Case Digest Marbella-Bobis V. Bobis
Case Digest Marbella-Bobis V. Bobis
Case Digest Marbella-Bobis V. Bobis
MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS
Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS
FACTS:
October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated
January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez
February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into
the second marriage
*After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question
to a criminal case for bigamy
HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question
*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)
MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior
to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand,
argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims
that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years.[11] The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the
validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."[12]
Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.[13] No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an
element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final
judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we
held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.[15] This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.[16] The contracting of a
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.[17] The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage,
why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently
defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of
defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the
defense,[18] but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not
every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that
he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he
thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has
been discussed above, this cannot be done.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.[19] The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination
of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.