L SMALL ARMS & HELICOPTERS

This article was originally published

in the August 1980 issue of U.S.
Army Aviation Digest. Reprinted with
permission.

S MALL ARMS ARE effective

against low flying, high speed
aircraft and helicopters. In the
Korean conflict the U.S. Air Force
lost 544 aircraft to combined small
arms and air defense fire- almost
five times as many as were lost in
air-to-air combat. In South Vietnam
410 fixed wing aircraft and 2,100 Captain E. Gary Campbell
helicopters were lost. Over North
Threat Branch
Vietnam small arms f i e contributed
Directorate of Combat Developments
to significant losses of U.S. aircraft. Fort Rucker, AL
During the Mideast War of 1973
units on both sides used small arms
weapons to drive off, damage, or
destroy attacking aircraft. (FM 44- air defense is universal It ranges from in Vietnam. They feel that we relied
1, "U.S. Army Air Defense Employ- training the lowest ranking infantry too heavily on air support as a s u b
ment") troops about the value of their stitute for infantry combat. Also,
The result of the quantitative and weapons in an antiaircraft role to the conflict provided them with
qualitative changes in the design the use of highly sophisticated ac- significant data for "determining the
characteristics of these American quisition and missile systems to optimum mix of weapons in defense
helicopters was that combat oper- protect all maneuver elements. Sur- of various ground targets against
ations directed against helicopters prisingly, Soviet tactics and organi- close air support, including heli-
have to be conducted not only by zations are still fashioned from exper- copters." Furthermore, it confirmed
antiaircraft defense troops, but also ience gained in World War 11, espec- the value of rapid firing antiaircraft
by troops from other armed forces ially antiaircraft protection. A hind- guns and reinforced the importance
branches and services equipped with sight look at Soviet tactical air de- of small arms, antitank weapons
other kinds of weapons. (Pneglad fense during World War I1 has and vehiclemounted main guns in
Woisk Ladowych, June 78) discovered it to be "grossly inade providing a complete air defense
Both United States and Soviet quate" in both numbers and the umbrella. The Soviets feel they must
Armies recognize the effectiveness caliber of weapons. have overlapping air defense cover-
of small arms against armed helicop Additionally, the Soviets learned age with redundant weapon systems
ters. However, the Soviet concept of many lessons from our experience to the point where "in the event of

AIR DEFENSE w.G.zl,c

war, a maneuver enemy could not The armored personnel carriers The current recoilless gun in the
count on tactical air support." (APC) and infantry fighting vehicles motorized rifle division is the 7 3
Therefore, it is imperative that (IFV) have a variety of weapons for mm SPG-9 served by a four-man
Army aviators know the concept of use against armed helicopters. T h e crew, with two weapons per motor-
Soviet antiaircraft employment. basic IFV, the BMP, is armed with ized rifle battalion. The munitions
Granted, a lot has been written about a 73 mm smoothbore, short recoil for the S P G 9 are similar t o the
the threat from the extensive and gun that can fire a rocket assisted R P G 7 and can penetrate about 350
sophisticated surface-to-air missile HEAT projectile out to a maximum mm of armor at an effective range
systems and antiaircraft artillery in range of 1,300 meters, with an of 1,000 meters. T h e maximum
the Soviet inventory. But, because effective range of 800 meters. Ad- range is 1,960 meters.
of present employment techniques ditionally, it has a 7.62 coaxial The Soviets believe that during
of our scout and attack helicopters, machinegun with a 2,CQGround basic the performance of their combat
we cannot afford to overlook the load and four AT-3 SAGGER anti- missions, units will be operating
density, lethality and range of motor- tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The under conditions marked by a threat
ized rifle unit's small arms weapons. BTR-60 APC has a 14.5 mm heavy of air attacks. Their mounted w e a p
The Soviets define small arms machinegun capable of firing HVAP ons and small arms will be the only
weapons as armament carried by and API rounds, as does the BRDM- weapons they can use t o provide an
the infantry troops in the motorized 2 scout vehicle. The BRDM can effective focal defense against attack
rifle, tank and airborne units, where- mount three different models of helicopters. This situation will occur
as mounted weapons are those guns ATGM, including the AT-5. T h e most often when our helicopters
installed on combat vehicles such 14.5-mm heavy machinegun has a are launching attacks from altitudes
as BMPs, BTRs, BRDMs and tanks. basic load of 500 rounds with a of less than 50 meters and from
The standard rifle in Soviet units maximum effective range of 2,000 hiding places provided by terrain
is the 7.62 mm AKM, which is c a p meters. features. T h e Soviets also feel that
able of both semiautomatic and fully When considering the threat to
automatic fire. T h e AKM has a armed helicopters, the use of hand-
relatively short sight length with held antitank grenade launchers and
open sights and a semiautomatic recoilless guns in the antiaircraft
range of 300 meters and an automatic role must not be overlooked. All
range of X X ) meters. There are about motorized rifle units down to squad
10,000 AKMs found in a motorized level are equipped with the R P G 7
rifle division. Also, there is a semi- AT grenade launcher. The R P G 7
automatic 7.62 mm sniper's rifle is a 40 mm rocket-assisted, reload-
(SVD) with an effective range of able grenade launcher which is
800 meters that uses a 10-round shoulder-fired. Additionally, the
magazine. Each motorized rifle launcher can fire an 85 mm HEAT
platoon has one SVD. T h e sniper's round. "This type of weapon was
rifle range can be extended to 1,300 used most effectively against low-
meters by using an infrared-sensitive flying aircraft in Southeast Asia.
telescope. T h e magazinefed 7.62 T h e HEAT round of the R P G 7
mm RPK light machinegun is an will penetrate 13 inches of armor at
AKM with a longer, heavier barrel. zero degrees obliquity, can engage
It has two magazines- a 75-round targets up to 500 meters and has a
drum and a 40-round curved box. self-destruct range of 900 meters.
Its maximum range is 2,500 meters, Testing of the HEAT round fired
and the effective range is 800 meters* at a 45-degree elevation resulted in
There are almost 200 RPKs in the an airburst at an altitude of about
motorized rifle division, with most 701 meters (2,300 feet) at a slant
being found in the BTR-equipped range of about 920 meters. Although
units. the RPG is an inexpensive and
A heavier and longer range machine effective weapon it is expected to
gun is the 7.62 mm general purpose be replaced by an improved grenade
PK. It has an effective range of 1,000 launcher, the RPG16."
meters with a maximum range reach
ing3,800 meters. The GPPK uses 25-
round sections of nondisintegrating
metallic feed belts. The majority of
the approximately 200 PK machine-
guns are issued to the BMP units of
the motorized rifle division. Combined Arms Assault )

APRIL-JUNE 1981
this reduces to a few seconds the mission performance. Even the most must have weaDons that are loaded
amount of time that will be avail- well-organized fire direction and the with a ratio of three to four armor-
able to a unit to prepare to open selection of the most accurate firing piercing incendiary shells and one
fire. methods will not produce any useful tracer shell and are readv for action.
Consequently, time is the most results if troops move too slowly in The weapons are required to have
important factor when determining engaging aircraft. locked safety catches and preset
whether or not both small arms and The Soviets insist that only those sights. The Soldiers who are engaged
mounted weapons can be used units and weapons which are con- in the performance of observation
against this type of target. In this stantly ready to immediately open duties are required to continuously
regard the Soviets estimate that it fire and which are backed up by a scan their assigned sector.
will be necessary t o modify the well-organized reconnaissance and The soviet gunners manning
current communications chain, alert notification system will be able mounted weapons, as in the case of
methods of fire direction, firing to mount an effectivedefense against the BTR, go to their battle stations,
techniques, and also to introduce armed helicopters. For this reason, put on t h 6 r communications head-
new, more functional methods which an infantry company should always gear, switch on the "electrofiring
guarantee efficient and prompt have at least oneplatoon serving as locks," load the 14.5-mm heavy
a "watchsubunit"which is ready to machineguns, release the bolts on
open fire on air targets with small the weapon and "turret-aiming
arms and with all of the heavy mechanisms," and set gunsights for
machineguns at the company S dis- targets moving at speeds of 285
posal. These rules do not apply to knots. The Soviets instruct, for safety
offensive and defensive actions in reasons, that the small arms and
which a company is in direct contact the mounted heavy machineguns
with enemy forces (i.e., when it is will not be fired simultaneously from
operating as a battalion's forward the combat vehicles.
echelon). In this case an infantry In combat situations units are
company will not detail a unit to be required to organize circumambient
on alert for engaging aircraft with air surveillance systems. Observ-
either small arms or mounted ers wearing headphones scan their
weapons. assigned sectors with the naked eye
When the air attack alarm signal from the open compartment slots
is given, attacking helicopters will of the APC or IFV. If units are o p
be engaged only by those squads erating in a fast-march configuration,
and gunners operating mounted air-spotting duties are performed by
weapons who at that given moment several units. Observers sound the
are not directly involved in fighting alarm onlv for those aircraft which
enemy ground forces. The Soviets are reco&ized as targets and whose
perceive that the readiness of a heading or combat actions pose a
watch subunit is based on the fact direct threat to their unit.
that in addition to having a well- Observers performing lookout
organized "circumambient" air- duties from combat vehicles desig-
spotting and alert system, its Soldiers nate targets by means of an intercom

Organization of Troop Air DefenseTraining Areas

1 and2: Training inconducting fireagainstairtargetsofvariousmethods
in dismounted formation. 3. Training in conducting fire against air targets
while mounted in a vehicle; (a) Firing from the side; (b) Firing from the
front: (c) Firing from the rear

AIR DEFENSE 111(1.11"1

system, while observers performing Riflemen Engaging Aerial Targets )
duties from outside the vehicle (in
dismounted formations) sound the
alarms vocally or by means of pre-
determined signals. Also, signal lights
of a predetermined color are used with their organic infantry weapons.
as an additional means of sounding The calculations were based on a
the alarm from APCs. The Soldier helicopter at about 2,000 meters, at
detailed to perform this duty turns an altitude of 50 meters and a flight
on the signal light as soon as the speed of 95 knots.
observer sounds the alarm over the Therefore, the Soviets altered
intercom system. their firing procedures so that after
Observers mark the location of the air raid alarm signal is given,
air targets in relation to the direction each Soldier of the watch subunit
of the march route, attack or de- independently takes up his assigned
fense (on the march, attack and de- firing station, releases the safety
fensive actions) or in relation to catch, chambers a round and takes
compass points (in staging or troop aim. At the same time the com-
assembly areas). After having mark- mander locates the target, makes
ed the location of an air target and sure that it is an enemy aircraft,
during the time a unit is getting and determines the firing technique
ready to open fire, the observer or and the exact time to commence
commander continues to follow the firing. He then designates a fiiing
target's movements and identifies technique and issues the order to
it, making sure that the decision to fire. The firing technique depends
open fire is correct. If during this on the range, about 2,000 meters
interval it turns out that the detected maximum, at which the target was
object is not a target, the observer detected (identified) and the target's
will revoke his decision at once by heading and flight speed. The order
issuing the command: "Stand fast! to commence fiiing depends on the The Soviets conducted another
Ours!," thereby halting the firing range of the weapons to be used. similar time frame analysis of the
sequence. The same procedures are Therefore, the commanding officer function performed by the crew
followed by gunners operating should give the order "Fire!" as soon using the vehiclemounted weapons.
mounted weapons. After marking as the Soldiers have finished aiming The procedural time of the mounted
the location of a target, observers their weapons, and as soon as the weapon, when the gunner was al-
help mounted-weapon gunners to target has moved in close enough lowed to fire at his discretion, was
get a fix on the target by transmitting so the first burst of fire will hit it at 22 seconds. In contrast, the pro-
appropriate commands over the a range that corresponds to the cedural time to engage a helicopter
intercom systelh; e.g., "higher!, maximum range of their weapons. with infantry small arms was 146
lower! to the right!, to the left!" The commander can only issue seconds.
A combat vehicle's commander, firing orders to mounted-weapon The Soviets arrived at the follow-
to whom the target has been pointed gunners from the APC's command ing conclusions on the basis of this
out, will immediately pass on infor- compartment. The periscope lo- fire control analysis:
mation concerning the target in cated in this compartment limits his Firing techniques should be
unaltered form through the com- forward field of view to 7.5 degrees. decentralized, allowing squad lead-
pany's communications network. On the right and left sidesof the vehicle ers to decide when to open fire on
This information will be picked up the field of view is limited and there aircraft with small arms in all combat
by those unit commanders and is no way to make observations from situations, whereas platoon leaders
equipment operators who are wear- the rear section of the BTR. Under (or company commanders) should
ing headphones (i.e., vehicle com- these conditions the commander is be entitled to do so only when certain
manders, drivers, mounted-weapon unable to locate the airborne target conditions exist.
gunners and observers). identified by an observer. Even i t The decision to open fire on
The Soviets conducted a graphic under favorableconditions, the corn helicopters with mounted weapons
time frame analysis of the functions mander (squad leader, deputy platoon is to be made by the gunners them-
performed by observers, command- leader, platoon leader and company selves (in response to an air attack
ers and riflemen when firing small commander) were able to spot an signal received over the intercom
arms at helicopters from an APC. aircraft and issue firing orders, it would system or via company command
The calculations showed that a unit take too long to do so, and in the communications networks), while
does not have much time to get meantime the helicopter could fire taking into account the general
ready to fire on slow-flying air targets and take evasive maneuvers. instructions issued by commanders

APRIL-JUNE 1981
 Soviet View of a Helicopter's Vulnerable Points (with best ammunition to use). 1. Maln
rotor-general purpose (GP),and armor piercing incendiary(AP1I) 2 Turboshaft engines
(AP/I). 3.Tail rotor(GP,AP/I) 4 Antitankguided missile launcher(GP,AP/I). 5. Cannon on
ring mount (APII from heavy caliber machineguns). '6.Crew armored areas (AP/I from
'leavy caliber machineguns). 7. Controls (GP. AP/I). 8 Cabin (GP' . . - .
. .
per combat mission orders. Only in systems, refined their antiaircraft had incorporated in their antiair-
specialsituations will commanding technology and improved training. craft protection for ground forces.
officers be able to direct the mount- Included in improving training, the Admittedly, small arms and mounted
ed weapon gunners' fire. Soviets instituted an elaborate pro- weapons did not "do the most damagew
In order to reduce the amount gram to teach the maneuver units -but, they did reinforce the Soviet
of time it takes for a unit to get to protect themselves without the belief that the maneuver units can
ready to open fire on air targets, broad antiaircraft attillery and sur- provide a highly lethal and extensive
the message formats used by o b face-to-air missile assets. In 1973 air defense coverage that is capable
servers and by commanders in is- the Israelis' air power was eroded of acquiring and destroying attack
suing orders during the firing of by the improvements the Soviets helicopter teams.
small arms should be modified and
abbreviated. Below: Tank Mounted Antiaircraft Machinegun

comes to the distribution or con-

centration of fire.
In 1967 the Soviet-backed Arab
countries failed t o adequately pro-
tect themselves against Israeli air
forces. This brought about an ex-
tensive effort to improve the Soviet
and Arab air defense protection.
Therefore, they developed new