Lexber vs. Dayman

42. Lexber, Inc. vs. Caesar M. Conchita B.
Dalman
G.R. No. 183587, April 20, 2015
Facts: Lexber is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of housing,
construction, and real estate development. Spouses Dalman bought a house and lot
under a contract to sell in Lexbers Regal Lexber Homes at Tuba, Benguet. Later,
Lexbers financial condition deteriorated. It was forced to discontinue some of its
housing projects, including the one where the Spouses Dalmans purchased property is
located.
As Lexber could no longer pay its creditors, it filed a petition for rehabilitation with
prayer for the suspension of payments on its loan obligations. In an order dated June
12, 2007, the trial court gave due course to Lexbers rehabilitation petition and
appointed Atty. Rafael Chris F. Teston as rehabilitation receiver.
The Spouses Dalman filed a motion for reconsideration arguing on two (2) points: 1)
that consistent with Rule 4, Section 11of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), the trial court should have dismissed outright the
rehabilitation petition because it failed to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180
days from the date of the initial hearing; 2) that no rehabilitation petition of a real
estate company like Lexber should be given due course without the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Boards (HLURB) prior request for the appointment of the
rehabilitation receiver.
The Trial Court denied the Spouses Dalmans Motion for Reconsideration prompting
them to seek relief from the CA through a Rule 65 petition. The CA granted the
petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not HLURBs prior request for the appointment of a receiver of real
estate companies, is a condition sine qua non before the trial court can give
due course to their rehabilitation petition.
The HLURBs prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver is not a
condition precedent before the trial court can give due course to a rehabilitation
petition. Nowhere in the HLURBs charter is it expressly or impliedly granted the
power to appoint the rehabilitation receivers of financially distressed corporations
under its supervision and regulation. An administrative agencys powers are limited
to those expressly conferred on it or granted by necessary or fair implication in its
enabling act. While the respective charters of the BSP and the IC specifically
authorize them to appoint a receiver in case a company under their regulation is
undergoing corporate rehabilitation. Notably, this is not the case with the HLURB.
Its enabling law does not grant it this particular power.
2. Whether or not the lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of the
rehabilitation plan should automatically result to the dismissal of the
rehabilitation petition.
The lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan should
not automatically result to the dismissal of the rehabilitation petition. The records
of the case show that on May 4, 2007, Lexber filed a motion for the extension of
the period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan. However, the trial court
never issued a resolution on this motion. Instead, on June 12, 2007, it issued an
order giving due course to the petition. The records also reveal that after the
initial hearing, the trial court had to conduct additional hearings even after the
lapse of the 180-day period. The Court concludes that Lexber could not be faulted
for the non-approval of the rehabilitation plan within the 180-day period. A
petitioner-corporation should not be penalized if the trial court needed more time
to evaluate the rehabilitation plan. Notably, in the present case, Lexber filed a
motion for the extension of the 180-day period. However, the trial court did not
issue a resolution on this motion. Instead, it issued an order giving due course to
the petition, which also fell within the 18-month limit prescribed under the law.
Rule 2, Section 2 of the Interim Rules dictates the courts to liberally construe the
rehabilitation rules in order to carry out the objectives of Sections 6(c) of PD 902A, as amended, and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and
inexpensive determination of rehabilitation cases.

Lexber vs. Dayman

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lexber vs. Dayman

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lexber vs. Dayman

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

42. Lexber, Inc. vs. Caesar M. Conchita B.

You might also like