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    Husserl S Epoche and Phenomenological de

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    John O'shea
    The document discusses Husserl's concept of epoché or phenomenological reduction which involves suspending judgments about the external world to examine phenomena in their pure essence. The author argues it is not possible to give a full phenomenological description while performing this suspension for three reasons: 1) the essence reached may not represent a view others could share due to divergent intentionality, 2) the symbolic nature of language can reintroduce context that was suspended, and 3) first-person perspectives may differ in experiences like hallucinations. The author maintains their view that Husserl's concept of epoché is problematic due to the difficulties in reaching shared conclusions and retaining purity of experience.

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    Husserl S Epoche and Phenomenological de

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    John O'shea
    69 views5 pages
    The document discusses Husserl's concept of epoché or phenomenological reduction which involves suspending judgments about the external world to examine phenomena in their pure essence. The author argues it is not possible to give a full phenomenological description while performing this suspension for three reasons: 1) the essence reached may not represent a view others could share due to divergent intentionality, 2) the symbolic nature of language can reintroduce context that was suspended, and 3) first-person perspectives may differ in experiences like hallucinations. The author maintains their view that Husserl's concept of epoché is problematic due to the difficulties in reaching shared conclusions and retaining purity of experience.

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    The document discusses Husserl's concept of epoché or phenomenological reduction which involves suspending judgments about the external world to examine phenomena in their pure essence. The author argues it is not possible to give a full phenomenological description while performing this suspension for three reasons: 1) the essence reached may not represent a view others could share due to divergent intentionality, 2) the symbolic nature of language can reintroduce context that was suspended, and 3) first-person perspectives may differ in experiences like hallucinations. The author maintains their view that Husserl's concept of epoché is problematic due to the difficulties in reaching shared conclusions and retaining purity of experience.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    69 views5 pages

    Husserl S Epoche and Phenomenological de

    Uploaded by

    John O'shea
    The document discusses Husserl's concept of epoché or phenomenological reduction which involves suspending judgments about the external world to examine phenomena in their pure essence. The author argues it is not possible to give a full phenomenological description while performing this suspension for three reasons: 1) the essence reached may not represent a view others could share due to divergent intentionality, 2) the symbolic nature of language can reintroduce context that was suspended, and 3) first-person perspectives may differ in experiences like hallucinations. The author maintains their view that Husserl's concept of epoché is problematic due to the difficulties in reaching shared conclusions and retaining purity of experience.

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    Breanna Derlagen s4201033

    HusserlsEpochandPhenomenologicalDescription
    InIdeasI,EdmundHusserlintroducestheconceptofepochasameansof
    suspendingjudgmentsothattheessenceofphenomenamaybeexaminedasitis
    presentedtotheconsciousness.ThroughtheanalysisofHusserlsworks,aswellas
    theconceptsofJacquesDerridaandRobertWalsh,Iwillarguethatitisnotpossible
    togiveafullphenomenologicaldescriptionwhileperformingthissuspension.Firstly,
    theessenceofaphenomenaisproblematicastheperspectivewereachisintendedto
    representaviewthatotherswouldalsoreach;secondly,thesymbolicandindicative
    natureoflanguagehasthepotentialtotaintthepurityofourexperiencewiththe
    phenomena;andthirdly,theproblemofindividual,firstpersonperspectiveandthe
    possibilityofdivergentintentionality.
    InTheThesisoftheNaturalStandpointanditsSuspension,EdmundHusserl
    proposesaradicalalterationofthethesisofthenaturalstandpoint.Thisessaybegins
    byexplainingthatpeopleareapartofafactworldthatexistsoutsideofusand
    presentsitselftousassomethingthatexists.Everyoneinteractsandisrelatedtoitin
    thesameway,andeventhoughwemayquestionordoubtorrejectthethingsthis
    factworldpresentstous,itstillremains;meaning,westillareinteractingwith
    something.aworldthathasitsbeingoutthere(Husserl,112).Thisinteractionwith
    thefactworldistermedthegeneralthesisofthenaturalstandpoint(Husserl,112),
    whichsciencesofthenaturalstandpointattempttounderstandmorecomprehensively
    thanmereexperience,whilesimultaneouslyattemptingtosolveproblemsofscientific
    knowledge.

    Breanna Derlagen s4201033


    Husserlstates:theattempttodoubtanyobjectofawarenessinrespectofit
    beingactuallytherenecessarilyconditionsacertainsuspension(Aufhebung)ofthe
    thesis(Husserl,Ideas,114).Hereferstothissuspensionasepoch:a
    phenomenologicalreductionthatsuspendsthisgeneralthesisofthenatural
    standpoint.Husserlassertsthatthisthesisisnotabandoned,butsetasidesoallthat
    remainsisouressentialexperiencewithanobject(whichdoesnotnecessarilyrefer
    toaphysicalobject;itcanbeanemotion)ortheworldingeneral.Inotherwords,
    epochisachievedbysuspendingallphilosophical,social,culturalandhistorical
    biasesandassumptionsabouttheexternalworld,leavingbehindonlyreflection,
    directintuition,analysisanddescription.Thismethodallowsthesubjecttobracket
    theexternalworldwhilesuspendingjudgment,observinganddescribingtheobjector
    phenomenathroughtheprimordialactofpureexperience.
    Personally,Idonotbelieveweareabletoperformthissuspension
    recommendedbyHusserlandsimultaneouslygiveafullphenomenological
    description.Husserlarguesthattheactofbracketingorepochwillstripdownthe
    phenomenatoitsbareessence.Husserlbelievesthatthesefirstpersonperspectives
    shouldrepresentaviewthatotherpeoplecouldalsoreach;inotherwords,wegivea
    phenomenologicaldescriptionthatcanbeagreeduponbythemajorityofpeople.Ido
    notthinkthisisnecessarilypossibleaseachpersonsconsciousnessinteractswiththe
    factworldinstrangeandsometimesinexplicableways.Thepureactofconsciousness
    isradicallydifferentforeachperson.Forexample,ifIweretoattempttohaveapure
    phenomenologicalexperiencewithafieldoftulipsthroughHusserlsmethodof
    epoch,Icouldcometothephenomenologicaldescriptionofpeacefulbeauty,
    whereassomeoneelsecouldviewthemasloudandviolentlycolourful.Ifeachofus
    feltstronglyenoughaboutourphenomenologicaldescription,itcouldbecome
    difficulttocometoanagreement.
    Itcould,however,bearguedthateventuallyaconsensuscouldbereached
    betweenthetwoofusastothephenomenologicalessenceofthetulips,offeringan
    acrosstheboardphenomenologicaldescription.Though,Istillfindthistobe
    problematicasonceyouadjustyourphenomenologicaldescriptiontoadheretothe
    viewofothers,itmaybedilutedinitspurity.
    AnotherreasonIbelievethisphenomenologicaldescriptionisproblematicis

    Breanna Derlagen s4201033


    thesymbolicnatureoflanguage.Onceyoudescribesomethingthroughlanguage,it
    notimmediatelyplaceitbackwithinsomesortofcontext.Iftheessenceofanobject
    issomethingweexperience,whyshouldweneedtovocalizeittomakesureweare
    correct?IfIdescribethetulipsasred,Iautomaticallythinkabouttheconnotations
    behindtheworldredmakemethinkoflove,anger,fire,passion,apples,anda
    myriadofotherthingsIassociatewiththecolourred.InRobertWalshsHusserls
    EpocheasMethodandTruth,hepointsouttheproblemoflanguageinconnectionto
    thoughtexhibitedbothinHusserlsTheOriginofGeometryandMerleauPontys
    PhenomenologyofPerception,explainingtheseductionoflanguage(Walsh,217),
    whereinweareconstrainedbyahorizonofmeaningpertainingtolanguage,a
    tendencyofwordsandconceptstobecomescdimcntcd"intheformofpersisting
    linguisticacquisitions,"(Walsh,217).Walshbelieveslanguagemustbepushed
    beyondthelimiting,hermeneutichorizonofthefactworldtotheprereflective
    worldofintersubjectiveselfconsciousness.(Walsh,217),meaningthepure,primal
    experiencethatcanbeheldincommonwithotherconsciousminds.
    Idonotbelieveitispossibletopushlanguagebeyondthehorizonofthefact
    worldunlessyoumakeupalanguageentirelyofyourownandeventhen,there
    wouldbenowayofcommunicatingthistootherpeopleinawaythattheycould
    understand.
    InSpeechandPhenomena:AndOtherEssaysonHusserlsTheoryofSigns,
    JacquesDerridadiscussestwofacetsoflanguageidentifiedbyHusserl:expression
    andindication.Expressionreferstothemeaningwegivetoawordorlinguisticsign,
    whereasindicationreferstothewaylanguageempiricallyreferstosomethingelse,or
    iscontextualised.Derridaarguesthatindicationandexpressioncannotbeseparated
    becauseourconsciousnessusessignsthataredependentonindicativemeaning,
    stating:
    Betweenthephonicelement(inthephenomenologicalsenseandnotthat
    ofarealsound)andexpression,takenasthelogicalcharacterofa
    signifierthatisanimatedinviewoftheidealpresenceofaBedeutung
    (itselfrelatedtoanobject),theremustbeanecessarybond.Husserlis

    Breanna Derlagen s4201033


    unabletobracketwhatinglossamaticsiscalledthesubstanceof
    expressionwithoutmenacinghiswholeenterprise.Theappealtothis
    substancethusplaysamajorphilosophicalrole.(Derrida,76)
    Thissubstanceofexpressionisunabletobebracketedandexpressedwithout
    beingindicativeaslanguagecontainsadiscursivecontentthatrefersto
    somethingelseasapointofreference.
    Epochalsocallsintoquestiontheconceptofperceptioninregardstothe
    natureofexperience.Aphenomenologistsperspectiveisfromafirstperson
    pointofview,andthisperspectiveintendstorepresentaviewthatotherswould
    alsoreach.However,ifIwerehallucinatingthetulips,otherswouldnotbeable
    tohavethesamephenomenologicalexperienceasme.WhereIsawafieldof
    tulips,someoneelsecouldmerelyseeafieldofgrass.Therefore,ifIsawafield
    ofTulipswheresomeonesawafieldofgrasstheintentionalitydirectedtowards
    thefactworldwouldbedifferent.Husserlsversionofintentionalityrefersto
    therelationshipbetweenconsciousnesssandtheexternalworld,andtheway
    consciousnessisdirectedtowardsanobject.Thoughtheintentionalitywouldbe
    different,neitherofuswouldberightorwrongasitisourownpersonal
    interpretationoftheexperience,thoughupondiscussionwewouldbothquestion
    eithereachothersorourownperceptionofthefield.
    Husserlanswersthiscriticismthroughtheprincipleofprinciples,
    outlinedinhisessayIdeasas:Everyoriginarypresentiveintuitionisa
    legitimizingofknowledge,thatwhateverpresentsitselfinintuitionin
    primordialform(asitwereinitspersonalactuality)istobeacceptedsimplyas
    whatitispresentedasbeing,thoughonlywithinthelimitsinwhichitthen
    presentsitself."(Ideas,p44).Husserlbelieveseveryobjectthatpresentsitselfis
    tobeacceptedasitis.However,thisprincipleofprinciplesfailstotakeinto
    accounthallucinations.IfIbelievesomethingispresentingitselftome,butitis
    actuallyahallucination,myintentionalitywouldstillbethesameassomeone
    experiencingsomethingreal.
    Throughthisanalysisofvarioussources,Imaintainmyviewthat

    Breanna Derlagen s4201033


    Husserlsconceptofepochorthesuspensionofcertainjudgmentssoa
    phenomenamaybeexperiencedinitspureessenceisproblematicasitis
    difficulttocometoaconclusionthatotherpeoplewouldreach.Also,the
    symbolic,indicativenatureoflanguageanddivergentperspectivesmakethis
    suspensionproblematicasthepurephenomenologicalessencemaybedilutedor
    lost.

    References:
    Derrida,J(1973).SpeechandPhenomena:IntroductiontotheProblemofSignsin
    HusserlsPhenomenology,trans.D.B.Allison,Evanston:Northwestern
    UniversityPress.
    Husserl,E.(1980).TheThesisoftheNaturalStandpointanditsSuspension.InR.C.
    Solomon(Ed.),PhenomenologyandExistentialism(pp112117).Lanham:
    Rowman&Littleford.
    Husserl,E.(2010).TheIdeaofPhenomenology.Trans.L.Hardy(pp.1531)
    Dordrecht:Kluwer.
    Husserl,E.(2012).Ideas:GeneralIntroductiontoPurePhenomenology.Routledge.
    Walsh,R.D.(1988)HusserlsEpocheasMethodandTruth.(pp214223)Available
    online:
    https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/9170/1/auslegung.v14.n02.211
    223.pdf

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