Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27760

May 29, 1974

CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA
GURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEN0, respondents.
Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners.
Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p
This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of
petitioners Crispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana that an order of respondent Judge was
issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have dismissed an
independent civil action filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties,
private respondents here, 1 failed to reserve their right to institute it separately in the City
Court of Ozamis City, when the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was sought to be bolstered by a literal
reading of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111. 2 It does not take into account, however, the rule as to
a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123. 3 What is worse, petitioners appear to be
oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation were to be accorded the applicable Rules
of Court provisions, it would give rise to a grave constitutional question in view of the
constitutional grant of power to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure being limited in the sense that they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights." 4 It thus appears clear that the petition for certiorari is without merit.
The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had its
origins in a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in
injuries to its passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea,
Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case was filed with the city court of
Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in favor
of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco
Abellana appealed such decision to the Court of First Instance. 5 At this stage, the private
respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for
damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco

Abellana. 6 In such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin Abellana, as the alleged employer,
was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally
on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It
was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already
on appeal. 7
Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This
is a motion to dismiss this case on the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was
decided by the City Court and appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed to expressly
waive the civil action or reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court, as
required in Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ342, it appears that the City Court convicted the accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment
of the City Court was vacated and a trial de novo will have to be conducted. This Court has not
as yet begun trying said criminal case. In the meantime, the offended parties expressly waived
in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action, and reserve their
right to institute a separate action as in fact, they did file. The Court is of the opinion that at
this stage, the offended parties may still waive the civil action because the judgment of the City
Court is vacated and a trial de novo will have to be had. In view of this waiver and reservation,
this Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of
the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is hereby denied. ..." 8 There was a
motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition.
The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order
there was a grave abuse of discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to
the effect that upon the institution of a criminal action "the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party ...reserves his right to institute it
separately." 9 Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases
from city courts. 10 It does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the
extent that it could yield a meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a substantive right.
Such an interpretation is to be rejected. Certiorari, to repeat, clearly does not lie.
1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of
this Court : "That a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at
the institution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved or waived, at such
institution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher court." 11 It admits of
no doubt that an independent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of
appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the
city court of Ozamis. Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the aforesaid
Section 1 of Rule 111 for the unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an
independent civil action is barred. In the first place, such an inference does not per se arise
from the wording of the cited rule. It could be looked upon plausibly as a non-sequitur.
Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what is so explicitly provided in
Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the Court of
First Instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court." 12 Unlike petitioners,
respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a norm. This Court has made clear that its
observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory. 13 In a 1962 decision, People v. Carreon,
14 Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905 decision, Andres v. Wolfe. 15
Another case cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 16 where Justice Malcolm
emphasized how deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history is such a rule. In the latest

case in point, People v. Jamisola, 17 this Court, through Justice Dizon, reiterated such a
doctrine in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from
a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the
appealed case 'shall be tried in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been
originally instituted in that court.'" 18 So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. 19
Again, there is a host of decisions attesting to its observance. 20 It cannot be said then that
there was an error committed by respondent Judge, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
which is indispensable if this petition were to prosper.
2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictive
interpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation
but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite
clear: "In cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." 21 That is a substantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could
render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek
recovery for damages in a civil suit. As referred to earlier, the grant of power to this Court,
both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution,
increase or modification of substantive right. 22 It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional
doubt. Unfortunately, petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack awareness of the
undesirable consequence of their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable obstacle
to the success of this suit.
3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legal
propositions impressed with a certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client
would be served. That is though, merely one aspect of the matter. There is this other
consideration. He is not to ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties
justice according to law. He is not to fall prey, as admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice
of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule,
there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged
right. 23 The commitment of this Court to such a primordial objective has been manifested
time and time again. 24
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Costs against petitioners.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par. nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177

August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO,

CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC.
ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER
AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA
MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURTMARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO,
COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT.
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC.
ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA,
LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER
PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA,
CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT.
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT.
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURTMARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN.
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the
PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT.
WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T.
RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT
JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L.
CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio
Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores,
Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.

CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020
and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the
charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek
certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.

Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and
no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.

I
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated
January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing
This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses.

order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him
"pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as
of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and
later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial
and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was
done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated
by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries
as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of
the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a
statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that
no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for
summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and
they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of
GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14
ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the
president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order
granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and
to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said

(a)
Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to
all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing courtmartial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying
bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to
military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are
hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is
hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors
and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No.
14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this
Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as
well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a
petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was
raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had
been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered
their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities
to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12,
1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were
given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a
verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they
did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to
recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counteraffidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit
the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM
No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not
deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial
of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and
in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L
ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The
Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and
does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could
object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could
itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could
consider the same contention, reversing a court- martial conviction where failure to comply
with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial
investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not
required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the
investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold
that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab
initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate
General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War
Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after
which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration.
compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article
of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have
jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the
civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was
resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with
mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person
subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the
pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was
convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj.
Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of
suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided
under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the
affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does
not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911,
petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of
doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they
never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to
answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article
8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body,
was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8.
General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer
of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military
Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general
courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or
persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt
that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De
Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the
Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually
constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that General
De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would
certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the
principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment
filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for
under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on
June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by
the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine

the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member
at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided
before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies
who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should
not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused.
After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became
effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing
and intensive program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and
breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the
officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and
a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these
environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle
"each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court
shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security
Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies
intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State."
The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order

No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final
determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L
P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the
issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory
challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn
when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could
still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in
the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious
that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action
against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited
by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved
Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At
any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter
addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply
the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only
the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents
with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents
are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent
courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested
with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals
4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and
not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give
rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested
by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law
providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that
the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from
the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the
existing political system.
xxx

xxx

xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on
bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order
were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or

things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged
after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was
heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the
charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30,
1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created
and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the
private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and
were required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed
a delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the
private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation
only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass review
and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation
of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General
Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of
a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves
respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner.
Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article
70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof
mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the
charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating
or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February
26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for
reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour
period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice
of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private
respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when
the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations
of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW
71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave
abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the
Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated,
however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not
have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should
not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R.
No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the
petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War.
In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the
respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.

concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming
the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." 3
But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis
justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General
be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should
not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny
bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it.
Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as
he would deny bail to accused military personnel.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as
he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the
only exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the military officers here

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the
only exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the military officers here
concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming
the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." 3

But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis
justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General
be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should
not be granted the same right.

FIRST DIVISION

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny
bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it.
Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed by the Philippine National Police Station
Commander in Bato, Leyte for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip in the afternoon of
September 14, 1987. 1 After preliminary investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an
information charged Umpad with the crime of Homicide as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Leyte accused Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon" of
the crime of Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of September 1987, in the Island of Dawahon, Municipality of
Bato, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one GENARO TAGSIP, with a revolver .38 Cal.
Snub Nose Smith and Wesson (Paltik) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose,
thereby causing and inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wound on his head which was the
direct and immediate cause of the death of Genaro Tagsip.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Hilongos, Leyte, October 20, 1987.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the
consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused
would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as
originally charged in the information, and would incur the penalty of "four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) year of prision
correccional maximum as maximum." 2 Consequently, in his decision promulgated on the 27th
of June 1990, respondent judge found the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of
four years, two months and one day of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six years

of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum period, exactly in accordance with the plea
bargaining agreement. 3
On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S.
Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of
Crim. Case No. H-223 entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon." In said lettercomplaint, complainant contends that the sentence of respondent judge finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide and not Homicide
as charged is proof indicative, "on its face, of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
or gross misconduct.
Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the
1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual
with the consent of the offended party to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a
court of lesser jurisdiction. He explains that during the May 3, 1990 hearing, accused and his
counsel, with the acquiescence and in the presence of the prosecutor, informed the Court of the
defendant's desire to plea bargain pursuant to the aforestated rule. Moreover, he avers that in a
conference on June 27, 1990, the wife of the victim herself agreed to the accused's plea of
guilty to attempted homicide, instead of homicide as she needed the monetary indemnity to
raise her two orphaned children. In a Memorandum dated February 5, 1993, the Deputy Court
Administrator recommended that the complaint be dismissed, explaining that:
Section 2 116 is more liberalized as it allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
whether or not it is included in the offense charged in the complaint or information, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal. In this regard, it is inferred that the fiscal
consented to abbreviate the proceedings and in order not to run the risk of the accused being
acquitted, because there was no conclusive evidence to obtain the conviction of the accused to
the offense charged in the complaint of information.
It may be stated in this connection that unlike in the crime of murder where the accused may
plead to the lesser offense of homicide, in homicide a misinterpretation may arise, as in this
case, when the accused pleads guilty to attempted homicide, because here the fact of the death
of the victim, which is the principal element of the crime is obliterated. This is specially so
because the decision/sentence does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law but
merely an account that the accused pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and the penalty imposed.
4
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the
accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the
accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense
be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of
homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death;
attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which
could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such
a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an
amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.

However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal
application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition
with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code
5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent
is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of
law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge
of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear
negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a
possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so
cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's
lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties. While it is true, as
respondent judge contends, that he merely applied the rule to the letter, the palpably
incongruous result ought to have been a "red flag" alerting him of the possibility of injustice.
The death of an identified individual, the gravamen of the charge against the defendant in the
criminal case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a more expedient plea of either
attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that if the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 6
Finally, every judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 7 A
judge should not only be aware of the bare outlines of the law but also its nuances and
ramifications, otherwise, he would not be able to come up with decisions which are
intrinsically fair. In failing to exercise even ordinary common sense, a judge could be held
administratively liable for a verdict that could in no way be legally or factually sustained or
justified.
We note, however, that under the circumstances of the case, respondent judge's erroneous
exercise of his judicial prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad faith. The
phraseology of Sec. 2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely eliminate
possible misinterpretation. This observation is bolstered by the fact that the same provision
prompted the Department of Justice, on July 31, 1990, or three months after respondent judge
took cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990, to issue Circular No. 35, 8 later amended by
Circular No. 55 dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and setting limitations on the application
of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondent reached compulsory retirement age on April
5, 1995 after a long period of service in the judiciary entitles him to a certain measure of
leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench stands unique because of the potently absurd result of
respondent's application of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS. Let this decision appear in respondent's record of service.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 7, Annex "A".

offense shall also be one that is necessarily related to the offense charged or that the nature of
the offense must belong to the same classification or title under the Revised Penal Code or
special laws.

Id., at 9, Annex "C."

For your guidance and strict compliance.

Ibid.

Id., at 3.

Civil Code, art. 10.

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
6

Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, 221 SCRA 95.

Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.01.

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 35.

Sec. 2,
RULE 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides for a
process wherein the accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. To attain the
laudable objectives of the rules on plea bargaining and in order that the disposition of criminal
cases may be expedited its uniformly as possible by eliminating unnecessary and costly
litigation and in the interest of justice, you are hereby directed to observe the following
guidelines, to wit:
1.
The trial prosecutor shall immediately move for suspension of the proceedings
whenever the accused manifests his intention in court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, to
allow the trial prosecutor to evaluate the implications of the offer.
2.
The trial prosecutor, with consent of the offended party, may motu proprio agreed to
the offer of the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense if the penalty imposable for the
offense charged is prision correccional (Maximum of six years) or lesser or a fine not
exceeding P12,000.00.
3.
When the penalty imposable for the offense charged is prision mayor (at least six
years and one day) or higher or a fine exceeding P12,000.00, the trial prosecutor shall first
submit his comment/recommendation to the City/Provincial Prosecutor or to the Chief State
Prosecutor as the case may be, for approval. If the favorable recommendation is approved in
writing, the trial prosecutor with consent of the offended party, may agree to a plea of guilty to
a lesser offense. For this purpose, the Chief State Prosecutor or the Provincial/City Prosecutor
concerned shall act on the recommendation of the trial prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours
from receipt thereof. In no case shall the subject plea to a lesser offense be allowed without the
written approval of the above respective heads of office.
4.
In all cases, the penalty for the lesser offense to which the accused may be allowed
to plead guilty shall not be more than two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty for the
crime originally charged, notwithstanding the presence of mitigating circumstances. The lesser

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO
THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - Time and again we have decreed that statutes are
to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.
Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE
OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTION. - The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in
Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True
Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its
Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was
approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November
1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of
using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against
the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A.
No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by
proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.

that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had
used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The
use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was
not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself
properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the
complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because
the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone
under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions
of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended
under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the antialias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are
peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended
by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner
should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE COMMONWEALTH ACT
142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED. - As C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of
the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO

REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. - An alias is a name or names used
by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first
time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound
or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish
him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and thse are known as aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION WITHOUT
INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS NAME IN ADDITION TO HIS REAL NAME,
NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. - The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging
to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that
petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the
name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the
first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to
obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then

Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of
C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use
of Alliases.[1]
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato
requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint
for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and
other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the
Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany
trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.[2]

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against
petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of
the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez
and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the
respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just
sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.[3]
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by
the security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead of writing down his name
petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative
Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the
Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the
complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name Oscar Perez.[4]
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo,
who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida
learned that the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually petitioner Cesario
Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the
prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local
civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil
registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No.
142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year
and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the
penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as
maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as. he reasserts his innocence. He
contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085 as he never used
any alias name; neither is Oscar Perez his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which
connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he
has never been known as Oscar Perez and that he only used such name on one occasion and it
was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential
requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085 has not been
complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from

his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred
in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.[5]
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose.[6] The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the lawmakers.[7]
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly
violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the
pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142,
which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is
entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different
from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his
childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name.
Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the
original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained,
specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial
authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As
amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and
who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be
allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall
set forth the persons baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if
different, his immigrants name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than
his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other

than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act
to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the
Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November
1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.[8] The pertinent
provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow -Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person
to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any
written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence
of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other
than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his
business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or
business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or
business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract agreement, business
transaction, or business x x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the
common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the
crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained
against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.[9]
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic[10] the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept
and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioners use of alias Kheng Chiau Young in addition to
his real name Yu Cheng Chiau would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business,
as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him
its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact,
the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither
would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government
offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition,
for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real
name Yu Cheng Chiau.
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his
having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court, argues the
more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would
then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino
way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as
the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better
for him to write his name following the Occidental method, he can easily file a petition for
change of name, so that in lieu of the name Yu Kheng Chian, he can, abandoning the same, ask
for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young.

All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown
satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the
use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which
he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by
his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several
different names and these are known as aliases.[11] Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication
that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the
case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar
Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter
to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request
of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is
no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence
showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to
his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated
transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he
had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able
to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not
refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute
an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes
seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[12]
Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused.[13] The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.[14] Indeed, our mind cannot
rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian,
and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and
GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute, courts become the unfeeling
pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of
compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may
already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents
from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;

2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China
Banking Corp., US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)
cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg
Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802,
803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing
for Bartellis petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscals Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989
granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in
the amount P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on
February 28, 1989.

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provision of the
Constitution, hence void; because its provision that Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order to process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever
i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y
Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners favor in violation of
substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution;

On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China
Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China
Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment
served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply
to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank
deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made
by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to
this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March
20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar
deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.

iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit
account with an authorized bank.

This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter
dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or
whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory
the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action
secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57
of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:

The antecedents facts:

May 26, 1989

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape
the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On
February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the
following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20;

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmea Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:

This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB
Circular No. 960 (1983).
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the
same been repealed nor amended.
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the countrys banking system
which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the
basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some
perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director[1]
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners motion for leave to serve
summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled Karen Salvacion. et al. vs.
Greg Bartelli y Northcott. Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the
complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant,
ordering the latter:
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion
the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;

circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the
publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion
of the plaintiffs through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were
authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her
father, Federico N. Salacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Mandulio, who
gave the following testimony:
Karen took her first year high school in St. Marys Academy in Pasay City but has recently
transferred to Arellano University for her second year.
In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with
her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing
her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was
then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when
he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse
in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karens age and who was with
him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5).
The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him its Pilipino. He then
invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even
gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.5-6)
They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendants house
along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)

3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

4. To pay attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein
awarded;

When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendants alleged niece was not
outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see
the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited
Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)

5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

6. Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in
graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able
to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the
Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim.
Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons
was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general

Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous
because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karens hands
with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a
packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied
her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger
in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because
there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and
Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p.8)
He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ.
After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it,
Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely

presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen
could not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)
After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower
and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she
presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood
came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of
blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she
got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining
the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food
before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 oclock the following morning. (Id., pp.
9-10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke at about
8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took
biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening,
they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice
that is why it looks like lugaw. For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night.
During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say
whether the organ was inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and
feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be
killed; besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help,
nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able
to call a police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill
her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty
minutes after breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first,
Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until
defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she
found that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the
window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the
door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she
also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She
cried: Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan nyo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!
Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was
istorbo. Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police.
She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 oclock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time
sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he
always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day,
February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the
second at about 8:30 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her
for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting

for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third
time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and
shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices
were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a
voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her
clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being
afraid that should the neighbors call the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he
might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the latter washed
her dress. (Id., p. 16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help
because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her
clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell
the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She
could hear people conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked
repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the
door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why she
was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in
uniform and the defendant was talking to them. Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis, Karen
added. The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode
the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and
two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were
brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her
father arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were
brought to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement
she gave to the police was marked Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medicolegal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in early morning, of the following
day when they reached the NBI, (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal
officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
She was studying at the St. Marys Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident but she
subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue,
because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for
transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit
Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer.
The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister
anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed
even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad. (Id.,

p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience
which probably, she would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she
could ever recover from this experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in
the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial
court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartellis dollar deposit with China
Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in
petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? She Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as
the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
providing that Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken
away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott
garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners favor in violation of substantive due
process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue
favor or a class privilege n violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has
provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since
criminal could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to
a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized
bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiffs
substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of
the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the
plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution
out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board
in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because
the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D.
1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or
garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it
does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was
based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular
methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits
from attachment, garnishment or any other order process of any court, is to assure the

development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore
Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign
currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a
position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all currency
deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the
public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a
considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take
some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property
may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public
interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially
provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides,
among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that
of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the
inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of
Greg Bartelli; that it is not only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may
perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing
so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that
despite the harsh effect to these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow
the same.
This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require
respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory relief.[2]
However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has farreaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for
mandamus.[3]
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her
gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the
American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said
American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4)
days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the
other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in
the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety,
and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time;
and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the

award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes
futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As
stated by the trial court in its decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was indoubtedly a
shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long,
long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been
actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School,
Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the
school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly
feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial
manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of
his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and
credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial
desire on her nor capable of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that
unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest
there is a snake, xxx.[4]
If Karens sad fate had happened to anybodys own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom
how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his childs right to
said award of damages; in this case, the victims claim for damages from this alien who had the
gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is mere visitor. This further
illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys
economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was
the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the
country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the
questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said thatBut I also know,[5] that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times We might as well
require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.

specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment,
garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246 and CB
Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a
mere transient who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized
in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx
xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to
honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following
provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall
take effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case
the Central Bank promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the
rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As amended
by P.D. 1246, thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign currency deposits authorized
under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency
deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered
of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in
no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or
any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other
court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:

In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035,
certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept
deposits in foreign currency;

"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress
for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated
for a purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the allien. More

WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of
an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to
receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;

WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were
provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality subject to certain exceptions and
tax exemptions on the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged
in trade or business in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency
deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested right of depositors
would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions
authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a
position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country;

WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said depository
banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to
transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these
depositors that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of
deposit encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time.

Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the
Offshore Banking in the Philippines (3rd Whereas).

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with
respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.

The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD
No. 1034 are as follows:

For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
[6]

WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking system, such as

political stability, a growing economy and adequate communication facilities, among others,
exist in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as possible to
the sources of capital funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be advantageous and
beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of
desired investments into the Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in
international finance, and contributing to the national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other positive
factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as another financial center in
Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No. 1035. Its
purpose are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has been
authorized under a separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial competence to more
actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of foreign
currency loans to resident corporations and firms;

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that
the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would
result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro. Simply
stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be
used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the
guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding
the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular
protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien
depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness
legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of
justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with

the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg
Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar
deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

THIRD DIVISION
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., no part.
Mendoza, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., on leave.

G.R. No. 166199

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
and THE BOARD OF
Present:
COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Petitioners,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

CHRISTOPHER KORUGA,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 24, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[1] dated September 14, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated November 24,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578. The assailed Decision set aside
the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), and dismissed the deportation case filed against Christopher Koruga
(respondent), an American national, for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of Commonwealth Act
No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; while the
assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous
letter[3] requesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found
guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington,
United States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983.
On the basis of a Summary of Information,[4] the Commissioner issued Mission Order No.
ADD-01-162[5] on September 13, 2001 directing Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Lino G.
Caligasan, Chief of the Intelligence Mission and any available BI Special Operations Team
Member to conduct verification/ validation of the admission status and activities of respondent
and effect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended.
On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. The case was docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. The Charge Sheet reads:
On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by Intelligence
operatives at his residence, located at 1001 MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas
Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-01-162;

On February 26, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] but it was denied by
the BOC in a Resolution dated March 19, 2002.
Unaware that the BOC already rendered its Resolution dated March 19, 2002, respondent filed
on April 2, 2002, a Manifestation and Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Cautelam[14] with the
Office of the President, which referred[15] the appeal to the DOJ.
On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a Resolution[16]
dismissing the appeal. On April 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17]
which he subsequently withdrew[18] on April 23, 2003.
On April 24, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[19]
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76578, seeking to set aside the Resolution dated
April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC.
On September 14, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision[20] setting aside the Resolution dated
April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and
dismissing the deportation case filed against respondent. The CA held that there was no valid
and legal ground for the deportation of respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)
(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because respondent was not
convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court
dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of
Washington, USA filed against respondent; that petitioners further failed to present or attach to
their pleadings any document which would support their allegations that respondent entered
into a plea bargain with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to the
record the alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the conviction of
respondent for violation of the prohibited drugs law in the USA; that even if respondent was
convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, his deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is
improper, since the prohibited drugs law referred to therein refers not to a foreign drugs law
but to the Philippine drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972; that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive authority to decide as to the right of a
foreigner to enter the country, still, such executive officers must act within the scope of their
authority or their decision is a nullity.

That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in
connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of
Washington, United States of America, thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public
burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration[21] was denied by the CA in its presently assailed
Resolution[22] dated November 24, 2004.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE

SUBJECT CASE WHICH FALLS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT.

On September 28, 2001, after filing a Petition for Bail[7] and Supplemental Petition for Bail,
[8] respondent was granted bail and provisionally released from the custody of the BI.[9]
Following the submission of respondent's Memorandum[10] and the BI Special Prosecutor's
Memorandum,[11] the BOC rendered a Judgment[12] dated February 11, 2002 ordering the
deportation of respondent under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended.

Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OVER THE CASE,
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST
THE HEREIN RESPONDENT WERE DROPPED.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIOR CONVICTION IS

REQUIRED BEFORE RESPONDENT COULD BE DEPORTED.[23]
Petitioners contend that the BI has exclusive authority in deportation proceedings and no other
tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence presented
therein; that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioners when they sought
the deportation of respondent since he was convicted by the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington for attempted Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and underwent
probation in lieu of the imposition of sentence; that the dismissal of the charge against
respondent was only with respect to penalties and liabilities, obtained after fulfilling the
conditions for his probation, and was not an acquittal from the criminal case charged against
him; that there is a valid basis to declare respondent's undesirability and effect his deportation
since respondent has admitted guilt of his involvement in a drug-related case.
On the other hand, respondent submits that the proceedings against him reek of persecution;
that the CA did not commit any error of law; that all the arguments raised in the present
petition are mere rehashes of arguments raised before and ruled upon by the CA; and that, even
assuming that Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 does not apply, there
is no reason, whether compelling or slight, to deport respondent.
There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over
deportation proceedings bars judicial review, and (2) whether there is a valid and legal ground
for the deportation of respondent.

[30] Clearly, the filing by respondent of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
to assail the order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion is permitted.
This brings us to the second issue.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a
matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However,
aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner
provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and
administrative issuances pursuant thereto.[31]
Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
xxxx
(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited
drugs;

The Court resolves the first issue in the negative.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases
against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings.[24]
Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1[25] of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review
in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the
courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered
to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,[26] the
Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made
with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.[27]
In Domingo v. Scheer,[28] the Court set aside the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC
over an alien for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in violation of the alien's
constitutional and statutory rights to due process, since the BOC ordered the deportation of the
alien without conducting summary deportation proceedings and without affording the alien the
right to be heard on his motion for reconsideration and adduce evidence thereon.
In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[29] the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual
findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the
Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to evidence, because the
agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or
prohibition may be filed in the CA as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.

Respondent contends that the use of the definite article the immediately preceding the phrase
law on prohibited drugs emphasizes not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in
this jurisdiction, at that time, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[32]
The Court disagrees.
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.[33] However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate
unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole.
[34] After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[35] Indeed, courts
are not to give
words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.[36]
Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to
convictions under the Philippine prohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the
way to an absurd situation whereby aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws may be
allowed to enter the country to the detriment of the public health and safety of its citizens. It
suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited
drugs law would be deported, while aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be
allowed entry in the country. The Court must emphatically reject such interpretation of the law.
Certainly, such a situation was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do so would be

contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognized with almost
pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law.
Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which
defeats the very purpose for which the law was passed. This Court has, in many cases
involving the construction of statutes, always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute
as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity, and that
therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.
[37]
Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs law
and the Philippine prohibited drugs law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemos.[38] Thus, Section 37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all
prohibited drugs laws, whether local or foreign.
There is no dispute that respondent was convicted of Violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA for attempted possession of cocaine, as shown
by the Order Deferring Imposition of Sentence (Probation).[39] While he may have pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense, and was not imprisoned but applied for and underwent a one-year
probation, still, there is no escaping the fact that he was convicted under a prohibited drugs
law, even though it may simply be called a misdemeanor drug offense.[40] The BOC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deportation of respondent.
The Court quotes with approval the following acute pronouncements of the BOC:
x x x We note that the respondent admitted in his Memorandum dated 8 October 2001 that he
pleaded guilty to the amended information where he allegedly attempted to have in his
possession a certain controlled substance, and a narcotic drug. Further, he filed a Petition for
Leave to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and Enter Plea of Not Guilty to obtain a favorable release
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the filing of the said charge.

U.S. Government may not have any law enforcement interest on respondent, Philippine
immigration authorities certainly do in the able and competent exercise of its police powers.
Thus, this case of the respondent is no different from a convicted felon abroad, who argues that
he cannot be removed from the Philippines on the ground that the crime was committed
abroad. Otherwise, it would open the floodgates to other similarly situated aliens demanding
their admission into the country. Indeed, respondent may not be a menace to the U.S. as a result
of his being discharged from criminal liability, but that does not ipso facto mean that the
immigration authorities should unquestionably admit him into the country.
x x x x[41] (Emphasis supplied)
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be
admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent,
has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or
devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not
lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.[42] Every sovereign power has the inherent power
to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its selfpreservation or public interest.[43] The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by
or under the authority of the sovereign power.[44] It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
the domestic tranquility of the people.[45]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated
February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration ordering the
deportation of respondent Christopher Koruga under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Evidently, the U.S. Court issued the Order of Dismissal in exchange for the respondent's plea
of guilty to the lesser offense. Though legally allowed in the U.S. Law, We perceive that this
strategy afforded the respondent with a convenient vehicle to avoid conviction and sentencing.
Moreover, the plea of guilty is by itself crystal clear acknowledgment of his involvement in a
drug-related offense. Hence, respondent's discharge from conviction and sentencing cannot
hide the fact that he has a prior history of drug-related charge.
This country cannot countenance another alien with a history of a drug-related offense. The
crime may have been committed two decades ago but it cannot erase the fact that the incident
actually happened. This is the very core of his inadmissibility into the Philippines. Apparently,
respondent would like Us to believe that his involvement in this drug case is a petty offense or
a mere misdemeanor. However, the Philippine Government views all drug-related cases with
grave concern; hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the creation of various drug-enforcement agencies. While
We empathize with the innocent portrayal of the respondent as a man of irreproachable
conduct, not to mention the numerous written testimonies of good character submitted in his
behalf, this incomplete and sanitized representation cannot, however, outweigh our
commitment and sworn duty to safeguard public health and public safety. Moreover, while the

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147009. March 11, 2004]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SECOND

DIVISION) and NEOLITO DUMLAO, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
The Civil Service Commission (CSC), through the Office of the Solicitor General, brings
before the Court the issue of regularity of the CSCs institution of disciplinary administrative
proceedings against an erring civil servant on the basis of an anonymous letter-complaint.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
a reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated October 30, 2000 and Resolution[2] dated
February 6, 2001 in CA G.R. SP No. 56098.
The facts of the case are as follows:[3]
On February 4, 1997, the CSC received an anonymous letter-complaint against Neolito
Dumlao (Dumlao), a Department of Education Culture and Sports Supervisor of Binalonan,
Pangasinan. The letter-complaint contained allegations that Dumlao: 1) never received a
college degree; 2) never received a Master of Arts degree in English; and 3) has many pending
criminal cases.
On March 13, 1997, the CSC requested Director Antonio R. Madarang to look into these
allegations and, if necessary, conduct an investigation. On August 4, 1997, Madarang
submitted his Report of Investigation stating that Dumlao failed to finish his four-year Liberal
Arts Course.
On August 7, 1997, the CSC wrote to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to verify
the educational attainment of Dumlao. On September 15, 1997, the CHED confirmed that
Dumlao did not finish his four-year Liberal Arts Course from the University of Pangasinan.
On September 18, 1997, the CSC formally charged Dumlao with Dishonesty and Falsification
of Official Document.[4]
After receiving Dumlaos Answer, the CSC conducted formal hearings wherein both parties
presented testimonial and documentary evidence. On May 21, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution
No. 99-1056 finding Dumlao guilty under the administrative charge and ordered his dismissal
from the service.[5] Dumlao filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied on October
27, 1999.[6]
Dumlao elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision that granted the petition and set aside the resolution
dismissing Dumlao from the service. It ruled that the CSC was without jurisdiction to conduct
an investigation and file a formal charge on the basis of a mere anonymous letter-complaint.
The relevant portion of the Decision is reproduced below, as follows:[7]
Section 46, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides:
SEC. 46. Discipline: General Provisions.

xxx
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service
official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and
sworn to by the complainant. (Italics Ours)
Section 48 (1) and (2), of the same Subtitle further provides:
SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. (1)
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by
the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other person, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary
evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in
writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint,
sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less
than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under
oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate
whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If
the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
(Underscoring Ours).
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule II of Resolution No. 99-1936, otherwise known as the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provides:
SEC. 8. Complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given
due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in
cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complainant need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the
allegations therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which the person
complained of may be required to comment.
The complaint should be written in a clear, simple and concise language and in a systematic
manner as to appraise the civil servant concerned of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare his defense or answer.
The complaint shall contain the following:
a. full name and address of the complainant;
b. full name and address of the person complained of as well as his position and office of
employment;
c. a narration of the relevant and material facts which shows the acts or omissions allegedly
committed by the civil servant;

d. certified true copies of documentary evidence and affidavits of his witnesses, if any; and

The complaint is dismissible at the outset. Section 48 (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of
E.O. No. 292 provides: x x x

e. certification or statement of non-forum shopping.

In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements, the complaint shall be
dismissed.
As may be observed, while E.O. No. 292 is silent as to anonymous complaints, Resolution No.
99-1936 provides for cognizance of such complaints in two (2) instances, to wit: (a) there is
obvious truth or merit to the allegations therein, and (b) they are supported by documentary or
direct evidence. It may be recalled that E.O. 292 was promulgated by former President
Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, pursuant to Section 6, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution (Transitory Provisions) which reads:

(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other person, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary
evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case (Underscoring Ours).
Section 8, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provides:
xxx
SEC. 8. Complaint. x x x.
xxx

SEC. 6. The Incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened

The complaint shall contain the following:

On the other hand, resolution No. 99-1936 was promulgated by the Civil Service Commission
pursuant to the power vested upon it under Section 12 (2), Chapter 3, title I, Subtitle (A), Book
V of E.O. No. 292 which reads:

xxx

SEC. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:

e. certification or statement of non-forum shopping.

xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws:
xxx
May the Civil Service Commission arrogate upon itself to provide something which the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not provide for? We rule in the negative. Administrative rules
and regulations are intended to carry out, not supplant or modify, the law. With this, We cannot
but hold with disapprobation the pertinent provision, viz., the second paragraph of Section 8 of
Resolution No. 99-1936. Where the law makes no distinction, one does not distinguish.

d. certified true copies of documentary evidence and affidavits of his witnesses, if any; and

In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements, the complaint shall be
dismissed. (Underscoring Ours)
The employment of the word shall connotes a mandatory character. A formal charge may only
be filed upon establishment of a prima facie case. A prima facie case must be found to exist on
the basis of sworn statements of the complaint and his witnesses, and certified true copies of
documentary evidence. Absent these, the complaint shall be dismissed. Corollarily, a formal
charge is not in order.
In short, the Court of Appeals deemed the anonymous letter as a complaint which failed to
comply with the formal requirements of the law.
The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but it was subsequently denied in the assailed
Resolution. Hence, this petition.

Does this affect jurisdiction?

The CSC assigns two errors:
xxxxxx
In Our considered opinion, what is contemplated under Sections 46 and 48 aforecited, is the
initiation of a complaint against a civil service official or employee, much like the institution of
a criminal complaint, by filing a complaint for preliminary investigation by the fiscal, which
vests the fiscal with the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether to file a criminal case in
court. In the case at bar, the CSCRO was without jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the anonymous complaint. May the CSCRO then file a formal charge against
petition? We rule in the negative.

1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the CSC Regional Office was without jurisdiction
to conduct an investigation on the anonymous complaint.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the CSC Regional Office cannot file a formal
complaint against Dumlao on the basis of an anonymous complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in considering the letter-complaint as the complaint
referred to in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 and the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases

in the Civil Service. A plain reading therein readily shows that the complaint under said statute
and rules both refer to the actual charge to which the person complained of is required to
answer and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation should his answer be
deemed not satisfactory.[8]

And even assuming that Mayor Villegas based his memorandum of April 10, 1970 on the
letter-complaint of Atty. Padlan, the Mayor as the head or chief of the office may, in his
discretion, take action thereon if public interest or the special circumstances of the case
warrant.

In contrast, the letter-complaint in issue simply contained the following averments:[9]

Following this ruling, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the complaint against
Dumlao was initiated by the CSC itself.

1. A department of Education Culture and Sports, Supervisor based in Binalonan is an

undergraduate. He never had a college degree. His name is Neolito Dumlao, presently assigned
as supervisor based in Binalonan, Pangasinan. He claims to have finished his college degree in
U Pang., short for University of Pangasinan in Dagupan City. xxx. A check with the registrar
office will shock you.
2. Dumlao also claims to have taken his M.A. in English at the Zaragoza College of Tayug,
Pangasinan. Check that one too and you will be surprised.
3. He also has many pending cases in court; all criminal cases that includes forgery,
falsification of public documents, and estafa
As can be seen from the bare contents of the anonymous letter, it was not a complaint within
the purview Section 8, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service which requires, among others, the full name and address of the complainant and of the
person complained of, a narration of the relevant and material facts, and certification of nonforum shopping. Neither did it, by itself, commence administrative proceedings, requiring an
answer from Dumlao described under Section 48 (2) of E.O. No. 292, but merely triggered an
investigation by the CSC.

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8,
Rule II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be
initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority,
even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining
authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired.
As regards the actual guilt of Dumlao, the Court notes that while the petition filed before the
Court of Appeals raised both questions of law and fact, the appellate court limited itself to
ruling only on the question of law and refrained from making a ruling on the facts. The Court,
not being a trier of facts, is not in a position to determine whether the facts presented warrant a
finding of guilt against Dumlao.[11] Consequently, this case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings solely to determine the sufficiency of the evidence against
Dumlao.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 56098 are REVERSED. The case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in consonance with this decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Indeed, the letter-complaint is just a plain and simple letter. It was merely a communication
sent to the CSC Regional Office to call its attention to the educational background of Dumlao
that is not different from an information or tip given by telephone to the Regional Office. To
say that the CSC cannot act upon the information because it was from an anonymous caller, or
in this case an anonymous writer, would result in an absurd and restrictive interpretation of
E.O. 292 and effectively deprive the Government of its disciplining power over people who
hold a public trust.
In David v. Villegas,[10] a case cited by the CSC, private respondent therein Padlan charged
petitioner David before the Office of the Mayor with brazen dishonesty. The Mayor issued a
memorandum to David ordering him to explain within seventy-two hours why no
administrative action should be taken against him. Not satisfied with the explanation, the
Mayor ordered the matter investigated and the case was docketed as an administrative case.
Among the issues that reached the Court was Davids argument that Padlans complaint was not
subscribed and sworn to in accordance with Republic Act No. 2260, which provides that no
complaint against a civil servant shall be given due course unless the same is in writing and
subscribed to by the complainant. The Court therein ruled that it was the Mayor who filed the
complaint which, consequently, need not be subscribed and sworn to:
The petitioner-appellant contends that Administrative Case No. 22, Series of 1970, filed against
him is not valid because the letter-complaint of Atty. Jovita Padlan is not sworn to by her. x x x
It appears, however, that Mayor Antonio J. Villegas himself filed the administrative charge
against the petitioner motu proprio. Hence, the complaint need not be subscribed and sworn to.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 154380

- versus Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe
for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question
the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to remarry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered
to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into
law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In
Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The

Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2.
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127718. March 2, 2000]

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, ABELARDO SANGADAN, LUCIANO RAMOS,
NESTOR TILASAN, GREGORIO TILASAN, JOAQUIN GARCIA, ROGELIO SABAITAN,
CASTRO LEONARDO, PILARDO POTENCIANO, RONILLO POTENCIANO,
SANTIAGO SABAITAN, JOVENCIO BARTOLOME, JUANITO CONCERMAN, GEORGE
TUMILAS, PATROCINIO DOMINGO, AVELINO FRANCISCO, MELITON SANGADAN,
ALEXANDER GERONIMO, JOAQUIN GERONIMO, RAMIL MACASO, LAMBERTO
JOVEN, CRISTINO GARINA, SAMMY GANTAAN, NACIAL USTALAN, EDWIN
USTALAN, ROLAND POTENCIANO, RODY CONCERMAN, ELMER DOMINGO,
ARNAGUEZ SANGADAN, UNDING BOLENG, EDUARDO BOLENG, ROBERTO
PANEO and HENRY SANGADAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (5th Division), PATALON COCONUT ESTATE and/or CHARLIE REITH as
General Manager and SUSIE GALLE REITH, as owner, respondents.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

DECISION

WE CONCUR:

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside and annul two (2) resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission[1] promulgated on April 24, 1996[2] and August 29,
1996[3] denying the award of separation pay to petitioners.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Chairman

The pertinent facts are as follows:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Petitioners are bona fide members of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate
labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. They were
employed by private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and
owner, respectively, of the 354-hectare Patalon Coconut Estate located at Patalon, Zamboanga
City. Patalon Coconut Estate was engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising
livestock.
In 1988, Congress enacted into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which mandated the compulsory acquisition of
all covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries under the socalled Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP).

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate
Agrarian Reform Association (PEARA), a cooperative accredited by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), of which petitioners are members and co-owners.
As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon
Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners was severed on July 31, 1994.
Petitioners did not receive any separation pay.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

On August 1, 1994, the cooperative took over the estate. A certain Abelardo Sangadan
informed respondents of such takeover via a letter which was received by the respondents on
July 26, 1994. Being beneficiaries of the Patalon Coconut Estate pursuant to the CARP, the
petitioners became part-owners of the land.[4]

On April 25, 1995, petitioners filed individual complaints before the Regional Arbitration
Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City,
praying for their reinstatement with full backwages on the ground that they were illegally
dismissed. The petitioners were represented by their labor organization, the NFL.

Joaquin Geronimo 24,917.28 1,211.25 26,128.53

Ramil Macaso 6,229.32 861.25 7,090.57
Lamberto Joven 16,611.62 1,011.25 17,622.77

On December 12, 1995, the RAB rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
provides:

Cristino Garina 35,299.48 849.65 36,149.13

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

complainants charge for illegal dismissal for lack of merit, but ordering respondents thru [sic]
its owner-manager or its duly authorized representative to pay complainants separation pay in
view of the latters cessation of operations or forced sale, and for 13th month differential pay in
the amount, as follows, for:

Sammy Gantaan 14,535.08 961.25 15,496.33

Names Separation Pay 13th Mo. Pay Diff. Total

Roland Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 6,102.35

Abelardo Sangadan P23,879.06 N o n e P23,879.06

Rody Concerman 7,267.54 691.25 7,958.79

Luciano Ramos 43,605.24 P711.25 44,316.49

Elmer Domingo 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,325.91

Nestor Tilasan 19,726.18 401.46 20,127.64

Aranquez Sangada 45,681.68 711.25 46,392.93

Gregorio Tilasan 25,955.50 N o n e 25,955.50

Unding Boleng 31,146.60 N o n e 31,146.60

Joaquin Garcia 7,267.54 1,211.25 8,478.79

Eduardo Boleng 35,299.48 759.30 36,058.78

Rogelio Sabaitan 21,798.00 1,211.25 23,009.25

Roberto Paneo 23,876.06 911.25 24,787.31

Castro Leonardo, Jr. 25,955.50 63.10 26,018.60

Henry Sangadan 16,611.52 1,011.25 17,622.77

Pilardo Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 6,102.35

Total Benefits P586,774.22

Ronillo Potenciano 7,267.54 N o n e 7,267.54

"FURTHER, complainants claim for Muslim Holiday, overtime pay and rest day pay should be
dismissed for lack of merit, too."[5]

Nacial Ustalan 38,414.14 79.95 38,494.09

Edwin Ustalan 7,267.54 1,011.25 8,278.79

Jovencio Bartolome 8,305.76 477.25 8,783.01

Appeal was taken by private respondents to public respondent NLRC.[6]
Santiago Sabaitan 4,152.88 1,011.25 5,164.13
On April 24, 1996, the NLRC issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which provides:
Juanito Concerman 7,267.54 611.25 7,928.79
George Tumilas 16,611.52 1,011.25 17,622.77
Patrocinio Domingo 2,076.44 1,011.25 3,087.69
Avelino Francisco 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,325.91
Meliton Sangadan 15,573.30 392.50 15,965.80
Alexander Geronimo 15,573.00 N o n e 15,573.30

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in favor of the following
findings:
1) Respondents are not guilty of illegally dismissing complainants. Respondents cessation of
operation was not due to a unilateral action on their part resulting in the cutting off of the
employment relationship between the parties. The severance of employer-employee
relationship between the parties came about INVOLUNTARILY, as a result of an act of the
State. Consequently, complainants are not entitled to any separation pay.

2) The award of 13th month pay differential is, however, Set Aside. Any award of 13th month
pay differentials to complainants should be computed strictly based on their reduced pay,
equivalent to six (6) hours work, Monday to Friday, pursuant to what the parties agreed in the
November 18, 1991 Compromise Agreement."

[9] The use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally
permissive only.[10] The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[11]

SO ORDERED.[7]

In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the
closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit
of the employees.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution[8] dated August 29, 1996.
Hence, this petition.
The issue is whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of
the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian reform, is
liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to separation pay citing Article 283 of the Labor Code
which reads:
"ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination
due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall
be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not
due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year."

As earlier stated, the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the
said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. Hence, the closure of the Patalon
Coconut Estate was not effected voluntarily by private respondents who even filed a petition to
have said estate exempted from the coverage of RA 6657. Unfortunately, their petition was
denied by the Department of Agrarain Reform. Since the closure was due to the act of the
government to benefit the petitioners, as members of the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform
Association, by making them agrarian lot beneficiaries of said estate, the petitioners are not
entitled to separation pay. The termination of their employment was not caused by the private
respondents. The blame, if any, for the termination of petitioners employment can even be laid
upon the petitioner-employees themselves inasmuch as they formed themselves into a
cooperative, PEARA, ultimately to take over, as agrarian lot beneficiaries, of private
respondents landed estate pursuant to RA 6657. The resulting closure of the business
establishment, Patalon Coconut Estate, when it was placed under CARP, occurred through no
fault of the private respondents.
While the Constitution provides that "the State x x x shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare", that constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not
intended to oppress or destroy capital and management. Thus, the capital and management
sectors must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated April 24, 1996 and August 29, 1996 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena JJ., concur.

It is clear that Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and
reduction of personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves neither
the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the
aforesaid article. When the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed because a large portion of the
estate was acquired by DAR pursuant to CARP, the ownership of that large portion of the
estate was precisely transferred to PEARA and ultimately to the petitioners as members thereof
and as agrarian lot beneficiaries. Hence, Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable to the
case at bench.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the situation in this case were a closure of the business
establishment called Patalon Coconut Estate of private respondents, still the
petitioners/employees are not entitled to separation pay. The closure contemplated under
Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to
close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal
provision that "The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to...".

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5

September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila,
respondents.1
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.

justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the
same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the
Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in
the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the
Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers.
Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and judicial courts
in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and
customs. . . ."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no
substantial change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different
courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they
administered and enforced.

FERIA, J.:
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower
court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were
initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the
Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case
on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas
MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of
an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and
memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next
day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the
districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the
Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as
executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the
past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their
duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine
Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was
appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the
existing central administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed
therefore, with approval of the said Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over
judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative
organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942,
respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the

On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas
MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
1.
That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the
supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government
having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control;
2.
That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and
legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control; and
3.
That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945,
General MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the
full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose
seat is here established as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be
resolved in the present case may be reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;
(2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and
proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been
invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which
were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation
of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the

Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of
international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and
valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the United States and Filipino forces.
1.
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in these
Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If
they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper
legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the
voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the
latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and
later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which
is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the
war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an
independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the
parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in
the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto
governments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of
government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be
more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in
submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are
established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, civil authority,
supported more or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is
found in the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U.
S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during
the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614).
These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at
war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III
of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague
Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the
legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take
steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right
and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation,
he possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and
promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to
respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory,
the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and
regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature
or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear
arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are
considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and
civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is
militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own
hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice;
and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the
belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the
military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These
principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and
have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law
(Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of
a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. .
. . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either
change the existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory,
which were later embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his
executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the
Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant
are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the
inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or
superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as

they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered
to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration
of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the
ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American
Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the
Confederate States as a de facto government. In that case, it was held that "the central
government established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at
Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of
regular war; but it was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it
must be classed among the governments of which these are examples. . . .
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States,
discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of
government, the same general laws for the administration of justice and protection of private
rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance
and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy
of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in
general, to be treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21
Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of
society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was
to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts
enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property
regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions
the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and
kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what
occured or was done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de
facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those
governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution;
this, because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not
relieve those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor
destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular administration
of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within
the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the
de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without
blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or
insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the socalled Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their
purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not
impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was
organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese
forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a

de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established
by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says,
"The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may
exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is
subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such
government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of
its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far
it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine
the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive
Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied the greater part of
Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of a french official
(Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on
invading France, authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions,
apparently without appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The
Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own officials,
at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of every rank.
(Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign
state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a
government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It
was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of
its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General
MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already
quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines'
was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's
will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to
grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or
recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and
possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty
by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established
doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907
(which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to
the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to
transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the
period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of
Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9
Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the
Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the
apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of
government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by
doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in
her war against the United States and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the
Filipino who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and
the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent
government under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would
have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the

parent state or the Unite States. And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar
to that organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such
by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of
Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to
the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during
the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts
in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898,
having first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly
in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the Islands and established a republic,
governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on
February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of
the class of de facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . .
'called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that the government of a
country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state,
rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at
regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that
the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the
fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its
legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the
effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence
to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his
control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction
of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would
be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be
scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should
be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon
criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been
each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the
occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the
Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and
establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a
political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur
on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the
governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not
have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2.
The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any
other government" as used in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of
October 23, 1944 that is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the
American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the
courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during
the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according
to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings,
which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese
military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory
had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not,
and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase
"processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in
violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said
phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C.
L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his
government, may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the
occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation demand such action.
But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in
chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied
by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as
that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the
exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be
presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of
the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of
the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence,
applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of
1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who
enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the
Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines," should not only reverse the international policy and practice of his own
government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our
Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the Nation."
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result,
and great public interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already
adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on
criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may
have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records
in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another

well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a
particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives
who reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or
proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish
in order to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to
paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected
that litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgements or
decisions may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing
crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered
against them may be afterwards set aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of
justice during the Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which
has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of
the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and
provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that
the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not
been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said
Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the
Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly
appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed
cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on
January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on
March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First
Instance during the Japanese regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover
when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be
abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist
to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What
does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the
matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English
edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that
whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to
the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the
restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the
restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it in its
stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the
occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government
established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the

words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not
necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set
aside all judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question
to be determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the
United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary
implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it would be
necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas
MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the proclamation did not so
provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his
powers as Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from
the usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
the public of conscience, constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague
Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the
Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first
question, imposes upon the occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h),
section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . .
suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party,"
forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert
or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals of England in the case of Porter
vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish
courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from
asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military
commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying
or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of
occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be
thwarted, for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts
the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by
the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at
the same time empower another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President
or commanding officer of the United States Army has violated restraints imposed by the
constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and
applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from
general rules of international law and from fundamental principles known wherever the
American flag flies."
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in
command of the forces of the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War,
wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case within its
jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2,
1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and
duties of military officers in command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the
course of its decision the court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2,
1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military
commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we
have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The clearest language would be
necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so
exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be

imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we
are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military
power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the
exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67;
Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject
before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was void."

4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of courts, with the same jurisdiction in
conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no
substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944,
which declared that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts
and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the
Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and
proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of
liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that
the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases
then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon
them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force,
resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their
original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same exception in case
of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)

3.
The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth,
which are the same as those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military
occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts
at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino
forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.
Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the
invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the
ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President
McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are
not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far
as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says:
"From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.596.)
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the
Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military
administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all
the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
continue to be affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain
in their present post and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine
Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on
January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion
that the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take
cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and unless
the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the
transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the
cases commenced and the left pending therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to
the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the
Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws and the courts
had become the institutions of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146),
as they became later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines."
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and
institutions of the country occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the
laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the
territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially
provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the
occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue
or set them aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and
institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the Philippines,
therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907
which prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to
the hostile power, "extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a change made
by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the political life
of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far
as the courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be
allowed to give their sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law,

Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the victor need not allow the use
of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to
violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to
administer justice in the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine,"
upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and
government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and
suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German
Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the name of the
Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once
established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change
merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary
Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his
Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness
of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created,
it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition
until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an
end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by
legislative acts creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which
create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore"
unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are
expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such
proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those
laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands,
which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the
laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the
laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it
necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over
cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and
until they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed
by the said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings
pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the
mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts
are abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance
of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts
having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish
sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the
United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and did not cease to exist, and
proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the Spanish
sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of
First Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases
pending therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136
abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution

of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a
mere proclamation or order that the courts in the Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted
abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of
occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78
provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper
tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court
having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of
provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same
section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal
court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.
That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese
regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the
restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37
which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second
question. Said Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established
under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2)
that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order
considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that existed prior to, and continued
after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated in discussing
the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had
theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been
cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the
Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same
one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time
of the Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up
to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment,
the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which
involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending
in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent
judge of the court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office
as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction
herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now pending in
all the courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed
to the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said
court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.