United States v. Leamon Lee Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 10th Cir. (1970)

429 F.
2d 884
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Leamon Lee CROFT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 124-70.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

September 1, 1970.
Louis A. Mankus, Cheyenne, Wyo., for appellant.

Richard V. Thomas, U. S. Atty. (Tosh Suyematsu, Asst. U. S. Atty.,
Cheyenne, Wyo., with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, * and
SETH, Circuit Judge.
LEWIS, Chief Judge.
The defendant-appellant was found guilty by a jury on each of four counts of an

indictment charging violations of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. 2314. Counts one
through three charged the unlawful interstate transportation of certain forged
bank checks, and count four charged the unlawful interstate transportation of a
check protector. Concurrent sentences were imposed on each count. The
defendant now challenges the validity of his arrest, the evidentiary fruits of the
search of both his automobile and his motel room, and his identification by
witnesses at trial by claim of impermissibly suggestive photographic
identification made prior to trial.
Defendant was operating his automobile eleven miles east of Pratt, Kansas on
the morning of July 10, 1969 when he was stopped at a roadblock by an officer
of the Kansas Highway Patrol. The officer later testified that he was conducting
driver's license checks on his own volition and that defendant's car was the first
he had stopped that morning. After discovering that defendant did not have a
driver's license and that there was an opened bottle of liquor on the front seat,1
the officer arrested defendant for both violations and placed him handcuffed in
the patrol car. The officer then returned to defendant's automobile and searched
the glove compartment, finding a key to a room at the Wilcox Motel in

Syracuse, Kansas and ten suspicious looking checks. The officer did not extend
his search immediately but obtained a search warrant using the checks as a
basis for probable cause. A subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered no
additional evidence.
3
The owner of the Wilcox Motel testified that defendant rented a room on July 8
for two days. Shortly after noon on July 10 the local county attorney and
county sheriff came to the motel and were permitted by the owner to search the
room that had been rented to defendant. This search disclosed, in addition to
personal effects, a cardboard box containing a check protector. These items
were retained by the motel owner in his office, but several days later an agent of
the F.B.I. called at the motel and took possession of the check protector. At no
time was a search warrant shown to the motel owner.
At trial, witnesses identified defendant as the man who cashed three forged
checks in Cheyenne, Wyoming similar to the ones found in defendant's car. The
motel key, the checks taken from defendant's car, and the check protector were
admitted into evidence over objection. Expert testimony established that the
check protector had been used in drawing the forged checks.
Defendant does not contend that a Kansas law officer cannot make a lawful
warrantless arrest where, as here, a misdemeanor is committed in the officer's
presence nor that a properly administered driver's license check is not a proper
police function. See Myricks v. United States, 5 Cir., 370 F.2d 901, cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1015, 87 S.Ct. 1366, 18 L.Ed.2d 474; Lipton v. United States,
9 Cir., 348 F.2d 591. Defendant does argue, however, that the stopping of
motor vehicles without probable cause for the purpose of driver's license
checking is a procedure so inherently subject to abuse that such roadblocks can
be constitutionally justified only when they are set up as a command decision
and not at the initiation of a single patrolman. We must reject this distinction as
a constitutional requirement. The evidence in the case at bar shows no past or
present abuse of the practice and does show general departmental authority
given to the individual patrolman to conduct discretionary driver's license
checks. Defendant was not singled out for this check but was simply the first
car stopped. We conclude that he was both lawfully stopped and arrested. It
follows that the search of his car, although not justified as incident to his arrest,
was made with probable cause under the mandate of Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 1970. Both the lack of a driver's
license and the open discovery of contraband were sufficient cause to premise
the limited search made at the scene of arrest.
The subsequent search of the motel room and seizure of the check protector are
subject to more serious question. We hold, however, that defendant does not
have standing to challenge these actions, for the basis of defendant's complaint
must rest on some invasion of his right of privacy. And although it is clearly
established that a guest in a hotel or motel room is entitled to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct.
889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93
L.Ed. 1819, still the protection is dependent on the right to private occupancy
of the room. When the rental period has elapsed, the guest has completely lost
his right to use the room and any privacy associated with it. The manager of the
motel may then freely enter the room, rent the room to others, and remove any
belongings left in the room. These belongings may be retained and eventually
sold by the motel to pay for back rent.2 Since after the rental period expires a
guest has no right of privacy, there can be no invasion thereof. See United
States v. Cowan, 2 Cir., 396 F.2d 83.
The owner of the Wilcox Motel testified that defendant's rental period expired
at noon on July 10, before the officers entered the motel room. It follows that
there was no invasion of defendant's right of privacy.
Defendant argues that the expiration of the rental period should not control in
this case because his arrest prior to check-out time prevented him from
returning to the motel and perhaps extending the rental period. We are not
persuaded by this argument for it was defendant's own conduct that prevented
his return to the motel.
Defendant lastly contends that he was prejudiced by photographic identification

procedures prior to trial which were "so impermissibly suggestive as to give
rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. Mrs.
Clifford, a witness who identified defendant at the trial, was unable to identify
a photograph of defendant from a group of three black and white photographs
on July 14. She picked out two colored photographs of defendant on August 11,
however, from a group of three colored photographs and one black and white.
Other witnesses who identified defendant at trial were also shown this second
group of photographs.
10
Considering the circumstances of this case, we hold that the photographic

identification procedures were not impermissibly suggestive. That two pictures
of defendant were shown at the second photographic identification was not, in
itself, improper. See United States v. Baker, 2 Cir., 419 F.2d 83, cert. denied,
Dinorscio v. United States, 397 U.S. 976, 90 S.Ct. 1086, 25 L.Ed.2d 265. The
witnesses' in-court identification had a sound basis in personal observation
since each had an opportunity to view defendant in a face to face confrontation
lasting several minutes. There is no evidence that the F.BI. agent who showed
the photographs did anything to emphasize defendant's picture. The searching
cross-examination by the defense counsel developed adequately the
discrepancies in the description of the man who cashed the checks, the
uncertainty of some witnesses in their identification, and the possible
inadequacy of the photographic identification process. Finally, the inability of
one witness, Mr. Nation, to make a photographic identification, although he
identified defendant at the trial, suggests that the government's techniques were
not overly suggestive.
11
Affirmed.
Notes:
*
Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation
Driving without a valid license is a violation of Kan.Stat.Ann. 8-235, and

transporting an opened bottle of liquor in the front part of the car is a violation
of Kan.Stat.Ann. 41-804
See Kan.Stat.Ann. 36-201 to 36-205.

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429 F.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Louis A. Mankus, Cheyenne, Wyo., for appellant.

The defendant-appellant was found guilty by a jury on each of four counts of an

the glove compartment, finding a key to a room at the Wilcox Motel in

Defendant lastly contends that he was prejudiced by photographic identification

Considering the circumstances of this case, we hold that the photographic

Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation

Driving without a valid license is a violation of Kan.Stat.Ann. 8-235, and

See Kan.Stat.Ann. 36-201 to 36-205.

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