NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

, PATERIO TORRES and ARTURO

UMBAC, petitioners,
vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS UYPITCHING
Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition) sent by the respondent
Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, requiring their attendance and testimony at the
Committee's investigation on October 29, 1985. Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the same Committee
on the latter date, (Annex "D", Petition) directing said petitioners to show cause why they should not be
punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said investigation.
The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending legislation related
to the operations of public utilities" (Id.) in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO II, an electric
cooperative, had its principal place of business. The inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by
the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to
compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to
obey its subpoena
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondentSangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the
power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. It is also the position of the
respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted
theSangguniang Panlungsod
Issue:
Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis
mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of a city council is
the threshold issue in the present controversy.

Held:
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and
punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local
legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature
does
To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses
and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to
issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is
devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the
investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

The power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the franchising
powers of the NEA. The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if there be
sufficient basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the subpoena is declared null and void for being ultra vires

G.R. No. 134213 July 20, 1999

ROMEO J. GAMBOA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., and JUAN Y. ARANETA, respondents.
The query herein is purely legal. May an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor,
continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre,
Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members,
respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the
duration of the former's official trip abroad until his return. When the SP held its regular session on September
6, 1995, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as
Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session,
seven (7) members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four (4) others voted against
with one (1) abstention. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as "temporarily legally
incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting
Governor." 1 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned

Held:
Sec. 49(a) and 466(a) (1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that
for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of
the SP for the time being.

Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is no longer
considered a member thereof. 10 This is clear from the law, when it provides that "local legislative power
shall be vested in the SP," 11 which is "the legislative body of the province," and enumerates therein
membership consisting of the:
1.) Vice-Governor, as presiding officer,
2.) regular elective SP members,
3.) three elective sectoral representatives, and
4.) those ex-officio members, namely:
a.) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay,

b.) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang

kabataan,
c.) president of the provincial federation of sangguniang members of
municipalities and component cities. 12

This event constitutes an "inability" on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside
during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local
Government Code concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting
Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such
capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at
the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer." 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

MANUEL E. ZAMORA, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO, ANESIO M. RANARIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator,
MARIANO KINTANAR, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor, CARMEN R. RASUL, in his capacity as
Provincial Treasurer, ROLANDO L. OSORIO, BELINDA G. APAWAN, ARMANDO L. SERAS, RUWEL
PETER S. GONZAGA, ARMANDO C. CODILLA, RAUL B. BASAÑES, GRACIANO C. ARAFOL,
JR., respondents.
Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the
Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its
sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things, allow the Governor
to deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were
present,3 no resolution was considered.
On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No.
054declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No.
075 authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with
Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the construction of
the capitol building
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the session on
February 26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that
a total of thirteen members attended it.7
Petitioner thus filed a petition 8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley against
the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that
while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless
"conducted official business without a quorum" 9 as only seven of its fourteen members were actually present
when the irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, 10 and the motions to declare the

entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity 11 and to authorize the Governor to enter into the
Contract with the Allado Company12 were approved.13
ISSUE:
Whether the Sanggunian complied with the LGC
Held:
While the Journal and the Resolutions show that 13 members attended the session,30 the Journal
shows that only six members were called by the presiding officer to vote on the motions. Coincidentally,
in Resolutions 05 and 07, the names of the Board Members who were not called upon to vote, including
petitioner as he had in the meantime left, are followed by two asterisks (**).
The placing of the asterisks after the names of five members in the Resolutions is highly irregular and
suspicious especially since both resolutions indicate that petitioner, whose name is also followed by asterisks.
In the instant case, there is nothing on record, save for respondents allegation, to show that Board
Member Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude that she was outside the coercive power
of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions were held.
The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions
aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all
such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an
unauthorized session.
Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when her letter of irrevocable
resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal
effect.
Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07
is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen
members in the Sanggunian, the approval of eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter
into the Contract with the Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for payment on the part of the
local government unit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED

REYNALDO
O.
MALONZO,
in
his
capacity
as
City
Mayor
of
Caloocan
City,
OSCAR
MALAPITAN,
in
his
capacity
as
Vice-Mayor
of
Caloocan
City,
CHITO ABEL, BENJAMIN MANLAPIG, EDGAR ERICE, DENNIS PADILLA, ZALDY DOLATRE, LUIS TITO
VARELA, SUSANA PUNZALAN, HENRY CAMAYO, in their capacities as Members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod
of
Caloocan
City, petitioners,
vs.
HON.
RONALDO
B.
ZAMORA,
in
his
capacity
as
Executive
Secretary,
HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government,
and EDUARDO TIBOR,

On March 22, 1999, petitioners Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Oscar G. Malapitan and councilors Chito
Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar Erice Dennis Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre, Luis tito Varela, Susana Punzalan, and
Henry Cammayo, all of the City of Caloocan, filed a petition assailing the OP decision.
On July 27, 1999, We granted the petition and accordingly annulled and set aside the OP decision for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction.
Based on the above provision, the OP reached the determination that Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 could not
have lawfully realigned the amount of P39,352,047.75 which was previously appropriated for the expropriation
of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such appropriation was in the nature of a capital outlay until fully spent,
reverted, or the project for which it is earmarked is completed.
Rather, the issue is whether petitioners are liable for their actions in regard to said ordinance which
actually realigned a position of the P50 million which was simply denominated in a general manner as
"Expropriation of Properties" and classified under "Current Operating Expenditures" in the 1998
Annual Budget of Caloocan City. Clearly, these are two distinct amounts separate from each other. . . . [T]he
P50 million was NOT appropriated for the purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate but rather for
expenses incidental to expropriation such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, expenses for publication,
mobilization fees and expenses for preliminary studies.
Bearing in mind, therefore, the fact that it is the P50 million which is now being realigned, the next logical
question to ask is whether such amount is capable of being lawfully realigned. To this we answer in the
affirmative.

Issue:
III. Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was also enacted without sufficient compliance with
Section 50, Chapter 3, Title II of the Local Government Code of 1991;

Held:
We disagree.
There is nothing in the records to indicate that the sum of P39,352,047.75 appropriated under Ordinance No.
0246, Series of 1997 is actually part of the P50,000,000.00 allotted for "Expropriation of Properties," under the
"Current Operating Expenditures" of the 1998 Annual Budget of Caloocan City.
Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 5 appropriated P39,352,047.75 for the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo
Estate. It is, however, not this but the sum of P39,343,028.00 appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, Series
of 19986 which was sourced from the P50,000,000.00 allotted for "Current Operating Expenditures. 7Thus, it
can be said that petitioners, as early as when the case was pending before the OP, were already arguing about
the character of the P50,000,000.00 as proper subject of realignment.
This argument however is wrongfully premised as it presupposes the identity, which does not however
exist, between the P39,352,047.75 appropriated under Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997, and the
P39,343,028.00 appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. The former which was a 1997
appropriation was never touched for the expropriation of the Maysilo Lot and did not materialize, while
the latter was sourced from the 1998 Annual Budget under "Current Operating Expenditures" by
realigning the allocation of P50,000,000.00 therefrom to fund the items in Ordinance No. 0254, Series of
1998. Since the P50,000,000.00 appropriation is classified neither as capital outlay nor as a continuing
appropriation9 but as "Current Operating Expenditures," it could be a valid subject of realignment.

Third. Respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was enacted without sufficient
compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the Local Government Code requiring that house rules be
adopted or updated.
During said meeting, the Sanggunian created an Ad Hoc Committee composed of seven (7) members to study
the existing house rules. Thereafter, it enacted Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998.
Fourth. Respondents maintain that assuming that the Sanggunian can legally take up matters pertaining to the
supplemental budget even before the adoption or updating of its existing rules of procedure, the circumstances
that preceded the enactment of the supplemental budget were irregular since there was undue haste in
conducting the three readings of Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, in one session day.
There is nothing in the law, however, which prohibits that the three readings of a proposed ordinance
be held in just one session day. Respondents themselves are aware of this.
But there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OP. Its findings are totally devoid of support in the
record. Hence, the Decision of respondent Executive Secretary suspending the petitioners, on the basis of the
said findings, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to an act done in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the respondents' motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

G.R. No. 121215 November 13, 1997

MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The significance of the minutes taken during the session of a local legislative assembly is the determinant issue
in this present petition.
Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the crime of falsification of a public document, specifically
Resolution No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The
complaint 1 alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the payment of the

terminal leave of two municipal employees, was anomalous for not having been approved by the said
Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made no reference to the supposed approval
thereof. It contended that its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.
The deputized prosecutor of Balanga, Bataan recommended the filing of an information 2 for Falsification of

Public Document against petitioner and Concepcion, excluding Zurita.

In a resolution dated December 29, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations undertaken and the
consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds that as local chief executive,
he has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare said resolution

Held:
Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution,
where the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article
109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive
Contrary to petitioner's belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act
of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief
executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with
his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same.
In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang
Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully
well that "the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the
Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session." 14
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually
transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account
of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent
corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED

G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997

PERCIVAL
MODAY,
ZOTICO
MODAY
(deceased)
and
LEONORA
MODAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution
No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare
Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan
Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." 2
Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering
that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." 3
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain
against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 4
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of
Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary
amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.

Ruling:
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental
State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a

compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. 15 For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. 17
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly
provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation

proceedings were initiated.

What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does
not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No.
43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain
and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could
be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir
Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government
units,
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.

Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the
oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU,
enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within
the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES compliance with the
provisions of this MOU.
In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing
Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003
also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that
Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.11

Issue:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.12

Held:
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance
No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and
the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the
second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002
and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as
mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN, petitioners

vs.
ROLANDO BANIQUED, respondent.
The case before us views the sanctity of a man's home in a different light. It is about a man's struggle against the
attempt of the State to demolish his house.
Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel
de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a
parcel of land6 located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City.
On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999,
against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued.
Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in
Baguio City.
In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law
and "was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion."
Baniqued buttressed his complaint by arguing that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, i.e., there should
be a court action and a court order first before his house can be demolished and before he can be ousted from the
lot.9 More, under Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, an adequate relocation should be provided first before demolition
can be had. Lastly, the 1991 Local Government Code does not empower the mayor to order the demolition of
anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to
demolition are satisfied.
Issue:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE
ACT OF THE CITY MAYOR IN ISSUING A NOTICE OF DEMOLITION IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION;

Held:
The petition is unmeritorious.

Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition.

Petitioners contend, though, that the complaint of Baniqued is premature. They say that what was issued by City
Mayor Domogan was only a notice of demolition, and not an order of demolition.39 In short, petitioners are saying that
Baniqued jumped the gun. He should have waited first for the issuance of a demolition order because no demolition
can be carried out in the absence of such order.
To Our mind, the distinction between a notice of demolition and an order of demolition is immaterial. What is
material is that Baniqued felt threatened with the impending demolition of his house. The issuance of the notice of
demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rule-making function. It is strictly an act of law
enforcement and implementation, which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City
Mayor a quasi-judicial body.45
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or
orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is
illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as
provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor
has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.