Nuclear Bunker Busters, Mini-Nukes, and the US Nuclear Stockpile

The Bush administration is contemplating a new crop of nuclear weapons that could reduce the
threat to civilian populations. However, they're still unlikely to work without producing massive
radioactive fallout, and their development might require a return to underground nuclear
testing.

Robert W. Nelson

Congress is currently considering legislation that would authorize the US nuclear

weapons laboratories to study new types of nuclear weapons: Earth-penetrating
nuclear bunker busters designed to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets,
and agent-defeat warheads intended to sterilize stockpiles of chemical or
biological agents. In addition, the Bush administration has requested that
Congress repeal a 1994 law, banning research that could lead to development of
mini-nukes, low-yield nuclear warheads containing less than the power
equivalent of a 5-kiloton chemical explosion, one-third that of the Hiroshima
bomb.

The actual development of new nuclear weapons would require additional

legislation and would signal a major policy reversal. The US has not developed a
new nuclear warhead since 1988 and has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992.
And although the Senate did not consent to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty in 1999, the US continues to participate in a worldwide moratorium on
underground nuclear testing. Currently, US nuclear weapons laboratories
monitor and maintain the existing nuclear inventory through the Department of
Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program. (See Raymond Jeanloz's article in
Physics Today, December 2000, page 44.)

In support of its request to repeal the 1994 law, the Bush administration is
arguing that the US may need lower yield nuclear weapons to more credibly deter
rogue regimes possessing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. But arms
control advocates fear that renewed US development of nuclear weapons would
spark similar actions by other nuclear-armed nations and damage long-standing
efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, critics
charge that mini-nukes blur the distinction between conventional and full-blown
nuclear war and make the eventual use of nuclear weapons more likely.

Whether the US should go forward with actual development of new types of

nuclear weapons will almost certainly be debated vigorously in Washington, DC
for the next several years. Physicists and engineers have often participated in
public debates over nuclear weapons policy, including new nuclear weapons
development.1,2 (See various related articles in Physics Today, July 1975,
November 1989, and March 1998*.) More important, scientists can help
policymakers to distinguish which technical goals are feasible and which are
merely wishful thinking.
Nuclear weapons advocates in the Bush administration favor missiles carrying
nuclear warheads that could be designed to penetrate the ground sufficiently to
destroy buried command bunkers or sterilize underground stocks of chemical
and biological weapons and yet produce "minimal collateral damage." Crucial to
the debate, therefore, is an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
earth-penetrating nuclear weapons. How deeply, for example, can missiles really
burrow into reinforced concrete? How deeply buried must these weapons be for
the surrounding rock to contain the blast? Would the underground temperatures
of a nuclear blast sterilize chemical and biological agents?3 This article addresses
these questions and explains that the goal of minimal collateral damage falls
squarely in the wishful-thinking category.

Conventional and nuclear earth penetrators

The US Department of Defense (DOD) has tens of
thousands of conventional earth-penetrating
weapons capable of destroying hardened targets
like an underground bunker buried within 10
meters of the surface. As figure 1 illustrates, a
typical 2.4-m laser-guided missile penetrates just a
few meters into reinforced concrete and can create
an explosion that leaves a 5-m-wide crater of
material.

Figure 1 To supplement its supply of conventional

penetrators, the DOD is also developing
conventional agent-defeat warheads that combine the advantages of a hardened
missile casing with a low-pressure incendiary warhead. Those weapons are
designed to penetrate the interiors of a shallow-buried facility and then ignite a
thermocorrosive filling that can maintain high temperatures for several minutes;
the high temperatures and low pressures are meant to sterilize toxins and
bioagents without dispersing them to the environment. The warhead may also
release chlorine and other disinfecting gases to destroy any remaining biological
agents.4 To judge by the effectiveness of weapons used in the US wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the precision, penetrating capability, and explosive power
of conventional earth-penetrating weapons has improved dramatically over the
past decade, and those trends are likely to continue.

Deeply buried and hardened structures, like a command and control bunker or a
missile silo tens to hundreds of meters underground, are more immune to
conventional explosives, though. Those structures are difficult to destroy even
using an aboveground nuclear explosion: Until recently, the huge 9-megaton B-
53 nuclear bomb was designated to destroy such targets. Most nuclear weapons
now in the US stockpile were designed to explode in the air or on contact with the
ground. (For a brief summary of basic designs of nuclear weapons, see the box on
page 34.) In either case, the blast wave transmits only a small fraction of the total
yield as seismic energy into the ground; the large density difference between the
air and the ground creates a mechanical impedance mismatch.
A nuclear device exploded just a few meters
underground, by contrast, couples its energy
more efficiently to ground motion and
generates a much more intense and damaging
seismic shock than would an air burst of the
same yield. Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic
change in equivalent yield. Exploding a 10-kt
nuclear bomb at a depth of 2 m underground,
for example, would increase the effective yield
by a factor of about 20 and result in
underground damage equivalent to that of a
200-kt weapon exploded at the surface.

To exploit that efficiency, in 1997 the US

replaced its aging 9-megaton bombs with a Figure 2
lower-yield but earth-penetrating 300-kt
model by putting the nuclear warhead from an earlier bomb design into a
strengthened alloy-steel casing and a new nose cone. When dropped onto a dry
lakebed from 12 km, the missile penetrated a modest 6 m. But even at this
shallow depth a much higher proportion of the explosion energy would be
transferred to ground shock compared to a surface burst at the same yield.

Were a bomb manufactured using even stronger materials and its mass increased
using a dense internal ballast material--as proposed for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator (RNEP), for instance--penetration depths could improve somewhat.
(The Bush administration requested $15 million to study this improved
penetrator.) However, figure 2 illustrates that those improvements would result
in only modest gains in the total depth of destruction. Near the explosion, the
peak pressure of the shock wave is proportional to the bomb yield and decreases
with the inverse cube of the distance from the explosion. Consequently, the
destructive effects of an explosion can be expressed as a function of a scaled
distance, as is done in figure 2. Most of the benefit of earth penetration is
obtained from the first (scaled) meter of burial.

Still, one might want maximum depth to help contain the

blast. How deeply a missile can penetrate a target
depends on the mechanical response of both missile and
target at high dynamic stress levels. Generally, faster-
moving missiles make deeper holes; that correlation is
roughly linear up to speeds approaching 1 km/s. At
higher velocities, however, the correlation breaks down
as materials plastically deform and erode when the
Figure 3 impact pressure from the target approaches the finite
yield strength of the penetrator: Yp ≈ ½ρtv2 (see figure 3). The impact velocity of
a missile made with even the hardest steel casing must remain less than a few
km/s to avoid deformation.
Taking into account realistic materials strengths, 10–20 m is a rough ceiling on
how deeply into dry rock a warhead can penetrate and still maintain its integrity.

Radioactive fallout
The 10 to 20-m range is far less than the burial
depths needed to contain the radioactive fallout
from even small nuclear explosions. Figure 4
illustrates the stark disparity in the numbers.5
A 1-kt weapon, for example, must be buried at
a depth of 90 m to be fully contained. Also
shown is the destructive reach of a shallow-
buried (10–20-m) bunker buster as a function
of its yield--that is, how deep a target a given
bomb could destroy. The seismic shock from
the explosion can certainly destroy deeply
buried targets. But weapons like the RNEP
would still require very high yields (more than
100 kt) to destroy targets buried deeper than Figure 4
100 m.

To appreciate the enhanced effect and the attendant dangers of a buried

explosion, consider the sequence of events that follow detonation of a shallow-
buried nuclear weapon, as diagrammed in figure 5. The explosion initially
vaporizes the surrounding rock and produces a high-temperature cavity. The
initial pressure of the cavity gases exceeds the pressure from overlayers of hard
dirt and rock by many orders of magnitude. The cavity expands rapidly, sending
outward a strong seismic shock that crushes and fractures rock.

Surface and shallow-buried nuclear

explosions produce much more intense local
radioactive fallout than an airburst, in which
the fireball does not touch the ground.6
When the blast breaks through the surface,
it carries with it into the air large amounts
of dirt and debris, made radioactive by the
capture of neutrons from the nuclear
detonation, as well as fission products from
the bomb itself. The radioactive dust cloud
produced in the blast does not rise as high
Figure 5 as a classic mushroom cloud, but instead
typically consists of a narrow column of
vented hot gas surrounded by a broad base surge of ejecta and suspended fine
particles, as shown in figure 6.
Casualties from an earth-penetrating nuclear
weapon would be due primarily to ionizing
radiation from the local fallout. The total
number of fatalities due to radiation sickness
depends on many factors: the population
density, the local terrain and weather
conditions, the time allowed to evacuate the
area, and the radiation dose. But
straightforward estimates based on empirically
determined scaling laws show that anyone Figure 6
within the roughly 3W0.6 km2 area covered by the base surge would receive a fatal
dose of radiation.3 (W is the explosive energy yield in kilotons of TNT.) For a
typical third-world urban population density of 6000/km2 those estimates imply
that a 1-kt weapon would kill tens of thousands and a 100-kt weapon would kill
hundreds of thousands of people.

Sanitizing stockpiles

High temperatures or intense radiation can destroy chemical or biological agents

such as VX nerve gas or weaponized anthrax.7,8 So, one might naturally imagine
that the temperature and radiation levels produced in a nuclear explosion would
be the ultimate germicide, atomizing shallow-buried stockpiles of chemical
agents before they could disperse into the environment.2

It turns out, however, that most of the ejected crater material would be unheated
and shielded from the initial burst of radiation. A nuclear blast of yield W would
create a crater volume about 105 W m3, which disperses about (2 × 108 W)
kilograms of debris.6,9 If all of the 1012 W calories of energy from the nuclear
explosion were distributed evenly, the mean energy available per unit mass totals
about 5 kcal/kg--sufficient to raise the ejecta temperature by only 5–10°C.

Of course, the heat from the explosion is not evenly mixed, but is confined mainly
to a small cavity of vaporized rock and steam that expands and vents to the
atmosphere. Because the mass density of soil or rock is roughly 2000 times
greater than air, the radiation and high temperatures that are usually associated
with a nuclear blast have a much shorter range in a buried explosion. In fact,
nearly all of the neutron and gamma radiation are absorbed within just a few
meters of the explosion.3 Furthermore, although the initial temperature can
exceed a million °C, the heat available to vaporize a cavity of rock extends only to
a radius near 2W1/3 m, and the heat necessary to melt rock extends only to about
twice that distance.10

As the cavity expands, the vaporized rock cools and condenses. For a contained
explosion, such as the 1.7-kt Rainier test at the Nevada Test Site, the remaining
gases are mainly superheated steam and carbon dioxide at temperatures less than
1500 K.11 Beyond the cavity, the temperature falls off rapidly with distance,
reaching the ambient ground temperature within a few cavity radii (see figure 7).
Gases vented from within uncontained explosions cool even more rapidly.

Containers or munitions filled with chemical or

biological agents that are within the final crater volume
would be ruptured by the same strong ground shock
that crushes the rock. But those agents are unlikely to
suffer the high temperatures or radiation levels that
would render them harmless unless they are very close
to the nuclear weapon. More likely is that the cargo of
still lethal chemical and biological toxins would mix
with the fallout raining down from the main cloud or
would be dispersed with the ejecta thrown out in the
base surge.

A far more sensible strategy would be to ensure that

whatever toxic material is already stored deep
Figure 7 underground simply stays there. Once the entrances
and exits to toxic storage facilities were sealed up using
conventional tactics and the territory captured, the agents could be safely
neutralized.

To test or not to test

If Congress does eventually authorize the development of new nuclear weapons,

will the US have to resume underground nuclear testing in order to certify its
warheads? The answer depends on the design in question, but in most cases
nuclear testing would be unnecessary.

Nearly all the components of a nuclear weapon, including the implosion of its
plutonium core, can be tested absent a nuclear explosion. The testing engineers
simply replace the fissile material with a chemically identical isotope that does
not produce a chain reaction--the weapon performs nearly every step, but does
not deliver a nuclear yield. That method should be sufficient to test previously
certified designs under new conditions and allow engineers to safely judge the
performance of weapons that would experience the severe shock of earth
penetrators.

If Congress were to opt for low-yield nuclear weapons, nuclear testing could
again be bypassed because of the flexibility already built into existing warheads.
Indeed, every modern warhead in the US nuclear arsenal has a low-yield mode.
By disconnecting the secondary stage of the thermonuclear reaction and reducing
(or eliminating) the phase that boosts the deuterium–tritium gas, a nuclear
weapon in the arsenal could be converted into an unboosted primary fission
weapon that delivers a subkiloton yield.
Gun-type designs, described in the box on page 34, are so simple and robust--one
subcritical piece of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is propelled into another to
make a supercritical mass--that they would also require no testing. Unfortunately,
would-be nuclear terrorists are also likely to recognize the simplicity of those
devices. To minimize the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, therefore, the number
of locations in the world where HEU can be found should be greatly reduced.

But if Congress were to authorize the nuclear weapons laboratories at Los Alamos
and Lawrence Livermore to pursue a completely new design--an implosion device
using a boosted primary--the inherent uncertainties in warhead performance
would almost certainly require that the weapon be fully tested before being
certified to enter the US stockpile.12 Such a decision would have profound
consequences.

Since the end of the cold war, nuclear weapons have receded in importance; high-
precision conventional weapons can now accomplish many missions that until
recently would have required nuclear yields. Were the US to research and develop
new types of nuclear warheads for the kinds of missions discussed here--bunker
busting or targeting chemical stockpiles--the course change would surely signal a
renewed US belief that nuclear weapons have a broad range of potential uses. In
response, wouldn't foreign nations have a powerful incentive to develop or
improve their own nuclear deterrent?

Were the US to resume underground nuclear testing, it is highly likely that Russia,
China, and other countries would resume their own programs as well. Those
nations could improve their own nuclear arsenals far more than would the US, if
there was a return to testing. Such a breakdown in the moratorium would destroy
near-term prospects of entry into force of a comprehensive test ban and
profoundly undermine efforts to limit nuclear proliferation.

I thank Frank von Hippel for originally suggesting this project and for his
thoughtful guidance. I also acknowledge helpful conversations with Sidney
Drell, Harold Feiveson, Steve Fetter, Richard Garwin, Raymond Jeanloz, Scott
Kemp, Zack Halderman, Michael Levi, Michael May, and Greg Mello.

Robert Nelson is a senior fellow for science and technology at the Council on
Foreign Relations in New York City and a research staff member of the
program on science and global security at Princeton University.

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