RODRIGUEZ vs.

MACTAL
Nature: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, issued in the intestate proceeding of Mauricia de Guzman,
deceased, denying the motion of the appellants in which they sought to
annul a sale, executed January 23, 1926, by the administratrix Trinidad
Mactal, of a parcel of land to Silverio Choco and a resale of the same land
on March 10, 1928, to the administratrix Trinidad Mactal.

They insisted that the administratrix bought the land indirectly through the
mediation of Choco and that both sales should be annulled under the
provisions of the article cited above.
Issue:

Facts:
1.

The appellants Catalina and Rodriguez, and the appellee Mactal, are all
heirs of Mauricia de Guzman whose estate is under administration in
CFI.

2.

Appellee Mactal was appointed as administratrix. The committee of

claims submitted a report in which various claims against the estate
were allowed. The report was approved by the court.

3.

The administratrix prayed that she be allowed to sell the only parcel of
land belonging to the estate with an area of 19 hectares for the
purpose of paying debts. This land was a part of a parcel of land of 23
hectares of which belonged to Rodriguez.

4.

The court authorized the administratrix to sell the land. The latter then
sold it to Silverio Choco. Thereafter, the administratrix paid the
approved claims against the estate. These payments, all of which were
made after the sale in favor of Silverio Choco, conclusively prove that
sale was not fictitious as alleged by the appellants.

5.

More than two years later, Choco sold the same land to the spouses
Pio Villar and Trinidad Mactal for the sum of P4,500, who in turn
mortgaged it to PNB for the same amount.

Petitioners-appellants contention: they alleged that this sale was

fictitious, that there was collusion between Choco and Mactal and that the
former never paid the latter.
The appellants relied on article 1459 of the Civil Code, which enumerates
persons who cannot take by purchase, i.e. agents and executors.

WON the sale in question should be annulled due to the fact that it
falls under the prohibition under Article 1459 with respect to purchase
by executors/ administrators.

Held:

No. The proofs in this case do not substantiate this claim of the
appellants. The SC declared that In order to bring the sale in this
case within the part of article 1459, quoted above, it is
essential that the proof submitted establish some agreement
between Silverio Choco and Mactal to the effect that Choco
should buy the property for the benefit of Mactal. If there was
no such agreement, either express or implied, then the sale
cannot be set aside. The evidence before this court does not
establish such agreement.

Note: (Additional contention of the appellants)

The appellants also alleged that the order of the court authorizing the
administrator to sell the land in question is null and void due to the fact
the motion of Trinidad Mactal, praying that she be authorized to sell, was
not accompanied by the written consent of the heirs or their duly
authorized guardian.
The SC applied Act No. 3882, sec 714 provides that: Realty may be sold
or encumbered. When there is no personal estate of the deceased or
when, though there be such, its sale would redound to the detriment of
the interests of the participants in the estate and the deceased has left no
testamentary disposition for the payment of his debts and charges of
administration, the court, on application of the executor or administrator,
and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and other persons interested,
may grant him a license to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber for that
purpose real estate, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgaging or
encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested and will not

defeat any devise of land; in which case the assent of the devisee shall be
required.
The appealed order of the lower court is affirmed with costs
against the appellants.

jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this

prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyesr, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
The present case clearly falls under this, especially since the case was still
pending appeal when the sale was made.
Issue:
Legal effect of a sale falling under Article 1491?
Held:
NULL AND VOID.CANNOT BE RATIFIED.

RUBIAS vs BATILLER (1973)

Facts:
Francisco Militante claimed that he owned a parcel of land located
in Iloilo. He filed with the CFI of Iloilo an application for the
registration of title of the land. This was opposed by the Director of
Lands, the Director of Forestry, and other oppositors. The case was
docked as a land case, and after trial the court dismissed the
application for registration. Militante appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
Pending that appeal, he sold to Rubias (his son-in-law and a
lawyer) the land.
The CA rendered a decision, dismissing the application for
registration.
Rubias filed a Forcible Entry and Detainer case against Batiller.
In that case, the court held that Rubias has no cause of action
because the property in dispute which Rubias allegedly bought
from Militante was the subject matter of a land case, in which case
Rubias was the counsel on record of Militante himself. It thus falls
under Article 1491 of the Civil Code. (Hence, this appeal.)
Issue:
Whether the sale of the land is prohibited under Article 1491.
Held:
YES. Article 1491 says that The following persons cannot acquire any
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through
the mediation of another. (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose

Manresa considered such prohibited acquisitions (which fell under

the Spanish Civil Code) as merely voidable because the Spanish Code did
not recognize nullity. But our Civil Code does recognize the absolute nullity
of contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contract to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy or which are expressly
prohibited or declared void by law and declares such contracts inexistent
and void from the beginning. The nullity of such prohibited contracts is
definite and permanent, and cannot be cured by ratification.
The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
permit of compromise or ratification. In this aspect, the permanent
disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on
public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians agents and
administrators (under Art 1491). As to their transactions, it has been
opined that they may be ratified by means of and in the form of a new
contract, in which case its validity shall be determined only by the
circumstances at the time of execution of such new contract. In those
cases, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract may
have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second
contract, or the intent, or the service which was impossible. The
ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution;
however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract.
Decision affirmed.

in the name of Florendo Catalino be issued in lieu thereof by the Register

of Deeds.
Ruling:
(1)The laws applicable to the said sale are: Section 145(b) of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, providing that no conveyance
or encumbrance of real property shall be made in that department by any
non-christian inhabitant of the same, unless, among other requirements,
the deed shall bear indorsed upon it the approval of the provincial
governor or his representative duly authorized in writing for the purpose;
Section 146 of the same Code, declaring that every contract or agreement
made in violation of Section 145 "shall be null and void"; and Act 2798, as
amended by Act 2913, extending the application of the above provisions to
Mountain Province and Nueva Vizcaya.
SIMEON B. MIGUEL, ET AL. vs. FLORENDO CATALINO
Facts:
Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina Miguel, and Florendo Catalino brought suit
against Florendo Catalino for the recovery of the land, plaintiffs claiming to
be the children and heirs of the original registered owner. The defendant
was in possession of property for 30 years. The land in dispute is situated
in the Barrio of San Pascual, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, Mountain
Province and contains an area of 39,446 square meters, more or less. It is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 31, which was issued on 28
December 1927 in the name of Bacaquio (or Bakakew), a widower, who
has an only child to a first wife.
Bacaquio acquired the land and sold it to Catalino Agyapao, father of the
defendant Florendo Catalino, for P300.00 in 1928. No formal deed of sale
was executed, but since the sale in 1928, or for more than 30 years,
vendee Catalino Agyapao and his son, defendant-appellee. Florendo
Catalino, had been in possession of the land, in the concept of owner,
paying the taxes thereon and introducing improvements.

Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the
owner of the land until his death in 1943, when his title passed on, by the
law on succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
Even granting appellants' proposition that no prescription lies against their
father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years
(1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable
defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffsappellants must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so
held. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay
and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense
in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for
30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the
possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make
easy profit at his expense.
As in the Gamponia case, the four elements of laches are present in the
case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation

Issues:
Who is the rightful owner? Does principle of estoppel apply?
Held:
Florendo Catalino is the rightful owner. Since the plaintiffs-appellants are
barred from recovery, their divestiture of all the elements of ownership in
the land is complete; and the Court a quo was justified in ordering that
Bacaquio's original certificate be cancelled, and a new transfer certificate

of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(b) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.

(2) The difference between prescription and laches was elaborated in

Nielsen & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17
December 1966, 18 SCRA p. 1040, as follows:
Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches
applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the
statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of
delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on fixed time laches is not, (30 C.J.S., p.
522. See also Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p.
177) (18 SCRA 1053).

The trial court denied petitioners motion to cancel the

reconstituted titles and granted instead Hernaez prayer that they be
placed in possession of the subject properties, which petitioners challenged
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R.
No. SP-00139.

On June 7, 1971, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary

injunction which was ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed before
this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as

ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA vs. HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO

HERNANDEZ
FACTS:

A petition for reconstitution of alleged lost OCT and owners

duplicate copies in the name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot No. 1316 of
Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the
Province of Negros Occidental, was filed by his successors-in-interest
Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez with then CFI of
Bacolod City.

The CFI granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the
subject OCTs and its duplicate copies. These reconstituted OCTs were
cancelled on May 29, 1969 upon presentation by Hernaez of a declaration
of heirship and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T51546, T-51547, and T-51548 were issued in their names.

Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra

Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim and
moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They averred that
they are holders of valid and existing certificates of title over the subject
properties and have been in continuous and actual possession thereof.

G.R. No. L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693, seeking to
annul the resolution lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING:

Petitioners alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the

subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily
conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is founded on dubious
claim of ownership. Since petitioners impugn the proprietary claim of
Hernaez over the properties, the burden rests on them to establish their
superior right over the latter.

It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens.

Under Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by
hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners did not
present proof that they acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither did
they claim to be former natural-born Filipinos. On the contrary, they
declare in this petition that they are all Spanish citizens residing in Spain.

their signatures to the deed of sale of 1936 was procured by fraud and
that the Narcisos were buyers in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 3, 2000 decision
and the April 17, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52817 are AFFIRMED.

They also filed another complaint wherein they asked the court to
declare deeds of sale of 1936 and of 1951 over the land in question be
declared null and void as to the western half of said land.

CFI ruled in favor of the Mapalo spouses. Upon appeal filed by

Narcisos, CA reversed the lower courts ruling solely on the ground that
the consent of the Mapalo spouses to the deed of sale of 1936 having
been obtained by fraud, the same was voidable, not void ab initio, and,
therefore, the action to annul the same, within four years from notice of
the fraud, had long prescribed. (From March 15, 1938). Hence, this
appeal.

MAPALO vs. MAPALO

Facts:

The spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Quiba were the registered
owners of a residential land located in Pangasinan. (1,635 sq. m.)

The spouses donated the eastern half of the land to Miguels

brother Maximo Mapalo who was about to get married.

However, they were deceived into signing, on October 15, 1936, a

deed of absolute sale over the entire land in Maximos favor. Their
signatures were procured by fraud because they were made to believe
by Maximo and the lawyer who acted as notary public who "translated"
the document, that the same was a deed of donation in Maximo's favor
covering one-half of their land. (It must be noted that the spouses are
illiterate farmers).

Although the document of sale stated a consideration of Five

Hundred (P500.00) Pesos, the aforesaid spouses did not receive
anything of value for the land.

In 1938, Maximo Mapalo, without the consent of the spouse,

registered the sale in his favor.

After thirteen years (1951), he sold the land to the Narcisos.

(Evaristo, Petronila Pacifico and Miguel) who thereafter registered the
sale and obtained a title in their favor.

In 1952, the Narcisos filed a complaint with the CFI to be declared

owners of the entire land, for possession of its western portion; for
damages; and for rentals.

The Mapalo spouses filed a counterclaim seeking cancellation of

the the Narcisos titles as to the western half of the land. They said that

Issues:
1. WON the deed of sale executed in 1936 was null and void. YES
2. WON the Narcisos were purchasers in good faith. NO
Held:
1st issue: YES, the sale was void.
The Civil Code governs the transaction because it was executed in
1936
Accordingly, since the deed of sale of 1936 is governed by the Old Civil
Code, it should be asked whether its case is one wherein there is no
consideration, or one with a statement of a false consideration. If the
former, it is void and inexistent; if the latter, only voidable, under the Old
Civil Code.
There is lack of consideration
As observed earlier, the deed of sale of 1936 stated that it had for its
consideration Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. In fact, however, said
consideration was totally absent. The problem, therefore, is whether a
deed which states a consideration that in fact did not exist, is a contract
without consideration, and therefore void ab initio, or a contract with a
false consideration, and therefore, at least under the Old Civil Code,
voidable.
When there is no consideration, the contract is null and void

According to Manresa, what is meant by a contract that states a false

consideration is one that has in fact a real consideration but the same is
not the one stated in the document.
In our view, therefore, the ruling of this Court in Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs.
Flores, 40 Phil. 921, is squarely applicable herein. In that case we ruled
that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect
whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration in that the
purchase price which appears thereon as paid has in fact never been paid
by the purchaser to the vendor.
2nd issue: No, they were no purchasers in good faith.
Narcisos were not buyers in good faith
Aside from the fact that all the parties in these cases are neighbors, except
Maximo Mapalo the foregoing facts are explicit enough and sufficiently
reveal that the Narcisos were aware of the nature and extent of the
interest of Maximo Mapalo their vendor, over the above-described land
before and at the time the deed of sale in their favor was executed.
The Narcisos were purchaser-in-value but not purchasers in good
faith
What was the necessity, purpose and reason of Pacifico Narciso in still
going to the spouses Mapalo and asked them to permit their brother
Maximo to dispose of the above-described land? To this question it is safe
to state that this act of Pacifico Narciso is a conclusive manifestation that
they (the Narcisos) did not only have prior knowledge of the ownership of
said spouses over the western half portion in question but that they also
have recognized said ownership. It also conclusively shows their prior
knowledge of the want of dominion on the part of their vendor Maximo
Mapalo over the whole land and also of the flaw of his title thereto. Under
this situation, the Narcisos may be considered purchasers in value but
certainly not as purchasers in good faith.

by the municipal government for the construction of avenues, parks and

City hall site according the Arellano plan. On 14 January 1938, Melliza
sold her remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian Villanueva
(thereafter TCT 18178). Remedios in turn on 4 November 1946 transferred
her rights to said portion of land to Pio Sian Melliza (thereafter TCT 2492).
Annotated at the back of Pio Sian Mellizas title certificate was the following
that a portion of 10,788 sq. m. of Lot 1214 now designated as Lots 1412B-2 and 1214-B-3 of the subdivision plan belongs to the Municipality of
Iloilo as per instrument dated 15 November 1932. On 24 August 1949 the
City of Iloilo, which succeeded to the Municipality of Iloilo, donated the city
hall site together with the building thereon, to the
MELLIZA vs. ILOILO CITY
Facts:
Juliana Melliza during her lifetime owned, among other properties, 3
parcels of residential land in Iloilo City (OCT 3462). Said parcels of land
were known as Lots Nos. 2, 5 and 1214. The total area of Lot 1214 was
29,073 sq. m. On 27 November 1931 she donated to the then Municipality
of Iloilo, 9,000 sq. m. of Lot 1214, to serve as site for the municipal hall.
The donation was however revoked by the parties for the reason that the
area donated was found inadequate to meet the requirements of the
development plan of the municipality, the so- called Arellano Plan.
Subsequently, Lot 1214 was divided by Certeza Surveying Co., Inc. into
Lots 1214-A and 1214-B. And still later, Lot 1214-B was further divided
into Lots 1214-B-1, Lot 1214-B-2 and Lot 1214-B-3. As approved by the
Bureau of Lands, Lot 1214-B-1, with 4,562 sq. m., became known as Lot
1214-B; Lot 1214-B-2, with 6,653 sq. m., was designated as Lot 1214-C;
and Lot 1214-B-3, with 4,135 sq. m., became Lot 1214-D. On 15
November 1932, Juliana Melliza executed an instrument without any
caption providing for the absolute sale involving all of lot 5, 7669 sq. m. of
Lot 2 (sublots 2-B and 2-C), and a portion of 10,788 sq. m. of Lot 1214
(sublots 1214-B2 and 1214-B3) in favor of the Municipal Government of
Iloilo for the sum of P6,422; these lots and portions being the ones needed

University of the Philippines (Iloilo branch). The site donated consisted of

Lots 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D, with a total area of 15,350 sq. m., more
or less. Sometime in 1952, the University of the Philippines enclosed the
site donated with a wire fence. Pio Sian Melliza thereupon made
representations, thru his lawyer, with the city authorities for payment of
the value of the lot (Lot 1214-B). No recovery was obtained, because as
alleged by Pio Sian Melliza, the City did not have funds. The University of
the Philippines, meanwhile, obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7152
covering the three lots, Nos. 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D.
On 10 December 1955 Pio Sian Melizza filed an action in the CFI Iloilo
against Iloilo City and the University of the Philippines for recovery of Lot
1214-B or of its value. After stipulation of facts and trial, the CFI rendered
its decision on 15 August 1957, dismissing the complaint. Said court ruled
that the instrument executed by Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo
municipality included in the conveyance Lot 1214-B, and thus it held that
Iloilo City had the right to donate Lot 1214-B to UP. Pio Sian Melliza
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 May 1965, the CA affirmed the
interpretation of the CFI that the portion of Lot 1214 sold by Juliana
Melliza was not limited to the 10,788 square meters specifically mentioned

but included whatever was needed for the construction of avenues, parks
and the city hall site. Nonetheless, it ordered the remand of the case for
reception of evidence to determine the area actually taken by Iloilo City for
the construction of avenues, parks and for city hall site. Hence, the appeal
by Pio San Melliza to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from insofar as it
affirms that of the CFI, and dismissed the complaint; without costs.
Held:

Requirement, that sale must have a determinate thing as object, is fulfilled

if object of sale is capable of being made determinate at the time of the
contract
The requirement of the law that a sale must have for its object a
determinate thing, is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered
into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without
the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties (Art.
1273, old Civil Code; Art. 1460, New Civil Code). The specific mention of
some of the lots plus the statement that the lots object of the sale are the
ones needed for city hall site; avenues and parks, according to the
Arellano plan, sufficiently provides a basis, as of the time of the execution
of the contract, for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a
new and further agreement of the parties.