317 F.

2d 281

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Charles Redfield VOSE, a/k/a

C. R. Vose, Deceased. In the Matter of the petition of the
Executors of said Estate for the Construction of said
Decedent's will and Instructions as to the Property
Distributable to 'Charles R. Vose, Inc.,' and the Persons to
Whom and the Shares in which the Stock of said Corporation
Should be Distributed, , pursuant to Article 'Fourth' of
said Will, Charles R. Rose, Inc., Appellant.
CHARLES R. VOSE, INC., Appellant,
v.
William Houston EVANS, et al., as Executors of Estate of C.
R. Vose, Deceased(two cases).
CHARLES R. VOSE, INC., Appellant,
v.
BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE, INC.,
Nos. 14157-14160.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Feb. 21, 1963.
Decided May 7, 1963, Rehearing Denied June 10, 1963.

Bernard G. Segal, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.

(Samuel D. Slade, Shirley S. Bitterman, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief),
for appellant.
J. Quincy Hunsicker, III, Kelley, Drye, Newhall, Maginnes & Warren,
New York City (Irving L. Young, New York City, William W. Bailey,
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V.I., on the brief), for appellees.
Before McLAUGHLIN and GANEY, Circuit Judges, and COHEN,
District judge.
McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge.

These are four consolidated appeals 1 from the judgment of the district court
raising a common question as to the interpretation of a will.

Charles R. Vose, a domiciliary of the Virgin Islands, died in a plane crash on

July 10, 1957, leaving a gross estate of approximately five and one half million
dollars. His estate had been accumulated over the years as a result of the
diverse business enterprises which he carried on in both corporate and noncorporate form. Primary and central to all such commercial activity, however,
was his operation of an insurance brokerage business as a sole proprietorship.
This was started in the 1920's and continued, with increasing success,
throughout his life.2 His involvement in other business ventures did not
commence until the 1940's.

In October, 19553 Vose executed a will in which, after minor specific legacies,
he directed his executors to incorporate his insurance business and transfer to it
'all the assets of my said business,' with the stock in this corporation to be
distributed in varying proportions to his insurance employees of at least five
years standing. The remainder, and bulk, of his estate was left to his secretary,
or alternatively, the immediate members of her family.4

The sole question at issue here is what the testator intended by the phrase 'all
the assets of my said (insurance) business': in particular, whether certain
disputed items are 'assets' of the insurance business or, instead, are properly
includible in the remainder of the estate. The items in dispute are (1) insurance
proceeds from the destruction of an airplane, (2) sums carried on the insurance
business books as 'accounts receivable' from three other enterprises of the
testator, and (3) bank account balances of the insurance business. As to items '1'
and '2' the district court held that they were 'not such assets as C. R. Vose
referred to in his will which wre to be transferred to C. R. Vose, Inc.' and that
item '3' 'is such an asset minus $38,886.56.'

We note, initially, that the dispute here is not with the legal principles
applicable, but rather with the district court's findings of fact within the general
legal framework. As such, the findings of the district court must prevail unless
they are clearly erroneous and the record leaves us with the 'definite and firm'
conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 1147 (1948); Robert H. Fox Co. v.
Keystone Driller Co., 232 F.2d 831, 835 (3 Cir. 1956).
The Disputed Matters

1. Airplane
6

Item '1' involves the net insurance proceeds from the destruction of the
Lockheed Lodestar in which testator died in 1957 and which, the record shows,
had been purchased by testator in the latter part of 1945. The district court
found that 'the proceeds listed * * * as ($191,353.59, were) from the sale of
Vose's * * * 'Sky Gypsy' which (was) not purchased or used mainly or to any
appreciable extent from or in the conduct of his insurance business.' The court
evidently reasoned from this that since the testator did not buy the plane for use
in his insurance business and did not use it primarily in the conduct of this
business he did not intend for it to be considered as an insurance business 'asset'
that would devolve to the business upon his demise.

Appellant attacks this finding of fact on the grounds that (1) it is unsupported
by the evidence and (2) is not decisive of the issue to be resolved. On the latter
point, appellant contends that 'the decisive test is the testator's understanding
and intention.' This conclusory language, however, is really 'decisive' of
nothing, for it is precisely just this question-- testator's understanding and
intention with respect to the word 'asset'-- that is at issue. Certainly such factors
as the testator's reasons for purchasing the airplane and his subsequent use of it
are primary indicia in resolving this question.

Appellant's argument that the district court's finding is unsupported by the

evidence fares no better, for we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support its findings and we cannot say that it is clearly erroneous.

A brief summary of testator's business and personal activities points up the

significance of the factors which bear on this question.

10

The uncontradicted record evidence reveals that testator started his insurance
business in the 1920's and was increasingly successful in its operation over the
years. His central office was always in Brooklyn and branch offices were
established in the late 20's and the 30's in Detroit, Chicago and Philadelphia
and, in the early 40's, Pittsburgh, with a further branch office opened in Newark
in 1949 (later moved to Montclair, New Jersey in 1956).

11

Until his marriage in 1938 substantially all of testator's business interests were
restricted to his insurance brokerage and his sphere of activity was centered
around its headquarters and branch offices. However, in that year his wife,
shortly after their marriage, purchased real estate in Osprey, Florida, which was
later transferred to testator in 1940, the same year in which he acquired real

estate in Casey Key, Florida. Around 1943 he acquired more acreage and a
house in Florida which became their winter home. In 1943, testator also
acquired a 'land operation' in upstate New York. Testator's wife bought a ranch
in Melville, Montana in 1945 (this was prior to the purchase of the airplane in
that year), and there is evidence that previously testator, his wife and sister-inlaw had leased a cabin at a ranch in Melville. It also appears that Mrs. Vose
participated quite actively in the running of this ranch. Shortly thereafter
testator himself acquired cattle interests in Montana. In 1945 testator also
spread his interests to the Virgin Islands, for there is testimony that in May of
that year he organized two Virgin Island investment trusts for the purpose of
conducting investment operations in that area.
12

In 1947, testator became the sole owner of the Key Nursery, a wholesale and
retail nursery business in Osprey, Florida and three years later he acquired an
interest in a Florida plant food operation. Testator's next substantial business
investment (ca. $1,500,000) came in 1953 with the organization of Antilles
Enterprises, Inc., a Virgin Islands corporation, of which he subsequently
became controlling shareholder. Then in 1954 he acquired another Montana
interest by organizing a livestock corporation. In the same year he organized
Tropical Investors, Inc. a Virgin Islands corporation which administered the
bulk of a securities portfolio which he had previously conducted in his own
name.

13

This brief resume indicates that the diversification of testator's business and
personal interests preceded, was concurrent with and followed the acquisition
of his airplane in 1945. A permissible inference to be drawn from the timing of
this diversification-- and the one the district court drew-- is that testator's
expanding interests were a prime motivating factor in his purchase of the
Lodestar; or cast in the negative terms of the district court, the Lodestar was not
purchased primarily for use in his insurance business. Further, it is significant
that there was no evidence to indicate that changed circumstances in the
insurance business necessitated the purchase of an airplane in 1945. As
indicated above, the headquarters and all but one of the branch offices had been
well-established prior to 1945.

14

Other evidence to support this finding is seen in the testimony of testator's

sister-in-law, Mrs. Donald. She testified that her sister (testator's wife) 'thought
it would be nice to have a plane of her own, because we were always getting
bumped for priority reasons during the war.' This idea initially started as a
'joke' because there was no chance of acquiring an airplane during the war,
however, 'as time went on they (testator and his wife) talked more and more
about it.' Her testimony also reveals that the difficulties of getting back and

forth between Florida and Montana because of the curtailment on transportation

during the war figured largely in the conversations in which they explored the
possibility of purchasing an airplane. The credibility of this witness, of course,
was for the district court to determine. Mrs. Donald also testified that testator
was concerned about getting an airplane large enough to require a professional
pilot so that Mrs. Vose-- who had a private pilot's license and had crashed one
plane before-- would not be able to fly it. As appellees rightly point out, such a
concern is more consistent with testator's treatment of the plane as one to be
used for over-all business and personal purposes between Florida and Montana,
etc., than as a strict insurance business 'asset'.
15

As to the use of the plane, the executors showed, by a compilation of the daily
whereabouts of testator and the airplane that, from 1954 until July, 1957, the
Lodestar was used principally in connection with testator's activities in the
Virgin Islands, Florida and Montana and not in furtherance of his insurance
business. Appellant concedes that this was so. However, bottoming its
argument on the position (contrary to the court's finding) that 'the plane was
acquired and maintained as an asset of the insurance business,' it dismisses the
court's finding by saying that 'the simple fact is that, after 1954, the testator
continued to use the plane for insurance business purposes but less frequently
than in prior years.' This is wide of the mark, for the very point of inquiry is
whether or not the plane should be considered an 'asset' of the insurance
business within the meaning of Paragraph Fourth of the will.

16

Appellant's evidence as to the use of the plane indicated that testator made
insurance trips to Alaska at times, but their frequency ranged, according to the
witness, from only two trips since 1945 to two trips per year from 1945 to 1957.
Appellant also places great emphasis on a letter sent from testator to Mr.
Greenberg, his accountant, in 1948.5 Appellant stresses that portion which
states:

17

'By using the plane I can cover Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York in
three days. I am entirely independent of railroad or commercial airline
reservations and time tables, and I find it difficult to put into words how simple
it is to be able to take off anywhere in the United States on two or three hours'
notice.

18

'I might add that I can conceive of no one in his right mind using a plane for
pleasure.'

19

It urges that this demonstrates testator's emphasis on the utility of the Lodestar

for insurance business activities. Yet, read in its entirety, the letter does not
reveal this peculiar intent to limit use to his insurance business. In response to
the question of 'why I use a plane in my business' testator responds 'Let me
point out that I have offices all over the East, and I also have considerable
interests in a nursery in Florida (Key Nursery, acquired in 1947) and a ranch in
Montana (acquired in May, 1945).' Coupled with this evidence is a summary of
his and his wife's whereabouts that testator wrote to his attorney in 1954. In that
summary, he described their activities from aobut 1949 to 1953 as falling into 'a
definite pattern for years. Florida or V.I. in winter and ranch in June until after
(the Christmas) holidays.' His New York apartment was referred to as 'a spot to
stop when in N.Y. I may be there a week or ten days every month or two.'
20

This evidence as to his whereabouts and activities is also consistent with the
testimony of Mr. Greenberg that in the latter 1940's and during the 1950's Mr.
Vose devoted a great portion of his active time to the supervision of his other
business interests and by that time his insurance business was able to run with
his supervision and control but without the necessity of his physical presence.

21

However, appellant's objection to the holding of the district court goes deeper
than contradictory evidence as to the use of the airplane. Basically, appellant
urges that (1) the manner in which the airplane was carried on testator's books;
(2) the funds from which the airplane expenses were paid and (3) the income
tax treatment of the airplane depreciation are the prime and controlling
determinants of the question of whether the airplane is an asset of the insurance
business within the meaning of Paragraph Fourth.

22

The evidence as to the book entries is conflicting and is not specifically

resolved by the findings of the district court. The conflict arises from the nature
of the bookkeeping scheme which testator employed. Separate books were kept
for each of the insurance business branch offices, the Brooklyn headquarters,
and each of his other separate business enterprises, such as the Key Nursery,
Montana ranch, etc. In addition, there was another separate set of books for a
'New England Office' of the insurance business. This was merely a 'paper office'
consisting of a set of books (relating to bank accounts in Boston and Montreal),
kept by testator in Brooklyn for a twofold purpose: (1) to keep separate the
insurance commissions attributable to policies written outside of New York
City (and thus not subject to the state gross receipts tax) and (2) for
disbursements for non-insurance transactions as well as insurance business.
Lastly, all of the activities of testator, insurance and otherwise, were
consolidated and summarized in a set of ledgers and journals referred to as
'private summary books.'

23

Appellant's two-stage argument on this point is that 'from the date of its
acquisition, the plane was carried as an asset of that business' and since for
bookkeeping purposes it is an 'asset' this should control the meaning of that
term as it is used in testator's will. In supprt of the first step in this argument
appellant refers to certain balance sheets for the over-all insurance business
wherein the plane is listed as an asset at its then total value. On the other hand,
the executors refer to still other books in support of their contention that only a
small portion of the total airplane investment was ever carried in testator's
insurance books and that the balance was carried on the 'private summary
ledger' as a fixed asset along with such other items as testator's former
Connecticut home. We do not feel that the resolution of this apparent conflict is
necessary. Even assuming the validity of appellant's argument, we cannot agree
with its conclusion as to the overpowering significance of such treatment. The
fact that testator, , for business, tax or any other reasons, might have carried the
airplane as an 'asset' on his insurance books is only one factor to be considered
in determining the meaning of that word as it is used in his will. To say that
testator carried the plane as an 'asset' for bookkeeping purposes is not to say
that ipso facto it must be an 'asset' within the meaning of Paragraph Fourth.
Appellant's position cannot be sustained for it oversimplifies the question and
ignores the fact that a word may have many shades of meaning and,
accordingly, must be viewed from a wider perspective.

24

Appellant also urges that paymetn of the Lodestar's maintenance and operating
expenses out of insurance funds should be controlling. Again there is no
specific finding by the district court as to whether or not these expenses were
charged to the insurance business. It is clear that most of these expenses were
paid out of the 'New England Office' account. However, as we noted earlier,
this 'office' account was used for both insurance and non-insurance purposes, so
that proof of payments out of such an account does not indicate an unequivocal
intent to give them a uniquely insurance business characterization. Further, the
fact that the plane expenses might have been paid from insurance funds is not
conclusive in itself, for the majority of testator's ordinary income throughout
the years was derived from his brokerage business and, of necessity, many of
his expenses-- personal, insurance, and other businesses-- were paid out of the
insurance business proceeds.

25

Finally, appellant points to testator's income tax returns for the years 19451956, and terms them 'decisive in themselves as to the manner in which the
testator regarded the plane * * *' In each of these years, testator took
depreciation on his airplane against insurance income at a value equal to its
current total cost. Appellant contends that this acknowledged tax treatment for
depreciation-- which must be presumed to have properly qualified under the

applicable Internal Revenue Code provisions-- is inconsistent and

irreconcilable with the finding of the district court as to the purchase and use of
the airplane. It urges further that, 'implicit in the holding of the court below * *
* is the presumption that the testator, over a period of many years, consistently
filed fraudulent tax returns.' We cannot subscribe to this view.
26

Depreciation deductions under Section 23(l)(1) and (2) (as amended by 121(c)
of the 1942 Act) of the 1939 Code were allowed for 'property used in the trade
or business' or for 'property held for the production of income.' The record in
these will construction suits is barren of evidence bearing on such factors as the
preparation of the returns, the grounds on which testator justified his
deductions, or the details of any formal agency examination or consideration of
the returns. This is not an income tax case. We are faced with the naked fact
that the depreciation deductions were taken by testator and apparently not
objected to by the Internal Revenue Service; nothing more. On this state of the
record, we are unable to find inherent conflict between such entries and the
district court's finding. 6

27

On balance, we cannot say that the court below was clearly erroneous in
finding that the airplane was not an 'asset' of the insurance business. An
examination of the evidence as a whole convinces us that there was sufficient
evidence to support its finding of fact.

28

2. 'Accounts Receivable'

29

The district court found that as 'creditor' of all his various business enterprises
testator 'freely withdrew funds from his insurance business which withdrawals
often times would be carried on one of the various sets of insurance business
books as accounts receivable; and subsequently such books would be audited
and adjustment entries made to characterize the withdrawals more accurately as
a withdrawal of profits or capital.' Consistent with this practice the court also
found that in the operation of his businesses testator 'freely transferred and comingled the funds and assets to discharge business or personal debts as required
or as his whim might dictate.'

30

The crucial question for the district court in this instance as with the airplane,
did not turn on narrow paths of inquiry as to whether testator could have a 'debt'
enforceable against himself or the strict accounting application of such a term
as 'accounts receivable'. Instead, its primary focus was on whether testator
treated his business affairs in a manner that would indicate that he considered
certain items as 'assets' of his insurance business rather than belonging to any of

his other interests. Accordingly, the court found that the three accounts 'were
carried on the insurance business books as accounts receivable and yet had no
relation to the operation of the insurance business and only represented
withdrawals by Vose of funds for his other business interests.' It concluded,
therefore, that these items were not 'assets' of the insurance business as that
term was used by testator.
31

One of those 'accounts receivable' was carried on the New England books of
the insurance business for Tropical Investors, Inc., the Virgin Islands
corporation which testator formed in 1954 to run a securities investment
business. He owned all but the directors' qualifying shares in Tropical. The
exhibits in evidence and the undisputed testimony show that from 1955 to 1957
there were frequent transfers of funds between testator's insurance and
securities investment businesses. Specifically, in 1955 Tropical transferred
funds totalling $99,500 to C. r. Vose which were deposited in the New England
branch account. In July and August the C. R. Vose New England account in
return disbursed $27,802.87 to Tropical. This left a difference of $71,697.13 in
favor of the Tropical account which, pursuant to the instructions of testator, Mr.
Greenberg closed out to testator's personal account by a year end adjusting
entry. In 1956 this pattern of transfer was again followed, but in that year there
was a $12,000 difference in favor of the C. R. Vose account, which Mr.
Greenberg, at the direction of testator, closed out in testator's personal account
by an adjusting entry. In January and March, 1957, Tropical disbursed $20,000
and $10,000, respectively, to C. R. Vose, New England branch and in March
and June, checks totalling $135,000 were issued from the New England branch
of C. R. Vose to Tropical.

32

The dispute is centered on the adjusting entry which Mr. Greenberg,

subsequent to Testator's death in July, made in closing out this account to
testator's personal account. Appellant contends that the difference of $105,000
which had been disbursed to Tropical was an enforceable debt which Tropical
owed to the insurance business. Strenuous objection is made to the fact that Mr.
Greenberg made a mid-year adjusting entry in closing out this sum when in
practice 'testator never adjusted or balanced these accounts in the middle of the
year. Adjustments were made at the end of the year when all inter-enterprise
transactions were concluded.' The simple answer is that these same
'interenterprise' transactions were made by testator, himself, in his various
business roles and accordingly came to an end with his death. Appellant has
several other objections on this score which we have fully considered.
However, there is no need to itemize them, for we are satisfied that there was
ample evidence to support the district court's conclusion that the $105,000
represented a withdrawal of funds by testator for use in his securities

investment business.
33

The second 'account receivable' carried on the New England books of the
insurance company was for testator's Key Nursery business in Florida. The
insurance company was the broker for the insurance on the nursery, which
testator had started in 1947. Although the nursery consistently had an operating
loss each year, the premiums due on its insurance policies were paid by it until
1953. From 1953 to 1957, however, these premiums were paid for by the
insurance business and each year the balance so paid was carried forward, until
on the date of testator's death they amounted to $19,204.67. This sum was
subsequently written off by Mr. Greenberg as a withdrawal of insurance
business capital, similar to that for Tropical Investors.

34

Appellant argues that this was erroneous, for it contends that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the fact that this balance was not written
off each year but was carried forward, is that testator intended these sums to be
regarded as advances to which the insurance business was 'ultimately entitled'.
This argument completely ignores the testimony of Mr. Greenberg as to why no
year end adjusting entries were made in this instance. He said that testator had
instructed him not to write off this account on the nursery books because he
wanted to impress upon his Key Nursery manager the fact that this was one of
the expenses of the business which the manager should consider in his
operations. Appellant points to no other evidence to support its contention and,
in light of Mr. Greenberg's testimony, the evidence is more consistent with the
view that testator never intended his nursery business-- which at no time
operated in the black-- to be obligated at some future date for a continually
enhanced sum.

35

The final 'account receivable' at issue concerns sums advanced to Bluebeard's

Castle, Inc., the wholly owned subsidiary of Antilles Enterprises, Inc. of which
testator was controlling stockholder. In March, 1957 testator instructed the
manager of his insurance business to, 'if possible', send $20,000 or 'what you
can spare' to the account of Bluebeard's Castle, Inc. Testator also stated that
'Antilles can pay as much of that back as and when you need it.' Accordingly,
$20,000 was advanced to Bluebeard's and recorded as an 'accounts receivable'
on the insurance bookds. On May 20, one-half of this amount was repaid.
However, since no further payments were made before testator's death, the
insurance books carried the remaining $10,000 as an accounts receivable item
for Bluebeard's at that time. Following the procedure that he employed for the
Key Nursery and Tropical Investors accounts, Mr. Greenberg subsequently
wrote off the amount as a withdrawal of capital or profit and that practice was
sustained by the court below.

36

We believe that the district court erred in this respect. There is no evidence, as
there was with Key Nursery and Tropical, of any past practice with regard to
the interchanging of funds between testator's insurance business and
Bluebeard's: the evidence presents this transaction as an isolated instance. More
importantly, the sole evidence we have of testator's intent in this regard is
contrary to an attempted inference that this was a permanent withdrawal of
capital from his insurance business. He expressly stated that the sum advanced
was to be paid 'as and when' the manager of his insurance business needed it
and consistent with this view one-half of the amount was repaid before
testator's death. In light of the facts, we must conclude that the $10,000
accounts receivable from Bluebeard's Castle is an asset of the insurance
business within the meaning of Paragraph Fourth.
3. Bank Account Balances

37

The final challenged item before this court is referred to by the district court as
involving 'Bank Account Balances-- $148,279.24.' The findings of fact in
relation to these balances are that (1) they 'represent accounts which Vose used
for over-all business purposes and non-insurance purposes' and (2) 'on the basis
of the accounting made by Mr. Greenberg the bank account balances contained
$38,886.56 which would have been withdrawn by Vose as profits in accordance
with his past practice.' Accordingly, it is held that these bank account balances
are assets of testator's insurance business 'minus $38,886.56.'

38

The Greenberg accounting referred to by the court is 'Executors Exhibit J.;

Income from Insurance Offices for the Period January 1, 1957 to July 10, 1957'
in which the final figure is 'Net profit as yet undrawn at Testator's death-$38,886.56.' This exhibit was introduced at trial as representing 'a fair statement
of the net profit from the insurance business' for the January-July period. We
can find no express objection made by appellant at the trial to any of the figures
or computations appearing in this exhibit. On the other hand, we also find no
testimony in the record to the effect that 'in accordance with his past practice'
testator would have withdrawn such sum.

39

Simply stated, the findings of fact with respect to these balances leave the
issues undefined.

40

Although both the trial judge and appellant characterize the question as
involving the entire 'cash on hand and in banks' of $148,279.24, appellees
inform us that they recommended at pre-trial (and the court accepted the
recommendation) that this entire sum be treated as an insurances business asset,

subject only to their claim for current profits. Viewed thus, the precise problem
would then appear to turn on the determination of the figure for current
undistributed net profits.
41

In any event, the present state of the record and the findings of fact leave this
court unsatisfied as to the delineation of these issues and the factors which
should be considered as bearing on them. The findings of fact are so inadequate
on this branch of the appeal that we are not properly apprised of the basis of the
district court's judgment. Cf. I.C.C. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 308 F.2d 435,
437 (3 Cir. 1962). Nor can we reasonably say that the conflicting fact
allegations which the parties raise on appeal as bearing on the point were fully
considered by the court below.

42

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be (1) affirmed with respect
to disputed item '1' and the Tropical Investors and Key Nursery Accounts of
item '2'; (2) reversed as to the Bluebeard's Castle account of itme '2'; and (3)
remanded to the district court for more adequate findings of fact with respect to
item '3'.

Three 'actions for debt' instituted by the appellant, Charles R. Vose, Inc., and a
petition for construction of testator's will instituted by testator's executors. The
cases were consolidated for trial

Annual gross commissions in 1945 were $255,000 and in the four calendar
years preceding his death they were in excess of $500,000. The principal
source of Vose's business-- comprising some 95% Of the commissions-- was
the Atlantic and Pacific food store chain and its affiliates

His wife died in January, 1954

Testator's secretary was also appointed, with two others, as an executor and
trustee of his will. Since she died in the same plane crash, under the terms of
the will her two brothers (who are also residuary legatees of the estate) were
substituted in her stead. Any intimation in appellant's brief that there is some
impropriety in the two brothers being both executor and residuary legatees of
testator's estate is clearly unwarranted. The mere existence of a possible adverse
interest, without more, is not sufficient grounds for complaint in the Virgin
Islands. 15 V.I.C. 240(b) (1957). In re Below (Bishop), 3 V.I. 300 (D. 1958).
More importantly, no complaint of such a nature has ever been made and thus
suggested inference to the contrary has no place in this case

'5/6/48
'Dear Mr. Greenberg:
'You asked me today to give you a resume of why I use a plane in my business.
Let me point out that I have offices all over the East, and I also have
considerable interests in a nursery in Florida nad a ranch in Montana.
'I also have very large insurance interests in Alaska, and in 1946 I took some
executives of the Nakat Packing Company, my client, from Seattle to Naknek
Airport on Bristol Bay, as well as to Fairbanks to a meeting and return. By
using the plane I can cover Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York in three
days. I am entirely independent of railroad or commercial airline reservations
and time tables, and I find it difficult to put into words how simple it is to be
able to take off anywhere in the United States on two or three hours' notice.
'I might add that I can conveive of no one in his right mind using a plane for
pleasure.
'Yours, etc. 'C. R. Vose'

It is also noteworthy that appellant's position, if sustained, would also make for
the inclusion of the proceeds from the sale of testator's boat as an 'asset' of the
insurance business, for it also was consistently treated as a depreciable asset of
the insurance business. However, from an adverse ruling below, appellant does
not now press this item on appeal, because it did not feel that there was
'sufficient evidence' intoduced below to sustain it position