JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

IN THE PHILIPPINES
MARIANO

c.

}AVIRR

On January 2, 1942 when Manila fell into Japanese hands, the existing political parties under the Commonwealth were immediately dissolved, and an educational campaign in the occupied areas was launched.
Believing that culture could serve to compliment military might, the
Japanese enlisted the help of political commentaors, educators and writers
from Japan and sent them to the Philippines to purge the people of the
thoughts originating from "enemy countries." 1' Newspapers and other
publications were mobilized to maintain internal solidarity and umty.
''In all the speeches and short talks which the Japanese officials in the
miliary and civil establishments delivered on practically all occasions the opening of a school, interviews, gathering of peasants, etc. - the
dominant ideas were the 'building of a New Philippines', the 'development of a truly Oriental culure', and the 'doing away with American
influences and way of life.' "2
The initial military victories of 1941 and 1942 must have given the
Japanese confidence in the strength of their moral philosophy. They
thought it was strong enough to defy "the shallow, materialistic approach of the Anglo-American." 3 They counseled the people to follow
Japan and be guided equally by strong moral and political ideals.4
1 Yasotaro Mori, "Nippon's Cultural Strength," Pillars, II (May,
1944), 52.
2 Agoncillo, Fateful Years, vol. I. p.366.
3 Mori, "For A More Spheric Consciousness," Pillars, II (May, 194.4),
3-7.
4 Ibid.

47

48

ASIAN STUDIES

General Masaharu Homma, in a speech after the seizure of Manila,

exhorted the Philippines to "liquidate the unnatural culture borrowed
from a far away country." 5 He stressed that "a nation which indulged
in pretty dresses, nice food, physical enjoyment and expensive fashions
could not succeed in establishing a strong nation." 6
Roots of subservience

It did not take the Japanese long to realize that the Filipinos' cultural and economic dependency on the United States was in a far worse
state than they had imagined. They were appalled by the Filipinos' slavelike reverence , and dependeq,cy on imported materials,., , They were
shocked by the Filipino standard of ,living which was "measured in
terms of sleek motor cars and electric refrig~r;uors,, neither of wh1ch was
produced in the country." 7 ' They could ndt' understand why the Filipinos would "always hark back to the pre-war era to lament, not its
colonial status but in recalling its artificial prosperity and the imported
foods." 8 They wondered how a nation could take pride, in speaking
foreign languages rather than their own; or even remain as a nation
with <J._, nati~nal economy which they described as "standing on a pr~
carious foundation of a foreign trade that could be relied upon to be
,
,
as stable as the shifting sands of the Sahara.''9
Looking into Philippine history, they discovered that the country
had no cu'ture nor racial identity of her own. They surmised that this
cultural deprivation was due to the years of Spanish and American impositions in the Islands. They seized upon the weight of argument to
.launch an ambitious program, taking. upon themselves the heroic task
of, liberating the people from Western economic domination and rekindling the flame of nationalism which they stretched to the regional level, embracing not only the Philippines and ,Japan, but the
entire East Asian countries as well.

The Japanese also looked into the "unnatural attachment of the

people to the United States," tr;:tcing its cause to the people's general

"feeling of inferiority." 10
5 Quotations from Journal of the Japanese Military Administration,
2 (1942, V-VI).
G S. Motukawa, "A Hospital Visit/' Philippine Review,. II- {May,
1944), p; 21.
.
. .. .
.
'
.
'
7 S. Mo+ubwa, "A Hospital Visit," Philippine Review II (May, 1944),
8 lhirl., p. 22.

9Jbid.

S. Matukawa, "The Filipino Reorientation Made Easy," Pillars,

I (February, 1944), p. 23.
1o

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

49

the Filipinos were wont to turn their eyes away from the
Orient because they saw the Orient as the ~lum of the wo~ld
and felt that embarrassing to be considered a part of it.
Consequently, their feeling toward other Oriental peoples was
like the universal attitude people feel toward poor relations.n

The Japanese administrator urged the people to regain their selfconfidence, deducing the Filipino feeling of inferiority from America's
policy of deceit and misguidance. 12 In a lecture commemorating the
fall of Bataan, General Yoshihide said that "the United States had sapped
Filipino strength with luxury goods, scattered their energies by excessive encouragement of individual rights, and handicapped their future
by not building enough vocational schools." 18
Southeast Asia possesses world control of rubber and tin ;
one fourth of the world's tungsten and antimony, the greatest
exporter of rice, the world's control of coipra and coconut oil;
the largest chromite deposit and the sixth gold producer of the
world.

America Unmasked
A Japanese writer confessed that "the only real element of poverty
(in the Philippines) is the poverty of the people's will to develop their
country ' s economy."1'4
Although they gave the American credit for the general improvement of the islands, the Japanese explained that the high standard of
living was a natural result of a period of industrialization, not a humanitarian act towards the Filipino people. They claimed this was a
general trend throughout the world since the close of the 19th century.u;
They denounced America's colonial objectives in the islands, from
her interference in the Spanish-Philippine War of 1898 to the sacrifice
of Filipino lives in Bataan and Corregidor. They exposed what they
claimed was America's organized effort to transform the Philippines
into a dependent colony, both politically and economically, so that she
wou:d remain an indispensable part of her vast program of Oriental
expansiOn.
Ibid., p. 24.
This is an often repeated advice by officers of the Japanese Military Administration, especially by Major Gen. Hayashi Yoshihide, Ist
Director General of the JMA.
13 Hayashi Yoshihide, as quoted in Theodore Friend, Between Two
Empires (London: 1965), p. 231.
14 S. Matukawa, "Filipino Reorientation Made Easy," Pillars, I (February, 1944), 24.
15 T. F. Ito, "America's Altruism in the Philippines," Philippine Review, II (May, 1944), p. 38.
11
12

50

ASIAN STUDIES

A Japanese writer, T. F. lto16 , gave an explanation of America's

supposed modernization of the Philippines which would later betome
an often repeated argument during the post-war disillusionmentof the
Filipinos with American colonial policies. Ito wrote that the sweeping
change in the political, social and .economic institutions after the establishment of the civil government in 1901 was no more. than "a
prelude to the Americanization of the natives.''1'7 He added:
Under the . banner of altruism, the doctrine of democraey was
nominally introduced; then a shallow but dazzling ID~J.terial
istic Civilization was brought in, followed naturally by Arne. rican mannerisms and tastes.ts

Mr. Ito continued to explain that the materialistic civiliz<1-tion introduced in the Philippines which America announced to the .world as
an act .of goodwill, was really no more than a plan to develop a new
and exclusive' market for the products of her industries.
Masao Matsuoka, another Japanese writer, also maintained that the
industrial revolution which swept Europe from the end of the' 19th to
the beginning of the 20th centuries had. increased the productio]l of goods
which resulted in a desperate need to seek new markets for these _goods.
American efforts to acquire the Philippines from Spain was motivated
by America's search for new markets for surplus goods. These ,goods
were dumped in the Islands under the guise of America's contribution
to the modernization of the Philippines.19
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, when confronted on
several occasions with questions to explain her position in the Philippines, America had managed to prove her absence of any coill.mercial
or economic designs by citing the unfavorable balance of trade with the
Islands, and also by presenting in figures the enormous expenditures
she iJ:lCUrred to maintain the Philippines. But the Japanese refuted
this contention. They said :20
As far as the visible items were concerned, this claim was
correct. But the truth was that Uncle Sam's profits which
were derived out of non-visible items such as insurance premiums, freight charges, interests and bonds and debentures,
etc. were more than enough to offset the losses in the visible
items.
l6Jbid., pp. 38-44.
t7 Ibid., p. 40.
ts Ibid.
t9l\{asao Matsuoka, "Japanese Colonial Administration,'' Philippine
RevieW, I (June,. 1943), 11.
2o Ibid., p. 40.

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

51

As for America's constant reference to the enormous expenditures

she had made for administrative purposes and defense of the territorial
integrity of the Philippines, and which she claimed to be no less than
$30,000,000 per annum, the Japanese disclosed the truth of this matter.
On the face or:f it, these appear to be rational arguments. But,
the American policy towards the Philippines was not as simple
as that; it was much more deeply rooted. . .
America had
apd still has in mind a sinister objective - the domination
of the entire Far East which abounds in economic potentialities.
lit fact, to America the Orient was and is synonymous t01 an
inexhaustible gold mine. So long as she could reign over the
Orient, she would be at liberty to exploit countries through
trade monopoly, an arrangement which would amply compensate his losses in the Philippines. The Philippines was an important outpost from which this tentacle of imperialistic exploitation would surreptitiously stretch to the Asiatic mainland.. Therefore, so lcng as the Filipinos could be put 'in the
bag' to serve their purpose Uncle Sam was always ready to
spend any amount.21

Summarizing America's economic interests in Asia, the Japanese

maintained that it was the intention of America to make the Philippines
and other Asian countries remain and subsist on agricultural economy
so that Great Britain and the United States would continue to maintain
their economic interests in Asia. Asian countries would continue to
provide the much-needed raw materials for Western power which would
in turn transform them into manufactured goods to be exported back
to the same countries whence the materials had been acquired. The
trade relation, so economically disastrous to agricultural countries, was
made to appear advantageous to both parties, and was frequently mislabeled "free trade", "international division of labor", internationalism",
etc.22
Japan added in conclusion that this economic policy of Anglo-America is sustained by force, and that it was for this reason that agricultural countries were naturally compelled to be either British or American
colonies.
While exposing American motives, the Japanese unwittingly exposed their own colonial ambition in Asia. Her reputation as a colonial empire which dated from 1894 or 189523 with the acquisition of
Taiwan, and then the Sakhalin Islands, and later Korea and Manchu21 Ibid., p. 41.
22 Isao Kume, "Rewriting The History of East Asia," Pillars, I. (December. 1943), p. 7.
23 Matsuoka, "Japanese Colonial Administration," p. 7.

52

ASIAN STUDIES

ria, is common knowledge for the Filipinos to alter their impression of

Japan's ambitions for colonial expansion. To free herself from embarrassment, Japan admitted having become a colonial empire, 24 but tried
to impress the Filipinos with the supposed "nobility of her purpose"
by claiming her participation in the war as part of Asia's history of
political struggle.25 The Japanese claimed that their country was motivated by the "noble cause of destroying the old order established by
Anglo-American imperialism."26 She also imposed upon herself a
moral obligation to redeem Asia from "Western clutches" and to establish a New World Order in Asia wherein each country shall be given
the privileged position of an independent nation in the concert of
free nations." 27
While the United States pointed out the sufferings of Korea,
Manchuria, North China and Indochina to prove the hallowness of
Japan's proposal for independence,28 Japan gave herself the credit for
the supposed economic progress of those countries. She presented
herself to the Philippines as a "peaceful loving nation", driven into
war in order to avenge herself for the "aggravating inj~ries and insults
from the United States and Great Britain." She justified her acquisition of Taiwan "by virtue of the right of conquest," and blamed the
Sino-Japanese War on China for the latter's refusal to recognize the
independence of Korea. She called the Russo-} apanese war an act of
"self defense against Russia's design over Manchuria and Korea."
The Japanese did not devote their criticisms alone to the subject
of American imperialism. Other aspects of Philippine culture and
society were also evaluated. They looked into the Phijppine educational system and discovered its close relatio!lship with American schools
- promoting American ideals, language, history, government and even
American outlook.29 They found that the country was turning into
a cheap imitation of America, and to prevent its shameful and total
transformation, the school curricula were drastically revamped. Books
and courses on Western culture and values were abolished, and emphasis was placed on vocational education and food production.
Ibid.
Ibid.
2s Ibid.
27 Kume, "Rewriting The History of East Asia," p. 8.
28 Friend, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
29 T. F. Ito, "American Altruism In The Philippines,'' Philippine
Review, II (March, 1944), 41.
24
25

JAPANESE CUl..TURAL PROPAGANDA

53

Language a.r a tool

Tagalog was proclaimed the country's national language and Nippongo the official language in Asia.30 It was the Japanese contention
that the introduction of Tagalog in the schools would give people con~
fidence in developing their own culture, and that Nippongo, on the
other hand, would direct the populace to Oriental culture and values.
In short the introduction of these two Oriental languages would hasten
the people's cultural emancipation from the United States.31'

By the end of 1942, city ordinances were already being printed in

Tagalog.32 One thousand basic Tagalog words were prepared by the
Kalibapi (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Filipino), and titles
and offices in the government were Filipinized.33 Tagalog literature
began to flourish through the encouragement of the Japanese Military
Administration. Contests on creative writing in Tagalog were periodically announced by the Manila Sinbun-Sya and the Manila City Hall
authorities. With this new and favorable treatment of the Tagalog
language, a number of our Filipino writers in English were soon trymg
their hands in Tagalog. A few continued to wnte in this medium
even after the war. The literary activities including frequently conducted contests which marked this period were really focused on one
specific theme: "to reflect the spirit and outlook of the New Philip. "
pmes.
Attempt.r to 'Nipponize'
Nippongo was also treated with the same enthusiasm as the Tagalog
language. Pamphlets on basic lessons in Nippongo were distributed
free immediately after the occupation of the Islands. When the press
was given permission to function under the supervision of the Japanese
Military Administration, all magazines, both in English and in Tagalog, contained sections of basic lessons in Nippongo. These supplemented The Nippon go Weekly, a grammar pamphlet which was sold
at three centavos a copy.34
30 Military Ordinance No. 13, Concerning Official Language for Public
Use, July 24, 1942.
31' Takao Yamada, "Reform of the Japanese Language," Philippine
Review, I (September, 1943), pp. 23-25.
32 Gregorio F. Zaide, Chronicle of Japanese Occupation, 1941-1943.
(Unpublished manuscripts, no pages.)
33 Ibid.
34 The Nippongo Weekly came off the press on February 15, 1943,
and issuPd by the Manila Sinbun-Sya. It is one-half of the regular
tabloid newspaper and contained eight pages. From Gregorio F. Zaide,
Chronicle of Japanese Occupation: 1941-1943. (Unpublished manuscripts.)

.A.SIAN STUDIES

Nippongo was made a basic course in the elementary and secondary curricula when the public schools were re-opened under the new
regime. Contests on the language were conducted regularly over the
radio. In less. than two years, a few gifted Filipino youths had learned
to speak Nippongo like native speakers of the language.
Columns of the more widely circulated magazines and journals
were placed under the supervision of Japanese writers from the Military Information Office. These writers became regular contributors
of articles which never deviated from the systematic program of rep~ac
ing the Spanish~Am<:rican-oriented culture. They .tried to establish a
cu.tural bond between the Philippines and Japan by tracing the past
and e){aggerating similarities which would link the two nations: from
ethnoiogy and history to sociology, art and language.
The persistence to "nippohize" the Philippines was to become
absurd when Filipino scholars, compelled to write propaganda articles
for the lucrative sums offered by the Japanese controlled press, went
looking into the past to search for similarities between the two >coun~
tries. Wild claims were made in many supposedly scholarly studies,
and minute findings were blown into exaggerated proportions. For instance, a Filipino linguist who was directed to find similarities between
Tagalog and the Japanese language, came out with an article to suit
the demand - a list of Japanese words which he clai~ed, would be
assimilated by the Tagalog language in the near future. 35 Later, after
the war, said linguist preferred to exclude this particular article from
his list of published works.
Historical distortion

Undocumented historical declarations were also made in Philippine

history. It was clciimed, for example, that Japanese Samurais had offered to join the ranks of the Filipinos during the 16th century to
smash the Spanish yoke; and that during the Philippine revolution,
a number of Japanese had "volunteered to fight and die side by side
with their Filipino comradescin-arms."36
Without evidences to support his contention, a Filipino historian
published an article on the .supposed intercourse between Japan and
Cecilio Lopez, "Foreign Influences in Tagalog," Philippine Re54-1l7~
.

36 Mentioned in the M$1nifes+o iRsued by the Philippine Council of

s+~te on Feb, 13, 1943. Historic<I,Z Bulletin, IX (March & June, 1965),
64-65.
.
.
35

vieiv, II (July, 1944),

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

55

the Philippines in the past, and which he elaborately imagined in

lieu of real facts and data. Even Rizal' s 28 days stay in Japan became
an important phase in the life of the hero. Not only did Rizal acquire
an Oriental flavor, but even his political ideals were made to originate
from J apan.37
Music and the arts also underwent the same systematic pattern
of change. American national and patriotic songs, together with books
on American values and life, were either burned or banned. Song
contests in Tagalog compositions emphasizing Filipino traditions and
customs were periodically announced by the Manila Sinbun-Sya.38 New
Philippine national songs were introduced.32 Japanese songs were
taught in schools, public gatherings and entertainment places.40

The entire popuiation, young and old, received propaganda education through the schools, through district organizations in towns and
villages, and also through their membership in the Kalibapi which the
Japanese introduced to work for the Filipinization program of the
country. Through the Ka 7ibapi, the Japanese hoped to elicit from the
people the essential Oriental outlook and social consciousness they can
display by actual participation in social community programs such as
food production, neighborhood associations, and community development projects.
Days of significance in Japan were declared special holidays. . Parades and mass rallies were held to celebrate historical events which
were often highlighted by propaganda speeches of Japanese and Filipino
leaders. One huge demonstration which was long to be remembered
was the Ka'ibapi's mammoth parade of 300,000 flag-waving Filipinos
at the Luneta, to celebrate Premier Tojo' s early announcement of Philippine Independence.H
On. February 4, 1943, the Manila Sinbun-Sya sponsored a movement
to change the name of the Philippines to another with a more Oriental
Read articles written on Rizal from The Philippine Review, 1943-44
On February 1, 1943, the Manila Sinbun-Sya announced a song
contest for the "New Philippine March." C/f Zaide's Chronicle of Japanese Occupation. Unpublished papers.
&9 On February 7, 1943, the First Kalibapi Concert-Meeting was
held at the Metropolitan Theatre at 9:30 A.M. The official march of
Kalibapi, composed by Felipe de Leon, was introduced for the .first time
to the public. It was sung by a chorus of stage actors and actresses.
40 On February 14, 1943, the first. presentation of Oriental JYlUsic
in the Philippines was held in the morning by the St. Theresa's College
at its Conservatory Hall.

41 This historic event is recorded in Gregorio F. Zaide's "Epic of

Philippine Independence," Philippine Review, I (November, 1943), 15.
37
3S

56

ASIAN STUDIES

flavor. To occupy their leisure, local writers, intellectuals and the cultured lower middleclass in the city readily caught up with this particular
tempo for Filipinization. The war had temporarily dislocated many
of the city dwellers who now spent much of their time idling and
intellectualizing in coffee shops where some buy-and-sell business transactions were being made. The Japanese and some Filipino nationalists
felt that the move would foster Philippine aspirations and traditions
as an Oriental nation. Some of the more outspoken argued that "it
is unreasonable for our people to continue honoring the memory of
Philip II, a monarch of an Occidental kingdom, and the first to deprive
us of our independence . . ."42 The movement was advocated by E.
Masao in his daily column in The Tribune. The subject became the
talk of among others city intellectuals and writters, who were soon
divided into two camps: the "fence-sitters" who opposed the change
and the "collaborationists" who favored the change. But since the
"collaborationists" were each advocating a different name, the debate
continued until the list of suggested names included such words as
SilanKan, Mai, Rizal, Mailog (Many Rivers}, Kayumanggi, Mutya ng
Silangan, and T aga!a. A certain D. C. Ticola, even suggested that the
country be called "Lapu-Lapu Islands" in honor of King Lapu-Lapu
of Mactan.'' The debate went on until a cool-headed Armando Ligaya
wrote to castigate:
It is high time that we stop this fancy of changing names.
If we indulge in a frenzy of name changing, we shall have a

Herculean task before us, because the great bulk of the names
of towns and provinces are of Occidental origin. . . .
What
is wrong with the name Philippines? Why change it to Rizal?
Rizal was born under the Philippine sun. Is the name of Jose Rizal
y Mercado of Oriental origin?
Why don't we change his
name too?45

Nonetheless, the Filipinization move~ent raged for sometime.

Manila was divided into twelve administrative districts patterned after
the cny plan of Greater Tokyo in a colorful festivity on October 31,
1942.46 The event was highlighted by the christening of Jones Bridge
into "Banzai Bridge" by Chairman Jorge Vargas in the presence of
Japanese and Filipino officials. The new name of the bridge was
' 2 A letter sent by Gregorio Perfecto on February 8, 1943 to the
"Public Pulse," Tribune.
43 See "our Tomorrow," Tribune, February 7, 1943.
44 A lei:ter sent to the "Public Pulse," Tribune, Feb. 13, 1943, signed
D. C. Ttcola.

45Jbid.
46

Zaide, Chronicle of Japanese Occupation, Unpublished, (no pages).

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

57

inscribed in Japanese characters by Lt. Gen. Homma. The twelve

districts were given the following Filipino names: (1) Bagumbayan:
Port Area, Intramuros, Ermita and Malate; (2) Bagundiwa: Paco,
Pandacan, and Sta. Ana; (3) Bagumpanahon: Sampaloc, Sta. Cruz,
Quiapo, and San Miguel; ( 4 Bagumbuhay: Tondo, Binondo, and San
Nicolas; (5) Ba!intawak_: San Francisco del Monte, Ga~as and La
Lorna; (6) Diliman: Diliman proper, Cubao and University Districts
(7) San Juan: San Juan del Monte; (8) Caloocan; (9) Manda!uyong;
(10) Mak_ati; (11) Pasay; (12) Paraiiaque.
The proponents of the Filipinization movement also made the
cinema a vehicle for propaganda. They, however, found Filipino movie
productions qualitatively inadequate to meet the demands of realism,
much less become a source for inspiration and guidance. 47 They called
Philippine movies "a shame to the nation," its themes ''flippant and
shallow." 48 Nevertheless, local motion pictures were produced under
the direction and guidance of Japanese movie experts, and Japanese
films were shown in local theatres through the Eiga Haikyu-Sha, the
Japanese film distributor in Manila.49
Fascinated with the life and courage of Dr. Jose Rizal, they laid
claim to his thoughts as that of a Japanese, and began to emulate his
person and to promote his qualities as examples of "the New Fiiipino." 50
Thus Rizal became the first hero to be institutionalized during the
Occupation Period and his life became the subject of many literary
contests where both Filipino and Japanese writers competed with each
other to give the hero an Oriental flavor. 51
The same correctional pattern was made in almost all social and
cultural avenues except religion which the Japanese allowed to function
without interference. They found the Church useful in contro:ling
society, and its tenets were not exactly opposed to their cu~tural and
po:itical program. However, they were to confess later that they did
not meddle with the natives' religious beliefs because they felt that
such moves might affect Japan's relation with the Vatican whom they
expected to play an important role at the termination of the war. 52
47 Tsutanu Sawamura, "For The Glc'l'y of Philippine Movies," Philippine Revierw, I (February, 1944), p. 30.
48 Ibid.
49 Daigaro Takeuti, "Contemporary Japanese Motion Picture," Philippine Review, I (June, 1943), p. 43.
50 Jun-iti Obmi, "Last Moments of Rizal," Philippin(!J, Review, II
(June, 1944). 23-27.
51 Iwao Kume, "Some Reflections," Pilla'rs, I (December, 1944), 6-12.
52 Takeuchi Tatsuji, Manila Diary:Dec. 1942-0ct. 1943, Appendix A,
The Philippine Polity, (Yale, 1967), p. 218.

ASIAN STUDIES

58

Japan's failure
Analyzing the content of Japanese cultural propaganda in the
Philippines, it can be said that Japan had made a fairly accurate if
cutting diagnosis of the subservient condition o~ our culture and economy. But one quality which the Japanese lacked is the patience to
direct the people, and also the means by which the country shall be
raised to its own feet.
While the Japanese propaganda seemed to have given the Philippines a political and cultural direction, no more had been made to rehabilitate the country's economy. The abrupt halt of material goods
from the "free trade" relations with the United States and the fai~ure
to substantiate this depletion of supply severely affected the continuance
of the normal social lives of the people. Added to this burden was
the objective of the Japanese Military Administration "to extract war
resources", 53 so much so that a few Japanese military officials had confessed to "having taken away ore, copper, and other resources of the
Archipelago, instead of bringing in goods in the Philippines." 54 As
a result, the Filipino living standard had continually become depressed
since the Japanese arrived.
Some Japanese officials confessed to the lack of Japan's concrete
program for post-war policy.55 Neither did they have an organized
political structure that would bring her policy into execution after the
war. 56 Even the Japanese who composed the cultural propaganda
group confessed among themselves that their actions under the Military
Administration were confined to those needed for the prosecution of
the war: 57
The supposed economic self-sufficiency program, except for the lipservice given to it, never had a headstart. Filipinos were left to improvise and fend for themselves, and the Japanese procured by force
whatever they desired on all matters. Without the benefit of industry
and science, the standard of living began to decline, accompanied by
a hatred for the Japanese whom the people blamed for their misery.
While the miserable condition of life during the occupation was
welcomed by Japan as a great leap towards the country's emancipation
from American dependency, the population in general saw it as a
53 Royama Masamichi & Takeuchi Tatsuji. The Philippine Polity,
p. 226.
54 Ibid., p. 277.
55 Ibid., p. 215 ..
56

57

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 212.

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

59

degradation, a backward step from the path of progress. When the

Japanese forcibly enforced self-sufficiency by creating zone groups into
work programs, the educated and the lower middle class deduced
the action as an effort to humiliate their persons. When Japan ventured
into censoring school textbooks to discourage the corrupting influences
of American materialism, the people saw it as a violation of the basic
tenets of democratic freedom. Indeed, the cultural and political reorientation program of Japan was destined to fail, "even from the very
start" .58
The Japanese concept of brotherhood sounded hypocritical to the
Filipinos. We were repelled by the Japanese's "glorification of Spartan
virtues," and their devotion to duty seemed fanatical and irrational.
They were intellectually unconvincing as well as physically repulsive.
On the other hand, the Japanese found the Filipinos "uncooperative," and the "laziest" of all the peoples with whom they had had
army experience. 5 9 A Japanese writer acquiescingly observed: "It
would be a hopeless thing to expect any future for a people devoid of
the sense of appreciation for native genius and things native . . . who
humble themselves before anything foreign and alien." 60
Theodore Friend surmised that "by 1941, the Filipinos were already
too well developed under American rule or too spoiled as the Japanese
saw it, for the invaders to accomplish much . " 61'

The 1triumph' of Westernization

One has also to consider the circumstances surrounding the development of the Philippines as a nation to understand its people's negative
reaction to Japanese intellect and judgment. This country has undertaken a long process of Westernization - a little more than 300 years
under Spain, and 41 years under American ruie spent by the colonial
powers in obliterating our Oriental heritage, and asserting the superiority
of Occidental culture. This was began by Spain in a somewhat visible
effort when Christianity was forcibly introduced in the Islands and
resumed by the Americans on a more extensive scale - through education - during the first half of the 20th century. The adverse effects
of this de-Orientalization had been he lamblike willingness of the
Filipinos to adopt Western language, culture and even prejudices; the
Ag-onrillo, Fateful Years, p. 338.
Frir"d, Between Two Empires. p. 232.
so S Matukawa, "A Hospital Visit," Phil!ippine Review II
1944), 23.
61' Friend, op. cit., p. 265.
58
59

(May,

ASIAN STUDIES

60

hastening of the Filipinos' desire to turn away from their own past
and identity; and their erroneous belief that through the imitation of
Western ways and the importation of Western technology can their
journey towards progress be ensured.
Because of the extensive process of de-Orientalization, the Filipinos
took the entire episode of Japanese invasion as a tempory interlude, a
mometary inconvenience brought by world affairs, and our undying
faith in America's ability to extricate us from the encumbrances created
by the Japanese occupation of the Islands. Indeed, one cannot unlearn
in three years a mental attitude which took almost four hundred years .
In addition to this factor, the Filipinos had already been warned
of Japan's growing territorial ambitions in Asia, even as early as the
1930's. The Manchurian incident of 1931, the invasion of China in
1937, and the atrocities committed against the people of Nanking which
shocked the rest of the world 62 were warnings against a type of people
we were to confront in the future. The atrocities and massacres in
Bataan and Corregidor, and the brutalities committed by the Japanese
in our country, had confirmed the so-called "perils of the yellow race."
It was natural for a people who had been violated to remain deaf to
the voices of her enemies, much less to forget, through her propaganda,
the memory of a painful. experience.
The Great Co-Prospen"ty Sphere Program

On the other hand, Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere Program can not

be considered a total failure. America's initial defeat in the Pacific
may have given Asians the idea of their capacity to free themselves
from Western domination. The victory may have given all Orientals
a sense of pride, even if the feeling had not been shared by a great
section of Philippine society who took the fall of Bataan as their own
personal defeat. Nonetheless, the sight of Americans retreating on all
fronts in 1941 and 1942 must have given dramatic proofs that the white
man was not invincible.63
When the Japanese asked the Philippines to join them in a program
of Asia united "in the spirit of universal brotherhood" under the leadership of Japan with each nation alloted its proper place "leading to peace
and prosperity," the idea was not exactly unconvincing to some Filipinos. Like many Asian idealists, Fil~pino nationalists must have seen
62
63

William Craig, The Fall of Japan, (London, 1967), p. XIII. ' John Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 507.

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA

61

in the program a chance to free the Philippines from exploitation by

the white man.
Of course it is true that the Co-Prosperity Sphere program had
been corrupted by Japanese militarists who looked upon Southeast Asia
with its rich natural resources as a solution to their economic ills,6 t
but the program's call for Pan Asianism had its appeal to the masses.
The mammoth demonstration of more than 300,000 Filipinos at Luneta
to commemorate the Kalibapi's Filipino :moveinent,66 the .Makapili and
Sakdalistas' commitment to the "Asia for the Asians" policy, and the
growth of the national language during the occupation, can be viewed
as signs of the people's growing consciousness of Asian nationalism and
the de-Westernization of the Philippines.
When Japan gave a token gesture to realize the Co-Prosperity
program by giving Burma her independence on August 1, 1943, followed by the Philippines on October 14, and the establishment of the
Provincial Government of Free India a week lat!!r, the Asians considered
the events very significant. It is true that the new governments were
puppets of Japan, but for millions of Asians, it was their first glimpse
of freedom from the white man.
A Japanese writer described the enthusiasm of millions of Asians
reaching the culmination of success when China, Manchukuo, the Phil-:
ippines and Burma sent representatives to Tokyo for the Greater East
Asi.a Conference early in November.66 "We were getting together,"
Ba Maw of Bu~a wrote, "not so much as separate peoples but as members of a single historical family containing all these peoples." Even
Jose P. Laurel, President of the Philippines, found .Pan Asianism irresistible: "One billion Orientals, o.o.e billion people of Greater East Asia,"
he proclaimed at the formal reception on the eve of the initial meeting,
"how could they have been dominated, a great portion of them particularly by England and America?" 67
Thirty years have passed and Japan has recovered from the holocaust of war to resume a respected place among the nations of the
''Ibid., p. 507.

65 Gregorio F., Zaide, "Epic of Philippine Indt!pendence," Philippirw

Review I (November, 1943), 15.
6& Iwao Kume, "A Comparison of Two Charters," Pillars, I (March,
1944), 27-28.
G7 Jose P. Laurel, Speech in Tokyo, November (?), 1943, as ouoted
in Iw11o Kume, "Comparison of Two Charters," Pillars, (March, 1944),
pp. 27-28.

ASIAN. STUDIES

62

world. The Yamato is said to be an exceptional race and is prophesied

to turn defeat into victory. The economic and industrial privileges extended by America. to Japan after the war have enabled these two natiOI~s to control Southeast Asia's economy, both sharing and controlling
once again the region's wealth of raw materials, and dictating the economic and commercial policies each government in Southeast Asia is
to. adopt.
Meanwhile, the Philippines has remained among the nations of
the Third World, has twice increased in number, and punctually celebrates a day of each year to commemorate her dramatic defense of Bataan,
true to the comic role s4e plays in the theatre of war drama. Often
puzzled by the turn of events, the Filipino simple mind could not comprehend beyond the shallow literacy and stereotyped learning with
which America had fed her mind before the war, at times wondering,
in lucid moments, if Japan, after all, had really won the war of 1941.
The Filipinos today are still well known for their kindness and
hospitality. B~t they are now slowly waking up from the over-extended
reigns of mental lethargy and complacency. Their unbounded faith in
America and her actions in the Philippines are no longer the prevailing
mood .among the youth, altho:ugh it has not been entirely shaken off.
There are still Filipino elements who remain subservient to America
and to whatever cause she upholds to suit her purpose. The loyalty of
these elements are not unshackled by the gravity of historical truth,
and they find meaningful solace in the narrow context of their dramatic
heroism in Bataan and Corregidor. But today, even that glory is
obliterated by the blazing light of political reality, for it holds no relevance to the people's struggle for true democracy and freedom.
This truth is dramatically symbolized in a recent incident68 when
a veteran of the World War II cried out in protest against a farmer's
desecration of the hallowed war-monument in Capas for turning the
sacred ground into a pigsty. The action is indeed outrageous, one may
say. Yet, on second thought, we may perhaps ask if the action is any
different from that of our government when it extended to Japanese
investors special economic and industrial privileges to exploit our country

and our people.

68

See headline, BuUetin Today XXIX (April 7, 1975), I.