Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763

February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said
novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of
the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General
has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds
the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging
the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as
a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the
family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1.
That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

The Facts

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2.
That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3.

That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4.

That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5.

That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6.
That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as
of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity

as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct
in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage.
If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."

The Issue
The Court's Ruling
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5
heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it
added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the

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psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q
It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A

Yes, Your Honor.

There is no hope for the marriage?

There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Yes, Your Honor.

Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

Q
Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with
other parties?
A

(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it

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from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk

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together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and

cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

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