United Airlines V Uy (Transpo)

United Airlines v Uy
G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

FACTS:
October 13, 1989 Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines,
bound from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one
piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A
United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling
crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene,
Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline
billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a
Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same
employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were
discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his
American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of
his bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.
October 16, 1989 he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline
did not refute Willies allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his
loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the
amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the
indignities he was subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one
dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding out-ofcourt
settlement
of
P1,000,000.00.
June 9, 1992 Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He
had two causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received
from petitioners employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme
embarrassment and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the
loss of personal effects amounting to US$5,310.00.
For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages
shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second
paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of
limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted. It is Willies position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period
should apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled,
giving
him
ample
time
to
file
his
complaint.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to
the local forums rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of
determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning
filed). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on
the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice
of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed. The CA,
however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled in favour of
respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the
2-year prescriptive period under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention
HELD:
Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw
Convention has lapsed, it did not preclude the application of other pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based
on tort which can be filed within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As
for the action pertaining to the loss of the contents of the luggage, while it was well
within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court found that there
was an exception to the applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period that is when
the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the passenger the run-around.
Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: Courts have discretion whether to apply
them
or
not
Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have
ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or
for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a
passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention.
Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the
Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the
carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the
contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established.
Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the
shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the
San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social
humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects
amounting to US $5,310.00.
While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or
damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention,
his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the
airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger - clearly is
not.
Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the
violation of the respondents rights as passengers is covered under the Civil Code
Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure
to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention
does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of
other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for
instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years
for filing an action based on torts.
Exception to the Application of the 2-year prescriptive period: When airline
employed delaying tactics
As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the
Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year
limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made
subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore
forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods.
Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action
had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an
action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is
indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time
frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be
doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to
petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims,
and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.
Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the
period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for
damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately
filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his
letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed
an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the
same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which
he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the
arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case
because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private
respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art.
29 of the Warsaw Convention.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting
aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the
complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the
records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
taking its bearings from this disquisition.

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United Airlines v Uy

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

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