Mirasol vs.

DPWH
Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the
Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1,
which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access
highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on
February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of
nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the
total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and
South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway under DO 215.
Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the
right to travel? Are all motorized vehicles created equal?
Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no
authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and
enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation
and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a
power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to
say that the only justifiable classification among modes of transport
is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially
different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access
to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may
be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that
real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and
other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among
those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of
motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle
is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and
troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less
stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.
Police Power
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7783
entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE

ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION

THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a
red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that
the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well
in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the
law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The
SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and farreaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Tuason v. Register of Deeds
FACTS:
Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in
Caloocan City by virtue of which they were issued a title in their
names and they took possession of their property. In 1973,
President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued PD 293
cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring
the lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members
of the Malacaang Association Inc.

ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of

titles
HELD:
The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial
function. Since he was never vested with judicial power -- such
power, as everyone knows, being vested in the SC and such inferior
courts as may be established by law -- the judicial acts done by him
were under the circumstances alien to his office as chief executive.
OSMEA vs. ORBOS
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993
" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there
must be a standard which implies that the legislature determines
matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS:
Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c
of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or
impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds
shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established
for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of
sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on
oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of
legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since
a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the
use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it
was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the
petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers
granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the
nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE:
Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD:
None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred
to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from

the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the

general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a
"trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to
the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative
power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority
upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the
local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates,
P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute
an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were
denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein
the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the
case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision
on non-imprisonment due to debt;
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract;
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause.
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by
BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as
an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay

an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and
partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit
against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment
upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted
as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not
legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient
substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions.
The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such
confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any
practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can
very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory
power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question
denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it
penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the
drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation
of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted

meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause

does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
Republic vs. Rosemoor
Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and
Development Corporation, et al.
G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004
Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation
after having been granted permission to prospect for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in
commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biakna-Bato mountain range.
The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines
and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding
license to exploit said marble deposits.
License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the
herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda
cancelled the petitioners license stating that their license had
illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and
that there was no more public interest served by the continued
existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was
confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to
this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of
land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former
status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No.
84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is
a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the
cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an
ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in
its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which
merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national
park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in
character.
Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on
March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of

Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution,

granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and
convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also
explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.
JMM vs CA
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations.
This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a
plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go
abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an
Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to
being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated
the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and
deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster
the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a
valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common
good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement,
does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly
the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order
No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which
would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme
at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing
artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from
them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists

abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the

room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
1 UTAK VS COMELEC
GR 206020 April 14 2015
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules
that would implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act.
One of the provisions of the Resolution provide that the posting of
any election propaganda or materials during the campaign period
shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the
premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list
organization, questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to
free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs
and public transport terminals during the election pursuant to its
regulatory powers delegated under Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the
Constitution
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles
used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a
form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has
nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the captive audience
doctrine
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed captive audience
may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor
are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply
avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence,
the doctrine is not applicable.
Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free
speech
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of

individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport

terminals to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others
to agree with them.
Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation
No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted, but the
prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to a stated governmental interest. First,

while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to

implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on
posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more
than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would
ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in
elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral
regulation was not satisfied.