The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should continue the trial for damages against military officers accused of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. While the privilege of writ of habeas corpus was suspended, this did not invalidate claims for other violations like illegal confiscation of property and torture. The orders given to the military did not give them blanket authority to disregard the Constitution. The complaint also sufficiently stated a cause of action by detailing how the plaintiffs' rights were violated, and both direct and indirect responsibility was covered under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The lower court was wrong to dismiss the case without proper trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should continue the trial for damages against military officers accused of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. While the privilege of writ of habeas corpus was suspended, this did not invalidate claims for other violations like illegal confiscation of property and torture. The orders given to the military did not give them blanket authority to disregard the Constitution. The complaint also sufficiently stated a cause of action by detailing how the plaintiffs' rights were violated, and both direct and indirect responsibility was covered under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The lower court was wrong to dismiss the case without proper trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should continue the trial for damages against military officers accused of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. While the privilege of writ of habeas corpus was suspended, this did not invalidate claims for other violations like illegal confiscation of property and torture. The orders given to the military did not give them blanket authority to disregard the Constitution. The complaint also sufficiently stated a cause of action by detailing how the plaintiffs' rights were violated, and both direct and indirect responsibility was covered under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The lower court was wrong to dismiss the case without proper trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should continue the trial for damages against military officers accused of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. While the privilege of writ of habeas corpus was suspended, this did not invalidate claims for other violations like illegal confiscation of property and torture. The orders given to the military did not give them blanket authority to disregard the Constitution. The complaint also sufficiently stated a cause of action by detailing how the plaintiffs' rights were violated, and both direct and indirect responsibility was covered under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The lower court was wrong to dismiss the case without proper trial.
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G.R. No.
L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN versus MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City
YAP, J.:
FACTS: Various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs and conducted an arrest without proper warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, employing threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them. Plaintiffs thereafter went to the RTC to claim for damages, alleging that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. A motion to dismiss was filed, alleging (a) no judicial inquiry may be made regarding the detention since the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (b) immunity of defendants from liability for acts done in the pursuit of their official duties; and (c) lack of cause of action. The RTC dismissed the action. A motion to set aside was filed, but without acting on the said motion, the RTC ruled that the decision is final. A motion to reconsider the said final order is denied (except for Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt.Balaba). Hence the Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court should continue trial for damages on the ground that (a) Judicial inquiry may be made in spite of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, (b) non-immunity of defendants from suit, and (c) the presence of a cause of action. HELD:
Yes, the lower court should continue trial for damages because a Judicial Inquiry may be made in spite of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus. Art. 32 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: [Bill of Rights] In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. Here, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. Nevertheless, the issue became moot because Pres. Corazon Aquino had already lifted the suspension in 1986. Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit does not apply Defendants allege that as agents of the State, acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. Since the President ordered the AFP to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and thru Gen. Ver, ordered to launch pre-emptive strikes against Communist Terrorist forces, the TFM merely acted within the scope of their powers. Nevertheless, the said orders cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
The Complaint States a Cause of Action
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply here. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. Still, Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein The decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights. Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation. The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint
