LEE TEK SHENG VS CA

292 SCRA 544

Facts:
After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against
his father (private respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of his
parents. The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land registered in
petitioners name are conjugal properties. The PR contends that the lots were
registered under Leoncios name only as a trustee because during the registration,
Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of
the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the
conjugal regime. To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency
of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was denied by RTC on
the grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing
petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending
litigation. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the annotation of a notice of lis pendens be
cancelled.
Held: No.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused
it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in
this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the
purpose of announcing to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.
Wherefore, the petition is denied and the CA assailed decision is affirmed.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115402. July 15, 1998]

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEK SHENG, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

After his mothers death, petitioner[1] filed a complaint against his father, herein
private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. [2] In his answer
with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered
solely in petitioners name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal
properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime
but was registered in petitioners name only as a trustee considering that at that time,
the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its
rightful owner the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the
case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial
court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing
petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending
litigation.[3] Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens
via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. [4]
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an
incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to
thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed
upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title
obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the
TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a
separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is
admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings
when the courts jurisdiction is limited.

Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily
for private respondent, petitioners claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a
Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked[5] but that rule is not material to
this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor
can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a
parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D.
1529 which states that:

Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be

subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[6] (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. [7] Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. [8] Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat,
registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to
petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent.
[9]
What the latter disputes is the formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although
petitioners certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance,
[10]
yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his
ownership.[11]
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the
motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of procedure [12] or
substance,[13] a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2)
when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to
concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the notice on
the legally untenable grounds that such annotation amounts to a collateral attack of
petitioners certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a partition case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the
purpose of announcing to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. [14] Here, the
parties are still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The

lower court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving
information to the public that that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who
deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it
to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect partition of the property.[15] For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that
the land belongs to him.[16]Besides, an action for partition is one case where the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.[17]
Further, contrary to petitioners argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the
parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the spouses
during their marriage.[18] In addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim
prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership
has been put in issue and each claimant must present their respective evidence to
substantiate their respective allegations.[19] Considering that this is a partition case, the
court is required to inquire into the nature and extent of title of the supposed claimant.
[20]
The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of the claimants and not
the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may be
considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]

Petitioner is one of the legitimate children of private respondent. The latter has illegitimate children with
another woman.
[2]
The listed properties are lumber business, rents, four buildings and a warehouse. (Complaint, ANNEX
D of Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, p. 47-48).
[3]
Order of RTC dated November 24, 1992; Rollo, p. 72.
[4]
Court of Appeals Decision promulgated February 8, 1994; Rollo, pp. 35-41.
[5]
Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174.
[6]
Property Registration Decree.
[7]
Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174 (1996).
[8]
Heirs of Gonzaga v. CA, 261 SCRA 327; Republic v. CA, 258 SCRA 712; In ejectment cases, a
certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and it does not matter if the title is questionable
(Dizon v. CA, 264 SCRA 391).
[9]
Private Respondents Memorandum, p. 6; Rollo, p. 196.
[10]
Section 32, P.D. 1529.
[11]
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 16.
[12]

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 14 (formerly Section 24).

Notice of lis pendens.- xxx xxx xxx.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (Emphasis supplied).

[13]

Section 77 of P.D. 1529 provides: Cancellation of lis pendens.- Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled, upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose
of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to
be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
[14]
Sajonas v. CA, 258 SCRA 79; Garbin v. CA, 253 SCRA 187; Tanchoco v. Aquino, 154 SCRA 1; J.P.
Pellicer & Co., Inc. v. Philippine Realty Corp., 87 Phil. 302.
[15]
Catapusan v. CA, 264 SCRA 534.
[16]
Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997.
[17]
The other instances where the notice of lis pendens is proper are: a) an action to recover possession
of real estate, b) an action to quiet title thereto, c) an action remove clouds thereon, d) any other
proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or
the buildings thereon. See Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. CA, 184 SCRA 325 (1990) cited
in Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997; See also Section 14, Rule 13 (formerly Section
24, Rule 14), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 76 of P.D. 1529.
[18]
Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, p. 61.
[19]
Section1, Rule 131.
[20]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 69. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
(Emphasis supplied).