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United States v. Glisson, 4th Cir. (2010)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4290

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOYCE GAYNELL GLISSON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston.
Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00459-PMD-2)

Submitted:

November 9, 2010

Decided:

December 16, 2010

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished


per curiam opinion.

Guy J. Vitetta, VITETTA LAW GROUP, Daniel Island, South


Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Alston C. Badger, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Joyce Gaynell Glisson pleaded guilty to embezzlement
from a federally-insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 656
(2006).

After Glisson embezzled the funds from her employer,

Citizens Bank, she obtained a loan from a third party, Robert


Player, and used that money to repay some of the embezzled funds
to the bank.

The district court sentenced Glisson to fifteen

months of imprisonment and ordered that she pay restitution to


the

bank

and

to

Player.

Glisson

appeals,

arguing

that

the

district court erred in ordering restitution to the third party.


For

the

vacate

reasons
the

order

that
of

follow,

we

restitution

affirm
with

the

conviction,

instructions

that

but
the

district court modify the order.


Glisson first argues that the district court erred in
awarding restitution to Player as he was not a victim of her
offense.

We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 520 (4th Cir. 1994).


the

Mandatory

3663A-3664

Victims
(2006),

Restitution
the

district

Act

(MVRA),

court

must

18

Under
U.S.C.

order

the

defendant to make restitution to victims of an offense against


property.

18 U.S.C. 3663A(a), (c)(1)(A)(ii).

A victim is

defined as
[A] person directly and proximately harmed as a result
of the commission of an offense for which restitution
may be ordered including, in the case of an offense
2

that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or


pattern of criminal activity, any person directly
harmed by the defendants criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy or pattern.
18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2).

Moreover, the MVRA authorize[s] an

award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific


conduct

that

is

the

basis

of

the

offense

of

conviction.

United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 1996).


Here, the offense of conviction was embezzlement under
656.

Section

656

makes

it

crime

for

an

employee

of

federally-insured bank to embezzle, abstract, or misapply any


funds of the bank.

18 U.S.C. 656.

For a violation of 656 to be proved, the Government


must show, in addition to the status of both the bank
and the defendant, that the defendant acted willfully,
that [she] misapplied [or embezzled] funds, . . .
belonging to or intrusted to the custody of the bank
and that [she] did so with the intent to injure or
defraud the bank.
United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 858 (4th Cir. 1979).
Accordingly, as Glissons embezzlement was complete prior to her
obtaining
contain

as

funds

from

an

element

Player,
a

and

scheme,

as

embezzlement

conspiracy,

or

does
pattern

not
of

criminal activity, see Blake, 81 F.3d at 506 (the act that


harms

the

element

of

furtherance
activity

individual
the
of

that

must

offense
a

is

scheme,

be

of

either

conduct

conviction,

conspiracy,

specifically

included

or

or
as

an

underlying

an

act

in

pattern
an

taken

of

element

criminal
of

the

offense

of

conviction),

Player

was

not

victim

within

the

meaning of the MVRA.


However, the Government correctly argues that Player
is entitled to restitution under 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1) (2006).
If a victim has received compensation from insurance
or any other source with respect to a loss, the court
shall order that restitution be paid to the person who
provided or is obligated to provide the compensation,
but the restitution order shall provide that all
restitution of victims required by the order be paid
to the victims before any restitution is paid to such
a provider of compensation.
18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1).

Here, as Player compensated Citizens

Bank for some of the loss resulting from Glissons embezzlement,


the district court properly awarded restitution to Player.

See

United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2005) (this
court

may

affirm

on

any

grounds

apparent

from

the

record).

However, as the statute unambiguously directs that victims be


paid the full amount of restitution to which they are due before
restitution

is

paid

to

persons

who

provide

compensation

to

victims for their loss, the order of restitution should have


specified that the restitution must be fully paid to Citizens
Bank before any restitution is paid to Player.
Glisson next argues that the court erred in failing to
examine

the

statutory

factors

before ordering restitution.


the

district

court

must

regarding

her

We disagree.

issue

an

order

ability

to

pay

Under 3663A(d),
of

restitution

in

accordance with 3664.

18 U.S.C. 3663A(d).

Section 3664(a)

provides that, for restitution orders, the court shall order


that

the

probation

presentence

officer

report

must

sufficient

include

for

information

the

court

to

in

the

determine

restitution, including, to the extent practicable, a complete


accounting of the losses to each victim, any restitution owed
pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the
economic circumstances of each defendant.

18 U.S.C. 3664(a).

Moreover, although a district court must make factual


findings
States v.

with

regard

Davenport,

to
445

the

statutory

F.3d

366,

factors,

373

(4th

see

United

Cir.

2006),

overruled on other grounds, Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.


708 (2008), [t]he district court may satisfy this requirement
by announcing its findings on the record or by adopting adequate
proposed

findings

contained

within

Blake, 81 F.3d at 505 (citation omitted).

presentence

report.

Here, the probation

officer included the necessary information in the presentence


report, and the district court explicitly adopted those findings
at the sentencing hearing.

Therefore, the court did not fail to

consider the statutory factors prior to awarding restitution.


Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court in part, but also vacate the judgment in part and remand
with instructions that the district court modify the order of
restitution to provide that Citizens Bank be paid in full prior
5

to restitution being paid to Player.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately


presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

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