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House Hearing, 110TH Congress - The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces

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[H.A.S.C. No. 110144]

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND


FORCES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 9, 2008

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


WASHINGTON

44-098

2009

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Congress.#13

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES


ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
HOWARD P. BUCK MCKEON, California
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JEFF MILLER, Florida
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
ROB BISHOP, Utah
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
MARK UDALL, Colorado
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director
MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member
STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member
CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant

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CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2008
Page

HEARING:
Wednesday, April 9, 2008, The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces ..............
APPENDIX:
Wednesday, April 9, 2008 .......................................................................................

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51

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008


THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee
on Armed Services ................................................................................................

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WITNESSES
Cody, Gen. Richard A., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ..............................
Magnus, Gen. Robert, USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ......

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APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Cody, Gen. Richard A. ......................................................................................
Magnus, Gen. Robert ........................................................................................
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:
Mr. Sestak .........................................................................................................
Ms. Tsongas ......................................................................................................

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THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2008.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:25 p.m., in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, as I announced at the


earlier hearing today, for this hearing we will depart from our
usual order of questioning to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to participate. And we will start by questioning with members who were here for this mornings hearing, but did not get to
ask a question, that were present at the gavel for this hearing. We
will then proceed in the usual order. If you have any questions,
please address them to the staff.
House Armed Services Committee will now meet in open session
to discuss the state of ground forces readiness.
We are honored to have with us today two exceptional military
leaders: General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff for the United
States Army, and General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant
of the United States Marine Corps.
And, gentlemen, we welcome you and thank you for your service.
We convene this hearing shortly after an important hearing this
morning with General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan
Crocker. And from my perspective we cannot consider the way
ahead in Iraq without careful examination of the state of readiness
of our military and its ability to deter or fight an unexpected conflict.
We have had 12 military contingencies in the last 31 years, some
of them major, most of them unexpected. We must have a trained
and properly equipped force ready to handle whatever comes, but
my strong concern is that our readiness shortfalls and the limitations on our ability to deploy trained and ready ground forces have
reached a point where these services would have a very steep uphill climb with increased casualties to respond effectively to an
emergency contingency.
And I have to agree with you, General Cody, in what you said
in testimony last week. I have never seen our lack of strategic
depth be where it is today, and this should concern all Americans.
We have the finest military in the world, no doubt about it, and
they have become masters in the counterinsurgency fight. But it
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takes time to retrain our forces so they can deal with our types of
conflict, and our forces just dont have the time.
I understand the Army intends to reduce deployments from 15
to 12 months. This is an improvement, and, of course, I applaud
it, but it only resets us to where we were last winter. At this pace,
we will still wear out our troops, and it does not leave enough time
for the training needed to ensure they can respond to any conflict
we might face.
I might, at this point, say I am very sensitive about this because
I had a roommate in law school who was caught in the Pusan Perimeter in 1950, and hearing him tell about that, we do not want
to be in that state of readiness as we were, sadly, at that moment.
The Army and Marine Corps have been forced to move equipment from nondeployed units and preposition stocks to support
combat requirements. Our equipment is focused on the units next
to deploy to Iraq and the ones in theater, leaving gaps for training
and for those who should be our strategic reserve.
This also extends to the National Guard, which has an average
of 61 percent of the equipment needed to be ready for disasters or
attacks on the homeland.
General Magnus, your testimony says that the net effect of these
trends is that our ability is very limited to rapidly provide ready
forces to conduct other small- or large-scale operations.
And despite all that this Congress and the services have done to
provide funding to reset our force, our readiness, as General Cody
aptly put it, it is being consumed as fast as we can build it.
So where do we go from here?
Gentlemen, there is no ulterior motive here. We need to hear
where things stand with our ground forces and what must be done
to reduce the strategic risk that we are facing. This committee is
committed to doing all we can to help you restore the readiness of
our ground forces. We owe it to all those serving with incredible
distinction, as well as to their families and to the American people,
whom they defend. We look forward, gentlemen, to your testimony.
My friend, my Ranking Member Mr. Hunter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding
this hearing. I think very timely hearing.
And, gentlemenGeneral Magnus, General Codythanks for
being with us today and for your great service.
And, General Cody, I understand this may be one of the last
hearings you are going to be attending, since your retirement is imminent. And let me just say that I think you have performed a
great service for this country. We have crossed swords a lot over
the last several years and had a lot of common ground together,
but I think that anybody who evaluates your great military career
has got to come to the conclusion that you put a tremendous intellect and a great heart into everything that you do.
And, personally, I think it is a mistake for us not to get a few
more miles out of you before we take the saddle off. You are a great
asset to this country, and, very personally, I would like to see you

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continue to perform in a leadership role for this country. It takes
a lot of time to develop that corporate insight and capability and
experience that is important in times of war. This is a time of war.
So my opinion is that we need to ride you for a couple more miles
here, General. Thanks for your great service to this country.
Our committee membersand especially those of the Readiness
Subcommitteeare actively engaged in the issues that impact the
readiness of our forces in light of the operations right now in Iraq
and Afghanistan. So we face this big challenge to rebuild and reset
and modernize and to transform and at the same time make our
forces bigger all the time we are engaged in the war.
So we started this endeavor with about a $56 billion shortfall in
equipment, and, in addition, the Armys transformation initiative
the necessary transition from a strategic reserve to an operational
reserveand the Army and Marine Corps grow-the-force efforts
have all increased a lot of the requirements.
In effect, these changes have shifted the readiness goalpost further down the field. And let me go over a few of those.
In 2001 we had a requirement for 4,722 medium tactical vehicles,
and we only had 290 of them on hand. Today that requirement has
grown to 22,000, and we have got over 9,200 fielded to our Army
Guard units. In other words, we have gone from 290 to more than
10 times that much.
In 2001 they had a requirement for 69,000 tactical radios, and
we had 60 percent of that requirement on hand. Today we have got
over 82,300. That means we have got about 40,000 more than we
had before, and yet the readiness sheets show that we now have
increased the requirement to 81,000. So we are right at what we
have to produce to have the right number, but we are substantially
over what we had in the past.
In 2001 they had a requirement for over 200,000 night-vision
goggles, and we had 53,000. So we had about 25 percent of the requirement. Today we have got over twice the number produced
that is, we have 112,000 night-vision gogglesbut we moved the
requirement up, and we now have filled 77 percent of the requirement.
So I think it is important to be clear that a lot of this progress
is a result of years of supplemental funding that is in part due to
the fact that the base budget was not increased to fill in these
shortages. And folks at home need to know that. They need to
know that what we refer to as the global war on terror supplemental is providing funding for things like trucks, radios, body
armor and night-vision goggles that we did not have but that we
had a requirement for prior to September 11, 2001. And I think it
is important for folks to understand, in many areas of equipment,
we have vastly more equipment today than we had in 2001, even
though our papers and our documents still show a shortage.
The readiness of our forces is critical, and there is certainly a lot
of work to be done. However, I believe we are remiss in talking
about military readiness without addressing the role that wethe
Congresshave in assuring the money is provided to achieve that
readiness.
In January 2007 the Administration submitted the 2008 global
war on terror (GWOT) supplemental request alongside the fiscal

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year 2008 base budget. I would like to read you a brief statement
from that request: The cumulative effect of 5 years of operations
is creating strain on both personnel and equipment. This request
provides funding for special pays and benefits for personnel to sustain the all-volunteer force, and it provides funding to maintain, repair or replace equipment lost, worn out or stressed by use.
During his testimony before this committee on February 6, Secretary of Defense Gates stressed that funding in the 2008 supplemental request was directly related to the readiness of the force.
He stated: We have about $46 billion in the 2008 supplemental for
reconstituting the force. We received about $13 billion-plus of that
in the bridge. So that will help us replace equipment and repair
equipment that is associated here.
Secretary Gates continued: So I think there are a number of
things that are in the budget that put us on the path to improve
readiness, but it is clear that our readiness is focusedat least in
the Armyon fighting the wars that we are in in both Afghanistan
and Iraq. The forces that are being sent there are fully trained and
are ready when they go.
That said, I would like to ask all of my colleagues concerned with
military readiness a very simple question: Why is the fiscal year
2008 supplemental request still sitting on the shelves collecting
dust when it can be used to improve the readiness of our troops?
Over the last two days, I have watched my colleagues across the
aisle chastise the government of Iraq for not passing critical legislation when we cant even pass a supplemental spending bill during
a time of war. We have readiness issues, and we are all concerned
about the impact on readiness on our national security.
However, our readiness issues are not to be blamed solely on the
war in Iraq. It is time we take responsibility for our readiness
shortfalls and fund the requirements rather than use readiness
problems that existed well before we set foot in Iraq as a reason
to justify abandoning that mission.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important
hearing today, and I look forward to the testimony.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
General Cody.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD A. CODY, USA, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CODY. Good afternoon, Chairman Skelton, Congressman


Hunter, distinguished members of the committee.
I am honored to represent the
The CHAIRMAN. Would you get a little closer to the microphone,
please.
General CODY. Roger.
I am honored to represent 1.1 million soldiers, nearly 600,000 of
whom are serving on active duty today and over 250,000 of whom
are deployed worldwide, 176,000 of those in the combat zone, as I
testify on issues that are critical to the readiness of the United
States Army.
I have submitted a detailed written statement for the record, but
I would like to briefly emphasize a few points here today.

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One of the qualities that we cherish as a values-based and capabilities-based Army is the ability to engage in frank, candid and
professional assessments of our abilities and our levels of preparedness. With this quality comes the duty to provide not only an honest assessment of our strengths and weaknesses but also recommendations to remedy those areas that we believe need improvement. We must be self-critical if we are to ensure that our soldiers
are always more than ready to meet the challenges of an adaptive,
patient, prolific and very dangerous enemy.
It has been almost nine years since I sat before this committee
as the returning deputy commanding general Task Force Hawk to
testify on the state of Army readiness. At that time, I told the committee that we were starting to feel the results of declining resources and that, while the armed forces budgets and authorizations continued to shrink, our mission set in the Army has steadily
expanded. When asked directly, I stated that I believed we were a
10-division Army attempting to execute a 14-division mission. I
stand by that statement.
Just two years later, 9/11 would bring terrorism to our shores,
and our necessary military response would accelerate us down a
path toward decreased strategic readiness that we now see today.
We can no longer allow hope to trump what history and experience have taught us. When we size and resource our force for the
stable world we all hope for and not for the full-spectrum dangers
before us, it is the American soldier who ultimately pays the price.
History has once again given us an opportunity to get this right.
If we take the long-term view, if we fully appreciate and act on the
reality that our investments in the Army of tomorrow and the readiness of our current force are dependent upon each other and are
inextricably linked, then we can change the course.
I believe that the Army leadership with the help of the President, the Department of Defense and Congress has taken the longterm view and maximized the momentum of a force in motion that
is at war to transform this Army. We have taken this window of
opportunity, the increased resources and national attention to invest in our soldiers and their families, to grow the Army, reset and
modernize our equipment, rebalance and modulize our formations,
change our doctrine and improve our care of the force across the
total force.
Because of this, we are faced with a dichotomy of readiness. We
are the most battle-hardened, best-equipped, best-led, and besttrained force for the counterinsurgency fight that we now face. But
we are also unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the
strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world. We are a stress force but not a hollow force.
We are a better force, but our focus has been narrowed.
Overall, I believe that the strength of our soldiers and their families are truly what allow me to say unequivocally this Army is not
broken. We have asked our soldiers to sprint, and they did. We
have asked them to run a marathon, and they have. That marathon has become an enduring relay, and our soldiers continue to
run and at the double time.
Does this exhaust the body and mind of those in the race and
those who are ever present on the sidelines cheering them on? Yes.

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Has it broken the will of the soldier? No. Our soldiers do not quit.
They stand on a tradition of victory for this country and dont just
want to run the race. They want to win it.
We cannot take their resiliency for granted. It will require more
than the courage and valor of our soldiers to ensure our Army can
continue to fight and win the Nations war in an era of persistent
conflict. We must invest in the future to ensure our soldiers always
have technical and tactical overmatch against any enemy. We need
an open and honest discussion on the size of our force versus the
demands of a contemporary operating environment that we now
face.
We must continue the transformation of the Reserve component
to an operational force, and, above all, we must retain the quality
all-volunteer Army that we now have. For in the end, the recruitment and retention of a highly motivated and capable all-volunteer
force is the center of gravity for this Nation and all that we stand
for.
To do this, we need full and timely funding that takes the longterm view of readiness. We must place a higher value in this country on what it means to serve and have a greater appreciation for
those who have heard that call to duty and, knowing the dangers,
are brave enough to answer it. And we will need the continued support of the American people, whose safety and security are preserved by those courageous few.
The Congress has provided tremendous support to our Army
these past six years, and we are grateful for it. With the continued
support from the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, the Army will restore itself to balance and build the readiness necessary in an era of persistent conflict and continue to remain the strength of this Nation.
I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cody can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]
The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you.
General Magnus.
STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman


Hunter, distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for this opportunity to report to you today on the
readiness of your Marine Corps. On behalf of our over 189,000 active component and nearly 40,000 members of the selected Marine
Corps Reserve, our sailors and their families, I would like to extend
my appreciation for the sustained support that the Congress provides your Marine Corps.
Your Marines are fully engaged in long war today, with over
37,000 Marines deployed from Iraq to Afghanistan, the Horn to
West Africa, from Korea to the Philippines and here in our homeland hemisphere. Your Marines and sailors are performing magnificently under challenging and often dangerous conditions. I want to
assure you that our warriors in combat are our number-one priority. They are well trained, well led and equipped for their assigned missions.

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Although we are currently meeting our operational requirements
with ready mission-effective forces, the net effects of sustained
combat and a high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) are taking a toll
on our Marines, their families, our equipment and full-spectrum
training readiness.
Contributing to the stress on our force is the short dwell time between deployments and our intense focus on counterinsurgency operations. The short dwell time at home does not allow our units the
time to train to the full spectrum of missions needed to be ready
for other contingencies. This most directly affects your Marines
proficiency and core competencies, such as, combined arms and amphibious operations.
To ensure our forward-deployed forces maintain high readiness,
we have been required to source personnel and equipment from
nondeployed units and prepositioning programs. This cross-leveling
of personnel and equipment has reduced nondeployed units ability
to train for other contingency operations.
Additionally, we are taking actions to correct the effects of stress
on the force.
First, to sustain the demands of the long war, the Marine Corps
is growing its active component and strength to 202,000 Marines.
This increase will provide the combatant commanders with ready
Marines for the current counterinsurgency mission.
It will also improve our active component deployment-to-dwell
ratio to one-to-two, reducing stress on Marines and their families
and ensuring that Marines have the necessary time for full-spectrum training. The increased active in-strength will create three
balanced Marine expeditionary forces and reduce the need to mobilize our Reserve forces, improving their dwell ratio to one-to-five.
Second, we are resetting our forces to ensure our equipment remains ready for tomorrows missions. For over five years, intense
combat operations have resulted in the heavy use and loss of our
ground and aviation equipment. Operational demands have also increased our equipment maintenance and replacement costs far beyond what was planned in our baseline budgets.
With the Congresss help over the past three years, we have
begun to make progress in meeting reset requirements. To date the
Congress has provided $10.9 billion in supplemental funding toward our estimated total reset requirement of $15.6 billion. We
look forward to continuing to reset our forces with the remaining
fiscal year 2008 GWOT request.
Third, to ensure that your Marine Corps will remain ready for
future challenges, we will continue to modernize our warfighting
equipment, including new ships and aircraft, and our infrastructure.
I am proud to report that your support has helped ensure the
continuing success of Marines and sailors. The morale and resiliency of your Marines has never been higher. They volunteered to
serve their Nation at war, have been sent to do that mission and
know that they are succeeding despite very demanding conditions
and a ruthless enemy.
We will continue to keep our primary focus on supporting Marines and sailors in combat and taking care of their families at
home. We will continue to reset and to modernize your Marine

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Corps, ensuring that it remains ready today, ready tomorrow and
ready for the uncertain challenges of the future.
Congresss support has enabled us to succeed. That continuing
support will ensure that we will always, as Congress has directed,
be the most ready when the Nation is least ready.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Magnus can be found in the
Appendix on page 66.]
The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much.
We will begin where we left off, and I have on the list now Mr.
Cooper, Mr. Miller, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Klinein that orderto
begin on the five-minute rule.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, our Nation is thankful for your service.
First question, since the ground forces have borne the largest
share of the fight, do you think they should get a larger share of
the base budget of the Pentagon than the Navy or the Air Force?
That share, as you know, has held constant now for some 30 or 40
years.
General CODY. I think, Congressman, having been in the building now for six yearsI think we ought to throw out the pie charts
or percentages for services. This Nation deserves the best Air
Force, the best Navy, the best Marines, the best Army and the best
Coast Guards we can have. This is not about percentages of what
service gets what share. It is about the wants and needs of this
country to be defended by our services.
Mr. COOPER. Thank you, General, but the Army has gotten 28
percent plus or minus 2 percent over 40 years, even though you
have bornewhat?90-plus percent of the casualties. It is an
amazing thing to me that we dont adjust these budgets to meet the
needs of our troops.
General CODY. I have testified before that this is not about,
again, taking money from our other teammates because we will always go to war as a joint force. The fact that our soldiers have not
been strafed by enemy aircraft for over 50 years is because we have
the best Air Force. The fact that we are able to unload our equipment in ports safely is because we have the best Navy. And the
Marines and Army fight as a joint force.
The real issue is what percent of the gross domestic product
(GDP) is the Department of Defense (DOD) going to get for a top
line? If you take a look at the amounts of dollars it has taken us
to put in supplementalsas Congressman Hunter so statedto put
in supplementals to buy backwhat the former Chief of Staff of
the Army Pete Schumacher so well saidholes in the yard for
the contemporary operating environment we are in, it is about increasing the top line for DOD so we can do all these things.
We cant look at the current fight and modernization of all the
other services and play them off each other. We have to take a holistic view of the defense of this Nation.
Mr. COOPER. Let me try again.
After the Pentagon completes its roles and missions review, do
you think that the Army and the Marines will or should look any
different than they do today?

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General CODY. As you know, we came out of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2005 and we started seeing a top-line increase
for the Army. We will have another QDR in fiscal year 2010. And,
again, it gets back to we need to fund what the Nation needs and
wants, and the wants and needs need to be equal.
Mr. COOPER. If you look at our troops today in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have performed brilliantly, but many of these troops
were not really trained for the job they are executing on the
ground. We have Navy and Air Force personnel on the ground
doing what would normally be expected to be Army-Marine work.
We have other anomalies: artillerymen training folks who will
never see any artillery.
Would our troops be under less stress if they had been better
trained for the mission against the insurgents or special groups
whatever we are calling them today?
General CODY. First off, let me make sure that I am clear on
this.
We had to in 2004 and 2005 retrain artillery battalions to conduct security convoy operations. We had to take them out of their
traditional roles as artillerymen. We have had to do that with other
parts of our forces because we entered this war with an Army that
was end strength of 482,000 on the active side, 350,000 on the National Guard and about 198,000 in the United States Army Reserve
(USAR). That was a result of 10 years of downsizing after the wall
came down in 1989 and after the Gulf War.
And so we did not have enough depth across the Armytotal
Armyto meet the demands of a 360-degree battle fight that we
were in. But we did not send those artillerymen in untrained. We
retrained them for that mission.
Mr. COOPER. But we have had four or five years now to train
folks properly for the task at hand, and we are still using Air Force
and Navy personnel on the ground.
General CODY. We are. Those are for the military-training teams,
as well as for other security force. Again, it is because of the stress
that we have had on the total force.
But I want to make sure I am clear. We dont send anybody
down range unless we train them for that mission. It may not be
the mission of the unit they came from.
But to your point, that is what we mean by when we say we are
out of balance. We should have artillerymen today preparing for a
different fight, in many cases, than doing convoy security. And that
is one of the reasons why growing the Army and the active force
by 65,000 and in the National Guard Reserve by 9,500, we believe
by 2011 we will have the right mix of capabilities across combat,
combat support and combat service support so that we dont have
to send artillerymen in to do an infantry mission.
Mr. COOPER. Thank you, General.
My time has expired.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General, before I call Mr. Miller, were you around when General
Meyer was the Army chief of staff?
General CODY. Yes, sir, I was.

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The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall he made the comment to us in this
Congress, in this room, about the United States Army being a hollow Army?
General CODY. Yes, sir, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that was 1983. Would you compare todays Army to the hollow Army of 1983, General?
General CODY. No, sir, I wouldnt. Chairman, I will
The CHAIRMAN. Do your best to, please, compare them.
General CODY. Compare them. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
General CODY. I was in that Army. I was a company commander
in the 24th Infantry Division. What made that Army hollow then
was the fact that we didnt have the right training base. We were
about 10 years into the all-volunteer force. Our soldiers were coming out of the training base 65 percent trained on their skills.
At the same time that was happening, we did not have any investments, as you know, coming after Desert One, the investments
in some of what we now call the big five. So we had older tanks,
older Cobra gunships, older UH1 helicopters, and we did not have
the OPTEMPO dollars to train the total force for the mission set
at hand. At the same time that was going on, I believe that we
were completely out of balance in terms of the types of forces we
had. But I have talked to General Meyer, the former chief of staff,
and I remember quite vividly when he made that statement, and
I think he was right.
What is different today is we have made some very tough decisions when we got into this fight. We made decisions like we are
going to fully train our troops in basic and increase the training
based upon the mission sets we see. So we changed the way we
trained.
We made the tough decision tounlike Vietnamkeep the commanders with the troops the entire deployment cycle. So a commander coming in taking over a unit at Fort Bragg, trains them
up as a unit, builds trust soldier to soldier, leader to led, and then
deploys, and he doesnt come out of command during that deployment. He stays with them and brings them home. And I think,
even though the personnel accountsthat caused all kinds of problems because we had commanders with 36 months or 40 months
of command time when usually it was only 24 monthswe believe
that kept this Army together in terms of the investment in leadership.
The other reason why I say that we are not hollow at this time
is because we have moved to the modular force design, and as Congressman Hunter talked about, that increased the numbers of
equipment that we had and the density of those levels so that we
didnt have a platoon, like Jessica Lynchs platoon, that only had
1 radio in that 10-vehicle convoy and 1 crew-served weapon.
And so with the help of Congress, we have been able to keep this
Army not being hollow, but we have got to continue to invest in it
and continue to grow it.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Thank you to both Generals and to the men and women that you
represent.
General Cody, if I can, in following up on some of the training
issues, involuntary call-ups of individual ready reservists. Many of
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers really havent conducted real Army training for many, many years. And I have got
a caseit may be a simple one at thatwhere there has been an
army captain that was recalled right before Christmas, he hadnt
fired a weapon in five years. After a few months of training here
in the States, he was placed on a military-training team, sent to
Afghanistan to lead combat patrols with the Afghan army.
My concern is are we giving the Individual Ready Reserves
ample training before they are sent to the field, or is this an isolated case?
General CODY. Well, thanks for that question, Congressman, because it allows me to answer it in a little bit different way.
When people talk about stress of the Army and people start talking about numbers, everybody is looking at brigade combat teams.
Brigade combat teams is just one part of the story. We have well
over 4,000 soldiers involved in military-training teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have 86 security company missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan. So it is not just brigade combat teams when you start
looking at rotations and stress on the force.
On the Individual Reserve soldiers that we call back to active
duty, one, we try to call back those who have been off active duty
for a short period of time. But we bring them allin the case of
the military-training teams, we bring them all to Fort Riley, Kansas. We have a very robust training environment there to train
them as a team and make sure that they are certified for the rigors
of the mission they are going to.
Mr. MILLER. Some are saying that our Army is broken due to the
high OPTEMPO and the deployments to Iraq. However, the reenlistments are currently at high levels, especially those that are
taking place within the combat zone.
Would you give us some feedback, sir, on what you are hearing
from your soldiers on the ground in Iraq as to the reasons that
they are reenlisting in such high numbers?
General CODY. One of the things, Congressman, that has made
me most proud of this generation is the fact that they have great
resiliency. But we should not take it for granted.
I just came back from Iraq and Afghanistan. I reenlisted in 1 formation over 240 soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division, Rock of
the Marne. They still had time left in country. They dont start
coming home until June.
I talked to many of those soldiers and asked them why they reenlist, and I will paraphrase by saying they know they are making
a difference, they dont want to leave their buddies, they are committed to the Army and they enjoy what they are doing.
At the same time, we are in uncharted waters. This is the first
time we have taken this all-volunteer force to war this long. But,
more importantly, this surge is not just about five brigade combat
teams. When we surged, we also added three months more of combat time to every brigade and unit down range. And when we did
that, we also surged every training base.

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And so we are in uncharted waters here in terms of what the reenlistment rates are going to look like in the next two years. But
we all should be grateful that these young men and women, after
seeing what it is like to be in combat, in combat raise their right
hand and say, America, I will stay with this. I will defend you.
Mr. MILLER. General, one more question. It is regarding the 40
percent shortfall in information operation soldiers. It does concern
meand this committee, I am surethat it is so crucial to winning
the hearts and minds, encountering the propaganda that is being
conducted by al Qaeda now. Can you talk a little bit about the
shortfall in the short term, and what are we doing for the long
term?
General CODY. In this setting, what I can tell you, Congressman,
is this: We have talked to the National Security Agency (NSA) director, we have talked to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as
well as our own intelligence community. We are on a path with this
65K growth in the active force to grow more information operation
soldiers and officers.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both, for your service, and especially thank all of
those that you represent here today.
General Cody, you talked in your written statement about the
complex 21st century security environments that we are going to
be facing in this era of persistent conflict. And I have talked an
awful lot with noncoms and officers about this issue that they are
quite concerned about. I know you are as well.
Whether it is counterinsurgencies or nation building or building
partner capacity or any number of the other kinds of challenges
that we are going to ask our soldiers to meet and our Marines to
meet, the quality of the individual soldier noncom officer is terribly
important to success, and yet at this point, at least as far as Army
recruiting is concerned, the summary given to us by staff is that
we are bringing in a larger number of recruits without high school
diplomas, higher percentages from some of the lower mental categories, a lot of medical waivers, conduct waivers, and we are having a real problem with young noncommissioned officers (NCO)
mid-level NCO and officer retention.
And those I speak with about this issuethey bring it up with
methey are concerned that one of the long-term effects that this
will have on the Army, on the Marine Corps is a force that is not
as well prepared as it might have been to address these complex
21st century security environments.
And I wish you both would comment a little about that. I know
you are concerned about it. There have been a number of different
proposals for how to address it. When I talk to college kids, I often
say, This is the greatest thing you could be doing for your country,
for your own selves as individuals, by getting involved in this. We
need our best and brightest stepping up right now, and you wont
do anything in your life that is as exceptional as this opportunity
for you offers.

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And if you could talk about that, I dont know whether it is
money or it ishow do we address this problem, assuming that it
is a problem?
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman, for that statement, and
I agree with you wholeheartedly. And that is why I put it in my
statement that we have to have a national conversation about what
it means to serve.
On the quality issue, we established those quality marksOffice
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and all the servicesback when
the all-volunteer force started. I talked about 1983I am going to
give you a quick vignette, and I will go quickly so my sidekick here
can answer.
Nineteen hundred eighty-three was a year where we had 60 percent or so high school grads that year that we recruited in the
Armyabout 84,000 that yearon an Army that was about
780,000. We had a high percentage of cap force, but, totally, if you
looked at those marks and superimposed them on the quality
marks of the citizennow, this is not the soldier quality marks,
this is when they come to us as citizensand you superimpose it
on the quality marks we have today, it is a little bit worse than
1983.
About 7 months ago I talked to our Command Sergeant Majors
Academy260 E9s that are getting ready to take positions as
command sergeant majors in our formationand I said, How
many of you came in the Army in 198384? Almost all their hands
went up. I said, Good. Now, how many of you were cat 3 Bravos
and cat 4? Keep your hands up. A third of them.
And I told them then, I said, When we talk about the quality
of the force, let us not get hung up on the initial marks because
my question to you one third that just raised your hand is when
did you become category 1? When you graduated from the basic
course? When you graduated from advanced individual training
(AIT)? When you graduated from your first sergeants NCO academy?
We take what America gives us and invest in them. Does that
mean we are having to train harder? Yes. Does that mean we are
taking 28-year-old soldiers who raise their right hand and say, I
have watched this war on TV, and I want to be a part of itoh,
by the way, he owns up to the fact he has a felony conviction when
he was 16 years old, and we will have a colonel look at it.
The one mark that we havent talked about is courage and selfless service. And the fact that we had 80,000 in the active and
175,000 total last year join the United States Army, that right now
is what I look at. This country has in the 17- to 24-year-oldsthe
population that General Magnus, myself and the rest of our recruiters go afterin that population today, 35 percent meet the
minimum requirements by those standards mentally and physically
to be in the military.
And so when people tell me you have a quality problem, I say,
America, we have got a problem with our youth, and we are going
to have to deal with it.
General MAGNUS. Thank you, General Cody, for the remarks.
If I could please respond to the question for the Marine Corps,
and I agree with General Codys entire set of remarks prior to this.

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Today we have 189,400 active component Marines. Only a year
ago we had estimated, as we grew the force, that we would have
3,000 fewer Marines. In other words, we have estimated 186,500.
Americas young men and women are answering the call to the colors. The Marine Corps has not diminished its quality standards,
and yet even with those high-quality standards, we have over 95
percent of our enlisted accessions are high school graduates, and
we have exceeded our target by 3,000 enlisted Marines.
That is not only accession, but we are also turning the corner in
improving our first and subsequent tour reenlistment rates to keep
those experienced warriors who volunteered to serve and have
served on for subsequent tours during a long war.
Additionally, we have 300 more officers than we projected a year
ago. So not only are Americas young men and women answering
the call, they are answering the call to stay and serve longer.
Some of this is due to improved training. We have historically
low attrition in our recruit training. We also have low losses during
the first tour due to improved and focus on mental and physical
health and in taking care of our Marines.
Todays Marine Corps is a far different Marine Corps than when
General Cody and I were company-grade officers or, for that matter, is a far different Marine Corps than it was before 9/11. Your
Marines are versatile, agile, and they have got the experience of
combat to prove that they have expeditionary combined-arms capabilities appropriate to the missions they have today.
From Iraq to Afghanistan and back to Iraq and back to Afghanistan, your battalions and squadrons have shown they are combat
effective. This is not just the units. This is the Marines and sailors
that make the combat effectiveness that is the units.
This is not just the active component. This is the Reserve. Our
Reserveall nine Reserve infantry battalions have been to war,
and they are going back to war again, and they want to answer the
call when the Nation needs them to go to arms.
Their performance is magnificent, and as General Cody has said
previously, their resiliency, to meafter over 38 years wearing the
uniform of the cloth of the Nationbrings tears to our eyes. They
and their families are performing well, and I believe that they are
already showing us that they will have the capability for the 21st
century. They are showing it now.
As we build the Army and the Marine Corps to the right number
of soldiers and Marines, the right number of brigades and battalions and squadrons, we will have the depth to be able to return to
a deployment-to-dwell ratio that will allow us to give them the
training that they would need should there be other contingency
operations than we face today.
Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony.
I want to be so bold as to say that, with the two of you here, I
feel a little bit like I am with family, and I am very proud to be
part of that family. General Magnus and I started serving together
probably for the first time 25 years agoa quarter century ago
when we were squadron commanders together.

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And, General Cody, it is a great pleasure and honor for me to
know that my son is serving with your son in the 101st in Afghanistan, repeat overseas tours for both of them.
And so it is a great family, and I will be so bold as to include
myself in that family for just a minute.
Earlier today we heard testimony from General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker, and Ambassador Crocker at one point, in
talking about the Iraqi governments inability to get things done
sometimes, he said that their parliament was engaged in lengthy
and contentious debate.
We know in this Congress a great deal about lengthy and contentious debate and sometimes not getting things done or not getting
them done in a timely manner. Last year we had some lengthy and
contentious debate over the supplemental, and that time period
dragged on, and I know that the members of the Army and the Marine Corps and all the services started to feel the pain.
We are getting ready to start debate again on another supplementalI understand in the next week or soand so my question
to both of you isand I hope you will both take a moment to try
to answer itshould we be engaged again in lengthy and contentious debate and we dont get the supplemental approved in April
or perhaps in May or perhaps in June or perhaps in July, I would
just like to get a sense from you on what the impact of that would
be on our ground forces should that debate extend on and on? Surely, you have taken some look at that. I would like to hear from
both of you, please.
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman. And your son is doing
well over there. I talked to him the other day. I am sure he is surprised to hear from the vice chief directly.
Mr. KLINE. Shocked, I think, would be the word.
General CODY. In 2007 this Congress passed the supplemental
very quickly, and if you remember, we got the $17.1 billion upfront,
and we got it by the end of October. We were able to take that
$17.1 billion and energize our depots. But, more importantly, we
were able to replace our pre-position stocks in Kuwait, the heavybrigade combat team, the light-brigade combat team and an infantry battalion for Afghanistan.
When the surge came, because of that timely investment by this
Congress to the United States Army, of which we obligated by January 2008, we were able to do the surge, and the surge units fell
in on that equipment.
This year we didnt get all the money for reset, there is still $7.6
billion for the Army sitting out there, and time is not on our side.
We now have the most brigades deployed that we have ever had
consuming our equipment, our depots are running at 26 million direct-labor hours, and we need that $7.6 billion like in October of
last year to start buying long-lead items because we have got the
workforce energized and then, as these 5 brigades come out, be
able to rapidly reset so we can start getting in to the time factor
of building a strategic reserve. And so when I talk about timely
and fully funding, that is critical to get back to strategic readiness.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you.
General Magnus, if this drags out on into the summer or later,
what would happen?

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General MAGNUS. Thank you, sir.
I would address it in two parts. First, clearly the fiscal year 2008
GWOT that is remaining on the Hill will have impacts to us by the
end of the summer, certainly before the end of the fiscal year. We
are concerned about the funds that are required for us to continue
to grow this force to get Marines and their units ready for the long
war and for combat. So there is hundreds of millions of dollars in
basic pay and special pays that are required to be able to sustain
this force through the fiscal year.
In terms of procurement, we have hundreds of millions of dollars
of logistic armored vehicles, up-armored Humvees, explosive ordinance disposal systems. That, in addition to the Navy has got nearly $2 billion of funding to buy replacement and new aircraft for
sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But that is the dollars and cents of the impact, and I am confident that the Congress will support our needs, hopefully, before
the end of April or at latest May.
The second part of it, though, sir, is that these tough, bright,
well-educated warriorsand most of them are young warriors
they are listening and watching. They have put everything on the
line. Many of our Marines, who would have normally gone back to
their communities to go to college and raise families and go to the
farm, they have extended to go for that next deployment. They
have decided to reenlist for two to four years. They have put family
and education on hold to go fight this ruthless enemy, to go bring
this war to a closure, to find, to fix and to finish this enemy that
brought the fight to Americans here at home or wherever we are.
They are looking for that sustained support so that their will, their
courage, their professionalism will be backed up by the will of the
American people.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Before I call on Mrs. Boyda, let me ask one quick question of
each of you. You can answer it with one word.
General Cody, are you personally comfortable with the state of
readiness of the United States Army to respond to any emerging
contingency?
General CODY. No, Mr. Chairman, I am not.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General Magnus, are you personally comfortable with the state
of readiness of the United States Marines to respond to any emerging contingency?
General MAGNUS. Mr. Chairman, in short, no. Of course, we are
sustaining significant risk for other unplanned contingencies at
this point.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Boyda.
Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, both, for your service and all of the men and
women who serve so proudly and honorably under you. Thank you
so much.
I just wanted to ask a quick question for the record about Stop
Losses. Could I just have some information on what the total Stop

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Losses are in the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we can do
that later. If you want to make a brief statement, but I dont want
to take my time on that, if I can.
General CODY. I will give you the exact numbers for the record,
maam.
Mrs. BOYDA. All right. Thank you so much.
General MAGNUS. I can give you the exact numbers for the Marine Corps: zero.
Mrs. BOYDA. Zero? Thank you.
When we talk about readinessand, General Cody, you had spoken about pre-position stocks. Can you just give me some information on when you see those pre-position stocks being at a point
when they are readyif you can share in an open forum or whereverwhen they are going to be ready to respond to another threat
that may in fact happen?
General CODY. Congresswoman, if we get the 2008 supplemental,
we get the full 2009 supplemental and the full base budget, we will
start building back the four Army pre-position stocks that are
empty today, and we should have them built back up by 2013. We
will build up the ones in Kuwait first so we have some depth there
and then fill up the float and everything else. Now, that is based
upon the level of commitment of not having another five-brigade
surge.
Mrs. BOYDA. I understand.
General CODY. Again, it is a time factor.
Mrs. BOYDA. I would also like to just ask a question onthe
week before last on the Sunday talk shows, Mike Hayden, our director of our Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said basically we
can expect to have another 9/11-type event happen and it will probably come from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border there.
If something were to happenand I assume from everything that
I have been told in these numerous hearings that we are prepared
as a country to have overwhelming force with our Navy, with our
Air Force, Army and Marines, as well, that we can go in and respond in some overwhelming way. It is the sustaining of some response that begs the question of what would we do.
And I would just like if you could comment on what do you think
the options are? What would we be doing if we had to respond to
another 9/11-type event? What would we do? What are our options?
Are we ever going to consider a draft? Would you ever consider
stopping the rotations and leaving people in place? What are the
options that you see as available to make sure that we can not only
have that overwhelming force, but we can sustain our effort?
General CODY. Not knowing the true nature of the scenario
Mrs. BOYDA. Let us assume that it is, again, a 9/11. And, again,
I know the theoretical, and you tend not to answer theoreticals.
General CODY. The issue would be, if something happened, we
would have to take those next-to-deploy forces, cobble equipment
sets together because they are not fully equipped back home. They
are equipped enough to train for the counterinsurgency mission in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and then, when they get there, they get the
full-up set. So we would have to take those forces. The other forces
probably would have to stay where they are or, depending upon the
situation, be redirected by the combatant commander.

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Mrs. BOYDA. And I understand, too, if we had another 9/11 situation, I think the fact of troops of maybe being asked to stay would
bein another 9/11 situation, my guess is that many of them
would be very understanding of that being a necessity with our
country under attack in that regard.
Any comments on a draft?
General CODY. Maam, I was in a draft Army. I am now in an
Army that is an all-volunteer force, General Magnus the same. We
do not need to go back to a draft.
In my statement I mentioned we need to get on with transforming the National Guard and Reserve to an operational force
and fill those holes in the yard. Most of the holes in the yard that
Congressman Hunter talked about were in the National Guard.
Mrs. BOYDA. I just have a few minutes. Could you comment,
then, on the cost of the draft Army versus the cost of an all-volunteer Army? What it means if you are going to invest in incentives
orwhat are we saying?the reenlistment incentives versus a
draft?
General CODY. It is harder to train, and you dont keep them
long enough for the investment you make.
Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.
I yield.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Dr. Gingrey.
Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Generals, thank you so much for being here today and for your
service. We have had a long day of hearings and, of course, as you
know, earlier hearing from General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker, and the Senate, of course, heard testimony from them all
day yesterdaythe two committees on that side.
And a lot of members, both in the Senate and the House, have
asked a similar question in regard to readiness. Our distinguished
chairman just a few minutes ago asked both of you the question
about if another contingency occurred, Mrs. Boyda referenced a 9/
11-type attack would we be ready, and I think your response was
no. Maybe, General Magnus, yours was no with some reservations.
And I realize that that is a concern. And what my colleagues
some of my colleaguesmostly on the majority side of the aisle
are talking about we have got a thinly stretched forceground
forcesArmy and Marines mostly. They are tired, and their equipment is wearing out. We have spent too much money. Some people
say it is $12 billion a monthalthough I think it is closer to $10
and it is time to come home. No matter what the situation is on
the ground from the security perspective or from the political perspective, it is time to bring those troops home, give them some rest,
reequip them, reset them and prepare them for the next contingency.
If we do thatand this is my question to both of you. If we do
that and disregard the fact that the surge has workedis workingby any metric one wants to measureand we have had those
statisticsand these troopers, as General Petraeus referred to
them, come home having seen 4,000 of their comradesmen and
womenkilled in action and 20,000 or so severely wounded, no
matter how well rested and reequipped and reset they are, what

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will that do to their morale in regard to going into that next contingency, and what adverse effect, if any, will that have on our retention and recruitment?
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.
First off, I support the surge, and I support everything that General Petraeus and General Austin and Ambassador Crocker and
our forces in Afghanistan are doing. I believe this is critical to the
security of this Nation.
How we fight it and how we sustain it are two different things.
The fighting piece, clearly, the generals on the ground and the officers on the ground are getting it right. The real issue that is facing
the Nation is how quickly can we build back up our strategic reserve while still being able to have a victory in Iraq, have a victory
in Afghanistan, take the options away from al Qaeda, take the options away from a meddlesome Iran and provide security in that
region while still having capacity to look at places that also have
trouble in the world that right now we dont have the capacity for.
And so I do not advocate the discussions of coming down so
quickly until the job is done because we have invested blood, sweat
and tears of our soldiers and their families. When I presented a
flag to one of our fallen family members, I will never forget the
steely-eyed, stern look the father gave me. He said, General Cody,
make sure that we continue this fight and my son did not die in
vain.
And so I dont know what impact it would have on morale, but
I will tell that, for the security of this Nation, we have got to continue this fight. The issue is how quickly can we build back up our
strategic reserve.
Dr. GINGREY. General, thank you.
If there is some time, Mr. Chairman, if General Magnus could respond to that just briefly, I would appreciate it.
General MAGNUS. Thank you, sir. I would be happy to do that.
I agree completely with my fellow warrior, General Cody. I supportand the Marine Corps supportsthe plus-up that was needed and is needed to continue this spring and summer as the situation in Iraq improves.
The Marine Corps also supports the additional forces that we are
sending this very day. Second Battalion 7th Marines is flowing into
Afghanistan as we are holding this hearing right now, 3,400 additional Marines that were not planned to go at the end of last year.
We are growing the force of Marines and soldiers, as well as Special Operations Command, to build the capacity that is necessary
to fight, not just these two campaigns but this long war against a
ruthless enemy.
The risks will be in the mistake of not fighting this enemy now
where the enemy is and waiting for the enemy to come back and
get us where we live. That is how this started on the 9/11 that was
mentioned by the good congresswoman. We have learned that lesson. We need to build the Army, the Marine Corps and the Special
Operations forces, the Air Force and the fleet that will support
them so that we will find this enemy where he lives, fix this enemy
where he lives, and with the help of our Afghan and Iraqi security
forces, crush this enemy before they come back and get us again.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

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Mr. Johnson from Georgia.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And please accept my humble thanks for the great job that our
servicemen and women do to protect our Nation, and you go to the
battlefield without regard to the political implications of it or
whether or not it is popular or not, you just go and do your job.
And as far as the war in Iraq is concerned, 4,017 men and
womenour troopshave paid the ultimate price, and 29,676 have
been wounded in combat. And to them, as well as their families,
and to all of the servicemen and women, we owe a debt of gratitude
for what you have done and what you will do.
Now, having said that, I would say that one of the things that
differentiates this country from many others is that we live in a democracy. We live in a country where the civilian control over the
military is a hallmark of what we do. And it is our civilians that
send the military into these roles that they have to respond to. And
this war in Iraq is a war that once enjoyed the support of the
American people, but now 66 percent of the people want us to bring
our troops home.
And this Congressthis civilian Congressis not immune to the
desires of the people who elect us to represent them. Eighty-eight
percent of the current and former military officers who have stated
that they believe that this war in Iraq has stretched the U.S. military dangerously thin88 percent, according to the Foreign Policy
Center for New American Security, a study that was published on
February 19 of this year.
And this is a war that we were placed in by civilian authority
on the concept that there were weapons of mass destructionthat
was the reason givenand then later the reason given nuclear materials being sought, and then, last but not least, there was a link
between Iraq authorities and the 9/11 attack on our country. And
all of those reasons for going to war have been debunked. And now
we find ourselves in a war that we can never get a good answer
as to what victory is, when would that victory be achieved and how
will we bring our troops home thereafter?
And so the American public is not in favor of the Congress continuing to write a blank check. Notwithstanding the fact that we
know that this war has strapped our military to the point where
we are not as ready as we would want to be to respond to any other
difficulties that may and probably will arise.
In reference to both the Army and the Marine Corps, how are extensive deployments of key leaders affecting those services ability
to recruit and train new personnel as they attempt to grow the
force?
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.
When the surge went in, it wasnt just the five brigades that
went in. We had combat support, combat service support troopers
that also went with them. But at the same time, we had to provide
the commander on the ground with 20 brigade combat teamsregimental combat teams from the Marines.
In order to do that, we had to extend all of the other brigades
that were there to 15-month deployments. What that meant was,
in the training and doctrine command of the Army, where our

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training base is, it meant that they had to go short drill sergeants
and captains and others to train the next force.
So currently the surge effect on our ability to train new recruits,
train brand new lieutenants, the leader-to-led ratio or the trainerto-led ratio is not where we want it to be, and until we come off
the 15-month deployment so we can start recycling, if you were in
a unit that was at 15 months, we need to get you back. When you
get back, we would like to put you in charge of training a unit.
Right now we dont have that capability.
And so when I say that the surge affected the whole Army, in
particular, it affects our combat troops for sure, but it has put a
premium on our ability to get combat veterans back into our training base to train the next-up guys and gals.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General.
General MAGNUS. Sir, thank you for the question. Let me respond, and I agree, again, with General Cody.
We are adding new battalions and squadrons to get the force so
that we have adequate capacity in the force and time for those at
home to get properly rested, reset and trained for their future missions.
As we grow the force with the new brigades, the new battalionswe are actually growing the second of three infantry battalions as we speak right now2nd Battalion 9th Marineswe need
the leaders for those units, as well as to supervise the training.
That means more drill instructors at the recruit depots, it means
more instructors in the schools, as well as more leadership in the
battalions and the squadrons.
We are also, just like the Army, meeting the demands for transition-team advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan, both from the Iraqi
and Afghan tactical level, right on up through the government.
This is the war that we have today, and we will meet those needs.
And as we have said before, this, of course, does give us stress on
that force.
Our Marines are responding admirably. They are volunteering to
extend to go out with their units or to go on independent deployment as advisor. They are reenlisting so that we retain the leadership, particularly in those mid-grades in the enlisted and officer
ranks.
We will grow the Marine Corps to have the right number of Marine enlisted and Marine officers in the active component well before 2011. We are well ahead of our goals, and our Marines that
are volunteering to stay, as well as the young Americans that are
volunteering for their initial accessions, we believe they full-well
understand the importance and the urgency of the mission that the
Nation has sent them to do.
Mr. JOHNSON. And I definitely support them 100 percent, and
they are brave men and women who are doing the work. And thank
you very much for your service.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, thank you very much for coming today.
Earlier today one of my colleagues mentioned that General
Fallon came here early March and requested 2,000 troops for, I

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guess, Afghanistan or something and was told didnt have them. I
dont know if that statement is accurate or notI dont want to address that. But in a setting like this that you can talk about, are
there requests for troops and capacities that are going unmet right
now throughout anywhere in the world at this stage?
General CODY. I know, Congressman, that General McNeill, as
well as General Cone, who is over there running the training of the
Afghan army, has asked for a brigades worth of trainers that we
have not been able to give them.
Mr. CONAWAY. General Magnus.
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman.
We are sending 3,400 Marines, most of whom are on the ground
right now going into combat operations, in addition to a third Marines Special Operations company that is also on the ground. If we
are asked to go, Marines are ready to go to war.
Mr. CONAWAY. But in terms of requests that have been made of
you, you have been able to fulfill all your requests so far for troops?
General MAGNUS. We have fulfilled the requests that have been
made of us for Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, that has caused
other unmet demands elsewhere. The 24th Marine Expeditionary
Unit, which is on the ground now in Afghanistan at full strength,
was originally intended to go afloat with the Navy in an expeditionary strike group to provide the combatant commanders a seabased theater-reserve force.
As a result of that, we have had to extend one Marine expeditionary unit that was at sea and accelerate the deployment of another Marine expeditionary unit. So we are stretching. We are
under stress. We are meeting the demand for combat forces first.
Mr. CONAWAY. All right. So thank you. What I am hearing you
say is you are coping with whatever it is that is going on.
The chairman earlier in his comments talked about how critical
it is that we reset and refit and fix everything that is going on. Has
there ever been a country that has been able to withdraw from a
fight that they were currently in in order to be able to do that? Is
there a model out there for us to look at?
I mean, the one we have got right now is we have got a fight in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we have got all this stuff that we need to
be doing, and we really cant call a timeout anywhere that I am
aware of that would make that process easier. Has there ever been
a historical precedent where a country has been able to quit or stop
a fight someplace in order to refit its Army or Marine Corps?
General CODY. Congressman, I dont know of any model, and,
again, I dont advocate leaving that dangerous part of the world.
General MAGNUS. Nor do I.
General CODY. Iraq and Afghanistan are what they are, but that
whole region is vitally important to our interests, and we need to
be moving forward.
The whole purpose, I believethe reason why the chairman
asked for this hearingis to talk about strategic depth and readiness for other things. You asked me a direct question about do you
have requests for forces that you cant meet? I told you of one. But
we have other combatant commanders that arent requesting forces
because we cant give them to them.

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And so we have got other work that should be done by the Marines and by the Army, by our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, our special operating forces that should be doing
theater security operations in other areas of responsibility (AORs),
building partners, training other militaries, providing medical support and other things that we have done in the past. But because
of the demand on the size of the force for Afghanistan and Iraq,
we are not meeting the other things we know we need to be doing
in what we call Phase Zero operations.
Mr. CONAWAY. General Magnus walked down a path. I dont
question anybodys love of this country or patriotism, and we all get
an opinion as to whether or not we ought to be in this fight in Iraq,
and I think we should be there and as hard as it is, we have got
to maintain the resolution that is necessary.
But as we have these conversations, I believe it has an impact
on morale. I believe it has an impact on moms and dads deciding
to promote military service. I believe it has an impact on community leaders and others who help young men and women decide to,
as you call, answer the call to this country.
And as folks make these critical comments, which they are perfectly right to do, we all ought to understand that they have a consequence. And to, out of one side of your mouth, praise what we
are doing there or praise the people that are doing it and then be
so harshly critical of what we are trying to get done there, to me,
is difficult to absorb and not as heartfelt as it might have been.
General, do we track stress thingslike suicide rates, divorce
rates and other home-front stressesthat help us understand the
depth of the problems here?
General CODY. Congressman, we do. We take a look at all the indicators. I can take that for the record and give them to you.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.
General Magnus, I listen to your comments, and I could hear the
anguish in your voice when you were talking about the troops and
you said that you hoped that their will would be matched by the
willand their courage be matched by the will of the American
people, and I would say to you that it has been. And I am sorry
that is even a question, because all of us sitting hereand I think
around the countryunderstand what we owe our troops and what
they have gone through. And so I just wanted to make that point.
But the will of the American people has to do with making sure
that we are safe around the globe. And when you were talking
about having these troops in Iraq to make sure that they didnt
come fight us here, I kept thinking about how there were no Iraqis
on the plane that day, that they were mostly Saudis and that the
attacks camewe had training camps in Afghanistan, not in Iraq.
And so my question to you is are we strategically in the right
place? I think we are all concerned about the safety of this country
and the safety of our troops. But it seems as if, when we are saying
things like we expect that the next attack will be coming from Afghanistan and when both of you acknowledge in some form that we

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are not quite able to stretch across the globe in possible other problems, why Iraq?
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think I would
combine my response to your comments, along with some of the
previous comments from other members.
I agree with General Cody. I can think of precedents about armies withdrawing from difficult fights that they were not doing
well in, either because the armies were not capable or because the
leadership changed their will. Right off the top Napoleon comes to
mind. The Germans and Russia come to mind. I dont think those
ended the way those nations wanted, and maybe those fights were
not good fights to have started in the first place.
We are in the process now of sustaining your Nations military
that has been sent to war by this Nation against an implacable and
ruthless enemy, who has the lives of 50 million Iraqis and Afghans
in their grasp. Now, it is not my purpose here to question the political decision of any nation to go to war. It is our mission to be
ready to properly lead, to properly train and equip your military to
go to war with our coalition partners and the Afghan and Iraqi
forces to help them be able to build their capacity to do internal
defense of their nation against an implacable nation.
It is true that there were other nationalities that were on those
aircraft in 9/11. I dont know how many Afghans were on those aircraft, but we had to go where the enemy was, and we are where
the enemy is now.
If I can use a baseball analogy, maam, we are in the top of the
seventh inning of a very long game. There is no time for a seventhinning stretch. We are building the capacity for this Nation to fight
the enemies where the enemies are, and we dont want to, like 9/
11, wait for the enemies to come back and see us.
I dont question the patriotism of any of the members here. I am
simply asking that, unlike previous warsand I joined the military
during Vietnamthat the Congress appropriate the funds that are
necessary for your troops to carry on this fight.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, General. Now, I would like to tell
you that my husband was also in the Army during the Vietnam
era, and I was a military spouse, and I think that all of us understand the sacrifice and are very grateful.
But I still have the same question. I worry very much about Afghanistan and the training camps and what we have been hearing
in testimony lately makes me think that we are in the wrong place.
And I agree with you that we have enemies around the world and
specifically in that region, but are we doing enough in Afghanistan?
So let me rephrase the question: Are we heavily invested in the
wrong tree? Given the problem that we have and the stretch of our
troops and our supplies, should we be more involved in Afghanistan? Are we just in the wrong place fighting and maybe we need
to change the strategy somewhat?
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congresswoman, and to answer
your question, I think we are heavily invested in the right countries, and we are increasing the number of combat troopsalong
with the French and British and our other alliesas the Afghans
in Afghanistan build their own security forces and their professional capability as the Iraqis build theirs.

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These two campaigns of the global war are the war that we have
against a ruthless enemy, and we should not leave until we are assured that our host nations have the capability to manage their internal defense. We are doing this. This is a very difficult enemy,
and it is a very difficult domestic situation for both of these countries. I believe we are in the right places and we are building the
capacity to allow the Nation the strategic reserves of forces to cope
with other possible contingencies.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Again I would state that I am concerned of
our ability to respond to an emerging threat, but I thank you very
much for your service and for your answer.
Thank you.
Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, thanks for
this hearing. This has been a great hearing.
General Cody, you were asked by Chairman Skelton if you were
satisfied that we are ready for any military contingency, and your
answer was, no, I am not satisfied.
You also have in your statement the fact that Congress has been
to date about $66.5 billion short in terms of the global war on terror fundingthe supplemental funding for this year. And on page
nine of your statement, you have a series of problems that will
occur if you dont receive funding soon.
You have the Army runs out of pay for active duty and National
Guard soldiers in June, the Army runs out of operation and maintenance (O&M) for the active component in early July, for the
Guard in late June, two Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
may not receive whole protection kits before they deploy, armored
security vehicles could face a break in production, Army National
Guard will not receive 10 CH47 model helicopters, converting and
existing BCTs will not receive the bridge to future networks communication system, and the Army will be unable to upgrade and
construct facilities for returning wounded warriors at various locations throughout the country.
So you say you are not satisfied that we are ready for any contingency. Would you say that, if the Congress does not act to fund
these dollars that you have identified, that we are contributing to
an unreadiness to meet any military contingency?
General CODY. Congressman, I would agree with that. It is all
about time now, and those things that will happen that I hope
dont happen. But if we dont get the balance of the 2008 GWOT
supplementalwe have been doing this now for six years, and I
challenged my staff and we went right down through all of those
things, and those will all be the consequences of not getting the
rest of the 2008 supplemental. It will be pushed to the 2009 supplemental, and depending upon when that is passed, we lose time.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay.
General Magnus, I noticed you have got a smaller amount that
you have identified in your statement, but you aresimilarly, the
Marines are awaiting funds that have not yet been approved in the
GWOT supplemental; is that right?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, that is correct. Until we receive
those funds, the Navy and us cannot put under contract for this
Nations industry to build the aircraft that we need, the ground

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combat vehicles and equipment that we need, in addition to the
personnel and operations and maintenance expenses that are needed. Our systems command are ready to contract with American industry now, and these are all lead-time away from delivering some
of these systems.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So would you agree with General Cody that,
if we dont pass those funds, weCongressare contributing to an
unreadiness to meet any contingency?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, the time to build the capacity
and reset the readiness of the forces is strictly dependent upon the
funding available. Americas families have responded and given us
their finest young men and women to give us the human capital
to invest.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you a couple of questions with
respect to readiness.
Do you agree, General Cody, that Army officers are being offered
inflated bonuses as incentives to address personnel shortfalls?
General CODY. No, I do not agree with that, Congressman.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you both, gentlemen, I think it
is fairly clear that you think that a priority for us is to pass this
global war on terror 2008 supplemental as soon as possible; is that
right?
General CODY. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. What other areas do you thinkif we were to try
to identify actions that would go most toward increasing readiness
programs, for example? I know it is tough to issue a priority right
now, but is there any particular program that you think is of urgent importance, aside from this broad funding that you have got
that Congress has pending but that we have failed to pass so far?
Any particular message you would send to us, for both of you?
General CODY. Congressman, I think, again, we thought through
and worked with OSD. General Magnus and I sat in many meetings and worked through all the budget supplemental requests for
2008 and 2009. I believe, if those come in on time, that is important.
Second, we have other programs that we have got to deal with:
the Wounded Warrior Transition military construction, the base realignment and closure (BRAC) funding. Army today is executing
the most comprehensive organizational and post and formation
change since World War II, and it is all being linked to and synchronized with putting our forces in and out of combat and keeping
them trained, manned and equipped. But any break in BRAC funding, military construction (MILCON) funding just causes us more
problems as we try to execute this and puts more strain on the
military families.
Mr. HUNTER. (OFF MIKE)
General CODY. I do not agree with that statement. The one thing
that we knew we had to do when this war started, after we looked
at it, was make sure that we met our moral obligation to the mothers and fathers and to this country to send no soldier or Marine
into harms way untrained or unresourced. And it took us a while
to get the resources going, but we stuck very hard with the training.
Mr. HUNTER. (OFF MIKE)

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General MAGNUS. Congressman, I agree with General Cody. Absolutely not. We will not send Marines or sailors to war unless they
are trained and equipped for the mission.
What risk we are facing is the increasing time to respond to
other unplanned contingencies, which would require holding certain forces in place, retraining and refitting the Marines and sailors for the new unplanned mission and considerations of additional
mobilization of our Reserve component.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Due to equipment shortagesI am going
to read you a statementArmy and Marine Corps units dont
train as they fight, instead receiving necessary force protection and
essential equipment just prior to deployment or when they arrive
in theater. Do you think that is accurate?
General CODY. That is an accurate statement, Congressman, in
terms of the improvised explosive device (IED) jammers and mine
resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP) for sure, although we
are getting better on the IED jammers. I have testified before that
we would fix that. We have got several hundred IED jammer
emulators so that our soldiers can train on so it is not the first
time they see them when they get in country.
On the MRAP, we are training leaders before they deploy on the
MRAPs, but I am not happy with the situation. I believe we need
to have MRAPs in the training base so that the first time the soldier starts driving is not in combat conditions. And so what we
have done is place a burden on the combatant commander to bring
the soldiers over to the issue point and take them to the drivers
course and train them up very quickly. That is not how a great
Army should be operating.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But arent you going to havewe just talked
about this new piece of equipment that we are going to get out to
the troops very quickly from a foreign military. By definition, General, we are going to have to introduce that to our people very
quickly. They wont have time to work on it for years before it gets
over because it is new, it is not something we have had before, but
it looks like it works.
General CODY. You are right. The training will have to be done
in theater, like we did with some of the other projects that you and
I are very familiar with, and we have to do that in theater.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I want to thank both General Cody and General Magnus for
their service and all those who are here in the room.
And I noticed Colonel Kennedy stepped out for just a minute. I
have gotten to know him quite well too, and I want to thank him
personally for his service. He happened to be my stepsons commanding officer in Ramadi when he was there early on in the conflict.
I do want to first thank General Cody also for sort of broadening
out this discussion a little bit, at least by mentioning BRAC and
MILCON, as I am sure our subcommittee chair would want to. I
dont want to necessarily put words in his mouth butbecause it
is not just, obviously, having the right size force and the right

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equipment and all the resta lot of other things that have to do
with readiness. And I have been honored to be on the Readiness
Subcommittee since I have been in CongressI am a freshman. So
I do want to thank you for mentioning those aspects as well.
But I do want to ask kind of a fundamental question here about
how you sort of arrived at the size of the Army and the Marines
that you believe we need to have. I voted for the increase in the
size of the Army and the Marines myself. But I am just curious
sort of what kinds of assumptions you make, not only about the
world but also I am trying to tie together what we heard today
from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crockerand General
Petraeus in particular.
What kind of assumption do you make, if any, as far as how
many troops you believe or assume that we are going to have in
Iraq over the course of the next, say, five yearsor whatever number of years you use when you decidewhen you did decide sort
of how large the Army should be or, General Magnus, how large
the Marines should be?
General CODY. Congressman, thank you. That is a very great
question.
We run what we call a Total Army Analysis. We run them sometimes three or four times a year.
We are not sizing this Army based upon the ebb and flow of what
is in Iraq and Afghanistan. We size it for what we call a steadystate security posture, and then we size it for a win decisive or
major campaign, as well as the ability to conduct another type of
campaign. And then we look across the mission sets of our combat
units. We look at the active component (AC) and the Reserve component (RC) mix, and we look at all the different types of capabilities that we would need, and then we put it in motion. In other
words, rotate it.
And you need to size your military for the steady-state security
posture for one-year deployed, three-years back. If you size it for
that and then you get into a fight like Iraq and Afghanistan, you
can move to that force and surge it to a one-year in, two-years
back.
Because we went into this fight with a very small military that
was sized basically for a 1-and-2 steady-state security posture, 10
years of peace, no peer competitor, you are now running this Army
and the Marine Corps at a 1-to-1 or less. And that is why the
65,000 in the active and the growth in the Marines is so important
to both General Magnus and I so that we can get the end strength
up so that, when this settles down, we can put troops in combat
for 1 year and guarantee them and their families 2-years back.
Mr. LOEBSACK. If I may ask, what does that do in the meantime
as far as length of deployment and dwell times?
General CODY. It would mean 1-year in, 2-years back at dwell
time.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Right. Okay. And let us assume for the moment
that we have on afor a number of yearseven though a number
of us on this committee dont want that to be the case, including
me butthat we have 120,000 to 140,000 troops in Iraq for, say,
the next 4 or 5 years. Where does that get us as far as length of
dwell times and length of deployments?

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General CODY. If we get the Army up to 48 brigade combat
teams, we will also be in constant mobilization. Every five years we
will have to get some Reserve component soldiers into the fight.
That is what operationalize and reserve means. If that demand is
what we think it is going to be in July, we will be at a 1-and-2,
which is a surge. We will not be at 1-and-3.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay.
And General Magnus.
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman. Again, I agree with
my fellow warrior, General Cody.
Our objective is, based upon on our own studies as well as continuing annual dialogue with the staff of the joint chiefs and the
combatant commanders in OSD, is to look both at the current demand in this war, as well as looking long as we build the force. So
it is critical that we try to understand the steady-state security
posture in between crises, as well as the impact of either spikes of
a short-term crisis, such as a disaster response, or a sustained crisis, as we are currently experiencing now.
We are basically looking at the same kind of one-to-one dwell
challenge that the soldiers are. That is for Marines, that is for the
tactical units, that is seven-months forward and seven-months
back, and then you are turning around. We have some specialties
that are more challenged than that.
We are building the capacity for the long term for three balanced
Marine expeditionary forces. So the commanders in chief 4, 8, 12,
16 years from now will be able to have, during these kinds of sustained surges, should the Nation have them at that time in the future, that we can give our troops the 1-to-2 dwell that they will
need to get reset, to get back with their families, to get the training
they need to be ready for the next unplanned contingency.
Should there not be this kind of sustained high level of demand,
we ideally would like to get to a 1-to-3 in between those major crises, but in this long war, I dont see that happening in the near
future.
This also has effect on our Reserve component. Currently, the
Reservesand we have a Reserve battalion that is back in the
fight againthe Reserves are just as eager to support the needs of
the country as their active component brethren. We are building
the active component force so that we can return our Reserve component to a 1-to-5 dwell.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Mr. Chair, if I might just have another 30 seconds. Is that okay? I just want to make one last statement. Is that
okay?
Mr. ORTIZ. Make it quick because we have got a lot of members
who are still waiting.
Mr. LOEBSACK. All right. Thank you.
Because part of this is leading up to the fact thatthe statement
that you made, General, that we should not take the resiliency of
our troopers for granted, and I have a very, very grave concern
about the mental health of soldiers and Marines and others. We
have all heard about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and I
think we are just seeing the tip of the iceberg perhaps. I have
talked to a lot of people at the Veterans Affairs (VA) in Iowa City
and a lot of veterans coming back. And so that is part of why I

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asked this question in the first place. I just wanted to make sure
you knew that.
And thanks, again, for your service.
And thanks, Mr. Chair, for letting me go over. I appreciate it.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.
General Cody, General Magnus, thanks for being with us today.
I would like to return to a subject that has been discussed on and
off here today about training shortfalls and constraints due to time
that restrict predeployment training, in particular.
I have the honor of representing the busiest mobilization and deployment base for Reserve component troops in the country, Fort
Dix. It might surprise some of you to know that, but that is the
case. We have deployed more Reserve component troops from Fort
Dix than any other base in the country.
And when I leave Fort Dix or when I am at Fort Dix during a
visit, I have the feeling that there is a high level of predeployment
training taking place there. The commander of the First Army has
built a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Fort Dix, they have built
an Iraqi village at Fort Dix, they have built a trail upon which people are trained to drive trucks over rough terrain through sandy
soil where IEDs explode along the way. And that, of course, is in
addition to all of the normal training that the folks had prior to
predeployment training.
I have also visited Fort Bragg, and if I said to the commander
of forces at Fort Bragg that there was a shortfall in training there,
I always had the feeling that he would set me straight pretty
quickly.
I have been down to Lejeune and Parris Island, and I dont think
I would find a Marine at either base that would claim that
predeployment training isnt what it should be.
Those are just the feelings from the experiences that I have had.
So I would just like to pose the question to yousome in Congress are claiming that there is a lack of training, inadequate
training, time constraints on training. Would you address this
problem for us, General Cody and General Magnus, as you see it?
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman. And by the way, I do
know that Fort Dix deploys more, and we are very proud of the relationship.
Mr. SAXTON. I am sure you do. I didnt mean you.
General CODY. I dont have the exact number, but I do know
where the monies flow from First Army.
When we talk about training, if you remember, in my statement
somewhereand I probably wasnt as clear as I should bewe are
the best trained for the contingency we are fighting today, but our
forces training focus is too narrow. And so if you asked an artilleryman or you ask an armored commander or a Bradley commander, Are you training to all your core mission essential task
lists in the 12-month dwell that you have? Because we are spinning so fast, he would say, No. Are you trained to the mission
that you are going to get in Ramadi or Taji or Baquba? He would
say, Yes.
General MAGNUS. Congressman, thank you. I agree, again, with
General Cody.

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And thank you for the comments about, not only Fort Dixand
Marine Reserves go there toobut Parris Island, where we get
about half of our enlisted through recruit training.
Again, as General Cody indicated, counterinsurgency operations
and transition team training are the focus of the two campaigns of
this global war that we have talked about today. The Marines who
are forward deployed and those who are next to deploy would tell
you they are at the highest levels of readiness in terms of personnel, training of those personnel, and as they train on their
equipment and fall in on the additional equipment in theaters, they
are at the highest levels of readiness.
What the shortfalls are are the shortfalls in full-spectrum or
multiuse training that would be for other unplanned contingencies.
For the Marine Corps, this means the focus on counterinsurgency
diminishes the time available for combined-arms trainingartillery, firing your tank tables, working with close air supportthat
we did before we did Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on the march
on Baghdad.
It also means that we have a generation of company-grade officers now who studied about amphibious operations in the basics
school and in some cases never set foot on a ship.
As we grow the force this year, we are putting our first basics
school class back on ships. So we are getting enough capacity now
to make sure that the Nation has the land forces with the full-spectrum capabilities necessary so the combatant commanders dont
have to wait for us to retrain and reset the force as we build the
right capacity, sir.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Sestak.
Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Magnus, you said we should not leave Iraqor we
should not leave until nations can handle their internal defense.
That is a very significant policy statement.
You also said we should notwe will not send troops to war unless they are trained and equipped.
Each of you, could I ask just for a one-word answer to this question:
You have a Congress that is supposed to provide by the Constitution for the common defense. Forty percent of our Armys equipment is in Iraq. For almost three years, we have trained on nothing
except counterinsurgency. Twenty-eight thousand troops who wear
the cloth of our Nation are in South Korea, where the timeline to
defend them by the Army cannot be met, nor any timeline for any
war plan.
You said there was significant risk to a second contingency. Is
that based potentially on probability and yet who predicted the
first Korea war or World War II or 9/11, where we then struck
back? Is it a legitimate question, therefore, for Congress to ask at
how long and at what cost do we pursue the strategy in Iraq as
we do our duty of providing for the common defense?
That is a yes or no, please, General. Is it a legitimate question
for us to ask that?
General CODY. I believe yes.
Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.
General.

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General MAGNUS. Of course, it is a legitimate question.
Mr. SESTAK. I only brought that up because I think we absent
our responsibility if we didnt. Men and women wearing the cloth
of this Nation, I think, were well represented by General Pace
when asked the question, are they upset by this discussion of what
is right or not right about the war in Iraq, is that our troops tend
to be smart today, and they understand that is a legitimate role
of Congress.
And the second question has to do, General42 percent of the
recruits that are coming into the Army today are in the below-average mental category. And I very much understand that we have
the best Army today. It cant do what is required, according to our
wartimelines, which is, I believe, the real debate and the failure
of what people call the Petraeus report. He should have just told
us what he is doing in the militarysecurity in Iraq. This discussion of overall Americas national security from defense to the economy being affected by it, et cetera, is what we really should be debating.
And I thought you said it very well, General. We can get these
recruits up to snuff and we deal with it, we take what we can, we
do, we must. Why not, then, do away with measuring mental categories if we are not that concerned about it? Because, when I was
in the military, we were very concerned about it because that is
who is going to run your Future Combat System (FCS) in 20 years
from now.
General CODY. I agree with your assessment. The reason why we
have themand it has been explained to methe high school grad
is a measurement of stick-to-itiveness. The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Batterys (ASVAB) scores tells us how we look at
each one of them in terms of trainability.
And we invested these young men and women and soI dont
know what category I was, but I waited a long time to receive my
diploma at West Point.
Mr. SESTAK. I was probably 4D.
General CODY. But I will tell you, it has nothing to do with measuring their human potential. And what we are seeing is these
young recruits that are coming in4th and 5th year and 6th year
into this warwe can train them
Mr. SESTAK. Then why not do away with the measurement? If
you are so comfortable, why measure it?
General CODY. I will go back and look at it. I mean
Mr. SESTAK. I asked the Secretary of the Army the same question six months ago, but I would love an answer to that. Because
I do believe in their bravery, but, boy, I will tell you, we always
seem to want the best and the brightest, particularly as you head
toward FCS.
If I could ask another question
General CODY. I will tell you one thing. In combat our soldiers
dont ask what category you were in. They just want to make sure
you can shoot well.
Mr. SESTAK. Sir, trust me, I know from my 31 years that is the
issue out there. But we also know that there were some who could
maintain that equipment better than others so it did perform when
we needed it. Am I wrong, General?

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General CODY. No, you are right
Mr. SESTAK. Can I ask another question, please?
Third Divisionwhat is the rate of Stop Loss in the 3rd Division?
General CODY. I dont have that figure, but I do know that we
probably Stop Lossed in the hundreds when we actand you have
got remember, now, you have got four brigades in that division so
I would have to go back and take it for the record. But normally
we are seeing about 200 to 300 Stop Loss per brigade as we get
to deploy them.
Mr. SESTAK. Two to three?
General CODY. Two to 300 is a round number. I will take it for
the record
Mr. SESTAK. The only reason I question that ASVAB is I have
talked to severalID people, and to some degree definedas General Petraeus talkedto find retention that we are having there
some believe is an outcome also of Stop Loss. In a sense you have
a choice: X amount of thousands of dollars to reenlist for several
years or Stop Loss, go to Iraq without it.
And let me end my question because I am just about done.
General, I honestly do believe that we have the best today, but
I honestly believe it is a very legitimate question to ask two things:
Is it going to be the best military for the future and the long-term
risk as we see what comes into the force? I dont question their
bravery at all.
And, second, General Magnus, I honestly believe that that policy
statement of yours is one that it is someone elses to weigh the risk
attendant to Americas overall national security of whether we stay
until they can ensure or we change our strategy to do it.
Thank you.
General CODY. Mr. Chairman, if I could just comment?
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. You bet.
General CODY. Thank you.
We will retain the quality of this force if we take the long-term
view. We have got to grow the force, we have got to invest in the
force, and we have to have a national conversation about what it
means to serve. But we will retain this quality force if we do those
things.
General MAGNUS. And, Mr. Chairman, the policy of the use of
the military forces of the United States are determined by the
Commander in Chief and, of course, in the dialogue that is right,
necessary with the peoples representatives in the Congress.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
And, General Cody, again, I want to thank you for your very
prompt assistance to help the family of the young Guardsman who
died trying to save some folks during Hurricane Katrina. I know
it didnt bring him back, but it certainly made life a little bit easier
for his family what you did.
I wish you would go back to the subject of the jammers and the
MRAPs, because for 18-plus years I have sat in this room and listened to you and your predecessor say, We train as we fight, but
we both know in the case of MRAPs and jammers we are not.

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I was curious what initiatives were underway to try to get to the
point where we are training as we fight? I sure hope I dont go back
to Camp Shelby anytime soon and see another box strapped onto
the front of a Humvee that says IED jammer and the thing is
empty and it is justand what is particularly, actually, galling
I have never actually heard you say it, but I have heard some very
senior people in the DOD, starting, quite possibly, with the Secretary or previous Secretary, will say, It is just a gadget. You turn
it on, and it works. Well, if that is so, then why did the Army go
and get electronic warfare officers from the Navy to explain to your
units how important it was to use it at the right time, how it is
going to jam their radio transmissions and how the terrain around
them is going to affect it. It isnt. It is more than just turning something on, and, quite frankly, if it is going to save peoples lives, we
needed to be training with that more extensively.
Same thing with MRAPs. I realize that there is a production
challenge, but I would think trainers, such as I know the Army has
at Fort Leavenworth for vehicles, could be produced on a separate
line, could be made available, could actually be run 24 hours a day,
you could run your folks through that.
Why isnt there a higher priority to getting those two things
done?
General CODY. First off, Congressman, I agree with you on the
jammers. In this setting I will say that it is not just turning it on.
There is a frequency spectrum knowledge that you have to be
trained to. It is an understanding of the electronic-magnetic interference of your other systems. And we are training people now and
have been training them. Hopefully, you wont find that boxI
hope they got rid of it. But we have bought more of the Duke systems, of the Acorns and others that we now have issued to First
Army.
But we have to deal withand I hope you can appreciate this.
Because of the frequency spectrum, we have to deal with what else
is around in terms of jamming other things that may be kind of
critical, like air-traffic control and stuff like that.
But I believe we are getting better there, and the Navy was very
helpful to us in getting their electronic warfare officers, and we
now have a course, and we are starting to replace those guys. And
I think that you will be pleased to see the progress we have made.
But if you remember, everything that was coming off the line
back then, we were more concerned about getting it, testing it, giving the new equipment training in theater, which was not sufficient at all and not the place we wanted to be, but it was the best
we could do at the time to get it off.
We find ourselves the same way in MRAP. We do have 25 vehicles from the MRAP University, and we are sending our master
drivers and our master trainers to that so that when they deploy
with their soldiers and go to the issue pointsthere is five issue
points over in theaterand they take their soldiers through it and
train them up, the leaders are trained ahead of time before they
deploy. That is not a place we want to be either.
We have a requirement for 600 MRAPs for the training base and
for the next-to-deploy soldiers, but we cant get to them until the
end of October so that we meet the theater commanders require-

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ment of what he needs for the Army, and it is saving lives over
there. And so we will be at that state until October, until we can
start putting some in the training base. Not the answer I want to
give you, but that is where we are.
Mr. TAYLOR. You might have noticed I have signed a letter or
two during this hearing. It is from the Military Retiree Organization. It starts off by saying, Military leaders have called for a
$2,000 increase in their TRICARE costs. You two guys strike me
as military leaders. I was curious if either of you gentlemen
thought this up, or is this something that came out of the White
House?
General CODY. I havent seen that, Congressman.
General MAGNUS. I am not aware of it, Congressman.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I think you just answered the question. I
think it is an initiative of the White House for the seventh straight
year to increase health-care co-pays for military retirees and, hopefully, for the seventh straight year this committee will defeat that
measure. But I just wanted to get on the record I dont think it
came from you two gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Assume, Generals, the Iraqi war stops tomorrow, the Afghan war
stops tomorrow, how would you reset the United States Army and
reset the United States Marines to make you personally comfortable with the state of readiness for the Army and the Marines
respectively?
General Cody.
General CODY. Well, first, under that assumption, Mr. Chairman,
there would be a detailed plan of the mission set of the units in
either Afghanistan and Iraq to move to operational and strategic
over watch and so that the units coming out were coming out in
an orderly fashion.
What we would have to do to get back to strategic readiness is
to get our depots even more ramped up than they are and immediately go back to full-spectrum trainingand by full-spectrum
training, to include counterinsurgency training. One of the things
that we did not do after Vietnam was we did not include counterinsurgency training as we built up our training base. We left that
to our special forces. And so we would continue the counterinsurgency training but get back to the full maneuver training that we
have at our training base.
And then what we do is probably try to accelerate the growth of
the Army so that we can build the strategic depth we need and
then finish converting the Reserve component to an operational
force.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General MAGNUS. Mr. Chairman, would you like an answer from
the Marine Corps on this?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please. I was about to call on you. Please?
General MAGNUS. Sir, thank you.
Agree, again. As we build the capacity, another way of doing that
is reducing the demand signals so should there be a significant
drop in the demand for forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom and En-

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during Freedom, we would also return to a multiuse or full-spectrum training to be ready for other potential contingencies.
There would be an extensive multiyear depot maintenance program for the equipment that would be flowing back from those
campaigns as the unit requirements dropped and as the ships in
the maritime pre-positioning squadrons came into Brown Island for
their own maintenance cycle and the aircraft will return for theirs.
We would also finish growing the force, which we anticipate
doing within the next three years. The 3rd Marine Regiment would
go back to Hawaii, and the 4th Marine Regiment would go back to
Okinawa and be able to stand or watch in the Western Pacific, and
we, with our shipmates in the Navy, would return to a steady-state
security posture, which includes providing forward-deployed expeditionary strike groups and Marine squadrons on the carrier strike
groups to provide the theater commanders the contingency forces
forward, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Cody, in essence, you would abide by the brand-new almost-printed new manualam I correct?when you speak about
full-spectrum preparedness?
General CODY. Yes, Chairman. A new doctrine, 3.0. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And it looks like the Marines have read the same
thing?
General MAGNUS. Yes, Chairman, that is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Cody and General Magnus, for being
here.
General Cody, how long have you been in the Army?
General CODY. In June it will be 36 years, sir.
Mr. FORBES. General Magnus?
General MAGNUS. General Cody is a youngster, sir. It will be 39
years this summer.
Mr. FORBES. Well, for both of you, thank you for your service,
and please understand, as I am asking my questions, if I put you
in a position where I demand a yes or no answer, you cant explain
it, forgive me. I have too much respect for you to be there. So I am
not going to put you in that position.
And earlier today we talked about statistics, and we hear everybody throwing these statistics out. One of the things we sometimes
forget, when we were fighting for the most important thing we
hadour freedom in the Revolutionary Warif we would have had
pollsters then, the pollsters would have said about 33 to 34 percent
of the people then favored fighting for freedom, about 33, 34 percent were against it, and about 33 or 34 percent didnt care.
We heard about 66 percenta figure thrown out todaywanting
to bring our troops back, and yet I look and I hear all these words
about how the Army is broken, the war is lost, everything has
failed, everything is horrible. Somebody can come into one of these
hearings with a costume with makeup on their hand and stand up,
and every photographer in here is going to take a picture of them.
Behind you, you have six of the best men and women probably
we have in the country today. My suspicion is that each of them

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has a story of courage, commitment and sacrifice. But if you stand
up, we are not going to take a picture of you, and we are not going
to write a story about you, and we wonder why we get that 66 percent number.
So what I want to do is take just a moment and take a breath
and look at this from a big picture. My suspicion is, in all the years
that you guys have served, there has never been a Camelot period,
where you looked and said you didnt need some tweaking in training, some additional equipment, something that you had that you
could make better, both the services that you served in.
The other thing I would say is that we have had witness after
witness after witness come before us, then, when they look at the
big picture, they say, This force we have today, despite some of the
tweaking we need to do and some of the shortfalls that we have,
is the most experienced, the most professional, the most adaptive,
and the most capable force in the world and that we have ever
fielded.
One question I have for you today is do you agree with that?
Secondand I just want to get these out in the short five minutes I have. Before we started this in 2000, we had these holes in
the yard that you guys have talked about before. As I understand
it, that was about $56 billion of needs we had in 2000. You guys
have fought a war. Basically, you have done all the stuff you have
done, and we have reduced that number from $56 billion. The last
statistics I saw show that you were on track to have them down
to $17 billionhuge success there.
And then you have also moved from the strategic reservewhere
everybody is talking about being ready for all these contingencies
but back before you began fighting this battle, we were in a posture
where we had strategic reserves, which meant you would have had
to have ramped up if you had one of these contingencies, and you
guys have moved tomoving to operational reserve at this particular point in time.
And the reason I throw all those things out is because it looks
like to meI dont know how we talk about all of those questions
when the huge problem we have for your readiness is a supplemental that is sitting somewhere that is not getting the funds that
you need to do what you really need to do.
And so, General Cody and General Magnus, my question for both
of you today is, if that supplemental doesnt come forward in a
timely basis, what specifically is going to be denied you, denied the
Guard, that is going to hurt us and hurt their readiness because
I think that is the issue we need to be addressing and getting before this committee today?
General CODY. Congressman, for the Army, we start running out
of military pay for our force in June, we start running out of
Mr. FORBES. Okay. Let me just stop you there. So that means
that, despite the fact that what we are talking about pay being
we start running out of pay in June?
General CODY. That is correct. We start running out of operational dollars that we can flow to the force either down range or
back home in early July for the active, by the end of July for the
National Guard.

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But I will tell you it is a cumulative effect. We have had late
supplementals two or three times since this war has gone on, and
this one here being late during a time, when we have asked our
soldiers and families to surge for 15 months, we are in uncharted
waters.
Mr. FORBES. So that means that, even a delayeven if the
money ultimately comesthe delay means you have to start making decisions earlier rather than later that could be that you
couldnt withdraw those decisions down the road; is that correct?
General CODY. We have to run contingencies. That is correct.
Mr. FORBES. General Magnus.
General MAGNUS. Sir, thank you.
If we dont get the supplemental in a timely manner, as I said
before, sir, it will simply mean that we, number one, delay procurement of warfighting equipment until such time as the Congress appropriates the funds and it becomes law.
The Army and Marine Corpsliterally in that orderin the
fourth quarter will run out of the necessary manpower funding and
the necessary operation and maintenance funding, and we will, of
course, support the troops forward, but that will simply mean that
we begin to ratchet down operations at home, and that includes
depot maintenance.
I am confident that we will be supported in the request for these
funds.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Does poor Mr. Courtney ever get to go, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Does Mr. Courtney want to go?
Dr. SNYDER. Yes. I will go last.
The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to do that.
Mr. COURTNEY. After the lunch break so thank you, Mr. Snyder.
I want to thank Mr. Chairman also for holding this hearing and
the witnesses, both for your service but also for your frankness
today and not pulling any punches in terms of the testimony that
you have given.
Recently in Hartford, Connecticut, where I come from, General
Eric Shinseki spoke to a large gathering veterans ceremony, another distinguished public servant who also spoke frankly and, I
think, will go down in history as a prophet, frankly, about this
whole episode and time of our countrys history.
And there was a large number of people in the crowd expecting
him to talk about his testimony before the Congress prior to the
conflict and the honest answers that he gave about what he
thought the proper troop size was and the consequences that he
suffered as a result of that.
But instead what he talked about when he spoke to the crowd
was what he saw as the fallout and theafter Vietnam in terms
of the loss to the officer corps of the militarythe hollowing out
that Mr. Skelton referred to earlierand expressed grave concern
about the fact that we are now entering a somewhat similar period
in our history.
The New York Times reported that half the graduating class of
West Point 2001 left military service. General Petraeus earlier
today, when he was talking about the success in terms of recruit-

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39
ment enlistment of enlisted men, did point out the fact that retaining the captains still is a challenge for our armed forces.
And I was wondering what, in the context of military readiness,
it means to our country that really the best and the brightest are
not staying with their original plans?
General CODY. It is a serious concern, Congressman.
By the way, five of those captains have my last name, and so I
get feedback.
We have run a retention bonus on our captains. We need to retain the best and brightest. Twelve thousand of them took it. This
past year we just opened it back up for the restfor the year
groups again to get another shot at it, and hopefully that will bring
more of them to stay with us.
The reason why we need them to stay with us is, when we grow
6th Infantry brigade combat teams by 2011, that is 36 to 37 captain company commanders we need. It is 40 new majors we need,
so many new lieutenant colonels. We have to start growing them
now and retaining them now. So as we grow this Army out, on the
active side in particular, with a 65K force that we are going to
grow it to, we need to retain these captains because they are going
to be the majors and lieutenant colonels that are going to be leaving these outfits.
So it is very important to us. We are watching it closely. I have
been to most of the training bases and talked to the captains that
are just coming back from the war. We have sent a brigadier general out with a team to talk to the captains of the units coming
back from 15-month deployments.
At the end of the day, those who are leaving has to do with they
dontthey are having a struggle between their family life and
staying with an Army they love. And it has all to do with the fact
they dont have enough dwell time in between deployments, and we
shouldnt put them in that position. It breaks my heart when a
young captain says, I am so proud of what I have done, this is my
second tour, but I have to make a choice between seeing my daughters birthday and all the things, and he said, I just cant put my
family through it. We should not have them in that position. That
is why getting this force size is so important to us.
Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. My time is almost up, but I have
talked to families back home who have described exactly that torn
feeling and the fact that it is the dwell-time issue that really seems
to be the biggest factor that is driving people out of the force. And
hopefully the President is going to change that proportion, as been
reported in the press, in the next 48 hours, 72 hours or so because
thatGeneral Shinseki clearly conveyed that message is that, if he
had to describe what he thought was the biggest future challenge
to our countrys military readiness, it is the damage that has been
done to the middle ranks of our armed forces.
Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett, Dr. Snyder, then Mr. Saxton in that order.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
What do I say to those who ask me why Stop Loss isnt a backdoor draft?

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General CODY. First, Congressman, thanks for the question.
It is because it is the law. It is the military service obligation.
It is part of every contract.
We do not like Stop Loss. I wish we werent in the position that
we had to use it. But we are executing Stop Loss because of the
short turnaround cycle of the units with 12 months dwell time back
at home, we have to keep unit integrity and unit cohesion and key
people, and so that is one of the reasons why we have instituted
it.
We started it, as you know, early just for high-demand, low-density military occupational skills, but when the war continued second, third and fourth rotation, and access to the National Guard,
after we spiked up in 2005, we have had to keep Stop Loss in.
But it is not a backdoor draft. The contracts are clear. I wish we
dont use it, but
Mr. BARTLETT. As necessary as it may be, to what extent do you
think it may hurt recruitment?
General CODY. I hope it doesnt hurt recruitment. It hasnt so far.
I will say that many of the young soldiers who end up being Stop
Lossed turn around and reenlist in the combat zone. But we
shouldnt put them in that position. We need to steady out this
force so we dont put this on their backs, and that is why getting
the force right and getting the dwell times back to where they need
to be is so important to us.
Mr. BARTLETT. General, at a hearing here last March you testified that we have the best counterinsurgency force in the world but
they are not trained for full-spectrum operations. I shouldnt conclude from that that you believe that we are adequately equipped?
General CODY. The units back home today are short equipment
for not just the counterinsurgency fight but for a full spectrum. So
we would have to move equipment around if we were to move to
another battlefield for full-spectrum operations. But the units
across the board right now have enough equipment back home to
train for the mission they have in Iraq and Afghanistan but not
enough time to train for full-spectrum in order to have all the
equipment for it.
Mr. BARTLETT. Which of those two shortages is the more acute,
people or equipment? We can fix the latter with money. The former
is a little more difficult.
General CODY. Right now in the first six months, it is both. It
is people and equipment. Because, as I said, the surge took all the
stroke out of the shock absorber for our personnel accounts. And
so in the first six months of reset, it is people and equipment. The
last six months, if you are talking about full spectrum, it is time
and equipment.
Mr. BARTLETT. General Magnus, let me ask you a question that
may be of more concern to you.
We found that the Humvees were very susceptible to IEDs, and
so we have now deployed at considerable cost a large number of
MRAPs. The enemy, in response to thatand I gather that, because we now find more explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and
they are clearly placed by more professional people because we cannot find anywhere near the percentage of EFPs that we do of IEDs,

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41
that the enemy knows that they are more effective. These, of
course, can bring down a tank.
At what point might our service people in the MRAP threatened
by EFPs be no more safe than they were in the Humvee threatened
by IEDs?
General MAGNUS. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Bartlett.
We continue to evaluate, along with the Armyand, quite frankly, the Navy and the Air Force are also using increased armored
protection, including the MRAPs both in Iraq, principally, and to
a lesser extent in Afghanistanwe continue to evaluate the requirements.
In Al Anbar province, where the majority of Marines are in Iraq,
this is more than just about the nature and the capability of a single IED or EFP, which are right now at a tiny fraction of the number of incidentsand incidents includes actual attacks, as well as
those that are turned into us by the Iraqis own security forces
a tiny fraction of what it was 18 months ago.
When we initially went with the Army to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council and started what was a tremendous response to
the request for these MRAP vehicles back in January and February
of last year, the number of incidents was at a high and immediately began a decline because of a variety of things, and it was
not the least of which, of course, was the vehicles, but it was also
the effectiveness of our tactics and the Iraqis.
Explosively formed penetrators are not currently a significant
portion of the incidents in Al Anbar. They are much more of a concern in Baghdad and the areas to the east, sir.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Generals, for being with us.
And, General Cody, I have sat through many a hearing with you
and appreciate your service through all these years, and perhaps
we will see you in this setting before you leave, but, if not, we certainly wish you well.
I also always appreciate your no-nonsense style about things. We
have had several discussions back and forth today about what happens if we dont have a supplemental pass in a timely manner, and
I appreciate your being very straightforward about that. And in
your statement you list the things that could happen, and I think
there will be bipartisan interest in seeing that this happens in a
timely way.
But I also think we need toyou were also very clear in your
statementand I am just going to read from page nine, which
didnt get read when the list was readin which you state, Congressional action on the balance of the GWOT request prior to the
end of May will provide funds in time to prevent any disruption in
operations or programs.
So I think in the intent of Speaker Pelosi is to have that done
before we recess for Memorial Day, but I think it is helpful that
you have laid out that list of the things that can happen if that is
not done.

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I wanted to pursue a little bitMr. Conaway began the discussion, but I was going to ask about it anyway, which is this issue
that Admiral Fallon first brought to our attention on March 5sitting right where you are, General Codyabout the need for 2,000
troops, primarily trainers, for Afghanistan. And I think there were
a number of concerns. I know it concerns you. You have got a combatant commander saying he needs 2,000 troops for a war zone
right now, today, not 6 months from now, and yet we dont seem
to have the ability to meet that need.
My first question, though, was piqued by what you said about
that response to Mr. Conaway, which you saidif I heard you correctlywhich is you have other requests from combatant commanders thatwell, I guess they are potential requests that are
actually not being made because they know they cant be met.
One of the fears that some of us have had over the last six or
seven years is that we would hear from the then Secretary of Defense that any need from combatant commanders is being met, but
some of us have feared that word has gotten around they cant be
met so the requests arent being made.
Of those that you have in the back of your mind, when you know
there are combatant commanders out there that have needs, that
they would make the request if they thought they could be met,
what other ones relate to the war in Iraq or Afghanistan, other
than Admiral Fallons request for the trainers for Afghanistan?
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.
Most of them deal with theater security cooperation, whether it
be in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) or U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) or U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR.
Many of them deal with civil affairs and psychological operations
(PSYOPS) deployments, medical teams to South Americathe
Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) we used to
run down thereSpecial Operations training with other countries
armies, reinforced by a company of Army troops.
Those types of operations for theater engagement are critical to
us worldwide so that we can assist countries that want to partner
with us and help them build and train with their military. In Europe I know of a couple exercises that we could not get the right
numbers of troops there because we were so stretched other places.
We had the same problem on one of the Korean exercises. And so
we end up having to cobble together capabilities that werent really
what the combatant commander wanted.
Dr. SNYDER. So there are not any other specific requests as
straightforward as Admiral Fallon has requested?
General CODY. That affect GWOT, no.
Dr. SNYDER. Help me understand about the 2,000. So Admiral
Fallon specifically said he needs 2,000 today in addition to the Marines that are either going or about to go. When Admiral Keating
and the commandant were here, the commandant said he didnt
have the troops. Admiral Keating saidI asked him, If you were
required to come up with 2,000 troops from your command, could
you find areas where you could do without 2,000 troops? and he
said he could. Subsequent to that, we had Admiral Mullen, who
said, Well, Admiral Mullen needs to talk with us because we cant
find them.

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Now, what I dont understand is why cant we find those troops?
In terms of balancing of risk for a period of time, could we do with
1,000 less troops in South Korea and 500 less or 1,000 or so less
in Japan? I mean, I am justyou all know your business.
But this must be incredibly frustrating for you warfighters, when
you have one of your combatant commanders saying I need 2,000
more troops, we are the most powerful nation on earth, we have
the most powerful military in the world, and we cant find 2,000
more troops. Now, is it just not realistic out there to find those
2,000?
General CODY. We have looked, to be sure. When the first request came inand it wasnt 2,000 when it came in, it was for a
brigade, which was about 3,200this was to train the Afghan army
and police, and we looked at it very hard. Again, I go back to my
comment that the surge sucked all the stroke out of the shock absorber. We have very little flex.
Now, we are under partial mobilization. When people ask and
say, Gees, you got 1.1 million people in the Army. Cant you find
that? Not the way we are operating today. We havent fully mobilized for this war, and I am not suggesting that we should. We
have put a lot of strain and stress on the National Guard and the
Reserve component forces, we have got a lot of stress and strain
on the active force, and when we looked at this, we couldnt find
the 2,000 that we would move over there to do it cyclically because
it was going to take away from the warfight in Iraq.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow through on that.
The question was asked of Admiral Keatinga similar question
was asked of Admiral Keating, when he was here, and my recollection is that he said he has sufficient troops to do that; am I not
correct?
Dr. SNYDER. That is exactly what he said
The CHAIRMAN. From his command. And I understand the thrust
of Dr. Snyders question and a little trouble on why you cant find
the answer.
Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. SNYDER. May I ask in a related follow-up?
The CHAIRMAN. Please do.
Dr. SNYDER. And you have been in the building a long time now,
Mr. Cody. Do you know, when did Iraq become priority number one
and Afghanistan became priority number two? Because that is
what your talk about here. Your priority is number oneand those
2,000 troops are somewhere. Right now they are in Iraq. When did
Iraq become priority number one?
General CODY. I dont have the exact date. I believe, though, we
ran an exercise with the Joint Staffour Elaborate Crossbow series exercisesand I cant remember if it was Elaborate Crossbow
1 or 2 where we looked at all the combatant commands (COCOMs)
across the board on how we were going to balance when we rotated
OIF one force out in the OIF to the Iraq force in and how we were
going to balance across the COCOMs, as well as the requirements
for Afghanistan and Iraq. But it was somewhere probably in the
2004 timeframe, as I remember.

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Dr. SNYDER. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
The CHAIRMAN. For what it is worth being a country lawyer and
a reserver through the years, those in the area that might well attack us, as they have before, have a very difficult time understanding why that does not remain priority number one.
Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I just wanted to follow up on a question that the chairman
asked earlier when he said, if the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
were overI dont know whether he used the word instantly or
notbut came to an end and what we would do, and I thought,
General Cody, your answer was right on. Obviously, we would have
to get people out of the country in an organized, efficient manner.
We would have to return to broad-spectrum training that you
talked about.
Let me just ask this: Looking ahead just a little bit furtherlet
us say 5 to 10 yearsit seems to me that we are going to find ourselves going through a revolutionary development in warfare. Over
the past several months, I have had the opportunity to look at
some of the technology that both the Army and Marines will have
access to as we go forward. Just the other day we ventured to Fort
Bliss to see some components of the future combat system, which
are quite impressive. And, of course, more recentlyjust today
the Army had an FCS and Land Warrior demonstration here in
this building.
And I have got to say, Mr. Chairman, that, while it is fairly
easycomparatively easy to talk about legacy systemswhere we
need more, where we have weaknesses, where we need more training, where we need different kinds of trainingit is a whole new
world to try to figure out what the technologies that we will be
adopting in the military in the next decade mean to readiness,
warfighting capability.
For example, to think about tactical firepower that can be precision firepower and reach out 40 kilometers, to talk about the force
multiplier effect of various types of technology and sensors that can
actually relieve us of some human responsibilities, that we can
have command vehicles that can handle top-secret information and
be mobile, that we can have fuel-efficient vehicles that eliminates
the need for long convoys of fuel trucks using electric and diesel hybrid technology.
These things are all in the design stage, and they are going to
be real, and I justand the Land Warrior system, a system that
gives soldiers at the platoon leadership level the ability to see
things that we cant see now. It is hard to talk about these things
because we really havent developed a language to explain them to
each other very well yet.
General Cody, I would just like to askyou have been dealing
with these things on a full-time basis now for the entire period that
they have been in development, whatever that has been. Tell us
what you think they mean to future readiness and future force capability?
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.

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You have stated it better than I can, but the real dichotomy that
we are in, that we have always been in in the past and why I think
we need to reverse that trend is we have always traded off either
our current or our future, and we no longer can do that.
The Future Combat System suite of equipment that you saw
the Armys experimental task force out theresome of that technology was being used right now in Iraq. With the help of this committee, we have got unmanned aerial vehicles tied to manned systems, air-ground manned and unmanned teaming seeking out and
killing the IED and placers. We have got robotics that are doing
great work in saving soldiers lives.
This stuff is here today, and what we need to do is take the longterm view. We cant leave Iraq and Afghanistanwhenever that
isand turn around and say, Well, that was fine, and we paid for
it by taking money out of future. Because we are going to face another threat.
And the chairman talked about 1950 and that war. We stopped
looking at the future back then, and our bullets wouldnt take care
of the Chinese tanks. We didnt have the right communication gear,
and Brad Smith and Task Force Smith had a heck of a fight on
his hands, and the Pusan Perimeter almost collapsed because we
did not have the forethought to invest in future technologies.
And so we have to balance that in a balanced way. But the Future Combat System promises to save soldiers on the battlefield,
allow them to develop out of the contact the situation and bring
precision munitions to the enemy and gives us great latitude, as
well as reduces our logistical footprint.
We need to continue to invest in that because there are going to
be fights in the next five years where that technology is going to
be needed, and we cant turn around and say, Let us trade off
those monies there to fix your current problems. We have to take
a balanced approach.
Mr. SAXTON. General Magnus, do you have a perspective on this?
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman. Again, agree with
and no surprise the two warriors known each other so long agree.
You are right about the tremendous impact of changing in technologies, but I will tell you that the human element of warfare continues to rapidly evolve. And more than just the humans. Yes, robots. Robots help us. In the future they are going to be under sea,
looking for mines, but they are on the ground right now getting an
advance of our explosive ordinance disposal teams and our other
ground combat Marines.
But it is also dogs. We are now learning how to use combat
tracker dogs, new ways of using an old capabilitythe man-dog
teambut also bomb dogs. They dont have to be used just in the
airports. They are actually helping the Marines along with the robots.
Along with intelligence fusion, and not just soldiers and Marines
but interagency fusion of our capabilities. To be able to exploit networksthe enemy is using networks to enable their command and
control communications and propaganda. We can also exploit not
only our own networks but exploit the capabilities of others.
We are fielding dramatically new capable weapon systems. The
Marines are first deploying out a weapon system that was pio-

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neered by the Armythe Armys multiple launch rocket system
(MLRS). We have got the high mobility artillery rocket system
(HIMARs) version of that. They are firing precision rockets from Al
Taqaddum in support of operations in Al Anbar.
We are fielding a new 120-millimeter mortar system and our Expeditionary Fire Support System so that, if we again have to go to
someplace like Eastern Afghanistanand it is not a question of if,
it is simply a question of when and where we will go therewe will
have organic, long-range precision fires to fill the gap between 81millimeter mortars and the 155s and, on the high end, the
HIMARs.
We are going to meet and beat the threat of things like IEDs and
EFPs not just by armoring our vehicles. And we are armoring our
vehicles. You know about the Humvees, the MRAPs and the future
joint light tactical vehicles (JLTVs). But it is a combination of
counter-IED electronic warfare equipment, as well as the tactics
and techniques of our soldiers and Marines.
New ground combat systems, like the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, new ships, new aircraft, but also a new 21st century warrior
team, which is here now and is probably evolving faster than the
technologies are evolving.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Taylor has a question.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, again, thank you for sticking around.
General Magnus, on the V22great platform, I am glad it is
working. It does, however, strike me as being particularly vulnerable with its lack of self-defense. And I was curious what initiatives
are taking place within the Marine Corps to weaponize the V22.
I am glad things are going well in Anbar, but there is no guarantee
it stays that way.
The second thing I would hope you mention is, in your written
testimony, you talked about the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior
units. Every young amputee that I have encountered, first words
out of their mouths are they want to stay with their unit. And I
am curious to what extent both of your services are letting those
young people know early on the opportunities that exist, what
steps they would have to take in order to stay in? And I am very
pleased that, because of the help of the Secretary of the Navy and
the folks at the Merchant Marine Academy, we do have a program
to try to get some of your wounded warriors over to that academy
to act as coaches and tutors and instructors.
Can you walk us through some of the opportunities that you are
finding for people who, because of their service to their country,
find themselves in that situation?
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman. So let me answer
this in two parts. First on the V22 and then, second, on what we
are doing with wounded warriors, and on that one I certainly
would recommend that we allow General Cody to comment on the
Armys Wounded Warrior brigade and the tremendous efforts that
they are doing.
V22 self-defense, quite frankly, all of our rotary-wing aircraft,
with the exception of our attack helicopters, have always been vulnerable to fires received from the forward area. The only heli-

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copters that have forward-firing weapon systems are attack platforms that have been equipped with forward-firing guns or forward-firing organs like Hellfire and Tow.
Having said that, the V22 currently deploys with a rampmounted gun, which is very similar to the capabilities we use for
sideward-firing and rearward-firing guns, even on some of our special operations aircraft.
But, in fact, we are now working and believe that we will be successful in testing and eventually fielding a belly-mounted gun system that will be able to be deployed out of the door in the belly
that is commonly called the hell hole that will allow a forwardfiring capability for the first time from a transport helicopter. We
believe we will be able to successfully test that this year. On the
completion of those successful tests, we will rapidly fieldand this
is not a new gun system, but it is integration of the system inside
the V22 for the first time.
Our first V22 deployment is finishing this month, and they will
be replaced with another V22 squadron. And we are glad to report
that, not only are the readiness of the aircraft up and their effectiveness has been great but we have sustained no aircraft losses or
casualties.
With respect to our Wounded Warrior Regiment, sir, our first
mission, of course, is to get our troops recovered and rehabilitated.
There will be a determination then at the right point, particularly
for those who are traumatically injured, such as amputees or those
that have traumatic brain injury, a point at which a decision will
be made as to whether or not the medical personnel believe there
is what we call an unfitting condition; in other words, some medical disability that may prevent them from continuing military
service.
We will do everything in our power to make sure that, if it is an
infantryman, that there is a possibility, if they desire to stay in
military service, that they can change their occupational specialty,
provided that they are still fit for some other military capability in
the Marine Corps. We will put them on the temporary-limited-disability list, which will last for up to 18 months, pending reevaluation. They may, in fact, be able to go to the permanent-disability
list, in which case they will no longer be responsible for things that
they could have done before they were disabled but now no longer
can do, provided that they are still fit to perform in some military
occupational field.
Many of our wounded electas they would have if they werent
woundedelect to leave military service whether they are medically retired or not. We will do everything for our wounded to make
sure that, whether they stay or they elect to leave or if, in fact,
they are found to be unfit to stay in military service, that we not
only provide them the clinical and nonclinical care, but Marines are
Marines for life. We will take care of them and help them with the
Veterans Administrationwhich we are doing right nowto ensure that they can get the education they need to provide a useful
and productive role in society whether or not they stay Marines in
uniform or become civilian Marines.
General CODY. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.

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Just like General Magnus said, we offer every one of our soldiers,
if they want to stay on active duty and it is physically possible for
them to do that, we allow them. We have got double-amputees that
we have put down at our hospitals to train other amputees as a
coach. We have got a double-amputee that is going to go to the War
College and then be an instructor at West Point. Master Sgt. Luis
Rodriguez lost his leg early in this war above the knee. We allowed
him to stay on active duty.
We have got a couple of hundredI review the list every
monthof soldiers that ask to stay on active duty, and we make
those accommodations, and we do it early in the process because
we know it is important. Many of them want to stay and continue
to stay with their buddies and contribute to this Army that they
have invested in.
We have 11,000 wounded warriors today in our 35 Wounded
Warrior Transition Units. Within 12 months, 70 percent of them
are returned back to their units physically and mentally fit to continue on. The other 30 percent end up going through the physical
evaluation board process. We stay with them the whole step of the
way as we go through this.
Mr. TAYLOR. General, my question is, specifically, for both of
your services, is there a timeline once that wounded warrior has
regained consciousness? Is there a timeline where you try to deliver
the message that you, as the United States Armyyou, as the
United States Marine Corpsare going to do everything humanly
possible should it be that service persons decision, to help them
stay?
And this goes to a very real scenario that I encountered in the
past month or so, but it is about the third or fourth time that I
have seen it, whereI cant imagine waking up missing an arm or
a leg. I have seen other people that happened to, but I just cant
imagine going through it myself. But amongst all the other uncertainty that this person is dealing with, that is one of them that I
dont think anyone has clearly said to them, Look, if you want to
stay, we are going to find a way to help you make that happen.
This is what we are going to expect of you. This is what we are
going to do for you. When do you deliver that message?
General CODY. Usually, it is deliveredbecause we set up the
case managers and the Warrior Transition Units. Usually, it is delivered when they get on our wards, either at Walter Reed or Bethesda or at Brooke Army Medical. They stay a very short time in
Landstuhl and then get brought in. I go up theresome soldiers
will stay in the intensive care unit (ICU) for sometimes 2 to 3
weeks and then move up to Ward 57 or 56.
And then they are teamed with their case manager, the nurse
care manager, as well as their squad leader from the Wounded
Transition Unit. And we have empowered that triad of care to let
the soldier know that we are going to do everything we can for that
soldier to get him totally rehabilitated and, if they want to stay in,
we will assist them in doing thator her.
I had a casethese are all anecdotes. I had a case of a young
lady, a specialist, military police (MP), who lost both her legs below
the knee, and she asked to stay on active duty, we gave her that
option, she rehabilitated well, and then at the last minute she de-

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49
cided, you know what, I really dont want to do that, and we honored that. So we are working with them.
There are some tragic cases, though. We should not put false
hope to some of these people because they cant stay on active duty.
And for those, they are taken care of in our Army Wounded Warrior Program to move them through and take care of them all the
way up to the point where they have to be medically discharged
and go into the VA, and then our case manager from the Wounded
Warrior Program stays with them for five yearsor with their family, depending upon how severe the case isand then we renew
that.
But there are cases out there, Congressman. I have seen them
and I know you havewhere we will not be able to keep them in
uniform, and those are the tragic ones.
General MAGNUS. If I could, I will pile on to what General Cody
said, Congressman.
Early ontwo thingswe are going to tell them as soon as they
ask, which is usuallyand I have seen them undergoing multiple
surgeries want immediately go back to their unit with their warrior
buddies. So we are not going to give them false hope. What we will
tell them and their next of kin that are with them is that we are
going to focus on regaining their health, getting their medical condition right, if they need therapyand many of the severely
wounded, including the amputees we talked aboutwe have had
single and multiple amputees that are still in military service. I
know of a gunnery sergeant that has had over 30 surgeries and is
still on active duty, mainly because he is still undergoing surgery
and we are not trying to push him out of the door until he is ready.
The commandant of the Marine Corps two years ago told them
that, if they are fit to perform any military occupational specialty
and, if they want to stay in the Marine Corps, we will do our best
to take care of them clinically first and then take care of their rehabilitation in terms of their ability to perform a useful function.
None of these troops want to feel like we are just keeping them
to make them happy. They want to be soldiers, they want to be
Marines, and we dont want to give them false hopes, but we will
give them every single asset that they need, including caring, to
make sure that we are going to continue to take care of them.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Special thanks and tribute to each of you for your long and dedicated service. We appreciate it more than you know.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Couple of thingsone is, General Magnus, how many embassies
do Marines man around the world? Quite a few, isnt it?
General MAGNUS. Yes, sir. Embassies, including consulates, well
over 150. In fact, the number in the last several years since 9/11
has increased in response to security requirements from the State
Department.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So over 150. What is your average Marine
contingent at each one of those?

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General MAGNUS. Sir, I can get you the information on the numbers. The detachments vary quite significantly. In fact, we have deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq Marine fleet antiterrorism support
teams to back up the Marine security guards.
Normally, the number of Marines is in the vicinity of 8 to 15,
but, again, it varies depending upon the security situation in the
nation.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I was just looking at that following on the
question of my friend from Mississippi. If you have got 1,500-plus
positions at embassies around the world, that would seem to me to
be a good location for wounded Marines who may want to have
may be kind of nice to be able to go tell the wife we can go back
and we can stay in the Corps and we can deploy to one of these
locations.
General MAGNUS. If I could, Congressman, the only Marines that
go to Marine security guard duty are ground combat arms. These
are fully fit and male Marines for close combat that comes to your
attention when you see an assault like we saw on the assault in
the embassy in Belgrade. These Marines have to be capable of
independent combat action. And so we would make sure that a Marine who goes into close combat arms is as fully capable as he
would be if he was sent to close combat in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, dont you have some embassies that are pretty benign, the ones that the State Department guys like to go to?
General MAGNUS. Yes, sir. They are benign until they are not.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let us explore that a little bit, though, General. I think you ought to have somethe other place we were lookingat least I thought was of interestis the State Department,
especially when I saw the reluctance of some of the State Department folks to go to the Green Zone. You have probably got some
great Marines and soldiers that would like to look at that career
in the State Department and go to some of those places.
But, listen, one thing that I missed, when I was talking about
General Codyswas made aware that General Cody is retiring
was that you, General Magnus, are retiring on July 16; is that correct?
General MAGNUS. Seventh, sir. Please dont push it a day.
[Laughter.]
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Somebody moved you up.
Well, this is kind of ato me, this is quite a blow to the committee because you have given magnificent service to our country.
And to have both of you gentlemen here, especially in the middle
of this conflict, leaving the service, I think, is a real loss to our
country. And I want to commend you on a magnificent careerI
know the committee doesand I wish there was a way to keep
both of you aboard for the service to our country, especially while
we are engaged in two shooting wars.
But thank you very much for your great service to the Corps and
to America.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, gentlemen, and I know everyone on
this committee joins Mr. Hunter in commending you for your outstanding and fearless service.
Thank you so much.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD


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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING


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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK


Mr. SESTAK. What is the stop-loss number for the 3rd Infantry Division over the
past year, per brigade, and per division as a whole? In addition, how are they broken down, per specialty? Lastly, how many of those who might have faced stop-loss
as their unit prepared for deployment, reenlisted vice-face stop-loss?
General CODY. The Army is committed to reducing and eventually eliminating the
use of Stop Loss. We are currently working with the Secretary of Defense to develop policies that will allow us to reduce our reliance on Stop Loss as a force
management tool. The data that you requested related to Stop Loss in the 3rd Infantry Division is below.
We have a moral obligation to provide combatant commanders with cohesive
Army units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped for the missions they will
undertake in theater. Personnel losses caused by separations and retirements have
a significant adverse impact on units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in terms of cohesion, training, and stability. In order to minimize these detrimental effects, we use Stop Loss sparingly
and for limited periods of time. Stop Loss affects only about one percent of the
total force.

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Of those who might have faced stop-loss as their unit prepared for deployment,
reenlisted vice face stop-loss in the 3rd Infantry in the past 12 months, 255 subsequently reenlisted and 11 more transitioned to serve in the Reserve Component.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS


Ms. TSONGAS. While patrolling crowded and noisy urban settings in Iraq, U.S.
troops have a difficult time identifying where enemy fire is coming from. Hostile fire
has claimed the lives of more than 1,200 American soldiers in Iraq since combat
began there in March of 2003. Indeed, it is my understanding hostile fire has become the second leading cause of American fatalities after IEDs. General Cody, almost six weeks ago I asked General Casey about the status of releasing appropriated Supplemental funds for various shooter and sniper detection systems. To the
best of my knowledge, additional systems have not yet been procured using Supplemental funding. Can you please update the committee on the Armys counter-sniper
initiatives both in terms of last years $1.2 billion Supplemental as well as any additional plans moving forward?
General CODY. The Army received $400 million in other procurement, Army funding for Rapid Equipping Soldier support systems in the FY08 bridge supplemental.
The funds were allocated to procuring counter sniper items. The funding is less than
the total FY08 counter sniper requirement of $451 million, which is a reduction
from the original request of $1.2 billion and was based on a continuing refinement
of the counter sniper requirements by the Army staff. Counter sniper systems being
procured with current funding include:

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Boomerang gunshot detection system


DoubleShot shot detection system
Vanguard (which integrates a remote weapons station with Boomerang and
DoubleShot for vehicle based Counter Sniper capability)
handheld thermals, stabilized and ruggedized binoculars, security veils and
vehicle nets, magnifiers and mannequins.

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The remaining portion of the FY08 supplemental request includes the requirement for counter sniper procurement. The Army approved the transition of two sniper defeat capabilities into acquisition programs: vehicle/fixed site-based gunshot detection and Soldier-based gunshot detection. The third capability, a remote weapons
station with a vehicle based gunshot detection system (similar to Vanguard) has
been assessed to support an acquisition program decision. Funding requests have
been incorporated into the Armys FY1015 Program Objective Memorandum submission. If approved, a requirement for the Vanguard-like system would be submitted and expected to be a program of record in FY12.

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