It is, therefore, the decision of the Board based upon the evidence and finding
of the facts, as above set forth, that the discharge of Roy Goodall dated
December 2, 1948 should be and the same is hereby modified to a demotion
without pay.
'It is the further order and decision of the Board that he be reclassified and
given such employment by the Company which he is competent and capable of
doing.'
3
'Q. (By Mr. Shipp) You did, with Mr. Robinson, sign the award of February
26th?- A. Yes, sir
'Q. Your signature appears on it?- A. Yes, sir, I signed it and sent it to him.
'Q. You understood when you signed it that if another member of the panel
signed it, it became a binding award?- A. Yes, I understood that.
'Q. You understood that when you mailed it?- A. Yes.'
Rule 54(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.; Garland v. Garland, 10 Cir.,

165 F.2d 131; Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 2 Cir., 147 F.2d 54; Ring v. Spina,
2 Cir., 148 F.2d 647, 160 A.L.R. 371

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187 F.

MERCURY OIL REFINING CO.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Leon Shipp, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.

The Oil Workers International Union, CIO, a labor organization representing

Arbitration is designed to settle controversies and disputes between parties by a

than by the institution of further arbitration proceedings.

Pertinent provisions of the contract are:

justified in removing him from this classification

Rule 54(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.; Garland v. Garland, 10 Cir.,

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