1.

Leung Yee VS Strong Machinery Company and J.G Williamson

GR No. 11658
February 15, 1918
Facts:

The defendant (Strong Machinery Comp) sold rice-cleaning machinery to

Compania Agricola Filipina which in return executed a chattel mortgage to secure
payment.
In the mortgage deed it included the building of strong materials in which the
rice-cleaning machinery was installed without any reference to the land which it
stood.
The debt fell due and the Agricola failed to pay. The mortgage property was sold
to Strong Machinery and was registered in the chattel mortgage registry.
Few weeks thereafter, Agricola executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the
building stood however this deed although executed in a public document was
not registered.
The machinery company went into possession of the building at or about the time
of the sale and continued in possession ever since. (December 1914)
The plaintiff (Leung Yee) is the creditor of Agricola under the contract of
construction of the building.
At about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of strong
machinery, Agricola executed another mortgage to Leung Yee upon the building
separate and apart from the land.
When Agricola failed to pay his indebtedness, Leung Yee secured judgment of the
amount levied execution upon the building and bought the same at the sheriffs
sale. Thereafter and registered it in the land registry. (December 1914).
The present action was instituted by Leung Yee to recover possession of the
building from Strong Machinery.

Issue:
Whether or not the separate treatment of the parties to the building changes its
character as an immovable property?
Held:

No.
The building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was
installed by Compania Agricola Filipina was real property, and the mere fact that the
parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in
no wise changed its character as real property.
It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the
instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the builing and the machinery
installed therein nor the annotation in that registry of sale of the mortgaged property
had any effect whatever insofar as the building is concerned.

The purchase of the property by plaintiff was not in good faith that the defendant
first took possession of the property and that the defendant bought the land and
building before the sale to plaintiff.
2.
Prudential Bank vs Hon. Domingo Panis and Fernando Magcale and
Teodula Magcale
GR No. 50008, August 31, 1987
Facts:

Private respondent (Spouses Magcale) obtained a loan from Plaintiff (Prudential

Bank) amounting to P70,000. To secure payment they executed a real estate
mortgage over a residential building with warehouse spaces.
The mortgage included also the right to occupancy and the fact that the Spouses
Magcalde filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot to which the
building stood.
May 2, 1973 spouses Magcalde secured another loan to the bank amounting
P20,000 and another real estate mortgage was executed over the same property.
April 24, 1973 Secretary of Agriculture then issued a miscellaneous Sales Patent
over the land.
The Spouses failed to pay the obligation to Prudential Bank, the deeds of real
estate mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed. Consequent to the foreclosure
was the sale of the properties to prudential bank as the highest bidder in a public
auction conducted by City Sheriff.
The respondent court held that the REM was null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building
erected on the land belonging to another?
Held:
Yes.
In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the CC, this court ruled that
it is obvious that the inclusion of building separate and distinct from the land in said
provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property.
Thus, while it is true that a mortage of land necessarily includes in the absence of
stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be
still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable
property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. (Leung Lee vs strong
machinery)
At the case at bar, the original mortgage was executed before the issuance of the
final patent and before the government was divested of its title to the land. Under the
foregoing considerations it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent

on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all
intents and purposes a valid mortgage.
However, the second mortgage executed over the same properties is null and void
because the mortgage was executed after the issuance of the sales patent in accordance
with Public Land Act.
3.
Davao Sawmill Co., Inc., vs Apronio Castillo and Davao Light and Power
Co.,
GR 40411
August 7, 1935
Facts:
The Plaintiff (Davao Sawmill) operated a sawmill in the Province of Davao.
The land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person.
On the land Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery used
by it. The machineries were placed and mounted on foundations of cement.
From their stipulation in a contract of lease it is specified that the machineries
and accessories are not included in the improvements on the expiration or
abandonment of the land leased.
In an action brought by the defendant herein judgment was rendered against
davao sawmill.
A writ of execution was issued and the machineries placed on the sawmill were
levied upon.
Previously Davao Sawmill on a number of occasions treated the machinery as
personal property by executing chattel mortgage in favor of 3rd persons.
One of such is the appellee by assignment from original mortgage.

Defenses:
Castillo and davao light invoked p.1 of Article 334 of old CC which states that
land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil. Thus
it is immobilized and they belonged to the owner of the land.
Davao sawmill stressed p.5 of Article 334 of old CC which stated that machinery,
liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any
building or land for use in connection with industry or trade being carried on
therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade
and industry.

Issue:
Whether or not the machinery in dispute is personal or real property?
Held:
Personal property.

Machinery not intended by the owner of any building or land for use in
connection therewith but intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land
by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of the lease.
A similar question was raised in Puerto Rico and on appeal US SC it was held
that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed
in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a tenant,
usufructuary or any person having only a temporary right unless such person acted as
an agent of the owner.
4.
Board of Assessment Appeals vs Manila Electric Company
GR 15334, January 31, 1964
Facts:
On November 15, 1955, petitioner City Assessor of QC declared that the 3 steel
towers for real property tax under Tax declaration.
After denying the Meralcos petition to cancel these declarations an appeal was
taken to Board Assessment Appeals which required them to pay the amount of
P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956.
respondent pay the amount under protest and filed for petition for review in the
CTA which later ordered the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the city
treasurer to refund the sum of P11,651.86.
CTA held that: (1) the steel towers come within the term poles which are
declared exempt from taxes under Part II p.9 of Meralcos franchise; (2) the steel
towers are personal properties and are not subject to real property tax.
Issue:
Whether or not the steel towers constitute real property which will be subject for
real property tax?
Held:

Steel towers are not real property.

The steel towers or supports in question, do not come within the objects
mentioned in p.1 because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to
the soil. They are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of
bolts, which when unscrewed could easily dismantled and moved from place to place.
They cannot be included in p.3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or deterioration
of object to which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of
steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can be disassembled
by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same.
These steel towers or supports do not also fall under p.5, for they are not
machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements and even if they were they are not
intended for industry or works on the land. Meralco is not engaged in an industry or
works in the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

5.
Leon Sibal vs Emiliano Valdez
GR No. L-26278
August 4, 1927
Facts:
The deputy sheriff of Tarlac attached and sold to Valdez the sugarcane planted by
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff asked for the redemption of the sugarcane.
Valdez contended that it cannot be subject to redemption because it is a personal
property.
Issue:
Whether or not the sugarcane in question is a personal or real property?
Held:

Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products. The SC of Louisiana

provided that standing crops are considered part of the land to which they are attached
but the immovability provided for is only one abstract. The existence of a right on the
growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance,
rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein.
A crop on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to
the lessee and may be sold by him.
Act 1508 (chattel mortgage law) recognize growing crops as personal property.
Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested when produced by annual
cultivation is not part of realty.
Paragraph 2 of Art 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by Sec. 450 of Code of
Civil Procedure and Act no, 1508 in the sense that for purposes of attachment and
execution and chattel mortgage law ungathered products have the nature of personal
property.
6.
US vs Ignacio Carlos
GR no. 6295
September 1, 1911
Facts:
The defendant (Ignacio Carlos) was accused of theft of 2273 kilowatts of electric
current, owned by MERALCO.
The court found that Carlos placed a jumper to deflect the electric current from
the meter.
Carlos contended in his defense that only corporeal property can be the subject of
the crime theft. For this purpose he cited authorities showing that only tangible

movable chattels or things which could be taken in possession and carried away
can be the subject of theft.
Electricity according to the defendant , being unknown force cannot be the
subject of theft.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the defendant is meritorious?
Held:
It is true that electricity is no longer as formerly regarded by scientist as a fluid
but its manifestation and effects like those of gas may be seen and felt.
The true test of what is proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the
subject is corporeal or incorporeal but whether it is capable of appropriation by another
than the owner.
Electricity, the same as gas is a valuable article or merchandise bought and sold
like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by another.
Electricity is a subject of larceny.
7.
Government of the Philippines vs Consorcia Cabangis et al
GR no. 28379, March 27, 1929
Facts:
Lots 36, 39, 40 were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the
predecessor of the defendants.
In the year 1986 the said land began to wear away due to the action of the waves
of Manila Bay until the year 1901 when the said lots become completely
submerged in the water in ordinary tides and remained in such state until 1912.
In the year 1912, the Government reclaimed the area by depositing all the sand
and silt taken from the bed of the Estuary.
The claimants-appellees contended that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a
part of a large parcel of land belonging to their predecessor in interest, Tomas
Cabangis, having taken possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed, giving
his permission to some fishermen to dry their fishing nets and deposit their
bancas thereon, said lots belong to them.
On the other hand, the Government contended that, they reclaimed the land
through their efforts, therefore, the lots belong to them. Government further
argued that the failure of predecessor of the claimants-appellees to protect the
land by building retaining wall in 1866 and let the land submerged until 1912,
constitutes abandonment.
Issue:
To whom the lands in dispute belong?
Held:
The lands belong to the Government.

Article 5 of Laws of Water provides that lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing
such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
The fact that from 1912 some fisherman had been drying their fishing nets and
depositing their bancas on lots 36,39 and 40 by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not
confer on the latter or his successors the ownership of said lots because as they were
converted into public land, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the
form and manner established by the law.
In conclusion, the SC hold that the lots in question having disappeared on
account of the gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide and having remained
in such state until they were reclaimed from the sea by filling in done by the
Government, they are public land.
8.
RCPI vs Provincial Assessor of South Cotabato
GR no. 144486, April 13, 2005
Facts:
the municipal treasurer of Tupi South Cotabato assessed RCPI real property taxes
from 1981 to 1985. The municipal demanded that RCPI should pay P166,810 as
real property on its radio station building, as well as on its machinery shed, radio
relay station tower and its accessories and generating sets.
RCPI contended that that all assessed properties are personal property and thus
exempt from the real property tax.
Court of Appeals rendered decision that RCPI is exempt from paying the real
property taxes assessed upon its machinery and radio equipment mounted as
accessories to its relay tower. Because Sec 14 of RA 2036 as amended by RA 4054
clearly exempts RCPI from tax on radio equipment, machinery and spare parts
needed in connection with its business.
However, the radio station building machinery shed and relay station tower is
subject to real property taxes.
Issue:
Whether the properties assessed are real properties?
Held:
RCPIs radio relay station tower, radio station building and machinery shed are
real properties and are thus subject to the real property tax.
As explained by the CA, the tower upon which these different types of radio
equipment are mounted or attached is, however, subject to real property tax since a
tower is not strictly a radio equipment as it only serves as a support for antennas or
other communication equipment mounted thereon for the transmission and reception
of radio signals. Nor could it be classified as machinery, which is a combination of

mechanical devices, for without attachments to it, a tower is merely a structure designed
primarily with a view to elevation.
The machinery shed is likewise taxable as the same is a kind of real property
falling within the classification of buildings or permanent structures intended to shelter
human beings or domestic animals, or to house the tools or machinery he uses, or the
persons he employs in his business.
Section 14 of RA 2036 as amended by RA 4054 clearly states that RCPI shall pay
the real estate tax.
12.
LAUREL VS. ABROGAR
576 SCRA 41
FACTS: Petitioner Luis Laurel was charged with Theft after allegedly taking, stealing
and using the international long distance calls belongingto PLDT by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR), whichis a method of routing and completing
international long distancecalls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency
whichconnect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of thecountry where
the call is destined, effectively stealing thisbusiness from PLDT while using its facilities
in the estimatedamount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT in the
said amount.
In this regard, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is aconversation on the
phone or a communication carried out using the telephone and that it is not
synonymous to electriccurrent or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered aspersonal
property susceptible of appropriation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laurels acts may be considered as Theft
HELD: Yes. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft is that
it be capable of appropriation, not necessarily of asportation, which is defined as
carrying away. Thus, international long distance calls, which take the form of
electrical energy, may be conceded as personal property under Article 416(3) of the Civil
Code, and may be the object of theft. However, PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, could not validly claim that the same were taken without its consent.
Nevertheless, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service
are personal property under Article 308 of the RPC and the act of engaging in
International Simple Resale is an act of subtraction penalized under said article.
13.
MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. ROJAS AND TIUNG SIUKO
30 SCRA 602

FACTS: In 1907, the municipal council of Cavite leased to defendant Hilaria Rojas and
her husband TiungSiuko some 70 or 80 square meters of Plaza Soledad, a promenade
for public use, on the condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance. When later
required by the municipality to vacate said land, the defendant refused.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal council can sell or lease communal or public
property
HELD: No. A municipal council cannot sell or lease communal or public property, such
as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, bridges, etc., because they are outside the
commerce of man; and if has done so by leasing part of a plaza, the lease is null and
void, for it is contrary to the law, and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract.
(Arts. 344, 1271, Civil Code)
On the hypothesis that such lease is null and void, the lessee must restore possession of
the land by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it
may have collected as rent.
15.
Caltex (Philippines) vs Felisa Felias
GR no. L-14309, June 30, 1960
Facts:
Lot No. 107 was originally owned by the Spouses Felion the parents of Felisa
Felias who later acquired the property through donation.
In a civil case involving the husbandsimeon Samawoto of defendant Felias lost
the case and CFI issued a writ of execution to levy the Lot 107 together with the
improvements therein.
The lot was sold to petitioner Caltex in an auction held by the sheriff.
Felisa Felias aver that she is the exclusive owner of the property being it a
paraphernal in nature.
Issue:
Whether or not the property belong exclusively to Felisa Felias?
Held:

The SC applied the familiar rule of accessory following the principal.

When the lot was donated to Felisa by her parents, as owners of the landon which
the building was constructed, the lot became her paraphernal property. The donation
transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a building constructed on it. Therefore,
at the time of the levy and sale of the sheriff, Lot 107 did not belong to the conjugal
partnership, but it was paraphernal property of Felisa. As such, it was not answerable
for the obligations of her husband which resulted in the judgment against him in favor
of Ca14.

Barach Motor vs Talisay-Silay Milling Co., and PNB

GR no. 35223, September 17, 1931
Facts:
On 1923, Talisay-Silay Milling Co. was indebeted to PNB
To secure payment of its debt it succeeded in inducing its planters, among them
was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the PNB.
In a resolution, Talisay Milling Co., undertook to credit the owners of the
plantation with sum equal to 2% of the debt secured as a bonus.
Barach motors is the creditor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma, who now claims the
bonus awarded to Mariano.
PNB also filed a 3rd party claim and avers that the bonus is part of the civil fruits
of the land mortgage to them.
Issue:
Whether or not the bonus is a civil fruits?
Held:

Under the Civil Code it considers 3 civil fruits namely:

1. the rents of buildings
2. the proceeds from the leases of land
3. income from perpetual or life annuities or other similar sources of revenue.

Bonus is not obtained from the mortgage land but from accidental relation to the
land mentioned having been granted as compensation for the risk of having been
granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected ones land to a lien in favor of
the bank for the benefit of entity granting said bonus.
The amount of the bonus according to the resolution of central granting it is not
based upon the value, importance of any other circumstance of the mortgage property
but upon the value of debt thereby secured but according to annual balance which is
something quite distinct from the property.
16.
Spouses Conception Fernandez del Campo vs Estanislao del Canto vs
Bernarda Fernandez Abeisa
GR no. L49219, April 15, 1988
Facts:
Conception Fernandez-del Campo and Bernarda Fernandez-Abeisa are coowners of Lot 1161.
An action for partition was filed by the Conception Fernandez in CFI Cebu where
each of them are entitled to have 1/3 share of the lot.
The house of Bernarda Abeisa occupied the portion with an area of 5 square
meters of lot belonging to Conception del Campo.
The trial court decided that Bernarda is not entitled to reimbursement of cost of
house built because the land is under co-ownership.

Conception contended that Article 448 should be applied in the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 448 is applicable in the present case?
Held:

The co-ownership was terminated by the partition and appears that the house of
bernarda overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to the
plaintiffs which defendant obviously built in good faith, then the provision of Article 448
of the new CC should apply.
Applying Article 448, the plaintiff have the right to appropriate said portion of
the house of the defendants upon payment of indemtity to defendants as provided in Art
546 and 548.
Otherwise the plaintiff may be oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land
occupied by their house.
However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the price asked
for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the hpuse of defendants
built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants must
pay reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they may agree.
In case of disagreement the trial court shall fix the terms thereof.
Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house at
their own expense if they so decide.
17.
Silverio Felices vs Mamerto Iriola
GR No. L-11269, February 28, 1958
Facts:
Silverio Felices was the grantee of a homestead patent of over 8 hectares in
Camarines Sur.
A month after the grant, Felices sold the 4 hectares of land to Mamerto Iriola for
consideration of P1,700.
Two years after the sale, Felices tried to recover the land in question from Iriola.
Iriola refused unless he will be paid of P2,000 as the alleged value of
improvements he had introduced on the property.
Due to persistent refusal of Iriola, Felices filed the present action.
The lower court decided that in favor of Felices and did not award any
reimbursement to Iriola.
Iriola invoked Article 453 as a defense and avers that he is entitled for
reimbursement for the improvements in the property.
Issue:
Whether or not Iriola is entitled for reimbursement?
Held:

The rule of Article 453 of the CC invoked by the appellant cannot be applied in
the instant case for the reason that the lower court found, and appellant admits, that the
improvements in question were made on the premises only after the appellee had tried
to recover the land.
Under Article 453 when both of the builder and the landowner is in bad faith, the
rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
However, when Iriola recognize the right of Felices to recover the property, continued to
act in bad faith when he made improvements on the land. Therefore, article 449 will
apply he who builds, plants, sow in bad faith on the land of another, loses that is built,
planted, or sown without right to indemnity.
18.
Republic vs Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille, LRC and Register of Deeds of Davao
City
GR No. L-39248, May 7, 1976
Facts:
Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille is the owner of a parcel of land in Davao city which a
subdivision was built.
In the said subdivision there is an excess land measuring 82,127 square meters.
Luisa Abrille was able to secure an order from CFI of Davao directing the
registrar of deeds to correct the certificate of title which include now the 82,127
sq meters of land in favor of Luisa.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Abrille to include the increase in
area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan recommended by the
Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report.
Republic now avers that the registration of 82,127 sq meter is not in accordance
with the law. That said land in dispute is formerly a portion of Davao River which
dried up; hence the land belong to the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not subdivision plan for land obtained by Accretion is enough to
make the land a Registered Land?
Held:
NO.
In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a
former river bed of Davao River, under the operation of the Land registration Law, ACT
496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead
of ordinary approval of sibdivision plan.
In the instant case, part of the tracts of land particularly the area of 82,127 sq
meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of Torrens system. Worse still, the
approval of Subdivision Plans without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly
the director of lands.
19.

Government vs Colegio de San Jose

GR no. L-30829, August 28, 1929
Facts:
This case involves the question of ownership of 2 parcels of land bordering the
Colegio De San Jose and Laguna de Bay.
The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends that the land in dispute are part of
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan which has been in possession thereof since time
immemorial by means of its tenants or lessees and farmers.
On the other hand, the Government contends that the said land belong to public
domain, and its evidence tends to prove that they have always been known as the
shores of Laguna de Bay.
Issue:
Whether the land in question belongs to public domain or privately owned?
Held:
The land belongs to Colegio de San Jose.
Under Article 77 of Law of Waters, lands accidentally inundated by the waters of
lakes, or by creeks, rivers and other streams shall continue to be the property of their
respective owners.
The two parcels of land in litigation form no part of the bed of Laguna de Bay and
consequently do not belong to the public domain, they must belong to the claimant
Colegio de San Jose as a part of Hacienda de san Pedro Tunasan, owned by it, the
northwestern part of which borders on said lake and in accordance with the legal
provision just quoted, the fact that they are inundated by its waters during extraordinary
risings which take place during the months of Sept, Oct, and Nov does not deprive said
claimant of the ownership thereof.
20.
Belen Uy Tayag vs Rosario Yuseco, et al., and Hon. Antonio Canizares
GR no. L14043, April 16, 1959
Facts:
Prior to the year 1930, Joaquin Yuseco and attorney-at-law had been rendering
professional services without compensation to Maria Lim.
To show her appreciation of such services, Maria Lim offered Joaquin and his
wife to build a house in 2 Lots of Hacienda de San Lazaro registered under
Marias name.
Yusecos accepted the offer and built a dwelling house and an annex fro garage
and servant quarters on said lots. To legalize the possession of said lots by the
yusecos, Maria Lim and the Yusecos executed a contract of lease covering them,
which run for a period of five years with yearly rental of 120.
Few days before the death of Maria Lim, she sold two lots to her daughter Belen
Tayag for the sum of P4,000.

The Tayag asked the Yuseco to remove their house to from the lots or else pay
them a monthly rental of 120. Yuseco refused and a case was filed.
Belen Tayag chose to appropriate two buildings existing thereon upon payment
to the defendants of their value, which assessed at the sum of P50,000. Lower
court ordered that when Belen Tayag failed to pay Yuchecos within 90 days after
the decision, the latter will have the right to purchase the land for the sum of
P10,000.
When Belen Tayag cannot pay because of financial inability, she contended that
that she has the right to make a choice even if she had already chosen the
appropriation.

Issue:
Whether or not Belan Tayag can still change her choice after the decision become
final?
Held:

Since her first choice had already been communicated to the court and she had
already been ordered to pay her duty has been converted into a monetary obligation. If
she does not or cannot pay, execution on her properties would be proper. This is part of
the judicial machinery of due process in action. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with it.
If the claim or contention to be sustained and if the petitioners were allowed to
change their mind, repudiate their choice made in court the litigation will never end.
21.
Francisco Depra vs Agustin Dumlao
GR no. L-57348, May 16, 1985
Facts:
The dispute started when Agustin Dumlao constructed a house on his lot
however, the kitchen encroaches on an area of 34 sq meters of Francisco Depras
property.
MTC found that Dumlao was builder in good and applying 448 of the CC. The
court created a forced leased between Depra and Dumlao. But then Depra refused
to accept payment of rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the
MTC.
The RTC held that the decision of MTC is null and void because its jurisdiction is
limited to the sole issue of possession. When Depra did choose any the option
given under Article 448 (either to pay for the building or sell his land to the
owner of the building), thus the lower court ordered to remove the buildings from
the land belonging to Depra.
(depra wanted to remove the kitchen from his property)
Issue:
Whether or not Depra can refused to choose between the options provided under
Artcle 448?

Held:

He cannot refused to pay for encroaching part of the building and sell the
encroached part of his land.
Under Article 448, where the builder, planter or sower has acted in bad faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land.
In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership the law
has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter
to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent.
It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option because his
right is older and because by principle of accession he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.
Depra is entitled to such removal only when after having chosen to sell his
encroached land.
22.
Ismael and Teresita Macasaet vs Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet
GR no. 154391, September 30, 2004
Facts:
Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet invited their son Isamael and his wife
Teresita to occupy two parcels of land belonging to the former.
Petitioners occupied and these lots and used them as their residence and site for
their construction business.
Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises and thus, the
children lost their right to remain on the property.
RTC ordered that respondent to appropriate the building and other
improvement introduced by the petitioners after payment of the indemnity
provided for by Article 448.
However CA said that Article 448 is inapplicable and Article 1678 should be
applied to the right of Ismael for reimbursement.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 448 is applicable in the present case?
Held:

Accession is the right of the owner to everything that is incorporated or

attached to the property.
Article 448 is applies to the present factual milieu.
The established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by the petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the
lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the construction

of the improvements thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good
faith when they built the structures on those lots
Since the petitioners were in good faith, Article 448 should be correlated to
Article 546 for the entitlement of reimbursement.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate as their own the
building and other improvements on the subject lots but only after
(1) refunding the expenses of the petitioners or
(2) paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by the reason thereof.
They have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its
value is considerably more than that of the structures in which case, petitioners shall
pay reasonable rent.
23.
Spouses Baes vs CA
GR 108065, July 6, 1993
Facts:
The government Dug a canal on a private parcel of land.
That specific lot was acquired by Felix Baes and was later subdivided into 3 lots.
Lot B which was totally occupied by the canal, the government gave Baes Lot
2958-C with exactly the same area of Lot B.
In 1978, republic discovered that one of the lot on which the petitioner erected an
apartment covered the Pasay Cadastre which is a filled up portion of tripa
Gallina.
The old river bed was filled up by soil from Lot C.
Petitioner now claims ownership over the old river bed on the basis of Article 461
which states that abandoned river beds belong to the riparian owners whose land
is occupied by the new course of water.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 461 applies?
Held:
Yes
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his
property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the
change in course of the river is effected by artificial means.
The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of
deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to improve the flow of the
tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.

However, the petitioners have already been so compensated.

24.
Ignacio Grande vs CA, Domingo and Esteban Calalung
GR 17652, June 30, 1962
Facts:
Grandes are the owners of a parcel of land in Isabela by inheritance from their
deceased mother, who likewise inherited it from her parents.
In early 1930s the grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration
purposes. The land was described to have Cgayan River as the northeastern
boundary.
In 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river
and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m was added to the registered area.
The grnades filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs stating tht
they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the
alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalung already trespassed into their
property.
However Calalung stated that they were the rightful owners since prior 1933 that
they have acquired ownership through prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited on land automatically belong to the
riparian owner?
Held:
Art 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the
adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that the
said land have become imprescriptible.
The land of Grandes only specifies a specific portion of which the alluvial deposits
are not included, thus, subject to aquisition by prescription.
Since Calalung proved that they been in continuous possession of the land since
1934 via two credible witnesses as opposed to Grandes single witness.
This is because the possession took place in 1934 when the law to be followed was Act
190 and not the NCC which only took effect in 1950
26.
Severino Baricuatro Jr. vs CA, Spouses Nemenio, Constantino Galeos and
Eugenio Amores
GR 105902, February 9, 2000
Facts:
Baricuatro (now substituted by his legal heirs) bought two parcels of land-Lot 9
and 10 on installment basis from Galeos.

After the sale Baricuatro introduced improvements and resided therein in 1970.
Baricuatro was unable to pay Galeos in full amount that there was remaining
balance of 1K to Lot 9 and 3K to Lot 10. The title remained in Galeos.
Galeos sold the entire subdivision to Amores. Baricuatro was informed about the
sale and was advised to pay the balance to Amores.
In 1974, Amores sold Lot 9 and 10 to Spouses Nemenio. Baricuatro was informed
through letter by Amores about the sale but they failed to respond.
Spouses Nemenio caused the transfer of the titles to the said lots and the
issuance of tax declaration in their names.
Thereafter, Sps Nemenio demanded from the petitioner to vacate the said lots
but the latter refused to do so. Thus, complaint of quieting of title was filed by
Sps Nemenio.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint of quieting of title filed by Sps Nemenio will
prosper?
Held:

No.
Under 476 whenever there is cloud on title to real property by reason of
instrument, record, claim which is apparently valid or effective but it is truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and may be prejudicial to said title an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
In this case, both the 2nd (Amores) and 3rd (Sps Nemenio) are in bad faith.
Amores was not in good faith when he registered his titled, preponderance of evidence
showed that he already had knowledge of the previous sale of the disputed lots to
Baricuatro. As well to Spouses Nemenio, they cannot be considered in GF because it
appeared in the record that when they bought the lots in 1974, they only registered it on
1976 after he visited the residence of Baricuatro on the year 1975.
Hence, the complaint for quieting of title in favor of Spouses Nemenio will not
prosper and Severino Baricuatro is the legal owner of the lots.
27.
National Grains Authority vs IAC, Melecio Magcamit, Nena Cosico and
Emelita Magcamit
GR no. 68741, January 1988
Facts:
In 1972, Spouses Vivas and Lizardo sold to private respondents a parcel of land
for P90, 000; initially P50,000 after the execution of deed of absolute sale and
remaining P40,000 when certificate of title was issued.
In 1975, OCT was issued without the knowledge of the private respondents. It was
subsequently mortgaged to NGA.
The mortgaged was foreclosed when Spouses Vivas and Lizardo failed to pay their
indebtedness to NGA.

NGA was able to secure TCT title under its name. NGA asked the private
respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to do so. Hence,
petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against the PR.
Lower court rendered decision in favor of NGA, however it was reversed by CA.
hence present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of trust between Sps. Vivas and Lizardo and PR is
sufficient to defeat the title acquired by and innocent purchaser (NGA)?
Held:
No.
The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to the land and to stop
forever any question as to its legality. The only exception to this rule is where a person
obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of
the rights of the true owner.
In this case, NGA lawfully acquired the land after its foreclosure in public
auction. That NGA was never a privy between to the agreement of Sps. Vivas and
Lizardo and PR. Neither it was shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the
execution of mortgage, of existence of SCon in the deed of absolute sale.
Therefore, unquestionably, NGA is an innocent purchaser.
The court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a mortgage to make
an investigation of the title of the property being given as security. And where
innocent third persons like mortgagee relying on the certificate of title acquire rights
over the property, their rights cannot be disregarded.
28.
Heirs of Uberas vs CFI Negros Occidental
GR 48268, October 30, 1978
Facts:
Siblings Segundo, Albino, Francisca, Pedro and Alejandra inherited a parcel of
land from their parents.
The plaintiffs in this case are the heirs of Segundo and Albino while the
defendants are the heirs of Pedro and Alejandra. They are all co-owner and
possessor of the land in dispute.
Pedro and his wife allegedly persuaded Alejandra through deceit to sign the
declaration of heirship, stating falsely that they are the only surviving heirs of
their parents. It was later through fraud and deceit Alejandra agreed to sold her
inherited part to Pedro
A complaint was filed by the petitioner against the defendants for quieting of
title, recovery of possession and ownership, partition and reconveyance with
damages.

Defendants sought for dismissal on the ground that the action is barred by
prescription.
On the other hand the plaintiff argued that the action is imprescriptible because
the issued raised was the quieting of title for partition and declaring heirship and
the deed of sale executed by the defendants as void ab initio.
The respondent court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription.

Issue:
Whether or not action to quiet title to property in possession of the plaintiff is
imprescriptible?
Held:

yes.
In the case of Faja vs CA, an action to quiet title to property in possession of the
plaintiff is imprescriptible and that where there are material facts to be inquired into
and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will determine the
legal precepts to be applied, as in this case, the complaining party should be given full
opportunity to prove his case.
The respondent court was remanded by the SC not to summarily dismiss the case
on the ground of prescription notwithstanding contrary to factual averments in
complaint which would clearly rule out prescription.
29.
Elias Gallar vs Hermenegilda Husain, et al and Bonifacio Husain
GR no. 20954, May 24, 1967
Facts:
In 1919, Teodoro Husain is the owner of a hectare of land which was sold to
Serapio Chicirita for 30 pesos with the right of redemption within 6 years. The
deed of sale was executed in private instrument.
Teodoro did not redeem the land, shortly after the execution of deed of sale, his
sister Graciana Husain redeemed the land.
Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her rights to the land to Elias Gallar in
exchange of a cow. Gallar since then took possession of the land with duplicate
copy of certificate of title of Teodoro Hussain.
In 1960, Gallar filed suit against the children of Teodoro Hussain-Hermenegilda
and Bonifacio Husain (herein defendants) to compel them to execute a deed of
conveyance in his favor so he could get a transfer certificate of title.
The defendants denied the sale and contended that the agreement between theor
father and Chichirita was that of a mortgage to secure a loan of P30.00. They
claimed that the mortgage had been discharged when Graciana paid the debt to
Chichirita. They further contended that the action was already prescribed
Issue:
Whether or not the action is already prescribed?

Held:

No.
The action sought by the petitioner is not for specific performance; all it seeks is
to quiet the title, to remove all the cloud cast on appellees ownership as a result of
appellants refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor. And the as plaintiffappellee is in possession of the land, therefore, the action is imprescriptible.
41.
Republic/Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs Rosa BaltazarRamirez
GR 148103, July 27, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner (Republic) purchased several lots to be used for the construction of
Mactan Cebu International Aiport.
Two lots purchased by the Republic were owned by the respondents father.
Respondents eight siblings sold the lot to Republic on 1957.
34 years later, respondent is contesting that she has the right to acquire the
property from the Republic.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner on the ground that
there is no repudiation and the respondent recourse must be against her siblings.
That it must be noted that Republic acquired the property through adverse
possession. That her inaction for 34 years constitute laches.
CA however reverses the decision of the trial court on the ground that Republic
acquired the undivided shares of respondents siblings. Thus, it has become the
co-owner of the 1/9 of respondents share.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership exists after the sale of the lots?
Held:

No.
SC held that the juridical condition of co-ownership of things or right is
terminated:
1. By consolidation in only one of the owner of all the shares of the others;
2. By the destruction of the thing or the loss of the right of co-ownership;
3. By prescription in favor of a third person; and
4. By the partition which converts into certain and definite parts the
respective undivided shares of the co owners.
It is clear that upon the sale of the lots by the respondents sibling to petitioner,
the right of co-ownership among them ceased or was lost. There is juridical dissolution
of co-ownership when the thing is sold either publicly or privately to third persons.
Likewise a co-ownership is terminated by prescription in favor of a third person.

42.
Victor Juaniza vs Eugenio Jose
GR no. L-50127-28
Facts:
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with freight train of Phil. National Railway
which resulted in seven death and 5 physical injuries to its passenger.
At the time of accident eugenio was legally married to Soccoro Ramos but had
been cohabiting with defendant appellant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years.
RTC rendered decision that Eugenio and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally
liable to pay for damages.
RTC validated its decision based on Article 144
o When a man and a woman driving together as husband and wife, but they
are not married or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them throughout their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed the rules in co-ownership.
Issue:

Whether or not there is Rosalia Arroyo is jointly and severally liable to pay the
damages?
Held:

NO.
The SC held that co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the CC requires
that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage.
Since Eugenio is legally married to Soccoro Ramos, there is an impediment for
him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo.
Hence, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the
conjugal partnership of Eugenio and his legal wife.
Therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death
of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of jeepney which figured in the
collision.

43.

Union Bank vs HLURB, Martha David and Teresita Quanzon

GR no. 95364, June 29, 1992
Facts:
In 1973, Martha David purchased from FRDC a condominium unit in installment
basis.
In 1978, FRDC mortgage the condominium project to UBP without prior
approval from NHA and informing David.
In 1980, the mortgage was foreclosed and sold to UBP as the highest bidder.
Martha David filed a complaint to HLRUB and rendered judgment ordering the
cancellation of Condominium Certificate awarded to UBP.
Issue:
Whether or not HLURB has jurisdiction in annulling the Condominium
Certificate?
Held:
Yes. SC upheld the jurisdiction of HLURB.
As explained by the SC, under PD 957 or the subdivision and condominium
buyers protective decree, the NHA has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade business. NHAs regulatory and quasi-judicial functions were transferred to
HLURB by virtue of EO 648.
Under such executive order, HLRUB has the power to hear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business practices. Moreover, under section 18 of PD 957, no
mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made without prior written approval of the
Authority.
Clearly, FRDCs act of mortgaging the condominium project without prior
approval from NHA as required by PD 957 was not only unsound real estate business
practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer.
44.
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs PR builders, INC
GR 156364, September 3, 2007
Facts:
Jacobus a dutch national entered into a contract of sell with PR Builders to
purchase a residential unit in its townhouse project.
The respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project
by June 1995.
The petitioner filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages at
HLURB arbiter.
The latter rendered decision in favor of the petitioner and ordered respondent to
reimburse 3M representing the amount paid by the petitioner.
The respondents 15 parcels of land are subject to auction for 5,450,000.

Issue:

The respondent filed a motion to quash writ of levy contenting that it is grossly
inadequate since the appraised value of the parcels of land was 83M.
However, the sheriff proceeded to sell 15 parcels of land on the ground that there
is no restraining order that was given to him by HLURB. The parcels of land were
sold to Holly Properties for 5,450,000. 5,350,000 were turned over to the
petitioner and the excess has been remitted to the HLURB.
The HLURB arbiter set aside the sheriffs levy on the ground that the sheriff does
not consider the fair market value of the properties. Then it was later affirmed by
the CA.
Aggrieved the petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari under rule 45
contending thst HLURB Arbiter and director had no factual basis for pegging the
fair market value of levied properties at 83M.
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the decision of HLURB arbiter?

Held:
Yes.
SC held that the HLURB gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy
conducted by the Sheriff. The HLURB lost its jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash
the levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from
HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction
sale.
The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid;
The legal fees had already been remitted to the HLURB;
The judgment award was turned over to the judgment creditor
The only left to be done was the issuance of certificates of sale to winning
bidder.
In fact only the signature of HLURB director for that purpose is needed- a purely
ministerial duty.
A purely ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority
without regard for or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
In the present case, all the requirements of auction sale under the Rules have
been fully complied with to warrant the issuance of the corresponding certificates of
sale.