United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
3d 108
This appeal tests the limits of the good faith requirement applicable to petitions
filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Appellant NMSBPCSLDHB,
L.P. (the "Landlord") appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the
Bankruptcy Court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of good faith. The
Landlord contends that the Debtor, Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.
("Integrated"), was never in financial distress and that the petition in this case
was instead filed to frustrate the Landlord's claims and to increase the
distribution of the Debtor's estate to Integrated's shareholders at the Landlord's
expense. These contentions are corroborated by the record. First, according to
schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court, Integrated had $105.4 million in
cash and $1.5 million in other assets at the time that it filed for bankruptcy, and
yet the Landlord's proof of claim lists the present discounted value of
Integrated's lease obligations at approximately $26 million. Integrated's
schedules also list miscellaneous liabilities of approximately $430,000. Thus
Integrated was highly solvent and cash rich at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
Even if the IPO class action claim, which was capped at $25 million with
Integrated's liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be paid by
insurance) was listed at its full alleged value, Integrated was still solvent at the
time of filing. Second, in a smoking gun resolution approved by the Board, and
notwithstanding its strong financial position, Integrated authorized a letter to
the Landlord threatening that if it did not enter into a settlement of the lease in
the amount of at least $8 million, Integrated would file for bankruptcy so as to
take advantage of 502(b)(6), which sharply limits the amount that a landlord
can recover in bankruptcy for damages resulting from the termination of a
lease.
The issue on appeal is whether, on the facts of this case, a Chapter 11 petition
filed by a financially healthy debtor, with no intention of reorganizing or
liquidating as a going concern, with no reasonable expectation that Chapter 11
proceedings will maximize the value of the debtor's estate for creditors, and
solely to take advantage of a provision in the Bankruptcy Code that limits
claims on long-term leases, complies with the requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code. We conclude that such a petition is not filed in good faith and will
therefore reverse.
I.
3
of real property in Silicon Valley with the Landlord. After several months of
negotiation, during which the Landlord evaluated Integrated's business
condition and reviewed the company's prospectus, Integrated and the Landlord
executed a lease for a term of ten years beginning on February 23, 2001, with a
monthly base rent of $200,000, increasing 5 percent annually. The Landlord
was aware of the financial risks associated with Integrated's business and
willingly accepted those risks.
4
2001 was a very poor year for Integrated. The market for many of the
company's products deteriorated, causing Integrated to suffer net losses of
$36.2 million. Integrated hired a management and technology consulting firm
in December 2001 to help evaluate Integrated's operating alternatives.
Integrated also retained Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, in February
2002, to assist in identifying, soliciting, and evaluating proposals for a sale or
merger of Integrated or its assets. Unable to find a third party willing to enter
into such a transaction, and unable to identify an alternative business model,
Integrated's Board of Directors prepared a plan for the liquidation and
dissolution of the company under state law.
it might use Chapter 11 to, among other things, address Landlord's claims."
Appellee's Br. at 6-7. On August 13, 2002, the Board authorized a Chapter 11
filing in the event that the Landlord would not accept $8 million as an accord
and satisfaction of Integrated's obligations under the lease. The minutes of the
August 13 Board meeting state, in pertinent part:
8
Mr. Regel [Integrated's CEO] updated the Board on his discussions with the
landlord subsequent to the last board meeting. Mr. Regel noted that the landlord
did not appear to believe that the Company would seriously consider making a
bankruptcy filing.
Ms. Murray [of the law firm Murray & Murray] next reviewed with the Board
the draft letter to the landlord (a copy of which was previously distributed to the
Board).
10
Ms. Murray then reviewed with the Board the timeline ... for a bankruptcy
filing and related bankruptcy procedures.
11
Various members of the Board then asked questions of Ms. Murray related to
the draft letter to the landlord and the procedures for, and implications of, a
possible bankruptcy filing by the Company. A discussion among the Board
ensued, including a discussion of the costs and potential benefits and risks of
proceeding with a bankruptcy filing.
12
Following that discussion, Mr. Regel asked the Board for authority for
management to negotiate a settlement with the landlord in an amount in the
range of $6 to $7 million. A further discussion among the Board ensued
regarding the costs associated with a bankruptcy filing and potential costs of
any litigation. After additional discussion, the Board approved the following
resolutions: RESOLVED: That the officers of the Company are, and each of
them hereby is, authorized and directed to send the landlord the letter prepared
by Murray and Murray in substantially the form reviewed with the Board.
13
RESOLVED FURTHER: That the officers of the Company are, and each of
them hereby is, authorized and directed to negotiate a settlement with the
landlord up to a maximum settlement amount of $7 million.
14
RESOLVED FURTHER: That the Board hereby appoints ... a special committee
(the "Committee") that is hereby empowered on behalf of the Board to
authorize the officers of the Company to enter into a settlement with the
landlord up to a maximum settlement amount of $8 million.
15
16
RESOLVED FURTHER: That the officers of the Company be, and each of them
hereby is, authorized and directed to instruct bankruptcy counsel to begin to
prepare the necessary paperwork for a bankruptcy filing.
17
18
On August 15, 2002, Integrated's bankruptcy counsel sent the Landlord a letter
stating that, if the Landlord was unwilling to settle, the Debtor was prepared to
avail itself of various provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, including the cap on
landlords' claims set forth in 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6).1 The letter asserted that
"even if [Integrated] were to file bankruptcy solely to cap the Lessor's claim
using Bankruptcy Code 502(b)(6), a use for which this Code section is
intended, [Integrated] would not violate the good faith filing doctrine."
19
20
21
Also on October 9, 2002, Integrated moved to reject the lease. The Landlord
opposed the motion and, on October 28, 2002, filed a motion to dismiss the
Chapter 11 proceeding on the ground that the petition was not filed in good
faith. On January 8, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the motion to dismiss and the motion to reject the lease during
which it heard evidence regarding Integrated's decision to file for Chapter 11.
After the close of evidence, the Bankruptcy Court determined that oral
argument was unnecessary and denied the motion to dismiss from the bench.
23
24
25
But even assuming that those other factors are not particularly persuasive, even
assuming or accepting the landlord's position, particularly illustrated by the
Board of Directors' minutes of August 13 of '02, that the principal reason for
the Chapter 11 case was to cap the damage claim for the landlord, I conclude
that as a matter of law, that is not a debilitating fact. I held in [In re PPI
Enterprises (U.S.), Inc., 228 B.R. 339 (Bankr.D.Del.1998), aff'd, 324 F.3d 197
(3d Cir.2003)], and other cases have held, that it does not establish bad faith for
a debtor to file a chapter 11 case for the purpose of taking advantage of
provisions which alter pre-petition rights, including altering the rights of a
The Bankruptcy Court was guided by the following proposition: "[A]s the case
law clearly indicates, not limited to my case [referring to the Bankruptcy
Judge's decision in PPI], the solvency of the debtor and the fact that the equity
interest holders will receive a distribution does not serve as the basis for a
finding of bad faith." The court thus saw no significance in the fact that the
502(b)(6) cap would operate solely to the benefit of equity holders, as opposed
to creditors:
27
What I think is also significant in this case is that ... this debtor had no
significant debt....
28
The difference in this case is that the company was not at all leveraged. And if
the distribution were, for the most part, or totally to go to the creditors, there
would be no basis for the landlord to complain regarding some equitable
principle.
29
But I don't think the Code makes any distinction. And I think that the-why this
case is different is because the debtor simply was not leveraged. And instead of
the significant distribution going to debt holders ... it's going to go to the
shareholders.
30
The Bankruptcy Court then went on to discuss "other decisions that agree with
that proposition, namely that a solvent debtor can avail itself of the 502(b)(6)
cap," focusing in particular on In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir.2002), and characterizing Sylmar as "almost on all fours with the situation
before me."
31
With respect to the equities of the case, the Bankruptcy Court found that,
although the shareholders would realize a "benefit" from the bankruptcy in the
form of a "significant distribution," "the shareholders are not coming out whole
by any means." The court concluded that "obviously you can't consider that
they [i.e., the shareholders] are being treated [to] any windfall." Conversely,
the court found that the Landlord elected to "ride with the bulls," when it
entered into the lease with Integrated, and that, as a "sophisticated individual"
who "took the risk [hoping] that his instincts were right," he must "suffer the
consequences" of his instincts being wrong. On January 30, 2003, the
Bankruptcy Court issued an order formally denying the motion "for the reasons
stated on the record at the Hearing."
32
33
The Bankruptcy Court held a confirmation hearing on April 7, 2003, and issued
an order confirming Integrated's proposed plan of liquidation over the
Landlord's objections on April 16, 2003. Applying 502(b)(6), the Landlord's
claim was reduced from $26 million to $4.3 million.
34
The plan of liquidation did not completely resolve the securities class action.
Instead, the plan reserved $5 million of the debtor's estate to satisfy any
judgment that might be entered in the securities class action. When added to
$20 million in insurance coverage available to Integrated, the plan effectively
limited any potential judgment in the securities class action to $25 million. The
securities class voted in favor of the plan of liquidation.
35
The Landlord appealed to the District Court and moved the Bankruptcy Court
to stay confirmation of the plan pending appeal. The Bankruptcy Court
addressed the Landlord's motion for a stay at an April 29, 2003 hearing. The
Bankruptcy Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling on the Landlord's motion to
dismiss, making several "observations to amplify the record on the issue."
Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court elaborated on the significance of the
securities class action:
36
There is nothing in the law to suggest that the corporation cannot avail itself to
the distribution scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code in effecting that
liquidation. In that regard, it's also worth noting that [this] Chapter 11 case had
the effect on the securities law plaintiffs similar to its effect on this landlord. It
effectively reduced the recovery by the securities law claimants by treating
them like shareholders pursuant to Section 510(b).2
37
Could the securities law plaintiffs obtain a bad faith ruling in this case? I don't
think so for essentially the same reasons I think that the landlord cannot.
38
With respect to the securities law action, I am puzzled to understand how that
claim could be resolved in a non-bankruptcy law liquidation context absent a
final resolution of that claim. In a non-bankruptcy law context, the securities
law plaintiffs would have had a very strategic advantage, namely so long as
there was a possible recovery against the corporation, the liquidation would be
stalled indefinitely.
39
THE COURT: Are you saying that Integrated Telecom is a healthy company?
41
42
43
MR. HAZELTINE: They're out of business. But their balance sheet looks great.
They have $105 million in assets, $28 million in debts if the landlord's claim is
not capped.
44
They could become an investment company, invest that money and make-make
money. They just
45
THE COURT: Well, I-they could. But I believe they would be in breach of
their fiduciary duty if they did, and I made this observation back in January.
46
47
The District Court affirmed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Landlord's motion to dismiss. The District Court
concluded that the Bankruptcy Court made two specific findings of fact: (1)
that in September 2001 the Debtor was in "financial distress"; and (2) that the
Board, consistent with its fiduciary responsibility, properly pursued liquidation
in order to fulfill its obligations to its investors. The District Court did not
disturb either finding.
48
The District Court understood the Bankruptcy Court to have alternatively ruled,
as a matter of law, that "even if the Debtor's principal reason for filing its
Chapter 11 case was to cap the Landlord's damage claim, that alone was
insufficient to establish bad faith." The District Court concluded that the
Bankruptcy Court's legal ruling "was based on a sound interpretation of relevant
case law from this and other jurisdictions, and does not constitute an abuse of
discretion." The District Court rejected the Landlord's argument that
The Landlord filed a timely appeal from the District Court's order. We
expedited the appeal and stayed the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order
pending the appeal. Jurisdiction in the District Court was proper under 28
U.S.C. 158(a), and we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(d).
Although this Court's jurisdiction is over the decision of the District Court, 28
U.S.C. 158(d), "review of the District Court's decision effectively amounts to
review of the bankruptcy court's opinion in the first instance." In re Hechinger
Inv. Co. of Del., 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir.2002).
II.
50
51
At its most fundamental level, the good faith requirement ensures that the
"[A good faith standard] furthers the balancing process between the interests of
debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy
laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to
a bankruptcy. Requirement [sic] of good faith prevents abuse of the bankruptcy
process by debtors whose overriding motive is to delay creditors without
benefitting them in any way...."
53
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161-62 (quoting Little Creek Dev. Co. v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068,
1072 (5th Cir.1986)); see also Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 698 (4th
Cir.1989) (good faith requirement is "indispensable to proper accomplishment
of the basic purposes of Chapter 11 protection"). The Supreme Court has
identified two of the basic purposes of Chapter 11 as (1) "preserving going
concerns" and (2) "maximizing property available to satisfy creditors." Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 453,
119 S.Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed.2d 607 (1999); accord Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S.
157, 163-64, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991) (discussing "the
congressional purpose of deriving as much value as possible from the debtor's
estate"). Each of these purposes informs our application of the good faith
requirement:
54
"Review and analysis of [the bankruptcy laws and relevant cases] disclose a
common theme and objective [underlying the reorganization provisions]:
avoidance of the consequences of economic dismemberment and liquidation,
and the preservation of ongoing values in a manner which does equity and is
fair to rights and interests of the parties affected. But the perimeters of this
potential mark the borderline between fulfillment and perversion; between
accomplishing the objectives of rehabilitation and reorganization, and the use of
these statutory provisions to destroy and undermine the legitimate rights and
interests of those intended to benefit by this statutory policy. That borderline is
patrolled by courts of equity, armed with the doctrine of `good faith'...."
55
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161 (quoting In re Victory Constr. Co., Inc., 9 B.R.
549, 558 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1981), order stayed Hadley v. Victory Constr. Co.,
Inc. (In re Victory Constr. Co., Inc.), 9 B.R. 570 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1981)); see
also Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir.1994) ("The
test is whether a debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter or harass creditors
or attempting to effect a speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible basis.");
United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir.1987) (en
banc) (stating that if Chapter 11 plan does not have a rehabilitative purpose, the
"statutory provisions designed to accomplish the reorganization objective
become destructive of the legitimate rights and interests of creditors, the
intended beneficiaries"); Connell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal
Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir.1991) (Breyer, J.) (stating that
there must be "some relation-at least an arguable relation-between the chapter
11 plan and the reorganization-related purposes that the chapter was designed
to serve").
56
Our cases have accordingly focused on two inquiries that are particularly
relevant to the question of good faith: (1) whether the petition serves a valid
bankruptcy purpose, e.g., by preserving a going concern or maximizing the
value of the debtor's estate, and (2) whether the petition is filed merely to
obtain a tactical litigation advantage. SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 165.
57
It is easy to see why courts have required Chapter 11 petitioners to act within
the scope of the bankruptcy laws to further a valid reorganizational purpose.
Chapter 11 vests petitioners with considerable powers-the automatic stay, the
exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan, the discharge of debts, etc.-that
can impose significant hardship on particular creditors. When financially
troubled petitioners seek a chance to remain in business, the exercise of those
powers is justified. But this is not so when a petitioner's amis lie outside those
of the Bankruptcy Code.
58
A.
59
difficulties had precipitated the filing of the petition and indeed testified that
the debtor's debts and other financial obligations were substantially current").
61
62
[T]he drafters of the Bankruptcy Code understood the need for early access to
bankruptcy relief to allow a debtor to rehabilitate its business before it is faced
with a hopeless situation. Such encouragement, however, does not open the
door to premature filing, nor does it allow for the filing of a bankruptcy petition
that lacks a valid reorganizational purpose.
63
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 163 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., In re JohnsManville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984) ("Accordingly, the
drafters of the Code envisioned that a financially beleaguered debtor with real
debt and real creditors should not be required to wait until the economic
situation is beyond repair in order to file a reorganization petition."). Saying
that there is no insolvency requirement, however, does not mean that all solvent
firms should have unfettered access to Chapter 11. Despite the absence of an
express financial eligibility requirement in the Code,5 SGL Carbon
emphatically rejected any such proposition:
64
65
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the absence of a
solvency requirement recognizes that even solvent firms can, at times, suffer
from financial distress. Id. at 163 (early access for solvent debtors designed to
preempt "a hopeless situation"); In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 512-13
(Bankr.C.D.Cal.2003) ("It is not uncommon for debtors to be solvent under the
balance sheet test, and yet to have severe financial problems.... The United
States bankruptcy law is designed to provide relief from creditor pressures for
debtors with cash flow difficulties, even where they are clearly solvent under a
balance sheet test.").
66
Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court concluded that Integrated
faced financial distress because it "was losing a lot of money," and "was
experiencing a dramatic downward spiral" in September 2001, and that, as a
result, Integrated had gone "out of business." We do not see how bankruptcy
offers Integrated any relief from this sort of distress, which has no relation to
any debt owed by Integrated. That is, we can identify no value for Integrated's
assets that was threatened outside of bankruptcy by the collapse of Integrated's
business model, but that could be preserved or maximized in an orderly
liquidation under Chapter 11. Because Integrated's "dramatic downward spiral"
does not establish that Integrated was suffering from financial distress, it does
not, standing alone, establish that Integrated's petition was filed in good faith.
67
Creditors that fear an impending default may seek to protect their claims,
triggering "the chaotic mix of self-help repossession and judicial execution
available at state law" to which the Bankruptcy Code provides an alternative.
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 350. The absence of an
insolvency requirement encourages companies to file for Chapter 11 before
they face a financially hopeless situation. SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 163-64. Yet
this is decidedly not the case here. The Bankruptcy Court recognized the
unquestionable reality that "the debtor simply was not leveraged" and, apart
from the Landlord's claim, "had no significant debt." JA34-35. The court's
conclusion that "I don't think the Code makes any distinction" is legal error.
68
The absence of any financial distress facing Integrated distinguishes the two
principal cases relied on by the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court. In
PPI, an insolvent debtor defaulted on a lease with approximately $5.86 million
in rent remaining on the lease. 324 F.3d at 200-01. The debtor's Chapter 11
petition purported to serve two main purposes: (1) liquidating the debtor's sole
asset, namely, $12.6 million in stock in Del Monte Food Co., free of restrictions
that would otherwise have limited its value to $1.6 million; and (2) limiting the
landlord's lease termination damages under 502(b)(6). Id. at 201 & n. 5. The
debtor was successful on both fronts. The Del Monte stock was sold at a courtapproved auction for $11 million, id. at 201 n. 5, and the landlord's lease claim
was capped at $100,000, id. at 207.
69
Critically, the debtor in PPI claimed to have been insolvent. In addition to the
landlord's claims, the debtor had unsecured claims of approximately $54.6
million, dwarfing the value of its only asset, the Del Monte stock. PPI, 228
B.R. at 343. The landlord in PPI objected to these claims because the debt was
owed to insiders of the debtor, namely, the debtor's parent companies. The
landlord argued that these insider claims should be recharacterized as equity
interests, which would leave the debtor solvent by approximately $11 million
(not including the landlord's claim). Id. at 345. This issue, however, was not
raised on appeal, and we proceeded on the assumption that the debtor "owed 50
million in `inter-company debt.'" PPI, 324 F.3d at 200 n. 3. Accordingly, PPI
stands for the proposition that an insolvent debtor can file under Chapter 11 in
order to maximize the value of its sole asset to satisfy its creditors, while at the
same time availing itself of the landlord cap under 502(b)(6).
70
71
The bank did not appeal the sale order. Sylmar Plaza, 314 F.3d at 1073.
Instead, the Bank appealed from the confirmation of the debtor's plan of
reorganization, which took advantage of a provision in the Bankruptcy Code to
calculate the bank's claim according to the regular interest rate, rather than the
default interest rate. Id. In particular, the bank objected to the fact that "the plan
leaves the [debtors] solvent while permitting them to avoid paying post-petition
interest at the default interest rate." Id. at 1074.
72
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of good faith, reasoning
that (1) insolvency is not a prerequisite to a finding of good faith, and (2) the
fact that a creditor's contractual rights are adversely affected does not by itself
warrant a bad faith finding. Id. at 1074-75. The court's holding, however,
cannot be divorced from the facts of that case, which reveal that the
Bankruptcy Code was used to maximize value for creditors as a whole.
Moreover, although the debtors appear to have come out solvent in Sylmar
Plaza, there is no indication that they would have come out solvent had the
bank's claim not been limited, or that solvency was a foregone conclusion when
the petition was filed.
73
IPO class action claim, which was capped at $25 million with Integrated's
liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be paid by insurance)
was listed at its full alleged value, Integrated was still solvent at the time of
filing.
74
B.
75
On appeal, Integrated argues that its petition served a valid bankruptcy purpose
because bankruptcy "provide[d] a framework for the Debtor to resolve the
Securities Class Action." Appellee's Br. at 8. In this regard, the Bankruptcy
Court made no findings that are entitled to deference. Instead the Bankruptcy
Court merely acknowledged that Integrated "offered a number of reasons for
the filing of the bankruptcy case," and that the court "believe[d] there is validity
to a number of those considerations." (Emphasis added). "[A] number of those
considerations" necessarily is less than all of those considerations, and the
Bankruptcy Court did not identify which particular considerations had merit
except to stress that Integrated "was losing a lot of money." Moreover,
colloquially at least, stating that "there is validity to" something is not the same
as saying that something is valid.
76
Nevertheless, Integrated bore the burden of demonstrating good faith, and there
is no evidence in the record from which a finding of good faith could be made
based on the pending securities class action. There is no question, for example,
that the securities class action did not place Integrated in financial distress.
When it filed its petition, Integrated had assets of nearly $107 million (of which
$105 million was cash). Integrated also had Directors and Officers ("D & O")
insurance coverage of $20 million. Although the securities class claimed $93
million, Integrated concedes in its brief that it "believed that the Securities
Claim would be settled, likely within policy limits [i.e., for less than $20
million]." Appellee's Br. at 33. In documents filed with the SEC, including a
proxy statement issued in anticipation of a vote on Integrated's Plan of
Complete Liquidation and Dissolution under Delaware law, Integrated stated:
77
The company believes that the claims against it are without merit and intends to
defend this lawsuit vigorously. While the outcome of these claims is currently
not determinable, the Company does not expect that the ultimate costs to
resolve these claims will have a material adverse effect on the Company's
financial position, results of operations or cash flows.
78
James G. Regel, Integrated's CEO, testified that the above statement was true
when the proxy statement was filed. Integrated offers no argument that
circumstances surrounding the securities class action changed between April of
2002, when the Board resolved to liquidate under state law, and October of that
year, when the Board decided to file under Chapter 11.
79
80
At the April 29 hearing, the Bankruptcy Court suggested that the bankruptcy
process facilitated the liquidation of the securities class action. First, the Court
reasoned that Chapter 11 "effectively reduced the recovery by the securities
law claimants by treating them like shareholders pursuant to Section 510(b)."
We cannot find any evidence in the record to support a finding that this
treatment forced the securities class to accept the $25 million limit that the plan
places on their potential recovery. Nor could counsel for Integrated and the
OCESH support this finding when it was raised at oral argument.
81
C.
83
Integrated argues that its petition served three additional purposes that support
a finding of good faith. As with the securities class action, the Bankruptcy
Court did not specify which, if any, of these asserted justifications had merit.
Our own review of the record convinces us that none of Integrated's proffered
justifications warrant a finding of good faith.
84
S.Ct. 1411; Toibb, 501 U.S. at 163, 111 S.Ct. 2197, but simply facilitates
dissolution on terms favorable to equity interests. Moreover, neither Integrated
nor the OCESH have identified any efficiencies that were realized in this
bankruptcy that could not have been realized under Delaware law.
85
86
For one, the increase in value was a result of Integrated's failure to adequately
market the assets to potential bidders outside of the Board and management.7
When, on the very next day after it filed its petition, Integrated moved to sell
the assets at auction without further marketing, the OCESH challenged
Integrated's sale as an improper exercise of business judgment. True, the
OCESH is "a creature of the Bankruptcy Code," Appellee's Br. at 31, and, but
for Integrated's petition, the OCESH would not have existed. But surely
Integrated did not need Chapter 11 to discover that a more open and
competitive auction might increase the price obtained for its assets.
87
88
Having determined that Integrated was not in financial distress, and having
rejected Integrated's post hoc rationalizations for filing under Chapter 11, we
turn to the OCESH's argument that Integrated's desire to take advantage of the
cap on landlord claims provided by 502(b)(6) establishes good faith in and of
itself. Integrated makes a similar argument when it states that its petition
properly sought "a favorable forum for the consideration and resolution of other
disputed claims, including the Landlord's claim." Appellee's Br. at 8.
90
The Bankruptcy Court did not hold that Integrated's desire to take advantage of
the 502(b)(6) cap established good faith. Instead, the Bankruptcy Court held
that "it does not establish bad faith for a debtor to file a chapter [11] case for
the purpose of taking advantage of provisions which alter pre-petition rights,
including altering the rights of a landlord under State law." (Emphasis added).
We agree. Indeed, we believe it to be a truism that it is not bad faith to seek to
avail oneself of a particular protection in the Bankruptcy Code-Congress
enacted such protections with the expectation that they would be used. In re
James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 170 (7th Cir.1992) ("It is not bad faith to
seek to gain an advantage from declaring bankruptcy-why else would one
declare it?").
91
92
At least one Bankruptcy Court has dismissed for a lack of good faith a Chapter
11 petition seeking primarily to cap a landlord's claim for future rent under
502(b)(6), In re Liberate Technologies, 314 B.R. 206, 214-15
(Bankr.N.D.Cal.2004), and other Bankruptcy Courts have similarly dismissed
Chapter 11 petitions filed merely to take advantage of other singular provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. See N.W. Place, Ltd. v. Cooper (In re N.W. Place,
Ltd.), 73 B.R. 978, 982 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1987) (Chapter 11 petition filed to
invoke trustee's avoidance powers under Bankruptcy Code and to set aside
transfer); In re S. Cal. Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987)
(Chapter 11 petition filed to reject executory contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
365(a)); In re Cardi Ventures, Inc., 59 B.R. 18, 22-23 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985)
(Chapter 11 petition filed to assume and assign lease pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
365(f)); In re Nancant, Inc., 8 B.R. 1005, 1008 (Bankr.D.Mass.1981) (Chapter
11 petition filed to have certain tax liability determined pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
505). For example, 11 U.S.C. 362 protects debtors by staying litigation
against them during the pendency of the bankruptcy. Yet courts universally
demand more of Chapter 11 petitions than a naked desire to stay pending
litigation. E.g., Dixie Broad., 871 F.2d at 1026-27. As one Bankruptcy Court
put it:
93
The protection of the automatic stay is not per se a valid justification for a
Chapter 11 filing; rather, it is a consequential benefit of an otherwise good faith
filing. A perceived need for the automatic stay, without more, cannot convert a
bad faith filing to a good faith one.
94
95
Integrated and the OCESH may therefore be correct that 502(b)(6) reflects a
Congressional determination that landlords stand to receive a windfall in a
bankruptcy, and that landlord claims are inherently speculative. Furthermore,
Integrated and the OCESH may be correct that 502(b)(6) should operate to
cap landlord claims, even where the only effect of the cap would be to transfer
assets from creditors to equity holders.9 Yet 502(b)(6) and the legislative
policy underlying that provision assume the existence of a valid bankruptcy,
which, in turn, assumes a debtor in financial distress. The question of good faith
is therefore antecedent to the operation of 502(b)(6).
96
Although the Bankruptcy Code contains many provisions that have the effect of
redistributing value from one interest group to another, these redistributions are
not the Code's purpose. Instead, the purposes of the Code are to preserve going
concerns and to maximize the value of the debtor's estate. 203 N. LaSalle, 526
U.S. at 453, 119 S.Ct. 1411; Toibb, 501 U.S. at 163-64, 111 S.Ct. 2197. Section
502(b)(6) is precisely the sort of provision this Court had in mind when we
stated:
97
It is easy to see why courts have required Chapter 11 petitioners to act within
97
It is easy to see why courts have required Chapter 11 petitioners to act within
the scope of the bankruptcy laws to further a valid reorganizational purpose.
Chapter 11 vests petitioners with considerable powers-the automatic stay, the
exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan, the discharge of debts, etc.-that
can impose significant hardship on particular creditors. When financially
troubled petitioners seek a chance to remain in business, the exercise of those
powers is justified. But this is not so when a petitioner's aims lie outside those
of the Bankruptcy Code.
98
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 165 (emphasis added). To be filed in good faith, a
petition must do more than merely invoke some distributional mechanism in
the Bankruptcy Code. It must seek to create or preserve some value that would
otherwise be lost-not merely distributed to a different stakeholder-outside of
bankruptcy. This threshold inquiry is particularly sensitive where, as here, the
petition seeks to distribute value directly from a creditor to a company's
shareholders. See In re Telegroup Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir.2002)
(quoting Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L.Rev. 775, 792
(1987), for the proposition that "[a]n almost axiomatic principle of business
law is that, because equity owners stand to gain the most when a business
succeeds, they should absorb the costs of the business's collapse-up to the full
amount of their investment"); see also 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453, 119
S.Ct. 1411 (characterizing one of the purposes of Chapter 11 as "maximizing
property available to satisfy creditors").
99
100 Taken to its logical conclusion, the OCESH's argument is that any entity
willing to undergo Chapter 11 proceedings may cap the claims of its landlord.
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history suggests that 502(b)
(6) was meant to allow tenants to avoid their leases whenever the landlord's
state law remedy exceeds the cap under 502(b)(6) by an amount greater than
the cost of proceeding through a Chapter 11 reorganization or liquidation. Such
a rule would not only obviate the need for a good faith requirement, but would
be antithetical to the structure and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
III.
101 We hold that both the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter
of law in concluding that Integrated suffered financial distress. Although
Integrated's business model had failed, the company had no significant debt
apart from the Landlord's claim. Moreover, the record demonstrates that the
securities class action did not present a significant threat to Integrated's
finances. Because Integrated was not in financial distress, its Chapter 11
petition was not filed in good faith as it could not and did not preserve
any value for Integrated's creditors that would have been lost outside of
bankruptcy. We will therefore reverse the order of the District Court affirming
the Bankruptcy Court's denial of the Landlord's motion to dismiss, and will
remand this case to the Bankruptcy Court with instructions to dismiss
Integrated's petition.
Notes:
1
11 U.S.C. 510(b) subordinates claims for damages arising from the purchase
or sale of a security of the debtor to all claims and interests that are senior or
equal to the claim or interest represented by such security. Where, as here, the
security is common stock, the claim has the same priority as common
stockCollier on Bankruptcy 510.01, 510.04 [1] (15th ed.2004).
Under 11 U.S.C. 1112(b), "the court may convert a case under [Chapter 11]
to a case under Chapter 7 ... or may dismiss a case under this chapter,
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause." The
statute lists 10 non-exhaustive factors that may amount to cause. H.R.Rep. No.
95-595, at 406 (1977),reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6362 ("[The] list
[contained in 1112(b)] is not exhaustive. The court will be able to consider
other factors as they arise, and to use its equitable powers to reach an
appropriate result in individual cases.").
InSGL Carbon, we used the phrase "a valid reorganizational purpose" because
that case involved a plan of reorganization. See SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 167.
Reorganization, however, is not the only "appropriate use of Chapter 11 since
the Code clearly contemplates liquidating plans under 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(4),
whereby a debtor may develop a Chapter 11 plan to sell off all of its assets."
PPI, 324 F.3d at 211; accord 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(4) ("[A] plan may ... provide
for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the
distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders of claims or
interests...."). Yet liquidation plans, no less than reorganization plans, must
serve a valid bankruptcy purpose. That is, they must either preserve some going
concern value, e.g., by liquidating a company as a whole or in such a way as to
preserve some of the company's goodwill, or by maximizing the value of the
debtor's estate.
We therefore reject the OCESH's argument that the good faith inquiry applies
with less force to liquidation plans because, since ownership is not allowed to
retain an interest in the reorganized entity, the potential for bad faith is reduced.
The good faith requirement is necessitated as much by the hardship of Chapter
11 to certain interests as it is by the benefit to others. SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at
161-62, 165-66. Moreover, the facts of this case demonstrate the fallacy of the
OCESH's argument. While the owners of Integrated may never recover the full
value of their investments, they stand to reap a substantial gain through
bankruptcy, at the expense of the company's sole creditor.
5
We further note that, given the $105 million in cash held by Integrated and the
$20 million in D & O coverage, Integrated would have remained solvent even if
the securities class and the Landlord were to recover the full value of their
claims ($93 million and $26 million, respectively)
Although Integrated suggests that the increase in value was realized because
"the Bankruptcy Code afforded Debtor and the buyer protections including the
ability to sell free and clear of liens and claims,see section 363(f), and specific
evidentiary `good faith purchaser' findings, see section 363(m)," Appellee's Br.
at 30, the record provides no support for this assertion. For the most part, the
assets were sold to the same insiders with whom Integrated had already
negotiated a sale prior to filing for Bankruptcy. The fact that these insiders
were willing to purchase the assets outside of bankruptcy undercuts any
argument that the protections of the Code affected the purchase price.
The law is clear that the burden is on the bankruptcy petitioner to establish that
its petition has been filed in good faithPPI, 324 F.3d at 211; SGL Carbon, 200
F.3d at 162 n. 10. The Bankruptcy Court's statements that "it does not establish
bad faith for a debtor to," or "I conclude that as a matter of law, that is not a
debilitating fact," erroneously suggest that the question before the court was
whether bad faith, rather than good faith, had been proven.
The Landlord and Amici vigorously argue that 502(b)(6) does not apply to a
solvent debtor