3783 9181 1 PB PDF

CURBING
CORRUPTION
THE PHILIPPINES
Philippine
Journal IN
of Public
Administration, Vol. LIV, Nos. 1-2 (January- December 2010)
1
Curbing Corruption in the Philippines:

Is this an Impossible Dream?
J ON S.T. QUAH *
This article begins by documenting the pervasive extent of
corruption in the Philippines. It then identifies low salaries, red
tape, low risk of detection and punishment for corrupt offenses, the
importance of family and cultural values, and lack of political will
as the five major causes of rampant corruption in the Philippines.
The anti-corruption measures initiated by the various
administrations since 1950 are analyzed and their effectiveness
evaluated. The ineffectiveness of the many anti-corruption
agencies (ACAs) and laws is reflected in the consistently low
rankings and scores of the Philippines on Transparency
Internationals 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, the Political
Economic Risk Consultancys 2009 survey on corruption, and the
World Banks 2008 control of corruption indicator. The lack of
political will is responsible for the Philippines ineffective anticorruption strategy which relies on overlapping, uncoordinated,
and inadequately staffed and funded multiple ACAs. This article
concludes that curbing corruption in the Philippines remains an
impossible dream until its political leaders demonstrate that they
have the political will to minimize the major causes of corruption
and to relinquish their reliance on the existing ineffective multiple
ACAs.
The Philippines does not need a foreign invader to destroy it.

The officials in government are already doing a good job in
causing the nation our heroes fought for so dearly to
ultimately perish.
Raymundo Julio A. Olaguer (2006: 88)
Corruption is a serious problem in the Philippines according to

Transparency Internationals 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the
Political Economic Risk Consultancys (PERC) 2009 survey of corruption in
Asian countries, and the World Banks 2008 data on the control of corruption
indicator. Why is corruption rampant in the Philippines? What measures have
been taken by the various governments to combat corruption in the
Philippines? How effective are the anti-corruption measures that have been
introduced since the 1950s, when the fight against corruption began? Is
*Professor of Political Science, National University of Singapore until his retirement

in June 2007. He is now an anti-corruption consultant based in Singapore.
Email: jonstquah@gmail.com; Website: http://www.jonstquah.com.
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PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
curbing corruption in the Philippines an impossible dream? This article

addresses these questions and contends that the major obstacle to curbing
corruption in the Philippines is the lack of political will of the various
administrations since the attainment of independence from the United States
in July 1946.
There are many definitions of corruption. Heidenheimer (1970: 4-6) has
identified three types of definitions namely: public-office-centered, marketcentered, and public-interest-centered definitions of corruption. However, for
this article, corruption refers to the misuse of public power, office or
authority for private benefitthrough bribery, extortion, influence-peddling,
nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement (UNDP 1999: 7). This publicoffice-centered definition is useful because it identifies the seven major forms
of corruption, and it is applicable to both the public and private sectors. It is
also important to distinguish between grand corruption and petty corruption.
Grand corruption refers to the misuse of public power by heads of state,
ministers and top officials for private, pecuniary profit (Moody-Stuart 1997:
2). In contrast, petty or survival corruption is practiced by underpaid junior
civil servants who demand bribes from the public to expedite transactions or
perform other favors.
This article is divided into five sections. The first section documents the
perceived extent of corruption in the Philippines by examining various
sources. The second section identifies the causes of corruption in the
Philippines. The third section analyzes the anti-corruption measures initiated
by various governments since the establishment of the first anti-corruption
agency in May 1950. The fourth section evaluates the effectiveness of the anticorruption measures. The concluding section contends that without political
will curbing corruption in the Philippines will remain an impossible dream.
Perceived Extent of Corruption in the Philippines
The network of corruption in the Philippines comprehends such a
wide range of civic and legal necessities and requisites that
Filipinos are left with little or no choice but to live with it. . . .
Truth to tell, it is widely perceived that corruption has footprints
on the floors of every public office in the Philippines, including the
Presidential Palace.
Joselito D.R. Obejas (2009: 97)

After World War II, the bureaucracy in the Philippines suffered from
low prestige, incompetence, meager resources, and a large measure of
cynical corruption (Corpuz 1957: 222-223). The colonial bureaucracys low
prestige was the result of its low salaries and the corrupt behavior of its
members. Bureaucratic corruption became a serious problem during the
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CURBING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES
1950s, especially during the administration of President Elpidio Quirino (19481953) because corruption permeated the entire gamut of the Philippine
bureaucracy, extending from the lowest level of the civil service to the top,
excepting the President himself (Alfiler 1979: 323).
In January 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia highlighted the problem of
graft and corruption in his State of the Nation Address to Congress:
In our essay at making our social and economic objectives a fact
accomplished, we are hampered by a cancer gnawing at our
national entrails. Graft and corruption . . . is . . . a national
problem. The problem of graft and corruption is not peculiar to our
administration in this country. Nor is it a new one. It has plagued
all administrations before us. Nevertheless, I do not condone nor
minimize the significance of this blight (Quoted in Iglesias 1963:
20).
In 1969, the Philippine Ethnic Group Attitude Surveys found, among

other things, that 66 percent of the 1,381 Filipinos interviewed believed that
graft and corruption were prevalent and constituted a major problem
(Averech, Koehler, and Denton 1971: 31). When the respondents were asked
Which officials are corrupt? thirty-eight percent identified politicians as
corrupt, 36 percent viewed government employees as corrupt, and 22 percent
considered local politicians as corrupt. Finally, the respondents from Manila
viewed politicians and government employees as corrupt unlike the Ilocano,
Muslim, Pampango, and lower-income respondents (Averech, Koehler, and
Denton 1971: 32-33).
In their analysis of the bureaucracy in the Philippines, Raul P. de
Guzman, Alex B. Brillantes Jr., and Arturo G. Pacho (1988: 197-198) identified
a total of 13 problems facing the bureaucracy, including the problem of graft
and corruption. They also referred to a study on corruption and red tape
conducted by the College of Public Administration, University of the
Philippines, which confirmed the existence of the systemic form of corruption
in many agencies.
Similarly, David Timberman (1991: 25) pointed out that corruption was
not only endemic to Philippine politics, but the more serious problem was the
widespread assumption that corruption is unavoidable. Consequently, few
Filipino politicians have left office without having significantly increased their
wealth because money is needed to acquire and hold public office,
particularly national office. He further observed that the magnitude of
corruption had increased exponentially during the Marcos administration,
which was described as a kleptocracy by U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz
(Timberman 1991: 104).
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Corruption in the Philippines reached its highest level during the 21

years of Marcos rule (1965-1986). According to Amelia P. Varela (1995: 173174):
Graft and corruption reached its all time high during the martial
law regime under Marcos. . . . Graft and corruption under Marcos
had permeated almost all aspects of bureaucratic life and
institutions which saw the start of the systematic plunder of the
country.
In the same vein, Joel Rocamora (1998: 22-23) observed that Marcos
perfected . . . a vacuum cleaner approach to corruption as he and his
relatives picked the government clean, siphoned large chunks of the tens of
billions of dollar loans which flowed liberally in the 1970s. Grand corruption
under the Marcos regime ranged from theft of foreign and military aid to the
domestic system of crony capitalism and required an extensive use of money
laundering devices (Chaikin and Sharman 2009: 153).
The most comprehensive study of corruption in the Philippines during
Marcos rule was conducted by Belinda A. Aquino. She described the politics
of plunder perpetrated by Marcos and his relatives and cronies in these
words:
His declaration of martial law in 1972 under false pretexts not only
protected the fortune he had already acquired, most illicitly over
the past two decades. It also served to accelerate the amassing of
even more power and wealth for several more years. . . . He lorded
it [the economy] over a rapacious team of trusted friends and
associates whom he had given lucrative fiefdoms in the economy.
Together they stole high and low, from both rich and poor. They
treated the Philippine treasury as if it were their personal
checking account. The consuming preoccupation with wealth
accumulation was abetted by multi-million international loans and
massive U.S. foreign assistance packages that were meant for
economic
development.
These
resources
provided
easy
opportunities for massive graft. As long as they were available, the
stealing by Marcos and his cronies went unabated. . . . In the end,
the Philippines had been bled of billions of dollars and had become
the basket case of Asia by the late 1970s (Aquino 1999: 120-121).
Carmen Navarro Pedrosa (1987: 222) estimated that Marcos had amassed
a staggering $15 billion, which was more than half of the countrys national
debt. The Marcoses used the government banks as piggy banks and diverted
US$27 million of Philippine National Bank funds for their own use (Chaikin
and Sharman 2009: 160). Among the ten most corrupt political leaders
identified by Transparency International in 2004, Marcos was ranked second
after President Suharto of Indonesia as Marcos was estimated to have
embezzled between US$5 and US$10 billion. Joseph Estrada, who was ranked
as the tenth most corrupt political leader, had embezzled between US$78 and
US$80 million when he was President of the Philippines from 1998 to 2001
(Hodess et al. 2004: 13).
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The Marcos regime was described as sultanistic by Mark Thompson

(1998: 216) as it was based on personalism and loyalty to Marcos was
motivated by a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. President
Marcos had appointed his relatives and close friends as directors of
government agencies, corporations, and development projects in the sugar
and coconut industries, hotels and resorts, and the construction sector. The
Marcos kleptocracy was characterized by the provision of behest loans to
members of his family, cronies, or political supporters by the governmentowned financial institutions. 1 Needless to say, their mismanagement and
agenda of personal gain had adverse consequences as the government was
deprived of positive returns on investments and profitable use of foreign
loans. More importantly, the government had to bear the deficits and losses
and incurred heavy foreign debts, which increased from US$16.98 to US$26
billion from 1982 to1985, for bailing out Marcos cronies (Rebullida 2006: 170).
The annual surveys of business enterprises on corruption conducted by
the Social Weather Stations (SWS) from 2000 to 2007 have shown that, on the
average, nearly two-thirds of the managers interviewed said that there was a
lot of corruption in the public sector in the Philippines. Table 1 shows that
while the proportion of managers indicating that there was a lot of public
sector corruption has declined from 77 percent in 2001 to 61 percent in 2007,
the average percentage for 2000-2007 is 65.7 percent. The percentage of
managers who perceived that there was a lot of public sector corruption
increased to 64 percent in 2008 and 2009 (Guerrero et al. 2010: 5).
Table 1. Managers Perception of Extent of Public Sector Corruption
in the Philippines, 2000-2007
Extent
2000
2001
2002/03
2003/04
2005
2006
2007
Average
A lot
63%
77%
60%
66%
66%
67%
61%
65.7%
Some
25%
19%
29%
26%
28%
28%
33%
26.9%
A little
10%
4%
10%
6%
5%
5%
5%
6.4%
None
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
0.3%
1.0%
Source: Guerrero et al. (2007: 7).
The managers were also asked to identify those government agencies or

corporations with a bad reputation due to corruption. Table 2 shows that the
seven most corrupt government agencies in the Philippines identified by the
managers were: the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Philippine
National Police (PNP), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Department of Education
(DepEd).
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Table 2. Managers Perception of Most Corrupt Government Agencies

Agency
2000
2001
2002/03
2003/04
2005
2006
2007
Average
Customs
74%
65%
66%
70%
65%
61%
60%
65.9%
BIR
72%
67%
68%
68%
64%
51%
46%
62.3%
DPWH
57%
38%
49%
49%
46%
37%
35%
44.4%
PNP
16%
32%
29%
28%
19%
11%
11%
20.9%
LTO
4%
5%
20%
21%
17%
13%
15%
13.6%
DENR
5%
10%
14%
10%
17%
12%
7%
10.7%
DepEd
22%
7%
8%
8%
9%
7%
7%
9.7%
In the 2009 SWS Surveys of Enterprises on Corruption, the respondents

were asked to rate the sincerity or insincerity of government agencies in
fighting corruption. Table 3 shows that the BOC, DPWH, and BIR were
perceived by the managers to be the least sincere in combating corruption. It
should be noted that the Office of the President (OP) was ranked fifth with a
net sincere rating of -37 percent. The three anti-corruption agencies were also
viewed negatively by the managers with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
receiving a net sincere rating of -8 percent, followed by -28 percent for the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and -33 percent for
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC).
Surprisingly, the Bureau of Immigration (BI) was not identified among
the most corrupt government agencies in Table 2 even though it was riddled
with corruption. According to retired Colonel Salvador Rodolfo, a former
intelligence consultant of the BI:
The Bureau of Immigration is the worst agency in the Philippine
republic enmeshed in graft and corruption, and the only language
spoken from commissioners down to clerks and janitors is money,
money, dirty money (Quoted in Chua and Rimban 1998: 153).
Corruption in the BI was systemic and permeated every rung in the

bureaus hierarchy because of the discretion given to immigration officials to
determine the lives and destinies of both aliens living in the Philippines and
Filipinos leaving for abroad, the opportunities for payoffs abound (Chua and
Rimban 1998: 153-154).
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Table 3. Net Sincerity Rating of Government Agencies in

Fighting Corruption, 2009
Agency
Sincere Rating
(a)
Insincere Rating
(b)
Net Sincere Rating

(a-b)
Bureau of Customs
9%
78%
- 69%
DPWH
10%
75%
- 65%
BIR
14%
71%
- 57%
LTO
21%
60%
- 39%
Office of President
24%
61%
- 37%
House of Representatives
20%
54%
- 34%
DENR
23%
57%
- 34%
PAGC
16%
49%
- 33%
DOTC
21%
50%
- 29%
PCGG
19%
47%
- 28%
DILG
24%
49%
- 25%
DA
27%
46%
- 19%
PNP
27%
44%
- 17%
DBM
27%
44%
- 17%
Ombudsman
32%
40%
- 8%
COMELEC
33%
41%
- 8%
GSIS
33%
39%
- 6%
DOJ
36%
41%
- 5%
DOF
34%
38%
- 4%
Senate
35%
37%
- 2%
The DPWH was identified in Table 2 as the third most corrupt

government agency and in Table 3 as the second least sincere government
agency in fighting corruption in 2009. The DPWH had earned a reputation as
a bastion of graft because it encouraged the payment of commissions and
bribes and discouraged honesty since honest employees and whistle-blowers
risk ostracism by their colleagues. As the DPWH dealt with huge
infrastructure projects involving vast sums of expenditure, bribes were
usually paid in cash and commissions were given after winning the contracts.
Consequently, the DPWH became known as a den of corrupt practices
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because there were ample opportunities for corruption among its employees
and external vested interests (Vitug 1998: 188).
Similarly, Yvonne T. Chuas excellent case study of the Philippines
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) demonstrates
graphically an education bureaucracy so ridden with graft that it is barely
able to deliver the most basic educational services to the countrys 15 million
public school students (Chua 1999: 1). She contends that corruption has
become systemic at the DECS and has permeated all levels of the public
educational system. Corruption in the DECS has assumed many forms, from
petty or survival corruption to top-level corruption, with procurement and
recruitment being the areas most vulnerable to corruption. According to Chua
(1999: 3):
Money changes hands at nearly every stage of procurement, from
the accreditation to the payment of suppliers. Money is also given
out from the time a teacher applies for a job up to the time she
requests for a change in assignment or works for a promotion. In
some cases, expensive gifts replace money in cash-less transactions
that take place in the education bureaucracy.
Furthermore, embezzlement, nepotism, influence peddling, fraud and

other types of corruption also flourish at the DECS. Indeed, corruption has
been institutionalized in the DECS because payoffs have become the lubricant
that makes the bureaucracy run smoothly (Chua 1999: 3). Finally, Chua
(1999: 11) lamented that one of the greatest tragedies of corruption in the
public school system is when teachers pass on their warped values to
students. In some schools, teachers teach young schoolchildren to cheat in
tests because it is on the basis of these tests that the schools performance is
assessed.
Unfortunately, Chuas expos of the rampant corruption in the DECS did
not result in the introduction of policy reforms by the government in the
DECS to reduce the opportunities for corruption. A more recent study of the
Textbook Delivery Program (TDP) in the DepEd has confirmed that
documented corruption linkages in the TDP are alarmingly high with
corrupt practices taking the form of (i) falsification of records to obtain
substantial money transactions; (ii) delivery of substandard textbooks, delay
in actual deliveries and insufficient amounts; and (iii) the misuse and
diversion of resources to unauthorised uses (Reyes 2007: 121). Vicente Chua
Reyes Jr. (2009: 218-219) has attributed the TDPs vulnerability to corruption
to these five factors: (1) insubordination and ambiguity in sanction control
among the key actors; (2) TDP operating procedures were in disarray; (3) TDP
implementers, especially the school-based supply officers, were incapable of
performing their jobs efficiently; (4) discordance and lack of coordination
among the TDP implementers at different levels; and (5) the exercise of
abusive discretionary authority.
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In May 2009, DepEd officials suspended Jeverps Manufacturing

Corporation (JMC) for supplying overpriced and substandard noodles to
schools involved in the P427 million food-aid program to improve the
nutritional needs of school children in 13 food-poor provinces. This program
provided meals for 373,440 pre-school and first-grade school children for 104
days to keep them in school. JMC won the contract to supply 19 million packs
of supposedly vitamins-fortified noodles to schools participating in the
program in 2009. The winning tender of P22 per packet of noodles with higher
nutritional content was almost three times more expensive than those sold in
shops. JMC was investigated for corruption and the food-aid program was
reviewed by independent experts to ascertain the nutritional contents of the
noodles and the programs cost-effectiveness (Daily Tribune 2009 accessed
http://www.daily tribune.net.ph).
In short, the preceding analysis confirms the prevalence of corruption in
the Philippines. Rachel Caoili (2005: 9) contends that, in spite of its
commitment to liberal democratic values, a culture of corruption persists in
the Philippines. In the same vein, Eric C. Batalla (2001: 50) argues that the
most serious consequence of institutionalized corruption in the Philippines
is that it damages the national psyche because it miseducates and tells
people that there is nothing wrong in being corrupt as corrupt people have
not been punished even if the public knows them.
Corruption is, perhaps, the most serious weakness of the Philippine
polity because it prevents national progress and perpetuates inequality and
poverty thereby seriously undermining the legitimacy of the government and
democracy (Caoili 2005: 9). Poverty in the Philippines is at an unacceptable
level as one in three Filipinos survived on $1 a day or less in 2006 (Cerojano
2009). This high level of poverty means that corruption in the Philippines
hits the poor hardest because of their inability to pay bribes for services
that should be theirs by right (UNDP 2008: 17). Accordingly, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has urged governments in the
Asia-Pacific region to reduce the forms of corruption that hit the poor the
hardest because the poor will benefit more from efforts to eliminate the
corruption that plagues their everyday lives (UNDP 2008: 152).
Causes of Corruption in the Philippines
Bribery proliferates and is sustained among agencies that do not
address the need for efficiency for procedures and effectiveness of
service delivery. Bribery is sustained in a system where personnel
get meager pay from government employment. . . . The culture of
corruption is sustained by a sub-culture . . . of gift giving,
reciprocity, clientelism, the so-called dark side of social capital,
fixing, facilitation used in a negative way, dualism, and the
expansive yet discretionary use of bureaucratic power. (Co et al.
2007: 35, 37)
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10
Corruption was introduced in the Philippines by the Spanish as the low

salaries and poor working conditions of the bureaucrats and the many
opportunities available for corrupt behavior contributed to the widespread
corruption in the colonial bureaucracy (Quah 1982: 158). For example, the
gobernadorcillo, or little governor, was paid a miserable salary of P2 a month
which was not commensurate with the extensive duties he had to perform
including, among other things, being the village mayor, justice of the peace,
and supervisor of tribute and tax-collections (Corpuz 1957: 111-112). A public
office was viewed as a grant or favor from the King during the Spanish
colonial period and many bureaucrats actually treated the transaction as a
businessselling an office at a profit and buying a more lucrative one
(Endriga 1979: 247-249). Corpuz (1957: 129) contended that the most serious
weakness of the Spanish colonial bureaucracy was the internal moral
corruption of its members.
Damon L. Woods (2006: 156-157) traced the roots of political corruption
in the Philippines to the Spanish system of governance. The King of Spain
appointed a friend or supporter as the governor-general to represent him in
the Philippines. As the governor-general and his officials were not always
qualified or dedicated, they had also expected to profit, through graft and
corruption, from service. Similarly, the lower-ranking officials also made
their fortunes through bribery and neglecting the instructions from the
central government in Manila. Accordingly, public service was viewed by the
population as a means of obtaining financial benefits for their own families. In
short, individuals were expected to advance their personal and familys
interests at the expense of the communitys interests.
During the American colonial period (1898-1913), there were two groups
of corrupt bureaucrats: civilians and discharged soldiers appointed without
examination by the previous military government; and the justices of the
peace who were also appointed without examination and did not receive
salaries, but could collect fees for their judicial services (Corpuz 1957: 169).
Scandals involving the police, the Bureau of Public Works, and the Philippine
General Hospital were also reported during the administration of GovernorGeneral W. Cameron Forbes (1909-1913) (Gleeck 1998: 152-153). However, the
bureaucracy as a whole was quite clean during the American colonial period
for two reasons: the bureaucrats received higher salaries and corrupt officials
were promptly prosecuted. Thus, the two major causes of corruption
responsible for the rampant corruption during the Spanish colonial period
low salaries and ineffective legal measureswere removed in the American
colonial bureaucracy and this explains why it was less corrupt than the
Spanish colonial bureaucracy (Endriga 1979: 254).
Why is corruption such a serious problem today in the Philippines? The
first factor responsible for corruption in the contemporary Philippines is the
low salaries of the political leaders and civil servants. For example, employees
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of the Bureau of Immigration are under-qualified and paid starvation wages.

Consequently they find it difficult to survive without accepting bribes, one
way or the other, because nearly everyone is doing it (Chua and Rimban
1998: 154). The monthly salary of the most junior civil servant (salary grade
1, step 1) in 1976 was P286 (US$36) and the monthly salary of the most senior
civil servant (salary grade 28, step 8) was P5,935 (US$747) (Fernandez 1980:
422). According to Perfecto L. Padilla (1995: 187), the grossly low
compensation is an unchallenged fact in Philippine government
administration because salary revisions cannot keep pace with the rising cost
of living, and civil service salaries are not as attractive and competitive as
those offered by private companies, multinational corporations, and regional/
international organizations.
In a survey of public attitudes towards corruption in the Philippines
conducted in September 1998, the problem of low salaries was cited most often
as the major cause of corruption (Beschel 1999: 9). Table 4 shows that the
monthly salary of the President of the Philippines is P50,000 (US$1,077),
while the Vice-President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court earn between
P40,000 to 47,547 (US$861 to 1,024) per month. The monthly salaries of
senators, members of the House of Representatives, and associate justices of
the Supreme Court range from P35,000 to 41,604 (US$754 to 896). In contrast,
most of the civil servants earn salaries which are 74 percent below
comparable jobs in the private sector, [thus] encouraging corruption in all
levels of the bureaucracy (Reuters India 2009). Consequently, these poorlypaid civil servants augment their meager incomes by resorting to such
practices as selling goods to their colleagues in the office, moonlighting,
part-time teaching, private professional practice after office hours, research
and consultancy projects, and petty corrupt practices (Padilla 1995: 195-206).
Recently, 11,000 Filipino doctors retrained themselves as nurses in order
to emigrate to other countries like the United States because it is much
harder for a Philippine-trained doctor to pass medical board exams in a
foreign country than for a Filipino nurse to be certified abroad (Harden 2008:
A13-A14). The health-care brain drain of physicians in the Philippines to other
countries to work as nurses has strangled rural hospitals across the country.
The motivation for this change in career is financial as in the United States,
a nurse can make 10 times the [US]$4,700 annual salary of a government
doctor in the Philippines. The exodus of doctors from the provinces has
resulted in a shortage of doctors in the poor rural areas. Rey Melchor F.
Santos, the President of the Philippine Medical Association, has revealed that
there are rural hospitals that are no longer operating because they have no
medical manpower (Harden 2008: A14).
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12
Table 4. Salary Grades and Salaries of Constitutional Officials

in the Philippines
Salary
Grade
Monthly Salary*
Annual Salary
President of the
Philippines
33
50,000 pesos
(US$1,077)
600,000 pesos
(US$12,924)
Vice-President of the
Philippines
32
40,000 to 47,547 pesos

(US$861 to 1,024)
480,000 to 570,564 pesos

(US$10,332 to 12,288)
President of the Senate
32
40,000 to 47,547 pesos

(US$861 to 1,024)
480,000 to 570,564 pesos

(US$10,332 to 12,288)
Speaker of the House

of Representatives
32
40,000 to 47,547 pesos

(US$861 to 1,024)
480,000 to 570,564 pesos

(US$10,332 to 12,288)
Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court
32
40,000 to 47,547 pesos

(US$861 to 1,024)
480,000 to 570,564 pesos

(US$10,332 to 12,288)
Senator
31
35,000 to 41,604 pesos

(US$754 to 896)
420,000 to 499,248 pesos

(US$9,048 to 10,752)
Member of the House

of Representatives
31
35,000 to 41,604 pesos

(US$754 to 896)
420,000 to 499,248 pesos

(US$9,048 to 10,752)
Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court
31
35,000 to 41,604 pesos

(US$754 to 896)
420,000 to 499,248 pesos

(US$9,048 to 10,752)
Position
Source: Tendero (2000: 195, 198).

*Except for salary grade (SG) 33, SG 31 and 32 have eight steps each. The monthly
salary indicated for each position is the range from step 1 to step 8. The conversion of pesos
to US$ is based on the exchange rate of US$1 = P46.43 at the time of writing on 28 February
2010.
Second, the excessive red tape and inefficiency of the Philippine Civil
Service provide ample opportunities for corruption. Indeed, papers in the
government are processed in an unsystematic and time-consuming manner.
Furthermore, the cumbersome and complicated procedures also slow down
paper processing. The filing systems are disorganized and there is no disposal
policy for files accumulated for many years. In other words, there is much
room for simplifying procedures in the bureaucracy (de Guzman, Brilliantes,
and Pacho 1988: 199). Excessive regulations coupled with increased
bureaucratic discretion provide opportunities and incentives for corruption as
regulations governing access to goods and services are exploited by civil
servants to extract rents from groups vying for access to these goods and
services (Gould and Amaro-Reyes 1983: 17). Accordingly, businessmen in the
Philippines resort to paying speed money (bribes) to expedite the processing
of their applications for licenses or permits from the relevant government
agency (de Guzman, Brillantes, and Pacho 1988: 198).
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13
The Doing Business Surveys 2007-2009 conducted by the World Bank

show that red tape is a serious problem in the Philippines as reflected in its
consistently poor ranking for the ease of doing business: 126 th position among
175 countries in 2007; 133 rd position among 181 countries in 2008; and 140 th
position among 181 countries in 2009. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that the
Philippines rank for starting a business deteriorated from 108 th position in
2007 to 155 th in 2009 because the number of procedures increased from 11 to
15; the length of time increased from 48 to 52 days; and the cost rose from
18.7 percent to 29.8 percent.
Table 5. Business Indicators and CPI Rank and Score
Indicator
2007
(N=175)
2008
(N=181)
2009
(N=181)
Ease of doing business (rank)
126
133
140
Starting a business (rank)
108
144
155
No. of procedures
Time (days)
Cost (% of GNI per capita)
11
48
18.7
15
58
26.8
15
52
29.8
Dealing with construction

permits or licenses (rank)
113
77
105
No. of procedures
Time (days)
Cost (% of income per capita)
23
197
113.4
21
177
75.9
24
203
90.1
Registering property (rank)
98
86
97
No. of procedures
Time (days)
Cost (% of property value)
8
33
5.7
8
33
4.2
8
33
4.3
CPI Rank and Score
131st
(2.5)
141st
(2.3)
139th
(2.4)
Sources: World Bank (2006: 135; 2007: 144; 2008: 128) and http://
www.transparency.org.
Third, corruption has flourished in the Philippines because of the low

risk of detection of corrupt offenses and the low probability of punishment for
corrupt offenders. Leslie Palmier (1985: 271) uses the term policing to refer
to the probability of detection and punishment. Corruption thrives in a
country where the public perceives it to be a low risk, high reward activity
as corrupt offenders are unlikely to be detected and punished (Quah 2003: 13).
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14
In his memoirs, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore attributed the
lack of punishment of Marcos, his family and cronies for their corrupt
activities to the soft, forgiving culture of the Philippines. He observed:
Only in the Philippines could a leader like Ferdinand Marcos, who
pillaged his country for over 20 years, still be considered for a
national burial. Insignificant amounts of the loot have been
recovered, yet his wife and children were allowed to return and
engage in politics. . . . General Fabian Ver, Marcoss commanderin-chief . . . had fled the Philippines together with Marcos in 1986.
When he died in Bangkok, the Estrada government gave the
general military honours at his burial (Lee 2000: 342-343).
Robert P. Beschel Jr. (1999: 8) observed that sanctions were

inconsistently imposed in the Philippines, with draconian punishment being
meted out for relatively minor infractions and major crimes receiving lenient
treatmentparticularly when they are committed by the rich, the powerful
and the politically well-connected. In his comparative analysis of successful
prosecution of corrupt offenders in Hong Kong and the Philippines, Beschel
(1999: 8) found that a person committing a corrupt offense in Hong Kong was
33 times more likely to be detected and punished than his counterpart in the
Philippines. More specifically, he found that Hong Kongs Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) successfully prosecuted about 8.24
cases per 10,000 civil servants for corruption in 1997. On the other hand, the
comparable figure in the Philippines was less than 0.25 per 10,000. The lower
probability of being convicted for corruption in the Philippines was confirmed
by the former Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (2004: 37) who revealed that
the Office of the Special Prosecutors conviction rate at the Sandiganbayan
(the Anti-Graft Court) was a dismal 6 percent. This low percentage means
that a high-ranking government official accused of graft and corruption has a
94 percent chance of walking away scot-free.
Fourth, the importance of the family and the cultural value of utang na
loob (debt of gratitude) among Filipinos have made them more tolerant of
corruption. The family plays a central role in the Philippines because:
It is the primary vehicle for socialization of the young; the source
of emotional and financial support for its members; and the chief
claimant of loyalty. . . . The primacy of the family is reinforced by
custom, embedded in Catholic teachings, and proclaimed in the
1987 Constitution (Timberman 1991:16).
Another characteristic of the Filipino family is that kinship ties extend

bilaterally to include the families of both spouses. It is further extended
through the compadre system, in which a prominent man in the community
is chosen as the childs godfather and the compadre of the parent. 2 The
godfather acts as an intermediary in dealings with the government and he
receives in return gifts or free labor services in election campaigns and other
political situations. In other words, the compadre system encourages the
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15
Filipinos to work whenever possible through an intermediary (Langston 1991:

71).
Gaudioso C. Sosmea Jr. (1995: 13) attributed the culture of patronage in
the Philippines to the Filipinos reverence for the family because whenever
one holds a seat of administrative and political power, the members of this
persons family and immediate relatives use the power and influence of the
position as a bridge in getting preferential government employment. More
recently, Balanga Bishop Socrates Villegas has described corruption in the
Philippines as family-based thus:
The singular trademark of graft and corruption in the Philippines .
. . is that our type of corruption is family-based. . . . The
corruption syndicate is either husband and wife partnership or a
father and son connivance or a whole family in cahoots.
Corruption is done through the family, with the family and in the
family. . . . Families are no longer just corruptible but have become
blatantly corrupt and corrupting (Quoted in Acua 2009).
Another contributing factor to the culture of patronage is the importance

of the cultural value of utang na loob (or debt of gratitude) which is incurred
when one receives a favor, service, or goods. It also implies a deep sense of
obligation to reciprocate when the appropriate moment comes (Langston 1991:
78-79). Indeed, utang na loob reinforces the strength of the network of strong
inter-family groups as it demands that all favors be returned in like or
greater value. These favors encourage patronage between superiors and
subordinates and perpetuate the domination of elite groups deriving their
power from the extensiveness of their networks (Kharas 1997: 471).
Consequently, it is not surprising that nepotism is prevalent in the
Philippines as public officials readily perform favors for their relatives,
including the appointment of unqualified persons. For example, in the case of
education, many people unfit for the teaching profession end up teaching in
and running public schools and they pay P3,000 to P5,000 in bribes to
ensure their admission and give up one to three months pay to recompense
their utang na loob (debt of gratitude) to their superiors when their initial
paychecks arrive (Chua 1999: 10).
Finally, the lack of political will is responsible for the rampant
corruption in the Philippines. Defining political will as the use of the power
one has to effect changes desired by the society, Ledivina V. Cario (1994:
115-118) identified six reasons for the lack of political will in curbing
corruption in the Philippines. First, the decentralization of power was not
accompanied by regular monitoring and evaluation of the subordinates
performance. Second, the inability of the political elite and senior civil
servants to distinguish between public needs and private interests resulted in
many conflicts of interest. Third, officials were not punished for their failure
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16
to perform their duties. Fourth, political will was lacking as there was
unequal or selective enforcement of the laws. Fifth, political will did not exist
as pronouncements were not followed by action. Sixth, political will was
absent as adequate manpower and funds were not provided for the
implementation of the anti-corruption measures.
Anti-Corruption Measures
Too many cooks spoil the broth.
English idiom3
The fight against corruption began in May 1950 when President Quirino
created the Integrity Board consisting of five members to investigate
complaints of graft and corruption against civil servants. However, this first
anti-corruption agency was short-lived as the lack of public support led to its
dissolution five months later (Quah 1982: 159).
After winning the 1953 presidential election, Ramon Magsaysay
established the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) to
reduce inefficiency and dishonesty in the civil service. He also issued
Administrative Order No. 1 to prevent public officials from participating in
certain types of official transactions with their real or imaginary relatives.
The first anti-corruption law was the Forfeiture Law of 1955, which
authorized the state to forfeit in its favor any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employer (Alfiler 1979: 324-325).
Unfortunately, this law was ineffective as there were no conviction even after
four years of its passage.
President Magsaysays untimely death in an air crash in 1957 led to the
emergence of the Garcia administration (1957-1962), which abolished the
PCAC and replaced it with the Presidential Committee on Administrative
Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) and the Presidential Fact-Finding Committee
(PFFC) in 1958 to implement the governments anti-graft campaign. In
February 1960, President Garcia formed a third agency known as the
Presidential Anti-Graft Committee (PAGC) (Alfiler 1979: 331-337). Two months
later, the second anti-corruption law, Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, entitled the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, was passed. 4 RA No. 3019 identified
eleven types of corrupt acts among public officials and required them to file
every two years a detailed and sworn statement of their assets and liabilities.
President Garcia was succeeded by President Diosdado Macapagal, who
served from 1962 to 1965. Macapagal created the Presidential Anti-Graft
Committee (PAGCOM). In 1965, Marcos replaced Macapagal as President and
abolished PAGCOM and formed the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) in January 1966. Three other agencies were
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17
created to assist PARGO to fight corruption: the Presidential Complaints and

Action Office (PCAO), the Complaints and Investigations Office (CIO), and the
Special Cabinet Committee in Backsliding (Alfiler 1979: 339-346). The third
anti-corruption law, RA No. 6028, which provided for the formation of the
Office of the Citizens Counsellor, was passed in August 1969, but was not
implemented.
President Marcos declared martial law on 22 September 1972 and ended
over a quarter century of robust, if often irresponsible and elitist, democratic
politics (Timberman 1991: 75). The remaining anti-corruption laws were the
four Presidential Decrees (PD) issued by President Marcos after the
establishment of martial law. PD No. 6 identified 29 administrative offenses
and empowered heads of departments to dismiss guilty officials immediately.
This resulted in the sacking of nearly 8,000 public officials. Two months later,
PD No. 46 prevented public officials from receiving and private individuals
from giving gifts on any occasion including Christmas. Finally, PD No. 677
and PD No. 749 are amendments to RA No. 3019, requiring all government
employees to submit statements of their assets and liabilities every year,
instead of every other year; and providing immunity from prosecution for
those willing to testify against public officials or citizens accused of corruption
(Alfiler 1979: 326-327).
However, these purges were ineffective as many of those who were fired
were already retired or dead, while others were exonerated and the charges
were dropped. Ten months later, many implicated officials were still at their
posts. Moreover, the criteria for these purges were random and encouraged
fear and indifference rather than excellence. Most importantly, the Marcos
regimes efforts in curbing corruption lacked credibility among the public as
there was growing suspicion that the worst offenders were sitting in the
presidents palace (Root 1996: 116). By 1976, corruption had become rampant
as grand corruption by Marcos and his cabinet encouraged the spread of petty
corruption.
The Philippines is the Asian country with the most anti-corruption
measures as it has relied on seven laws and 19 presidential anti-corruption
agencies (ACAs) since it began its fight against corruption in the 1950s. Table
6 provides details of the 19 presidential ACAs. The proliferation of ACAs is the
result of the frequent changes in political leadership as these agencies are
either created or abolished by the President. From May 1950 to January 1966,
five ACAs were formed and dissolved as there were five changes in political
leadership during that period. Similarly, President Marcos created another
five ACAs during his 21 years in power because the first three agencies were
ineffective and lasted between eight months and two years (Quah 1982: 168169). In December 1978, President Marcos formed the Sandiganbayan (Special
Anti-Graft Court) by issuing PD No. 1606 and, in July 1979, the Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) through PD No. 1630.
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18
Table 6. Presidential Anti-Corruption Agencies in the Philippines

(1950-2009)
Anti-Corruption Agency
President
Period
Integrity Board
Quirino
May to November 1950
Presidential Complaints and Action

Committee
Magsaysay
December 1953 to July 1958
Presidential Committee on
Administrative Performance Efficiency
Garcia
July 1958 to December 1961
Presidential Anti-Graft Committee
Garcia
February 1960 to December 1961
Presidential Anti-Graft Committee
Macapagal
January 1962 to January 1966
Presidential Agency on Reforms and

Government Operations
Marcos
January to September 1966
Presidential Complaints and

Action Office
Marcos
September 1966 to October 1967
Presidential Agency on Reforms and

Government Operations
Marcos
October 1967 to February 1970
Complaints and Investigations Office
Marcos
February 1970 to February 1986
Special Cabinet Committee on

Backsliding
Marcos
October 1973 to February 1986
Tanodbayan
(Office of the Ombudsman)
Marcos
Aquino
July 1979 to April 1988

Reorganized in May 1988
Presidential Commission on Good

Government
Aquino
February 1986 to present
Presidential Committee on Ethics and

Accountability
Aquino
February 1986 to 1988
Presidential Commission Against Graft

and Corruption
Ramos
February 1994 to June 2000
Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating

Council
Estrada
August 1999 to present
Presidential Committee on Effective

Governance
Estrada
October 1999 to present
National Anti-Corruption Commission
Estrada
July 2000 to April 2001
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
Arroyo
April 2001 to present
Governance Advisory Council
Arroyo
July 2001 to present
Sources: Compiled from Alfiler (1979: 347), Batalla (2001: 47), and Oyamada (2005:
100-101).
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19
President Aquino assumed office in February 1986 and there was high
expectation that the end of the culture of graft and corruption was near
(Varela 1995: 174). She established the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to identify and retrieve the money stolen by the Marcos
family and its cronies. Unfortunately, Aquinos avowed anti-graft and
corruption stance was viewed cynically by the public as two of her Cabinet
members and her relatives (referred to derisively by her critics as relathieves) were accused of corruption. The PCGG was also a target for charges
of corruption, favoritism, and incompetence. Indeed, by June 1988, five of its
agents faced graft charges and 13 more were being investigated (Quah 1999:
81).
In May 1987, Aquino created the Presidential Committee on Public
Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA) to respond to increasing public criticism.
However, the PCPEA was also ineffective as it lacked personnel and funds. In
other words, Aquinos honesty has not been matched by the political will to
punish the corrupt (Timberman 1991: 235). In November 1987, Archbishop
Cardinal Jaime Sin criticized the continued graft in government despite the
ouster of former president Ferdinand Marcos. He lamented that: Ali Baba
[Marcos] is gone, but the 40 thieves [corrupt officials] remain (Straits Times
1987: 44).
Aquinos ineffectiveness in curbing corruption was manifested in the
declining proportion of those citizens who were satisfied with the performance
of her administration in tackling corruption from 72 percent in March 1987 to
26 percent in July 1989. In short, Aquino herself had shared the peoples
exasperation and despair that she could not achieve the very thing that she
wanted to leave as a legacy: a clean and accountable government (Cario
1994: 113). According to Reid and Guerrero (1995: 2), Aquino left behind a
mixed legacy as the democratic institutions she struggled to rebuild
remained flawed and weak. Corruption prevailed, and Filipinos were
increasingly cynical about the state of their nation.
The Tanodbayan, or Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), was reborn in
1988 during Aquinos term of office and she appointed Conrado Vasquez for the
position. However, the Ombudsman failed to attract much public scrutiny
during 1988-1995 as the limelight was hogged by the more high-profile
Sandiganbayan. Thus, instead of inspiring confidence in the judicial system,
the OMB elicited only disappointmentif not contemptamong many of
those seeking redress for the wrong done them by public officials as it had
taken a long time to process the complaints received by it (Balgos 1998: 247248).
A more serious weakness was caused by the quota system introduced by
Vasquez as it encouraged inefficiency as investigators finished the easier
cases first to fulfil their quota and left the more complex ones untouched for
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20
months, or even years. Consequently, by December 1994, the OMB had

accumulated a backlog of 14,652 cases, or 65 percent of its total workload.
Nearly three years later, in August 1997, the OMB still had pending cases
dating back to 1979. The Sandiganbayans record was worse than the
Ombudsmans as it completed only 13 percent of its total caseload in 1996
(Balgos 1998: 250-251).
In May 1992, Fidel V. Ramos was elected president for a six-year term.
Even though the major focus of his administration was the recovery of the
economy, he established the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC) in 1994 to investigate violations of the anti-graft laws by
presidential appointees and appointed Eufemio Domingo as its chairman. After
serving for three years, Domingo lamented that the system is not working
because we are not making it work for the following reasons:
We have all the laws, rules and regulations and especially
institutions not only to curb, but to eliminate, corruption. The
problem is that these laws, rules and regulations are not being
faithfully implemented. . . . I am afraid that many people are
accepting [corruption] as another part of our way of life. Big-time
grafters are lionized in society. They are invited to all sorts of
social events, elected and re-elected to government offices. It is
considered an honorin fact a social distinctionto have them as
guests in family and community affairs (Quoted in Balgos 1998:
267-268).
Joseph Estrada succeeded Ramos as president and in his State of the

Nation Address on 28 July 1998, he identified the struggle against graft and
corruption as his major priority. In early 1999, he requested the World Bank
to make recommendations to help his government strengthen its fight against
corruption in the Philippines. The World Bank submitted its preliminary
findings in December 1999 and recommended a national strategy for fighting
corruption in the Philippines by reducing opportunities and motivation for
corruption and making corruption a high-risk, low-reward activity
(Bhargava 1999: 1, 5).
The Financial Times reported in June 2000 that perceived corruption in
the Philippines reached its highest levels in two decades in 1998 and 1999, the
first two years of the Estrada administration (Lande 2001: 92). Four months
later, on 5 October 2000, the Senate Minority Leader, Teofisto Guingona,
accused President Estrada of receiving large cash payouts from jueteng, an
illegal numbers game. On 9 October 2000, one of Estradas cronies, Governor
Luis Singson, claimed that he had given the president P400 million (US$10
million) from jueteng collections nationwide (Lande 2001: 92). Singsons
revelations triggered a major political earthquake (Magno 2001: 259).
Lande contends that it was Estradas mismanagement of the economy
that most decisively turned the upper and middle classes against him.
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21
Moreover, the business community did not accept cronyism and its members
were disturbed by the preferential treatment given to Estradas friends.
However, the last straw was the revelation that he himself was brazenly
corrupt (Lande 2001: 92). The minority members of the House of
Representatives initiated impeachment proceedings against the president.
During the impeachment trial, Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice-president of
Equitable-PCI Bank, informed the court that Estrada, under a false identity,
was the true owner of several bank accounts holding hundred of millions of
pesos (Magno 2001: 251).
The impeachment trial was covered live by the mass media from 6
December 2000 to 16 January 2001, and it broke all audience records
because it was a telenovela that outclassed all the others simply because it
was real. This trial became the single most important educational event on
civics and the rule of law in Philippine political history as it was a large
classroom where the weaknesses of institutions were exposed and the
innermost secrets of political corruption revealed (Magno 2001: 260, 262).
On 16 January 2001, two pro-Estrada senators prevented damning
evidence from being revealed in the trial and their action provoked a
firestorm of public outrage. The House prosecutors left in disgust and then
Senate president Pimentel resigned. Civil society exploded in non-violent
anger and, acting where the Senate had failed to act, moved over five days of
massive demonstrations to force the president from office (Lande 2001: 94).
On 20 January 2001, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the
president by the chief justice after Estrada allegedly agreed to resign when
the military withdrew its support. In her inaugural speech, President Arroyo
emphasized that one of the four core beliefs was to improve moral standards
in government and society, in order to provide a strong foundation for good
governance. However, Sheila S. Coronel, Executive Director of the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism, astutely observed that Arroyos
government was unlikely to be reformist as I was at her headquarters and I
could see the old faces coming out, people who have been accused of
corruption in the past (Sheehan 2001: 17). Nevertheless, three months after
her inauguration as president, Arroyo formed the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) in April 2001, followed three months later by the
establishment of the Governance Advisory Council (GAC) in July 2001.
During the second anniversary of her assumption to office, President
Arroyo launched a war against corruption and announced that US$55 million
would be allocated for her anti-corruption crusade against entrenched vested
interests or the corruption of the powerful. As she had initially announced
that she would not be running for re-election in 2004, she claimed that she
would be more effective in curbing corruption as a President without the
baggage of re-election can move faster, hit harder and work to greater effect.
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22
However, President Arroyos anti-corruption efforts were not supported by all

Filipinos as some opposition politicians had filed an impeachment complaint in
Congress against her for alleged graft and other offenses (Channel News Asia
2003).
In October 2002, the Arroyo administration introduced lifestyle checks
on all government officials, including the police and military. These lifestyle
checks focus on these four areas: behavioral (such as leisure habits); asset
value; relatives checks (means checking relatives who could have gained
employment through the officials influence); and conflict of interest
(Oyamada 2005: 106). In March 2003, the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft
Coordinating Council released a lifestyle checklist which identified the telltale signs that a public official or bureaucrat has amassed wealth
disproportionate to his declared sources of incomewealth probably stolen
from government coffers (Straits Times 2003: A15). The 11 indicators of a
corrupt civil servant in the Philippines are identified in Box 1.
Box 1. Tell-Tale Signs of a Corrupt Bureaucrat in the Philippines
How to tell if a public official or bureaucrat has amassed
wealth disproportionate to his declared sources of income:
Has multiple families or mistresses

Frequently gambles in casinos and cock-fighting pits
Maintains high-cost vices such as taking illegal drugs
Goes on frequent foreign trips
Owns country club shares
Patronizes expensive restaurants or nightclubs
Sends children to exclusive schools with expensive tuition
Buys additional houses or other real estate
Owns a large number of stocks
Has huge bank deposits
Has a big collection of jewellery, antiques, or paintings
Source: Straits Times (2003: A15).
Evaluation of Anti-Corruption Measures

But who cares if programs to combat corruption fail? The crooks in
government are happiest to see anti-corruption drives falter,
because they can continue their corrupt ways without fear of being
caught and punished. And there are many of them in high and low
places.
Philippine Daily Inquirer (2008)
The fact that corruption is a way of life in the Philippines is a clear

manifestation of the ineffectiveness of the various anti-corruption measures
employed by the various administrations since the 1950s. The systemic and
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23
rampant nature of corruption in the Philippines is further corroborated by its

consistently low ranking on Transparency Internationals CPI from 1995 to
2009. Table 7 shows that the ranking of the Philippines on the CPI declined
from 36 th position in 1995 to 139 th position in 2009. More importantly, its CPI
score rose from 2.77 in 1995 to a peak of 3.6 in 1999. Since 2000, the
Philippines CPI score has further declined from 2.8 to 2.4 from 2005 to 2009.
Its average rank from 1995 to 2009 was 86 th position and its average score was
2.7.
Table 7. Rankings and Scores of the Philippines on Transparency
Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index, 1995-2009
Year
Ranking
Score*
No. of countries
1995
36th
2.77
41
1996
th
44
2.69
54
1997
40th
3.05
52
1998
th
55
3.3
85
1999
54th
3.6
99
2000
69th
2.8
90
2001
th
65
2.9
91
2002
77th
2.6
102
2003
nd
92
2.5
133
2004
102nd
2.6
146
2005
th
117
2.5
159
2006
121st
2.5
163
2007
st
131
2.5
180
2008
141st
2.3
180
2009
th
139
2.4
180
Average
86th
2.7
Source: http://www.transparency.org.
*The score ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).
Similarly, Table 8 shows that the Philippines ranking and scores on

PERCs annual surveys from 1995 to 2009 have consistently been low
throughout this period. The Philippines best performance was in 1999, when
it was ranked fourth among the 12 Asian countries with its best score of 6.71.
It was ranked last among the 13 Asian countries surveyed for 2007-2008
because its score had increased to 9.40 and 9.00 respectively. However, in
2009, the Philippines was ranked 11th with an improved score of 7.00.
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Table 8. Rankings and Scores of the Philippines on the Political

Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) Surveys on Corruption
in Asian Countries, 1995-2009
Year
Score*
No. of Countries
1995
th
6.60
11
1996
9th
6.95
12
1997
th
6.50
12
1998
8th
7.17
12
1999
th
6.71
12
2000
8th
8.67
12
2001
th
9.00
12
2002
8th
8.00
12
2003
th
7.67
13
2004
9th
8.33
13
2005
12th
8.80
13
2006
th
11
7.80
13
2007
13th
9.40
13
2008
th
13
9.00
13
2009
11th
7.00
16
7.84
--
Average
Ranking
th
Sources: PERC (2001; 2008: 7) and Hussain (2009: B5).

* The score ranges from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt).
The World Banks governance indicator on the control of corruption from

1996 to 2008 also confirms the Philippines inability to curb corruption
effectively. Table 9 shows that the Philippines percentile rank in controlling
corruption has declined from 45.1 in 1996 to 26.1 in 2008. Its governance score
also decreased from -0.27 to -0.75 for the same period. Among the 26 Asian
countries included in the 2008 survey, the Philippines was ranked 17 th with a
percentile rank of 26.1.
The previous three indicators provide data on the perceived extent of
corruption in the Philippines. Table 10 provides data on the Philippines
rankings and scores on the Global Competitiveness Reports indicator on
public trust of politicians. The Philippines declining rank from 49th position
among 59 countries in 1999 to 130 th position among 133 countries and the
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25
Table 9. World Banks Control of Corruption in the Philippines,

1996-2008
Year
Percentile Rank
(1-100)
Governance Score
(+2.5 to -2.5)
1996
45.1
- 0.27
1998
43.2
- 0.35
2000
36.9
- 0.53
2002
38.8
- 0.49
2003
39.8
- 0.48
2004
34.0
- 0.60
2005
35.9
- 0.61
2006
22.8
- 0.78
2007
22.2
- 0.79
2008
26.1
- 0.75
Average
34.5
Source: Compiled from http://info.worldbank.org/

governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp.
Table 10. Public Trust of Politicians in the Philippines,

1999-2009/2010
Year
Rank
Score*
No. of Countries
1999
49
2.02
59
2000
51
2.00
59
2001-2002
52
2.10
75
2002-2003
69
1.50
80
2003-2004
94
1.40
102
2007-2008
119
1.70
131
2009-2010
130
1.60
133
Average
81
1.76
--
Sources: Compiled from Schwab et al. (1999: 327), Porter et al.

(2000: 253), Schwab et al. (2002: 408), Cornelius (2003: 619),
Sala-i-Martin (2004: 499), Schwab and Porter (2007: 379),
and Schwab (2009: 349).
* The score ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
with this statement: Public trust in the financial honesty of
politicians is very high.
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26
corresponding decrease in its score from 2.02 to 1.60 during the same period
for this indicator is a clear reflection of the Filipino citizens negative reaction
to the corrupt behavior of their politicians.
Why has the Philippines been ineffective in curbing corruption even
though it has relied on seven laws and 19 ACAs? According to Edna Co et al.
(2007: 11):
If laws and policies were to be the bases of the state of corruption
in a country, the Philippines would be ranked among the most
corrupt-free. Numerous laws and policies are legislated and
programs are in place all across the public sector. However, the
enormous constraint lies in the enforcement of these laws and
policies.
Indeed, the anti-corruption laws have not been enforced impartially

because of the lack of political will, which is the most important reason for
the ineffectiveness of the Philippines anti-corruption strategy as the
government has not allocated sufficient personnel and budget to the various
ACAs to enable them to perform their duties effectively. For example, the
OMB, which is the lead ACA, is under-staffed, and according to a former
Ombudsman, Simeon V. Marcelo (2005:1), it is designed to fail because of its
crippling lack of resources.
To demonstrate the OMBs severe lack of resources, Marcelo (2005: 3)
compared the personnel and budget of the OMB with those of Hong Kongs
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Table 11 vividly shows
how understaffed and underresourced the OMB is compared to the ICAC. The
OMBs field investigator-bureaucracy ratio of 1:17,045 compares unfavorably
with the ICACs ratio of 1:208. The OMBs staff-population of 1:71,340 is much
higher than the ICACs ratio of 1:5,354. In terms of per capita expenditure,
the ICACs figure of P696 exceeds that of the OMBs P6 by 116 times. Marcelo
(2005: 4) captures the essence of the OMBs powerlessness by describing it as
a hunter hunting for crocodiles with only a flyswatter in hand because
there is no way it can kill its prey, i.e., the corrupt public officials. Even
before Marcelo became the Ombudsman, Eric Batalla (2001: 73) had
recommended the expansion of the OMBs capacity and the improvement of its
capability to enhance its effectiveness. More recently, Raymundo Julio A.
Olaguer (2006: 79) has recommended that the OMBs budget be increased to
solve the problem of overworked and underpaid prosecutors and investigators
and to provide the OMB with modern and state-of-the-art equipment for
surveillance and evidence-gathering.
Table 12 provides a comparative analysis of the personnel and budgets of
eight Asian ACAs and shows that the OMB is ranked fifth in terms of staffpopulation ratio, and seventh in terms of per capita expenditure. More
specifically, the OMBs staff-population ratio of 1:85,057 is better than those of
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27
Table 11. Comparison of the Personnel and Budgets

of the OMB and ICAC, 2004
Item
Office of the Ombudsman
Independent Commission
Against Corruption
No. of field investigators
88
837
Total no. of staff
1,141
1,326
Size of bureaucracy
1,500,000
174,175
Field investigatorbureaucracy ratio
1: 17,045
1: 208
Budget
480 million pesos
4.94 billion pesos
Population of country
81.4 million
7.1 million
Per capita expenditure
6 pesos
696 pesos
Staff-population ratio
1: 71,340
1: 5,354
Sources: Marcelo (2005: 3) and Economist (2006: 152, 194).
Indias Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), South Koreas Korea

Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC), and Indonesias
Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC). Similarly, the OMBs per capita
expenditure of US$0.15 is only higher than the CECs per capita expenditure
of US$0.08 and the CBI's per capita expenditure of US$0.03.
Secondly, even though the OMB is the lead ACA in the Philippines, it
performs these five functions: investigation of inefficiency and anomalies;
prosecution of graft cases in the Sandiganbayan; disciplinary control over all
elective and appointed officials (except members of Congress and Judiciary
and impeachable officials); public assistance; and graft prevention.5 In other
words, apart from its lack of resources, the OMB is not a specialized ACA
dedicated solely to combating corruption, as it is also responsible for
disciplinary control and public assistance. This means that the OMB does not
enjoy the two advantages of specialized ACAs namely: the centralization of all
necessary information and intelligence about corruption and the resolution
of coordination problems among multiple agencies through vertical
integration (Meagher 2005: 80).
Another limitation of the OMB is that it only has jurisdiction over public
officials and not those employed in private companies (Quah 2009: 778). The
OMB has been tainted with allegations of wrongdoing as impeachment
complaints were filed three times against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto during
his seven-year term. However, the charges against him were dismissed by the
Congress. The OMB has also been accused of not taking action or dismissing
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28
Table 12. Comparative Analysis of the Personnel and Budgets

of Eight Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asian Countries in 2005
Anti-Corruption
Agency
Macao
CCAC
Personnel
Budget
(in US$)
Population
StaffPopulation
Ratio
Per Capita
Expenditure
(in US$)
112
10.6 m
488,100
1:4,358
21.72
1,194
85 m
7.0 m
1:5,863
12.14
Singapore CPIB
81
7.7 m
4.3 m
1:53,086
1.79
South Korea
KICAC
205
17.8 m
47.8 m
1:233,171
0.37
Thailand
NCCC
924
22.8 m
64.2 m
1:69,481
0.36
4,711
30.3 m
1,081.2 m
1:229,505
0.28
Philippines
OMB
957
12 m
81.4 m
1:85,057
0.15
Indonesia
CEC
305
18 m
222.6 m
1:729,836
0.08
Hong Kong
ICAC
India
CBI
Sources: CCAC (2006: 119, 123), ICAC (2006: 28), Republic of Singapore (2007: 371372), CBI (2006: 38, 44), KICAC (2006: 6), Office of the Ombudsman (2006: 73, 91),
ONCCC (2006: 85, 87) and Davidsen, Juwono, and Timberman (2006: 52).
cases despite overwhelming evidence against suspected offenders (Dizon

2007: 117).
Thirdly, the reliance on multiple ACAs has not benefited the Philippines
as the proliferation of these ACAs has led to duplication, layering and turf
wars (Quimson 2006: 30). There is also no coordination or cooperation among
the various ACAs, which compete for recognition, staff and resources because
they are under-staffed and poorly funded. Even though their basic mandates
are defined, these ACAs have overlapping jurisdiction, which diffuses anticorruption efforts and results in poor coordination in policy and program
implementation, weak management and wastage of resources (Oyamada
2005: 99).
Edna Co et al. have questioned why new ACAs are created by a new
administration without evaluating the effectiveness of the existing ones thus:
Each administration created flagship programs and projects,
sending the message that the political leadership was doing
something against graft and corruption. However, the creation of
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29
such commissions and bodies may have been redundant and costly
for the government. Although this may not be an efficient way of
doing things . . . the creation of these bodies itself should be
examined to ascertain whether or not they contribute to the
commission of corruption in the public administrative system. An
attendant question one could raise is why a new program needs to
be created each time a new administration steps in instead of
merely building upon past efforts (Co et al. 2007: 21).
The Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council (IACC) is a voluntary

alliance of the OMB, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Commission of
Audit (COA), the PAGC, the Department of Justice, and the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). It was formed in June 1997 to enhance coordination
among these six agencies, to conduct inter-agency skills training programs,
and to promote inter-agency conferences (Ursal 2006: 222-223). The IACCs
role is to improve coordination among these agencies, but in reality, it is not
active (Oyamada 2005: 99). The IACC met twice and the slow progress in its
revitalization reflects the inability of these six agencies to collaborate
effectively among themselves (Holmes 2007: 181).
Unlike her predecessor Simeon Marcelo, the current Ombudsman, Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, deactivated the IACC by not convening it. Thus,
instead of cooperating with the CSC, the OMB competed with it by also
implementing the Oplan Red Plate program, which the OMB, COA and CSC
had earlier agreed under the Solana Covenant to be the CSCs responsibility
(TAN 2009: 5). Apart from not convening the IACC, Gutierrez has also been
criticized for devoting the OMBs limited resources on investigating petty
corruption instead of continuing her predecessors exposure of corruption in
high places. Consequently, the OMB has been described as the Street
Ombudsman because of its emphasis on petty corruption (Newsbreak Online
2006). The Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN) has attributed the
OMBs disappointing performance to these factors:
From the looks of it, the apparent weakness of the Ombudsman as
an institution . . . is the doing of poor leadership. The low
conviction rate is explained by a highly centralized system, a
weakened Office of the Special Prosecutor, and a demoralized
staff. This and bad relations with other anticorruption
organizations contribute to the bad image of the Ombudsman and
thus its growing unpopularity (TAN 2009: 5).
The PAGC was created by President Arroyo in 2001 to perform these

functions:
(1) To investigate or hear administrative complaints against
presidential appointees;
(2) To investigate administrative cases against non-presidential
appointees conspiring with presidential appointees alleged to have
done irregular acts; and
(3) To assist the president in the campaign against graft and
corruption (Quimson 2006: 29).
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30
However, the PAGC lacks fiscal autonomy and depends solely on the
Office of the President for its budget, which is a fraction of what [the] OMB
receives (Quimson 2006: 30). The PAGC has been ineffective in securing
convictions as it dealt with 1,004 cases since its inception in 2001, but only 9
percent of these cases had punitive recommendations because 40 percent were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and 59 percent were dismissed for
insufficient evidence. Indeed, the PAGC is not viewed as a credible ACA
because of its lack of organizational and financial independence and its
organizational proximity to the President (Quimson 2006: 30). According to a
critic, there have been 14 versions of the PAGC since it was first created in
the 1950s. Unfortunately, like its predecessors, the present PAGC has had a
negligible impact in the fight against corruption (Dizon 2007: 117).
The PAGC conducted a total of 287 lifestyle checks on government
officials from 2003-2005 (Ursal 2006: 202). However, according to Romulo
Pagulayan (2007: 112), these lifestyle checks are selective and ineffective as
no secretaries, presidential assistants, general managers of governmentowned or government-controlled corporations were subjected to lifestyle
checks. Unlike the President who has declared that she was open to a lifestyle
check, the spokesperson for her husband, the First Gentleman, insisted that
he is a private person and is, therefore, not subject to a lifestyle check.
Furthermore, the hype generated by the lifestyle check diverts the peoples
attention from the more massive and systemic graft, even plunder committed
by political appointees, top bureaucrats and the Presidents relatives and
cronies. In short, like the other anti-corruption measures, the lifestyle check
is ineffective because it focuses on the lowly government workers [who] have
become convenient scapegoats and easy prey and ignores the fat cats of
government (Pagulayan 2007: 112-113).
President Arroyo has introduced such anti-corruption measures, as the
PAGC, the GAC and the lifestyle checks, as discussed above. However, she
could not focus all her attention on fighting corruption as she has also been
concerned with improving the economy and dealing with terrorism. After her
re-election in May 2004, she promised to continue the fight against corruption
but her credibility was severely eroded by the revelation that she had tried to
influence an election commissioner during the 2004 presidential election. The
revelation of the Hello Garci tapes sent a clear message throughout the
Philippines that
. . . the fight against corruption cannot truly be won since the
highest government official, no less than the President, is tainted
by corruption. Any Filipino, be he a simpleton in the streets or a
scholar would indubitably arrive at the conclusion that corruption,
if committed in high places, may go unpunished. This brings the
efforts of the anti-corruption campaign to naught (Olaguer 2006:
35).
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31
More importantly, President Arroyos expression of her confidence in

May 2005 that her governments campaign against corruption would bear
fruit in six to seven years at the end of her term (Oyamada 2005: 103)
appears to be premature and misplaced as there is no evidence that her anticorruption measures have been effective so far. On 11 September 2007,
former President Joseph Estrada was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of
receiving payoffs and kickbacks before his ouster from office and sentenced to
a maximum of 40 years imprisonment (Conde 2007: 3). On 25 October 2007,
President Arroyo pardoned Estrada six weeks after his conviction even though
anti-corruption advocates and state prosecutors had urged her not to do so
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007). The Economist (2008) criticized Arroyos
pardon of Estrada because it renews concerns in many quarters that the rich
and powerful remain immune from punishment and fails to dispel concerns
about entrenched corruption in the Philippines.
More importantly, President Arroyos pardoning of Estradas conviction
for plunder has also undermined the rule of law and the credibility of her anticorruption efforts. According to the South China Morning Post (2007: 14):
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims to be
dedicated to ridding her country of its biggest scourge, corruption.
Her predecessor Joseph Estrada was convicted last month of a
worse crime, plunder. Granting him a pardon and dangling a
government job for him shows she is interested not in the national
well-being but in political survival. . . . Mrs Arroyo has done the
Philippines a disservice. She has undermined the rule of law and
told officials that graft and corruption are not serious crimes. It is
hardly surprising that growing numbers of Filipinos want her out
of office.
Hence, it is not surprising that a nationwide Pulse Asia survey conducted

from 20 to 31 October 2007 found that 42 percent of the respondents believed
that President Arroyo was the most corrupt president among the last five
presidents. Table 13 shows that the ranking of the other four presidents was:
Marcos (35 percent); Estrada (16 percent); Ramos (5 percent); and Aquino (1
percent) (GMA News.TV 2007).
In its editorial on 21 October 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2008)
lamented:
People who keep hoping for clean and honest government that
uses taxpayers money wisely and well will have to wait for
another administration. The President thinks corruption is not a
problem or at least not the serious problem businessmen and other
observers take it to be. Nothing, not even neutral surveys and
studies, will change her mind. It would be pointless and futile to
look up to her for a solution.
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32
Table 13. Perceived Level of Corruption of Presidents

in the Philippines, 2007
President
Percentage believing that

the President was corrupt
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-present)
42
Ferdinand E. Marcos (1972-1986)
35
Joseph E. Estrada (1998-2001)
16
Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998)
Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992)
Source: GMA News.TV (2007).
In sum, President Arroyos commitment to curbing corruption in the

Philippines has been eroded after nine years in office.
Conclusion
The acid test of a governments sincerity in wiping out bureaucratic
corruption hinges not only on the formulation of anti-corruption
measures. Rather, its credibility lies in the actual implementation
of such measures and their effects on the behavior of civil servants
and the society at large. . . . [F]or anti-corruption measures to be
effective they must not only be properly designed (to attack the
causes of corruption in the society), but must also be sponsored
and upheld sincerely by the political leaders. The most elaborate
and well designed anti-corruption measures will be useless if they
are not enforced by the political leadership.
Quah (1982: 154, 175)
In conclusion, corruption will remain a serious problem in the

Philippines as long as the five causes discussed in the second section are not
eliminated. The salaries of the civil servants and political leaders are unlikely
to be substantially increased as the government would not be able to afford
such an expensive strategy without sustained economic growth. Furthermore,
Singapores experience shows that salary revision is a necessary but
insufficient condition for curbing corruption if other reforms are not
undertaken also (Quah 2007: 43). While the opportunities for corruption can
be minimized by reducing red tape and improving the efficiency of the civil
service by streamlining the cumbersome and complicated administrative
procedures, such opportunities will remain as long as low salaries or
starvation wages reinforce the need for civil servants to accept speed
money for expediting the approval of applications for permits. The
populations tolerance for corruption is reinforced by the importance of the
family and such particularistic values as utang na loob in Philippine society.
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33
In the final analysis, the key factor responsible for combating corruption
effectively in a country is the political will, or commitment of its political
leadership. According to Ian Senior (2006: 184, 187):
The principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they
wish to do so are politicians. This is because they make the laws
and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced. If,
however, politicians at the top of the hierarchy have routinely
worked their way up by accepting bribes to fund their parties and
themselves, there is little prospect that they will wish to cleanse
their colleagues or their nation of corruption. . . . The very people
who are the greatest beneficiaries of corruption have the greatest
power and use the corrupt nature of government to maintain that
power.
In other words, without political will, the probability of detection of and

punishment for corrupt offenses cannot be enhanced, and the resources
required for a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy will not be allocated by
the incumbent government.
In May 2005, Tony Kwok, the former Deputy Commissioner of the ICAC
in Hong Kong, was appointed by President Arroyo as her special advisor on
anti-corruption. Soon after his appointment, he informed a group of
businessmen in Manila that: Corruption can be eradicated. We did it in Hong
Kong. It can be done in the Philippines (Conde 2005). A few days later,
President Arroyo confidently declared:
Tony [Kwok] says, with our political will and working together,
what Hong Kong was able to do in seven years, we could perhaps
be able to do in three years. We shall win this war against
corruption (Conde 2005).
Three months later, Kwok reinforced President Arroyos optimistic

assessment when he asserted that nothing is impossible because there is no
shortage of political will to fight corruption here in the Philippines (Vanzi
2005).
Unfortunately, contrary to the expectations of President Arroyo and
Tony Kwok, corruption in the Philippines has not abated during the past four
years as they had predicted. On the contrary, corruption in the Philippines
has worsened according to Transparency Internationals CPI from 2005 to
2009, PERCs annual survey of corruption from 2005 to 2008, and the World
Banks control of corruption indicator from 2005 to 2008. As corruption is a
way of life in the Philippines, it is unrealistic to expect corruption to be
eradicated within three years as promised by Tony Kwok. Apart from the
significant contextual differences between Hong Kong, which is a city-state of
1,075 sq. km. with 7.2 million people and a gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita of US$29,910, and the Philippines, which is an archipelago of 7,017
islands covering a vast area of 300,000 sq. km. with a population of 85.9
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34
million and a GDP per capita of US$1,640, 6 the critical difference is the lack of
political will in fighting corruption in the Philippines.
Thus, curbing corruption in the Philippines remains an impossible dream
for the foreseeable future until its political leaders can demonstrate that they
have the political will to do so. So far, the political leaders in the Philippines
are either incompetent or corrupt and have failed to lead the battle against
corruption (Co et al. 2007: 33). This pessimistic conclusion is based on the
fact that none of the presidents who have governed the Philippines since its
attainment of independence in July 1946 has modified or improved their anticorruption strategies even though the plethora of ACAs and anti-corruption
laws has been ineffective in curbing corruption. Instead, each president has
created new ACAs without evaluating or learning from the mistakes of his or
her predecessor.
In other words, political leaders in the Philippines are unlikely to
succeed in curbing corruption unless they replace their modus operandi of
relying on ineffective multiple, overlapping, uncoordinated, and poorly staffed
and funded ACAs with the establishment of a single independent, powerful,
and adequately funded and staffed ACA, like the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore or Hong Kongs ICAC. While a
single ACA is not a magic bullet that can eradicate corruption overnight in the
Philippines, the success of the CPIB and ICAC in curbing corruption shows
that if there is political will, the establishment of a single independent ACA
will be an asset and a powerful weapon against corrupt politicians, civil
servants, and business persons. However, if political will is lacking, the ACAs
extensive powers can be abused by a corrupt government to victimize its
political foes instead (Quah 2010: 51). Hopefully, the next President of the
Philippines will avoid the same path as his predecessors by establishing an
independent and adequately staffed and funded ACA to replace the existing
ineffective multiple ACAs.
Endnotes
1
According to Chaikin and Shaman (2009: 164-165), Behest loans are insider loans
that are granted or executed on uneconomic terms and that are diverted for uses contrary to
their original purposes.
2
This explains why Ferdinand Marcos was reported to have been godfather to
thousands of godchildren when he was president.
3
The meaning of this idiom is: where there are too many people trying to do
something, they make a mess of it. See Idiom: Too many cooks spoil the broth at http://
www.usingenglish.com/reference/idioms/too+many+cooks+spoil+the+broth.htm, accessed
February 15, 2010.
4
For an account of how this law was passed, see Iglesias (1963: 17-68).
January-December

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35
See the OMBs website at http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/page.php?pid=13.
6
The data on Hong Kong and the Philippines are obtained from the Economist (2009:
154, 196).
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CURBING

Curbing Corruption in the Philippines:

The Philippines does not need a foreign invader to destroy it.

Corruption is a serious problem in the Philippines according to

*Professor of Political Science, National University of Singapore until his retirement

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

curbing corruption in the Philippines an impossible dream? This article

Joselito D.R. Obejas (2009: 97)

CURBING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

In 1969, the Philippine Ethnic Group Attitude Surveys found, among

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Corruption in the Philippines reached its highest level during the 21

CURBING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Marcos regime was described as sultanistic by Mark Thompson

Source: Guerrero et al. (2007: 7).

The managers were also asked to identify those government agencies or

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Table 2. Managers Perception of Most Corrupt Government Agencies

Source: Guerrero et al. (2007: 16).

In the 2009 SWS Surveys of Enterprises on Corruption, the respondents

Corruption in the BI was systemic and permeated every rung in the

CURBING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Table 3. Net Sincerity Rating of Government Agencies in

Net Sincere Rating

Source: Guerrero et al. (2010: 7).

The DPWH was identified in Table 2 as the third most corrupt

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Furthermore, embezzlement, nepotism, influence peddling, fraud and

CURBING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

In May 2009, DepEd officials suspended Jeverps Manufacturing

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Corruption was introduced in the Philippines by the Spanish as the low

6 Quah - Curbing Corruption (43 pages) FINAL 10

CURBING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

of the Bureau of Immigration are under-qualified and paid starvation wages.

6 Quah - Curbing Corruption (43 pages) FINAL 11

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Table 4. Salary Grades and Salaries of Constitutional Officials

40,000 to 47,547 pesos

480,000 to 570,564 pesos

President of the Senate

40,000 to 47,547 pesos

480,000 to 570,564 pesos

Speaker of the House

40,000 to 47,547 pesos

480,000 to 570,564 pesos

Chief Justice of the

40,000 to 47,547 pesos

480,000 to 570,564 pesos

35,000 to 41,604 pesos

420,000 to 499,248 pesos

Member of the House

35,000 to 41,604 pesos

420,000 to 499,248 pesos

Associate Justice of the

35,000 to 41,604 pesos

420,000 to 499,248 pesos

Source: Tendero (2000: 195, 198).

6 Quah - Curbing Corruption (43 pages) FINAL 12