On The Statistical Properties and Tail Risk of Violent Conflicts
On The Statistical Properties and Tail Risk of Violent Conflicts
On The Statistical Properties and Tail Risk of Violent Conflicts
Applied
H Y
'(Y ) = L H log
.
(1)
H L
I. I NTRODUCTION
Since the middle of last century, there has been a multidisciplinary interest in wars and armed conflicts (quantified in
terms of casualties), see for example [5], [15], [24], [30], [31],
[32], [44] and [45]. Studies have also covered the statistics
of terrorism, for instance [8], [35], and the special issue of
Risk Analysis on terrorism [33]. From a statistical point of
view, recent contributions have attempted to show that the
distribution of war casualties (or terrorist attacks victims)
tends to have heavy tails, characterized by a power law
decay [8] and [14]. Often, the analysis of armed conflicts
falls within the broader study of violence [6], [30], with
the aim to understand whether we as human are more or
less violent and aggressive than in the past and what role
institutions played in that respect. Accordingly, the public
intellectual arena has witnessed active debates, such as the
one between Steven Pinker on one side, and John Gray on
the other concerning the hypothesis that the long peace was
a statistically established phenomenon or a mere statistical
sampling error that is characteristic of heavy-tailed processes,
[16] and [27] the latter of which is corroborated by this paper.
Using a more recent data set containing 565 armed conflicts
with more than 3000 casualties over the period 1-2015 AD, we
confirm that the distribution of war casualties exhibits a very
heavy right-tail. The tail is so heavy that at first glance
war casualties could represent an infinite-mean phenomenon,
80'000'000
1'400'000'000
1'050'000'000
Casualties
Casualties
60'000'000
Three!
Kingdoms
40'000'000
An Lushan
20'000'000
Three!
Kingdoms
410
820
700'000'000
An Lushan
WW2
350'000'000
1230
1640
2050
1230
1640
60'000'000
2050
Three!
Kingdoms
WW2
1'050'000'000
Three!
Kingdoms
Casualties
Casualties
820
Time
80'000'000
40'000'000
20'000'000
410
Time
410
820
An Lushan
350'000'000
An Lushan
700'000'000
1230
1640
2050
Time
WW2
410
820
1230
1640
2050
Time
Fig. 1: War casualties over time, using raw (A,C) and dual (B,D) data. The size of each bubble represents the size of each
event with respect to todays world population (A,B) and with respect to the total casualties (raw: C, rescaled: D) in the data
set.
By studying the tail properties of the dual distribution (the
one with an infinite upper bound), using extreme value theory,
we will be able to obtain, by reverting to the real distribution,
what we call the shadow mean of war casualties. We will show
that this mean is at least 1.5 times larger than the sample mean,
but nevertheless finite.
We assume that many observations are missing from the
dataset (from under-reported conflicts), and we base on analysis on the fact that war casualties are just imprecise estimates
[37], on which historians often have disputes, without anyones
ability to verify the assessments using period sources. For
instance, an event that took place in the eighth century, the An
Lushan rebellion, is thought to have killed 13 million people,
but there no precise or reliable methodology to allow us to
trust that number which could be conceivably one order of
magnitude smaller.2 . Using resampling techniques, we show
that our tail estimates are robust to changes in the quality and
2 For a long time, an assessment of the drop in population in China was
made on the basis of tax census, which might be attributable to a drop in the
aftermath of the rebellion in surveyors and tax collectors.[4]
A. Data problems
Accounts of war casualties are often anecdotal, spreading
via citations, and based on vague estimates, without anyones
ability to verify the assessments using period sources. For
instance, the independence war of Algeria has various estimates, some from the French Army, others from the rebels,
and nothing scientifically obtained [19].
This can lead to several estimates for the same conflict,
some more conservative and some less. Table I, shows different estimates for most conflicts. In case of several estimates,
we present the minimum, the average and the maximum one.
Interestingly, as we show later, choosing one of the three as
the true" estimate does not affect our results thanks to the
scaling properties of power laws.
Conflicts, such as the Mongolian Invasions, which we refer
to as named" conflicts, need to be treated with care from a statistical point of view. Named conflicts are in fact artificial tags
created by historians to aggregate events that share important
historical, geographical and political characteristics, but that
may have never really existed as a single event. Under the
portmanteau Mongolian Invasions (or Conquests), historians
collect all conflicts related to the expansion of the Mongol
empire during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Another
example is the so-called Hundred-Years War in the period
1337-1453. Aggregating all these events necessarily brings to
the creation of very large fictitious conflicts accounting for
hundreds of thousands or million casualties. The fact that, for
historical and historiographical reasons, these events tends to
be more present in antiquity and the Middle Ages could bring
to a naive overestimation of the severity of wars in the past.
Notice that named conflicts like the Mongolian Invasions are
different from those like WW1 or WW2, which naturally also
involved several tens of battles in very different locations, but
which took place in a much shorter time period, with no major
time separation among conflicts.
A straightforward technique could be to set a cutoff-point
of 25 years for any single event an 80 years event would
be divided into three minor ones. However it remains that the
length of the window remains arbitrary. Why 25 years? Why
not 17?
As we show in Section IV, a solution to all these problems
with data is to consider each single observation as an imprecise
estimate, a fuzzy number in the definition of [43]. Using Monte
Carlo methods we have shown that, if we assume that the
real number of casualties in a conflict is uniformly distributed
between the minimum and the maximum in the available
data, the tail exponent is not really affected (apart from the
TABLE I: Excerpt of the data set of war casualties. The original data set contains 565 events in the period 1-2015 AD. For
some events more than one estimate is available for casualties and we provide: the minimum (Min), the maximum (Max), and
an intermediate one (Mid) according to historical sources. Casualties and world population estimates (Pop) in 10000.
Event
Boudiccas Revolt
Three Kingdoms
An Lushans Reb.
Sicilian Vespers
WW1
WW2
Start
60
220
755
1282
1914
1939
End
61
280
763
1302
1918
1945
Min
70
3600
800
1466
4823
Mid
7.52
3800
1300
0.41
1544
7300
Max
8.04
4032
3600
0.80
1841
8500
Pop
19506
20231
24049
39240
177718
230735
Real Tail
Apparent Tail
2.0e+07
1.5e+07
Mean Excess
1.0e+07
300
200
100
Frequency
400
2.5e+07
500
Histogram of casualties
5.0e+06
WW2
0e+00
2e+07
4e+07
6e+07
casualties
0e+00
1e+07
2e+07
3e+07
4e+07
Threshold
0.8
0.6
Rn
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0
100
200
300
400
500
0.8
1.0
500
0.0
0.2
0.4
Rn
0.6
0.8
0.6
Rn
6e+07
400
MSplot for p= 4
0.2
4e+07
Ordered Data
300
MSplot for p= 3
0.0
2e+07
200
0.4
1
0
0e+00
100
1.0
Exponential Quantiles
0.2
0.4
Rn
0.6
0.8
1.0
MSplot for p= 2
1.0
MSplot for p= 1
100
200
300
n
400
500
100
200
300
400
500
0.8
0.6
Rn
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
Rn
0.6
0.8
1.0
MSplot for p= 2
1.0
MSplot for p= 1
200
300
400
500
100
200
300
400
MSplot for p= 3
MSplot for p= 4
500
0.8
0.6
Rn
0.4
MAD Ra
35.20
47.73
72.84
113.57
136.88
261.31
325.50
Avg Re
9.63
13.28
20.20
34.88
52.23
73.12
103.97
MAD Re
15.91
20.53
28.65
46.85
63.91
86.19
114.25
0.2
Avg Ra
23.71
34.08
56.44
93.03
133.08
247.14
345.50
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
Rn
0.6
0.8
1.0
100
1.0
Thresh.
0.5
1
2
5
10
20
50
100
200
300
400
500
100
200
300
400
500
0.8
0.6
Rn
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
Rn
0.6
0.8
1.0
MSplot for p= 2
1.0
MSplot for p= 1
200
300
400
500
100
200
300
400
MSplot for p= 3
MSplot for p= 4
500
0.8
0.6
Rn
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
Rn
0.6
0.8
1.0
100
1.0
100
200
300
n
400
500
100
200
300
400
500
compute the distance, in terms of years, between two timecontiguous conflicts, and use for measure of dispersion the
mean absolute deviation (from the mean). Table II shows the
average inter-arrival times between armed conflicts with at
least 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 and 50 million casualties. For a conflict
of at least 500k casualties, we need to wait on average 23.71
years using raw data, and 9.63 years using rescaled or dual
data (which, as we saw, tend to inflate the events of antiquity).
For conflicts with at least 5 million casualties, the time delay
is on average 93.03 or 34.88, depending on rescaling. Clearly,
the bloodier the conflict, the longer the inter-arrival time. The
results essentially do not change if we use the mid or the
ending year of armed conflicts.
The consequence of this analysis is that the absence of a
conflict generating more than, say, 5 million casualties in the
last sixty years highly insufficient to state that their probability
has decreased over time, given that the average inter-arrival
time is 93.03 years, with a mean absolute deviation of 113.57
years! Unfortunately, we need to wait for more time to assert
whether we are really living in a more peaceful era,: present
data are not in favor (nor against) a structural change in
violence, when we deal with war casualties.
Section I asserted that our data set do not form a proper time
series, in the sense that no real time dependence is present
(apart from minor local exceptions).8 Such consideration is
further supported by the so-called record plot in Figure 9.
This graph is used to check the i.i.d. nature of data, and
it relies on the fact that, if data were i.i.d., then records
over time should follow a logarithmic pattern [11]. Given a
sequence X1 , X2 , ..., and defined the partial maximum Mn ,
an observation xn is called a record if Xn = Mn = xn .
For the sake of completeness, if we focus our attention on
shorter periods, like the 50 years following WW2, a reduction
in the number and the size of the conflict can probably be
observed the so-called Long Peace of [15], [24] and [30];
but recent studies suggest that this trend could already have
changed in the last years [20], [27]. However, in our view, this
type of analysis is not meaningful, once we account for the
8 Even if redundant, given the nature of our data and the descriptive analysis
performed so far, the absence of a relevant time dependence can be checked
by performing a time series analysis of war casualties. No significant trend,
season or temporal dependence can be observed over the entire time window.
ci = 0.95
50
100
200
500
u w|X > u) =
Fu (w) = P (X
20
Trials
10
6
2
Records
10
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Rescaled Data
145k
Dual Data
145k
0.8
0.6
(2016)
1.5868
497436
(0.1265)
(2097)
1.5915
496668
(0.1268)
(1483)
Fu(xu)
90620
(0.1233)
0.4
1.4985
0.2
Threshold
25k
0.0
Data
Raw Data
1.0
10
50
100
500
1000
5000 10000
0.050
0.020
0.005
0.200
0.500
0.001
(P )
at a more or less stable value for k,n in the plot. In Figure
10, the value 1.5 seems to be a good educated guess for raw
data, and similar results hold for rescaled and dual amounts.
In any case, the important message is that > 0, therefore we
can safely use MLE.
Table III presents our estimates of and for raw, rescaled
and dual data. In all cases, is significantly greater than 1, and
around 1.5 as we guessed by looking at Figure 10. This means
that in all cases the mean of the distribution of casualties
seems to be infinite, consistently with the descriptive analysis
of Section III.
Further, Table III shows the similarity between rescaled and
dual data. Looking at the standard errors, no test would reject
the null hypothesis that rescaled = dual , or that rescaled =
dual .
Figure 11 shows the goodness of our GPD fit for dual
data, which is also supported by goodness-of-fit tests for the
Generalized Pareto Distribution [42] (p-value: 0.37). As usual,
similar results do hold for raw and rescaled data. Figure 12
shows the residuals of the GPD fit which are, as can be
expected (see [11]), exponentially distributed.
10
50
100
500
1000
5000 10000
g(z) dz =
'
(1)
f (y) dy.
L
L, can be
(5)
10
Residuals
The ratios in Table IV show how the sample mean underestimates the shadow mean, especially for lower thresholds,
for which the shadow mean is almost 3 times larger than the
sample mean. For these reasons, a "journalistic" reliance on
sample mean would be highly misleading, when considering
all conflict together, without setting large thresholds. There
would be the serious risk of underestimating the real lethality
of armed conflicts.
50
100
150
200
250
300
Ordering
Sample107
1.2753
1.5171
1.7710
2.2639
2.8776
3.9481
Ratio
2.88
2.43
2.08
1.95
1.96
1.85
Shadow107
3.6790
3.6840
3.6885
4.4089
5.6542
6.5511
Exponential Quantiles
Thresh.103
50
100
145
300
500
1000
Ordered Data
1+
z 2 [L, 1).
1
1 log(H y)klog(H L)
f (y; , k) =
,
(H y)k
(6)
y 2 [L, H].
(7)
(8)
obtaining
E[Y ] = L + (H
L)ek (k) (1
, k) .
(9)
11
1.0
6000
5000
4000
Frequency
2000
Ratio
2.8444
2.8843
3.0422
2.9843
3.0412
3.1332
2.5
1000
Sample108
0.8574
0.9338
1.0120
1.1363
1.2774
1.4885
2.0
Shadow108
2.4388
2.6934
3.0788
3.3911
3.8848
4.6639
1.5
TABLE V: Shadow standard deviation, sample standard deviation and their ratio for different minimum thresholds. Rescaled
data.
Thresh.103
50
100
145
300
500
1000
1500
0
500
1000
Frequency
2000
2500
3000
3000
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4
3
0
Exponential Quantiles
have to admit.
10
Ordered Data
ACF
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
The good GPD approximation allows us to use a wellknown model of extreme value theory: the Peaks-overThreshold, or POT. According to this approach, excesses over
a high threshold follow a Generalized Pareto distribution, as
stated by the Pickands, Balkema and de Haans Theorem
[1], [28], and the number of excesses over time follows
a homogeneous Poisson process [13]. If the last statement
were verified for large armed conflicts, it would mean that
no particular trend can be observed, i.e. that the propensity
of humanity to generate big wars has neither decreased nor
increased over time.
In order to avoid problems with the armed conflicts of
antiquity and possible missing data, we here restrict our
attention on all events who took place after 1500 AD, i.e.
in the last 515 years. As we have shown in Section IV,
missing data are unlikely to influence our estimates of the
shape parameter , but they surely have an impact on the
number of observations in a given period. We do not want
to state that we live in a more violent era, simply because we
miss observations from the past.
If large events, those above the 25k threshold for raw data
(or the 145k one for rescaled amounts), follow a homogeneous
Poisson process, in the period 1500-2015AD, their inter-arrival
times need to be exponentially distributed. Moreover, no time
dependence should be identified among inter-arrival times, for
example when plotting an autocorrelogram (ACF).
Figure 14 shows that both of these characteristics are satisfactorily observable in our data set.11 This is clearly visible in
the QQ-plot of Subfigure 14a, where most inter-arrival times
tend to cluster on the diagonal.
Another way to test if large armed conflicts follow a
homogeneous Poisson process is by considering the number
of events in non-overlapping intervals. For a Poisson process,
given a certain number of events in a time interval, the
numbers of events in non-overlapping subintervals follow a
Multinomial distribution. If the Poisson process is homogeneous, then the Multinomial distribution is characterized by
the same probability of falling in any of the sub-intervals, that
is an equiprobability. It is not difficult to verify this with our
data, and to see that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
equiprobable Multinomial distribution, over the period 15002015, in which 504 events took place, choosing a confidence
level of 10%.
Once again, the homogeneous Poisson behavior is verified
for raw, rescaled and dual data. Regarding the estimates of ,
if we restrict our attention on the period 1500-2015, we find
1.4093 for raw data, and 1.4653 for rescaled amounts.
To conclude this section, no particular trend in the number
of armed conflicts can be traced. We are not saying that this
is not possible over smaller time windows, but at least in the
last 500 years humanity has shown to be as violent as usual.
To conclude our paper, one may perhaps produce a convincing theory about better, more peaceful days ahead, but
this cannot be stated on the basis of statistical analysis this
is not what the data allows us to say. Not very good news, we
12
10
15
20
Lag
(b) ACF of gaps. Notice that the first lag has order 0.
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS
Captain Mark Weisenborn engaged in the thankless and
gruesome task of initially compiling the data, checking across
sources and linking each conflict to a narrative. We also
benefited from generous help on social networks where we
put data for scrutiny, as well as advice from historians such
as Ben Kiernan.
We thank Raphael Douady, Yaneer Bar Yam, Joe Norman,
Alex(Sandy) Pentland and his lab for discussions and comments.
Pasquale Cirillo acknowledges the support of his Marie
Curie CIG Multivariate Shocks" (PCIG13-GA-2013-618794).
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